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The Place of God in Advaita.

(*From the standpoint of Dvaita.*)

By

H. N. RAGHAVENDRACHAR

(By "The place of God in *Advaita*." I mean two things— (1) God's place in *Advaita* and (2) *Advaita* God's place in the world of thought. By *Advaita* I mean the whole system of *Advaita* as handed down to us through tradition. I represent the spirit of the whole system in the name of *Sāṅkarācūrya*. Similar is the consideration with regard to *Dvaita*.)

1. The meaning of the term God with reference to *Advaita*.

The term God is commonly applied to the creator who is at the same time the ultimate principle in the universe. With this meaning it is not applicable to *Advaita*. In *Advaita* the Creator is determinate (saṅga) and is therefore not the Ultimate, and the Ultimate is indeterminate (nirgaṅga) and is therefore not the Creator. So the title "The place of God in *Advaita*" is not intelligible. To somehow justify the title the term God is to be specially interpreted. It is usual with some to take it to mean the Determinate God (Saṅga Brahman). But it does not fully satisfy the spirit of the present enquiry. The present enquiry is philosophical. It has the Ultimate in view. To justify this we may understand by 'God' in the title the Indeterminate (Nirgaṅga Brahman). This meaning has also a reference to the Determinate God. Some eminent writers on this subject also have understood the same meaning by the term. *Jayātīrtha* says in his *Nyāya Sudhā* "Others (Advaitins) say that God is, but hold that He

is in fact indeterminate" (Anyetū punarastyeveśvaraḥ kintū paramārthato nirguṇa eveti saṅgirante). A. S. Geden says in the *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, p 285, "(In Vedānta) God is...one only without a second." It is evident that the secondless God in *Advaita* is the Indeterminate.

2. The occasion for the Doctrine of the Indeterminate in *Advaita*.

Saṅkarācārya, the founder of the Doctrine of the Indeterminate, appears to have taken from the Upaniṣadic passages "From which all these elements.....that is Brahman (Yatovā imāni bhūtāni...tadbrahma)", "Brahman is real, knowledge and limitless (Satyam jñānāmanantam Brahma)" and "Brahman is one only without a second (Ekamevādviṭīyam Brahma)" the suggestion that Brahman is the Ultimate and all else is dependent on it. To establish the truth of it against the theories current at his time he formulates the conception of the Indeterminate in his system called *Advaita*.

3. The conception of the Indeterminate.

The Indeterminate, as the very name indicates, is not the subject of any enquiry. Strictly speaking, there can be no conception of it at all. Yet the founder, with the idea that it can at least be pointed to, makes use of several considerations, Logical, Psychological, Metaphysical, Cosmological and Religious.

i. The Logical Considerations.

Following the implication of the recognition "The same is the knowledge that apprehended an object then and apprehends now another object", he distinguishes between two types of knowledge, the Identical and the Particular. His idea is that without the former the recognition is meaningless and without the latter it is itself impossible. He takes up the former. He observes that in order to be identical it must be eternal. He further notes that it is

not revealed by anything external to it and in this sense calls it self-evident (*Svayamjyotiḥ*). From this he concludes that it is evident as a whole. He takes this to imply that it is devoid of all external and internal distinctions. To present this idea he calls it Partless (*Akhaṇḍa*). He further supports the same conclusion negatively by showing that it cannot be otherwise. This is his explanation. To deny its eternal character is to deny it at a point of time. This is absurd. For it is presupposed in its very denial. To deny that it is self-evident is to hold that it is made evident by an external agent. This is to presume that it is never presented, since that agent also needs to be revealed by another agent. To hold that it is never presented is to deny it and it is shown how this conclusion is wrong. Further, to hold that it is not partless is to make it involve distinctions relative to one another. This is to accept that it is not presented as a whole and therefore not self-evident. It is seen how this conclusion is wrong. In these considerations he does not attribute the properties, partlessness etc. to it. Because as partless it has no attributes. So he takes his description of it as having only a negative significance. That it is eternal only stands for the idea that it is not non-eternal; that it is self-evident for that it is not non-self-evident; and that it is partless for that it is not non-partless. To imply this he calls it *Cit*. He deduces great things from this conception. He takes up the question of the relation of the particular knowledge which he calls *vr̥tti* to *Cit*. Since *Cit* is partless and has nothing external to it, he concludes that *vr̥tti* is only superimposed on it. As the ground of *vr̥tti* it is called *Nirguṇam Brahma*.

ii. The Psychological Considerations.

He has to show the origin of superimposition. To do this he examines the three states of human experience,—

waking, dreaming and sleep. Since the former two follow the third he concludes that the latter must be the origin of the former. To illustrate this he analyses the latter. But there is nothing direct in it to help the analysis. So he takes up for examination the thought "I slept happily and I did not know anything," that happens to the individual just after sleep. This thought refers to an experience which must be in sleep itself. The experience must be of happiness and non-knowledge. The happiness here is not the negation of misery. Because the thought of the negation of misery presupposes the thought of misery itself. But sleep would be impossible with the thought of misery. So the happiness is positive. For similar reasons non-knowledge must also be positive. To posit the absence of knowledge is in a sense to posit knowledge itself. But with knowledge sleep is impossible. So there is the experience of positive happiness and positive non-knowledge in sleep. Since *Cit* is partless, its relation to *Cit* must be that of superimposition. Of the two things experienced in sleep happiness has no other source. On this basis he concludes that it is an aspect of *Cit*. But non-knowledge is different from *Cit*. To imply this he calls it *acit*.* So there are two things *Cit* and *acit* in sleep.

The partless *Cit* is not the source of anything. Therefore he holds that *acit* is the source of the other two states. From the thought that there is no knowledge of other objects in sleep, he concludes that there is no 'I' then. To account for the idea of 'I' in the other states he holds that it is produced just when the sleep is over. He further holds that *acit* is the cause of it. He makes it the knower

*Mr. Y. Subbarao, the author of '*Mūlavidyānirāsa*' disputes Saṅkarācārya's acceptance of *acit*. Here the orthodox position is expounded.

only from the standpoint of *vytti*. So in truth he understands by 'I' in "I slept happily, etc", *Cit* qualified by *acit*. All the three states happen to the same individual. There is nothing else to connect them together. To account for their connection he regards *Cit* itself as witnessing all and in this sense calls it *sākṣi*. So far he has reduced the whole of an individual's experience to *acit* with *Cit* as its ground (*adhiṣṭhāna*). This is to show that *acit* is the cause of superimposition.

iii. The Metaphysical Considerations.

On the basis of the same idea that *Cit* is partless he holds that *acit* with its relation to *Cit* is superimposed on *Cit*. Their reality is made impossible by the latter. So from the standpoint of *Cit* they are sublated (*bādhita*). But *Cit* is the very presupposition of their superimposition. So it is not sublated. *Acit* appears even though it is sublated. From this he concludes that it is not unreal (*asat*). He regards *Cit* real in the sense that it is never sublated. So *acit* is neither real nor unreal (*sadasadvilakṣaṇa*). To indicate this idea he calls it *mithyā*.

From the idea that *Cit* is real, he deduces that the real is eternal, self-evident and partless. From this he concludes that all that is not eternal (*anitya* and *savikāra*), not self-evident (*dr̥śya*), and not partless (*paricchinna*) is *mithyā*. He substantiates this position by showing that nothing of it is self-sufficing. This may be illustrated by taking, for instance, distinction (*bheda*). It is in a distinct thing. But in order to be there it requires another distinction. It is therefore not self-sufficing and is *mithyā*. For similar reasons he considers the whole world to be *mithyā*. He carries the spirit of this consideration to the empirical presentation of *Cit* and regards it as *mithyā*. He holds the pure *Cit* as the Ultimate. In this sense he calls it *Brahman*. It is the presupposition of all philosophy about

it. So the function of philosophy is not to prove it but to remove the counter thoughts about it. To convey this idea he calls his system *Advaita*.

iv. The Cosmological Considerations.

He further substantiates the thought that Brahman is the Cosmic Ground. From the standpoint of the individuality of a person's experience, he holds him to be empirically different from other individuals. Consistently with the spirit of this idea he takes the world to consist of innumerable individuals with their experiences and objects corresponding to these. The idea that a person's experience is conditioned by *acit*, to which he gives another name, *avidyā*, to imply that it obscures the truth, is applied to the cosmic experience. To make room for individual experience he distinguishes the cosmic condition from *aivdyā* and calls it *māyā*. Just as *Cit* with *avidyā* is the origin of an individual, so *Cit* with *māyā* is the origin of the cosmos. Consistently with this idea he considers the cosmic ground to form both the material and the efficient cause of the universe. As the material cause it unfolds the universe. As the efficient cause it knows all about the creation with the power to bring it out. To present this idea he calls it *Īśvara* or *Saguṇa Brahma*. *Avidyā* and *māyā* are the aspects of the same *acit*. Yet he has to distinguish between the imperfect individual and the perfect *Īśvara*. To do this, while he takes *avidyā* as deluding the individual he takes *māyā* as conferring overlordship and the consequent perfection on *Īśvara*. *Īśvara* is, on account of the *māyā* element in him, *mithyā*. So his place in *Advaita* is in substance that of the world. Though he may be called God only in a secondary sense, he is in fact no God if by 'God' we mean the Ultimate. His ground is *Cit*. Consistently with the idea of *Īśvara* as the origin of the world, he traces the world into five categories, that which is (*asti*), that which appears (*bhāti*), that which is

liked (*priya*), form (*rūpa*) and name (*nāma*). The first three represent *Cit* and the last two *māyā*.

v. The Religious Considerations.

So far he has shown that *Cit* or *Brahman* is the ultimate ground of all. He strengthens the same position by showing that it is possible for an individual to realise *Brahman*. He arrives at the idea of this possibility by analysing 'I'. He distinguishes between two types of factors in it. In one sense it is changeless, most liked, all-witnessing, self-evident and enduring in all objects, senses etc. And in another it is miserable, changing, inert and different from objects, senses etc. Each of them is opposed to the other. Yet the former which represents *Cit* asserts its reality against the latter which represents *acit*. This suggests that the latter can be removed by the knowledge of the former. When it is removed all that is is *Cit* or *Brahman*. This is *mukti*. The bondage and its removal are alike *mithyā*.

4. The place of Śaṅkarācārya's God both in *Advaita* and in the world of thought as he himself takes it to be.

In the light of the foregoing considerations he holds that *Brahman* as real, changeless, self-evident and partless is one only without a second, and It is the ground of all that appears. This is his God in the real sense of the term. He takes it to be the same as the Upaniṣadic Absolute. He thinks that he has established the truth of it against the doctrines current at his time. His idea is this: *Brahman*, the ground of the world, is real and is therefore different from the *Śūnya* of the Buddhists. It is eternal and partless and is therefore different from the *Vijñāna* of the *Vijñāna-Vādins*. It is one. So the doctrine of many real things does not hold good. As *Cit* it is the source of the Universe. So the doctrine that holds that *Prakṛti* is the independent source of all is wrong. The fact that It is changeless and partless

falsifies the doctrine that Brahman changes. To show that his philosophy is the same as that of the Upaniṣads he calls it *Vedānta*. *Advaita* or *Vedānta* according to him stands for the idea that the Indeterminate Brahman is the Ultimate.

5. Some general remarks about his philosophy.

With him the thought of the independent reality of Brahman (God) and the dependent reality of the world, the untruth of the doctrines that are opposed to it are all commendable. But the system he actually expounded has nothing to do with it. In fact, it does not differ from the doctrines he tried to refute. Not only this. The spirit of his ideas results in the denial of all including even the Ultimate. So there followed many oppositions to his system. Among the leaders of the opposition *Madhvācārya* is the most thoroughgoing. He clearly perceived the nihilistic implications of *Advaita*. To avoid them and to preserve the reality of the Upaniṣadic Brahman, he expounded the system of *Dvaita*. From this standpoint his system may be viewed as forming an improvement on *Advaita*. A reference to his criticisms against *Advaita* makes this idea clear.

6. *Madhvācārya's* Criticisms against *Advaita*.

If in the light of the Upaniṣadic teaching we have to preserve the sole reality of Brahman, then it is not necessary to regard Brahman as indeterminate. It is held in *Advaita* that the world has no reality of its own and for this reason it is said to be *mīthyā*. The underlying idea of this is that which is independent is real. If Brahman is real in this sense, then to preserve Its reality it is not necessary to make It indeterminate. Nor is it necessary to deny even the dependent reality of the world. The Upaniṣadic passage, "Brahman is one only without a second," may be taken to mean that Brahman is the only independently real. The world as having dependent reality is not opposed to this meaning. So both Brahman and the world are real. Any

definition of the real must have in view the reality of both. A thing may be regarded as real in various senses. It is real if it has being, individuality, function or knowledge. Both the world and Brahman are real in all these senses. But the difference between them is that the former is dependent while the latter is independent. In the light of this consideration, Brahman is determinate though It is the ultimate and It does not require the unreality of the world. This is the true implication of the Upaniṣadic teaching. Denying this *Advaita* is sublated by the Upaniṣads. The same idea may be further explained in the following manner.

7. The Indeterminate is not real.

The conception of the Indeterminate is impossible. It is therefore not real. It is said in *Advaita* that it yet can be pointed to. It is wrong. The state of being pointed to is the same as the state of being the object of conception. To have the conception of a thing is to have the idea of it as distinct from other things. The same idea is presented by pointing to it. Otherwise there is no meaning in pointing to it. Further the conception of a thing is the necessary presupposition of pointing to it. Unless one has the idea of a thing how can one point to it? So without the conception of the indeterminate there can be no pointing to it. But to hold that the indeterminate is the object of conception is a contradiction in terms. The object of conception is as a rule determinate. Therefore the indeterminate is in no sense real

i. The Logical Considerations in *Advaita* are meaningless.

The Logical considerations in *Advaita* are based on the strength of the recognition "The same knowledge that apprehended an object then apprehends now another object." If there is a recognition like this, then it only proves the

similarity of knowledge but not the identity of it. As referring to identity it is not a fact. There is the recognition rather in a different form, as "The same knower that apprehended an object then apprehends now another object." But this only proves the identity of the knower. So the classification of knowledge in *Advaita* is groundless.

Supposing even that there is identical knowledge, to characterise it as eternal, self-evident and partless in the *Advaita* sense of the terms is irrelevant. Whether the significance of this characterisation is positive or negative, it equally denies that knowledge is partless. There is in fact no vital difference between the positive and the negative significance. A positive quality can be negatively attributed—as, for example, "He is not without wisdom." A negative one can be positively attributed, e. g. "It is fallacious." Further, whether a quality is positive or negative, it is attributed to a thing to distinguish it from other things. If knowledge is so distinguished by its attributes, then to talk of it as partless is meaningless.

Knowledge is said to be self-evident in *Advaita*. But at the same time it is made the object neither of itself nor of anything else. This is nothing but the denial of knowledge. If knowledge is, then it must be evident to itself. This means that it is not partless.

If it is not partless, then it is not necessary to hold that *vr̥tti* is superimposed on it. Both may be equally real. Following the spirit of these thoughts, we can only say this much: "There are two types of knowledge, the self-evident and *vr̥tti*. The former reveals both itself and *vr̥tti*. It is an attribute of a knower. This is why the form of experience is "I know this or that object." "The knower is eternal and self-evident." So the *Cit* of *Advaita* is a myth unless it is made the same as the knower.

ii. The Psychological Considerations in *Advaita* are false.

In *Advaita* the knower is said to be absent in sleep. If it were true, then there is no occasion for the recognition "I slept happily, etc." To hold that the experiencer in sleep is one thing and the later recogniser is another is to deny the very possibility of thought. So in the light of the recognition we have to hold that the 'I' endures in sleep and there is nothing superimposed on it.

iii. There is no occasion for the Metaphysical considerations in *Advaita*.

Acit is held to be *mithyā* in *Advaita* on the basis that it is superimposed. Here the reasoning is fallacious. That which is superimposed may not be real. But its like must be real. The silver superimposed on a shell may not be real. But its like—the silver, must somewhere be real. Without such silver there can be no idea of silver and without it there can be no superimposition of it. Further, without a knower there can be no superimposition. Without one who perceives at least an aspect of a shell there can be no superimposition of silver on it. Similarly, the superimposition of *acit* on *Cit* is impossible without the reality of its like and the person who is the author of superimposition. So to hold that superimposition is the origin of *acit* as such is putting the cart before the horse. Further, unless the entity that is superimposed is similar to that on which it is superimposed, there can be no superimposition. Unless a shell is similar to silver, the latter cannot be superimposed on the former. If *acit* is superimposed on *Cit*, then the latter must be similar to the former. But *Cit* is similar to nothing. So the superimposition of *acit* is not possible. If there is similarity between the two, then *Cit* is not partless.

So *Cit* and *acit* must be equally real. The *Advaita* definition that the real is *Cit* is wrong. *Cit* is imaginary. In the light of experience the real is that which exists in time and

space. So exists the world and it is therefore real. That which does not exist so is unreal,—for instance, the horn of a hare. So the real and the unreal are contradictory; and the conception of *mithyā sadāsadvilakṣaṇa* is a contradiction in terms.

The real is necessarily relative. So all the *Advaita* arguments employed against the reality of the world prove in fact its reality. For they only mean the relative character of the world. This position negates the significance of *Advaita* and in its place asserts the reality of *Dvaita*.

iv. The Cosmological Considerations in *Advaita* prove nothing.

The whole universe is real. Its ground must be sought for so as to preserve its reality. The *Advaita* account that *Cit* with *māyā* i.e. *Īśvara*, is the ground of the world is wrong. *Cit* and *māyā* cannot be brought together. *Cit* is illumination. *Acit* is not so. The superimposition of each on the other is impossible. If it is possible, then both as superimposed must be unreal. To preserve the reality of *Cit* it is said in *Advaita* that only the relation of *Cit* is superimposed on *acit*. This is a convenient fiction. The same might be said with regard to the superimposition of *acit* and its reality preserved. It is said in *Advaita* that *Cit* is not opposed to *māyā*. This is to deny the self-evident character of *Cit*. It may as well be held that the partless *Cit* is not opposed to the reality of *acit*.

The so-called *Īśvara* really consists of two factors entirely different from each other. Therefore the ground of the world is not one. The idea that the same entity is both the material and the efficient cause of the universe is wrong. Hence the conception of *Īśvara* breaks down. Granting that he is, he must know and do. But to do both is impossible unless he is deluded. Because anything that appears to be other than *Cit* is the result of delusion in *Advaita*. Delusion is only another

name of superimposition. If he is deluded, then there can be creation. In this case the distinction between *avidyā* and *māyā* is meaningless.

So the Cosmological considerations in *Advaita* reduce all to nothing. They are due to the unwarranted assumption that the world is not real. If the world is real, then only it has a real ground. Such ground may be called *Īśvara*. As such he is independent and therefore the ultimate. And the world is dependent and therefore non-ultimate.

v. The Religious Considerations in *Advaita* are irrelevant.

Consistently with the position just now developed, the true aim of religion would be as follows. If *Īśvara* is the independent source of the universe, then the bondage of an individual soul is due to his false thought that he is independent. With the realisation that he is dependent, he finds his self in *Īśvara*, his true abode. He is no longer subject to any bondage. This is the aim of religion.

But this is not the case with *Advaita*. There the realisation of *Cit* is said to be the aim of religion. We have seen how *Cit* is impossible. Even though it is possible it is partless and therefore not the subject of any realisation. Further *vyṭti* is said to be the means of this realisation. But *vyṭti* is false. The false cannot remove the false. So if *Cit* is, then there can be no bondage; and if bondage is, then there can be no *Cit*. *Advaita* helps neither.

8. Concluding remarks.

The conception of God in *Advaita* does not touch the problem at hand. The problem is about the source of the individual and his relation to the world. It is to solve this that the question of God is taken up. The *Advaita* account of the Indeterminate negates the very problem. Nor does it justify the Upaniṣadic thought. The Upaniṣads have in view a real *Īśvara* as the ground of a real world. But the Indeterminate has nothing to do with him.

Nor is the position of *Advaita* really different from the doctrines that its founder wanted to refute. The world as superimposed is unreal. The Indeterminate is nothing. So the position is not different from the *Sūnyavāda*. *Cit* is made the ground of all. So the position is not in substance different from the *Vijñānavāda*. The world is traced to *Cit* and *acit*. So the oneness of the ground is not attained. The partless *Cit* has no effective relation to *acit* and therefore *acit* is the real source of all. This position is not different from the *Prakṛtiparināmanvāda*. *Īśvara* as representing *Cit* must be the material cause of the world. So this position is not different from *Brahmaparināmanvāda*. If he does not represent *Cit*, then he is no *Īśvara*.

As it has all along been indicated, if *Advaita* is to be consistent as a philosophy and do justice to the teaching of the Upaniṣads, then all about its *qualitiless entity*, *objectless knowledge*, *ultimatenessless ultimate*, and the *wholesale unreality of the world we actually live in* must be abandoned. Its *Cit* must be viewed as representing *an individual knower*, as a *real cogniser in a real world*. Its indeterminate Brahman must be taken to stand for *that which is transcendently perfect*.

But to make this improvement is to accept the reality of both the individual knower and the world even though they are dependent on Brahman. If this position is adopted, then *Advaita* as signifying the conception of God loses all its propriety. It may at best be interpreted as standing for the idea that the independently real is one. But in this case the reality of the world is not denied. For that the world is not independent and that it is unreal are not the same. So the independent and the dependent are both real. To signify this idea the position may conveniently be called *Dvaita*. The term *Dvaita* simply means that the Independent and the dependent are not one. Their difference is given

in their very idea. Difference is an essential aspect of every thing. Without it a thing is not. Without it even the Indeterminate cannot be had. The Indeterminate is indeterminate because it is different from the determinate. So to deny difference is to deny all. The term *Advaita* as implying the denial of it is only a word signifying little. So there is every propriety in calling the relation between the Independent and the dependent by the name *Dvaita*. This is exactly the position that is expounded by *Madhvācārya*. This position does not separate the world from Brahman. It rather brings them together without affecting the nature of either. Having these considerations in mind we may fruitfully hold that *Dvaita* is only an improvement on *Advaita*. With this improvement the Indeterminate God becomes the God that is Transcendently Perfect, and the *mithyā* world becomes dependently real. So to deny the world is to deny *Brahman*. The world is an indication of the perfection of *Brahman*. So the idea of the perfection of Brahman involves that of the reality of the world.

It is interesting to note in this connection that some thoughtful writers on *Advaita* have dimly felt the truth of the position just mentioned. To illustrate this some passages from "*The Outlines of Indian Philosophy*" by my revered teacher, Prof. M. Hirani, may be quoted. In page 88, the author says, "The Upaniṣads, though setting forth the doctrine of the Absolute, exhibit a development particularly on theistic and realistic lines." Here he abandons the orthodox *Advaita* view that the whole of the Upaniṣadic teaching is in favour of *Advaita*. The orthodox view is in fact the reason why *Advaita* is called *Vedānta*. In so far as he modifies this position he accepts the view that the system which is developed on theistic and realistic lines, that is, *Dvaita* as he seems to take it to be, is also Vedānta. In page 372, he says that Brahman does not depend on the

world for its being. This only means that Brahman is independent. But, from this, that Brahman is indeterminate does not follow. In page 373, he says that to term *Brahman* as *nirguṇa* 'only means that nothing which the mind can think of actually belongs to it.' Here the author is not satisfied with the genuine position of *Advaita*. He improves upon it by attributing transcendent qualities to *Brahman*. We have seen how this is exactly the position of *Dvaita*. Again, in the same page, he says, "...an appearance which can never be independent necessarily signifies a reality beyond itself." (The Buddhistic thinkers do not admit the soundness of this reasoning.) Granting somehow that it is valid, it only points to the truth of the Independent *Brahman* but not of *Nirguṇa Brahman*. In page 375, he says, "Even granting that the negative definition is the only possible one it does not follow that *Nirguṇa Brahman* is a blank. For all propositions directly or indirectly refer to reality and negation necessarily has its positive implication." Here the author makes all the negative descriptions of *Brahman* in *Advaita* positive. This improvement, on the one hand, negates the truth of the *Nirguṇa* and, on the other, asserts the truth of *Saguṇa* in its place. This is exactly the position of *Dvaita* though it is not recognised to be such by the author. Whatever the other details may be, these passages on the whole admit the transcendent qualities of *Brahman* and the dependent reality of the world; and this sublates the true spirit of *Advaita*. We may note that the so called Absolutism of the author is indeed *Dvaita*.

So *Advaita* with all its excellence is not free from inconsistencies. But without them it becomes *Dvaita*. *Dvaita* as philosophy is sound and it is the only proper *Vedānta*.

The Place of God in Advaita.—ii

By

P. P. S. SASTRI.

In philosophy, as in religion, "God" signifies that Being from whom the universe has its source; He is different from the world of finite intelligences as well as from the material world, though the degrees of difference vary in the two cases. God in some systems does not create the finite souls, as He creates the material world; and the soul in advaita differs from God only as the reflection from the prototype. But God is called such only in so far as He is distinguished from the soul and considered to be in some relation to it. God is the conservator of life's goods and the comforter in life's sorrows. Any Being that transcends happiness and misery, that does not recognise a distinct soul to be cheered and comforted, any undetermined Being that is called the Absolute or Ultimate cannot be called God; and it is not so called in the advaita system. The term most closely approximating to God is *Īśvara*; there is a place for *Īśvara* in the advaita; that may or may not be a satisfactory account of *Īśvara*, but there is no justification for what Mr. Raghavendrachar has done—the identification of God with the Ultimate. His paper then is for the most part an *ignoratio elenchi*. Since, however, the present paper arises out of the other and is expected to meet its arguments, some attempt is made to do this.

I

The dvaitin has always resorted to the trick of setting up dummies and knocking them down. The characterisation of the advaitin's Brahman as indeterminate is a case in point. The indeterminate is the characterless; it is a blank, a void (*śūnya*); it is against such a conception of the advaitin's Absolute that Prof. Hiriyanna so rightly protests (see p.375, *Outlines of Indian Philosophy*). The Absolute is undetermined, while

the finite by its very nature is determined. The finite, however, is not determinate; for, to be determinate is to have character, to have self subsistent reality unaffected by change from within or without. Such character (not characterisation or characteristic) belongs truly to the Absolute alone. To call that the indeterminate is to prejudge the case against the advaitin, making him out to be no better than a *sūnyavādin*. The Absolute is the undetermined.

What is the justification for maintaining not merely that the undetermined is real, but also that it is the sole real? The answer comes from our conception of reality. When in our everyday experience we claim something to be real and dismiss something else as unreal, what is it that we employ as our criterion? Uniformity, consistency, persistence, not being subject to variation by adventitious circumstances, non-sublation, in a word. Dreams, we say, are unreal, because they are sublated. We take waking experience to be real, because its sublation is not seen so far. But so long as there is another place or time or thing we have not experienced, what we now experience is subject to the possibility of sublation. To guard against sublation effectively one must, therefore, look for reality in what is above determination, whether in space or time, or by any other object. Hence the conception of the undetermined as the sole real.

But even in this statement we seem to contradict ourselves. If the real is the undetermined, how can there be a conception thereof? The answer is that the undetermined is conceived of not as a term in a thinking relation, but as the non-relational ground of all thinking and other relations. Conception does not grasp it, but indicates it as its own fulfilment, wherein it, as conception, ceases to be. This we claim, is not intellectually unintelligible, though it cannot be fully comprehended by the intellect because of the very nature of the Absolute as transcending thought. Let us assume for a moment the

unintelligibility of our view : Is the rival view that reality is the determined any more intelligible ? We have, one may say, a conception of the determined. Was it determined or not prior to the conception ? If it was determined, does the conception add to its determination ? If so, does it not inevitably distort its object ? If not, what is this relation called thinking which makes no difference to its terms ? If the difference be for the thinking subject, does not the determined object undergo a further modification, as affecting the subject ? If so, is not the object of conception different from the object in itself ? If so, can the latter ever be known as it is ? Again, if the object of conception was undetermined prior to conception, how is this different from our account ? Surely, on this alternative, it is nearer the truth to conceive of the undetermined as undetermined, rather than as determined.

Further, how can any cognition be primarily of the determined ? To be so, it must not only affirm what a thing is, but also deny what it is not. This function of negation presupposes the knowledge of both the substrate of the negation (say, "rose") and of the counter-correlate (say, "blueness"). The cognitions of these,—are they of the determined ? If so, they too imply negations, which in turn imply cognitions of the respective substrates and counter-correlates. Unless we stop somewhere at a cognition of the undetermined, there is infinite regress; and even what is supposed to be known, the cognition of the determined, becomes unintelligible. That is why the advaitin finds himself forced to admit a final cognition which is non-relational and is of the impartite (akhaṇḍa). This cognition is not itself the undetermined; it thus falls short of the real, and in so far forth may be called false; but none the less it has the capacity to remove all lower grades of falsehood; that the false can destroy the false is not a meaningless paradox, as the water of the dream can quench the thirst of the dream. True, the sublatter is also sublated in turn; but this is not unintelligi-

ble or in conflict with even ordinary experience. The fire that consumes the faggot finally consumes itself.

II

In what he calls the metaphysical considerations, Mr. Raghavendrachar does no justice to himself or to the advaitin. The advaitin through a series of cogent arguments, shows the entire world of difference to be illusory. Perception, inference, presumption, all lead to the same conclusion, as the Vivaraṇācārya says. The world of particulars cannot claim absolute reality, since it is perceived to perish in the very same locus where it was perceived. The nacre that is seen to perish in the "this" where it was perceived is not admitted to be real. The case is no different with the pot or cloth that was perceived, but is not now perceived. Nor may it be said that the sublation is not of the entity, but only of its spatial, temporal or other properties. For, in the case of these properties, since they do not possess other spatial and temporal properties of their own, unconditional sublation should be admitted; and what is possible in respect of the properties may be possible in respect of the thing itself. There is inference too to the effect that because of their differences co-existent with a common nature, as existent, the particulars are superimposed on a basic identity. And since what is not illusory, say Brahman, is known to be neither originated nor destroyed, it is presumed that the entire world of particulars, for which there is origination and destruction, is illusory. The world, however, cannot be wholly unreal, like the horns of a hare, as then it would not be presented at all. Hence the postulation of its difference from the real as well as the unreal, of its essential indeterminability. Nor may it be urged that to accept the indeterminable is to violate a fundamental law of thought. What happens here is not the acceptance of two opposites (which is absolutely unwarranted), but the rejection of two opposites; the latter is not unjustified

unless it is shown that the opposites are also contradictories; and despite the apparent contradiction in verbal form between "sat" and "asat", they should be admitted in the light of experience to be but contraries; for there is a whole world of appearances, which are neither real like Brahman, nor unreal like a barren woman's son.

III

Pure intelligence as defined by indeterminable māyā is the Jīva. A plurality of Jīvas is established in experience; hence there must be a plurality of māyās as their determinants. These māyās, being impure cannot find a location in the absolutely taintless Brahman. The ignorance is about Brahman; but it belongs to and is located in the Jīva.

In this scheme, where Brahman is the unconditioned and the Jīva is the avidyā-conditioned, where is the room for a God? He cannot be the unconditioned, for that is Brahman. He cannot be the conditioned, for that would reduce him to the status of a jīva. He is not the cause of the conditioning, since this is beginningless. To say that Īśvara is conditioned by māyā does not, as Mr. Raghavendrachar remarks, remove him far from the migrating soul; for, there is no distinction between māyā and avidyā, except as between the collective and the distributive, or as between the relatively pure and the relatively impure. The truth of this criticism does not affect the advaitin, for, in no case does he seek to identify Īśvara with the ultimate. That conception is real in so far as it works; but in the last resort that too is fictitious. But there are relatively intelligible ways of viewing this. On the principle that the offering is proportionate to the demon, a fictitious Īśvara may well fulfil all the demands of a jīva that is itself fictitious.

What happens may be thus conceived. The jīva is enveloped in nescience located in himself. As a consequence,

though he is in reality identical with the one secondless Absolute, he feels limited in time and in space and by other objects, intelligent and non-intelligent ; though of the essential nature of intelligence, he feels his cognitive capacities limited to particular objects and particular means ; though having no desires to satisfy or purposes to fulfil, he finds himself limited to acting in specific ways for specific ends with uncertain success ; as the logical presupposition of such limited capacities, known to be limited, he feels compelled to project not a being that is essential knowledge, but one that is the cogniser of all, not a being that has no purposes, but one that has all purposes fulfilled. This postulated Being is common to all jīvas ; for, whatever their starting-point, they arrive at the conception of the possession of all capacities ; they agree in what God is, though they may differ in their conceptions of the mode in which He is a complement to each of them. This God has māyā as adjunct, for, if He were adjunctless, He would be knowledge, not knower. But by the very conditions of the postulation, He is not *conditioned* by māyā, as jīvas are. While jīvas are māyā-bound, Īśvara is the controller of māyā (māyām tu prakṛtiṃ vidyāt, māyinaṃ tu mahēśvaram) ; He is limited by māyā only in so far as He should have something to control.

This conception of Īśvara remains, however, still on the level of the dualistic conception of the world. It implies distinction among finite intelligences and from the supreme intelligence, also from what is non-intelligent. But it gives room for moving on to non-dualism when these distinctions are transcended māyā apprehended as phenomenal, and Brahman realised to be the sole real. That is why the advaitin finds it possible to admit Īśvara. So long as there is ignorance, it is bi-polar, involving a distinction of locus from content. It is located in the jīva and refers to Īśvara.

The being with finite powers posits not an infinite being, but a being with infinite powers. God is an indispensable postulate of the thinking man. But when the thinking is thought out, when it has ceased to be discursive and has fulfilled itself in experience, when, as the advaitin would say, it has culminated in the intuitive realisation of the Scriptural declaration of oneness, then there is neither God nor man. These two were like the prototype and the reflection; the reflecting medium having been realised to be unreal, there is neither prototype nor reflection, but pure intelligence alone.

It is possible to urge that God thus conceived is but a human product, a creation of human frailty and credulity, not an incontestable verity. The only answer is that there can be no truth for us which is not in this sense a human product. Truth for us lies not in a wholly super human world, but in what we experience. The test of truth lies not in relation or non-relation to human experience, but in the integrity of what claims truth. Is it a section, a part, an abstraction which we declare to be true? Or is it the fundamental presupposition of experience, something which is concrete and a whole, in the absence of which our experience at its best (not at its weakest) fails to be intelligible? The advaitin answers the first question in the negative and the second in the affirmative. That is his reply to the charge afore-mentioned.

IV.

Mr. Raghavendrachar's attempt to secure a dependent reality for the world merits some attention. The advaitin does not deny dependent reality to the world; such reality, however, is for him the same as phenomenality. The illusory snake certainly exists at the time of the illusion; it is real to that extent, since if it were unreal it would not appear at all; and its reality is dependent on that

of the rope ; relatively speaking, the rope is independently real, while the snake is dependently real ; the former exists for some considerable time to all persons in that place, so long as they do not suffer from defective sense-organs ; the latter exists only for certain people at certain times ; the latter is sublata by the rope-cognition, while the former is sublata by Brahman cognition alone. Suppose for a moment these two were not related in this way but as the strands of the rope to the rope, or as the rope-maker to the rope ; would it still be possible to speak of the *independent* reality of one of the relata ? The rope is dependent on the rope-maker, but so is the rope-maker on the rope ; for, he would not be rope-maker but for the rope. In other words, if the so-called independent real is in a real relation to anything else, it is not independent ; and if the relation is not real, one at least of the relata must be phenomenal, and this is what the advaitin claims. It may be said that on the advaitin's principles both relata should be unreal ; this is a contingency of the acceptable. That is why the advaitin's Brahman is said to be supra-relational, while even Ívara is said to be phenomenal, since He is in the world of relations. It is meaningless to say that "the real is necessarily relative". On the contrary, what is relative cannot as such be real. The reverse has the support neither of Scripture nor of reason. And dualist attempts to torture texts can be paralleled only by Mr. Raghavendrachar's misinterpretations of the passages cited from Prof. Hiriyantha.

The Place of God in Advaita.—iii

By

A. C. MUKERJI.

A mass of conflicting opinions defying all attempts at a successful synthesis, a series of ineffectual hair-splittings leading to no definite results, mutual fault-finding, attacks and counter-attacks—these are generally supposed to sum up the nature of philosophy and indicate the function of a philosopher. However unpalatable and provocative such a characterisation may be, there is no denying the fact that the history of philosophy, either in the west or in the east, bears ample testimony to this deplorable state of philosophical thought; and, I believe, even the conception of the history of philosophy as the progressive realisation of the Absolute Truth through the relative truths of the divergent systems of thought or as the passage of the world-spirit through the different spirits of the ages, cannot wholly disarm the critics. What is this apparent fruitlessness due to? I believe there is but one answer to it. A system of philosophy, though professing to give a deeper insight into the nature of the universe by a rational sifting of existing knowledge, is frequently influenced by alogical considerations. And when extra-logical forces are allowed, either consciously, or unconsciously, to guide and incite a construction, the results are bound to be as various and conflicting as are the human prejudices and predilections. We have in that case travelled beyond the limits of philosophy into the region of the 'Idola'. And as the voice of Reason, which is the voice of the universal, is thus smothered under the weight of the 'idola', all prospects for the successful termination of an issue through mutual co-operation and understanding are bound to disappear, because the irrational 'idola' are proverbially personal and individual.

The long-drawn out dispute between the monist and the

pluralist is one of the clear cases in which the controversy has been perpetuated by the disputants stepping into the region of the 'Idola'; and the inevitable consequence is that Reason degenerated into a handmaid of the irrational, and in place of a dispassionate quest of truth, we get the sophistical pleading for a foregone conclusion. A certain amount of self created delusion is inseparable from such a procedure. And I have no doubt in my mind that such a delusion is, to a considerable extent, responsible for the dispute between Mr. Raghavendrachar and Mr. Sastri over the problem of the place of God in advaita. I call it a delusion because I find it difficult to imagine that the opposition they have created between their respective positions is in reality so strong and irreconcilable as their general procedure would lead one to surmise. In fact with a little redistribution of emphasis, the paper of Mr Raghavendrachar might easily be taken as an exposition of the views he seems anxious to criticise; and similarly, Mr. Sastri's paper requires a little re-editing in order to show that it is but a further continuation of the arguments employed by the former. To substantiate my contentions in detail would take me far beyond the limited space of this paper; yet something must be said in respect of this delusion in the sequel. Meanwhile, what I would like to make clear is that the opposition between the two positions is ultimately due to the fact that both of the writers have neglected to emphasise the fundamental character of the advaita as a spiritual discipline. I would therefore begin by removing this deficiency.

If it is assumed for the time being that the function of philosophy is to know the universe as a systematic unity, then, the aim of the advaita speculations may be said to consist essentially in bringing about a spiritual conversion of the finite into the infinite by means of knowledge or *jñānam*. The finite is here called upon to shake off its limitations and thus realise its own nature through systematic knowledge. But as

finite knowledge has its own presuppositions, the method prescribed is that of training the finite faculties of knowledge gradually through a number of definite stages, so that they may be stimulated towards what yet falls outside their scope. The advaita literature, as is well known, abounds in such expressions as the mounting of a staircase, the standpoint of ordinary experience, the viewpoint of ultimate realisation, etc. Here lies the source of the difficulties in understanding rightly the advaita position. As the reasoning has necessarily to pass through a series of tentative conclusions, each of which is valid only for a particular stage, they are sure to come into conflict with each other when the conditions under which alone they are valid are ignored or mis-stated. This I have always taken to be the right explanation of the apparent contradictions that have proved to be a stumbling block to the exponents of the advaita position. They are all due to the omission of the particular standpoints from which alone the statements are meant to be true.

The result that emerges from these considerations is that the terms truth, reality, etc., as used in the advaita philosophy, have always a reference to particular contexts, and consequently are likely to lead to confusion when they are used indiscriminately. Hence, I am inclined to believe, the key to a right estimate of the place of God in the advaita philosophy, as also of a number of fundamental problems, lies in its classification of experience into different levels of perfection, the most important of these being the *vyāvahārika* and the *pāramārthika* levels of experience. In view of the importance of this distinction, it will be useful to add here a few words of comments on their difference as well as relation.

The most fundamental characteristic of the *pāramārthika* level of experience is its transcendence of duality in all its forms. It is an experience which is so subversive of all the recognised canons of human knowledge that it has no place

for even such a generic relation as that of the experiencing subject to the experienced object. It is, therefore, aptly called an absolutely non-dual and ultra-relational experience. Here alone Reality is supposed to stand self-revealed. As thus stated, its contrast with finite experience is obvious. Finite knowledge is necessarily relational or discursive. It not only involves the subject object relation, but also those inter-objective relations that are generally called the basic conceptions of thought or categories. Thus, duality being implicit in the very structure of finite experience and finite faculties of knowledge, that which is *ex hypothesi* non-dual must be indistinguishable from a pure nothing, a mere naught that cannot stand as the subject of a significant proposition. Thus the non-dual Reality, though it is nothing less than the *ens realissimum*, is, for us, the *ens absolute indeterminatum*. How then is it possible to bridge over this great chasm between the finite and the infinite, and thus to bring about that spiritual conversion which, as we have said above, is the final aim of the advaita speculations? The answer is given in the advaita method of gradually training the finite faculties through successive stages of approximation to what is yet beyond their scope. Thus our discursive or *vṛttyātmaka* knowledge suffers a gradual transmutation leading ultimately to the Absolute Experience. Here, the advaita method offers a strong contrast to the mystical method as represented, for instance, by the Yoga philosophy. As we have put the whole position elsewhere, the advaita method is not that of removing the defects of discursive knowledge by a straight leap to the mystic platform; on the contrary, a rigorous intellectual scrutiny is regarded here as an indispensable generative condition of the Absolute Experience where alone Reality stands self-revealed. Like the temporary scaffolding which has an indispensable function while the construction is not completed, the discursive knowledge prepares the path to Intuition, and

is, therefore, an important propædæutics to Absolute Experience.

The peculiarity of the advaita method, as explained here, ought to awaken us to the difficulty of a right interpretation of the fundamental vedānta tenets. The terms *asat*, *mīthya*, etc., which are the current coins of the advaita speculations, are sure to propagate confusion when they are simply translated as non-existent or unreal. Even the usual term 'phenomenal reality', though used extensively for the *vyāvahārika sattā* has always appeared to me to be responsible for not an inconsiderable amount of mischief and misunderstanding. And the reason lies in the fact that the vadānta categories are always relative to definite stages or levels of experience, the most important of which, as suggested above, are the levels of discursive and non-discursive experience. The great chasm existing between these two types of experience ought to indicate clearly the danger of applying in the same sense the categories of reality and unreality, or of existence and non-existence, to the facts of different levels; this would be a serious misapplication of the categories beyond their legitimate sphere. If, for example, the world, in the advaita system, is condemned as *mīthyā* or non-existent, this is not equivalent to saying that the world does not exist *for us*, or that our world is a mere dream or an ordinary illusion. Such an evidently absurd position can have no place in any serious philosophy; and while this misrepresentation of the advaita system persists none can claim to have gone through even the initial baptism for understanding the profound implications of the theory of *Māyā*. The distinctions that we ordinarily make between a real thing and an illusion, or between the world of waking consciousness and that of dream, it is very important to note in this connection, are distinctions *within* finite experience; and, consequently, when an appearance is condemned as a mere illusion, it is presupposed that we are also aware of real

appearances. That is, to put it from the other side, it is only in so far as we know the nature of the real rope, that we can condemn the snake-appearance as an illusion. No philosophical thought can seriously ignore this essential correlativity of the finite categories.

In the light of these considerations, if we now try to ascertain the place of God in advaita, it may be easy to see that God as an omniscient and omnipotent Being possessing personality and perfections, and, as such, inspiring and satisfying religious sentiments of humanity has a genuine place in it. Such a God is as real as the individual centres of experience, or, as the world of our common experience, our moral strivings and aspirations, our happiness and misery. Neither He nor these minds and material things are mere illusions. The fact that they are absolutely non-existent from the stand-point of a higher experience does not militate against their genuine reality for our experience as it is now. A fictitious God can as little satisfy a factual religious sentiment as the unreal mirage can quench a real organic want for water. Not only this, but the vedānta method as a method of spiritual discipline would reduce itself to a sham mockery, not a serious pilgrimage, if reality were denied to those very things which form the background of the successive stages of the process. That is, if the Real is self-revealed at the final stage of Absolute Experience, such a stage cannot by any means be reached through a mere imaginary discipline ; hence the reality of the higher experience implies the reality of the lower stages, quite as much as the real completed structure implies the reality of the scaffolding. God, therefore, has the fullest measure of reality in the advaita system; nay, a real God is an indispensable postulate of the advaita method of spiritual realisation.

To put this idea in a clearer form, it may be useful to contrast the *vyāvahārika sattā* of God with the conception

of phenomenal reality as the latter is usually interpreted. The distinction between appearance and reality, phenomenon and noumenon, thing as it is for us and as it is in itself, implies a genuine transformation of reality when it is made to conform itself to our faculties of knowledge. So a phenomenal reality is a distorted reality, it is the *esse in intellectu* and not the *esse in re*. It is also used in the sense of a self-discrepant reality, a fragmentary reality claiming to be a *res completa*. The *vyāvahārika* reality is neither the *esse in intellectu* which is but the transmuted or disfigured image of Reality, nor a fragmentary manifestation of that which is fuller and completer than the phenomenal reality. It is *vyāvahārika* only in the sense that it is organically connected with the finite or pre-intuitional stage of development. While the finite remains as finite, knowledge is necessarily discursive ; but the fact that there is another type of experience which is not discursive does not prove that the objects of discursive knowledge are non-existent or unreal for the finite intelligence. Similarly, though God and the entire rubric of individual souls and material things, reduce themselves to absolute non-entities which could not exist either in the past or in the present or, again, in the future, yet, this is not incompatible with their fullest reality at the pre-intuitional stage of existence. It is this which the advaita system seeks to convey by its comparison of the world to a sort of cosmic illusion. The ordinary illusions show clearly how an absolutely non-existent entity can be as clearly perceived as any real thing, and how the non existence of the illusory entity can be realised only when the illusion has disappeared, but not before it. But this analogy is never meant to condemn the world as illusory *for us*.

I must now turn to what I have called above the self-created delusion born of an initial prejudice which prevents

unanimity in philosophical conclusions. It is difficult to imagine from the general trend of Mr. Raghavendrachar's analysis of the advaita position that he might be entirely ignorant of such a fundamental distinction of standpoints from which, as has been emphasised above, the vedānta thought must be interpreted. When, for instance, it is remarked that the real is necessarily relative, or that the whole universe is real, or, again, that difference is an essential aspect of everything, none but the ill-informed will take these observations to be anti-vedāntic. In fact, each of these so-called criticisms, far from exposing the defect of the advaita position, is explanatory of the well-known vedānta contention that finite knowledge is necessarily discursive. So far as the reality of the universe is concerned, this, as I have contended above, is never denied by it. The really important question is, not whether the universe is real, but whether the category of reality can be relative to a particular level of experience. But this point is not adequately accentuated by Mr. Raghavendrachar, and the consequence is that he inoculated into the advaita system a disease which does not really affect it. It will neither be possible nor profitable to discuss here all the interesting issues to which his paper refers. Whether the advaita represents a position that can be distinguished from the rival theories, such as Śūnya-vāda, Vijñāna-vāda, Prakṛtiparināma vāda and Brahmaparināma-vāda, whether recognition implies the identity of the knower rather than of knowledge, how far the doctrine that knowledge is neither an object of itself nor of anything else amounts to the denial of knowledge, whether superimposition is possible within the pre-suppositions of the advaita system, and, last of all, if Madhvācārya adhered to the spirit of the Upaniṣads more closely than Śaṅkarācārya,—these are some of the highly controversial issues raised by Mr. Raghavendrachar which, I think,

cannot be adequately discussed in a short paper. And it seems to me that the very fact that such a huge list of controversial topics is lightly dismissed with a cynical indifference to the arguments on the other side is strongly suggestive of the spirit of the advocate pleading before a court of justice rather than that of a philosopher before the tribunal of reason.

Mr. Sastri's paper arises out of the previous contribution by Mr. Raghavendrachar and, consequently, cannot keep itself entirely free from the contamination of the latter. While justly complaining that the Absolute should ever have been identified with God, he seems to reduce the advaita conception of God to a mere pragmatic necessity, a mere fiction which may well fulfil all the demands of a fictitious 'Jiva'. Here, again, I am inclined to believe, Mr. Sastri fails, like Mr. Raghavendrachar, to see the importance of the theory of different levels of experience which holds the key to the advaita position. A determinate God, as I have tried to emphasise above, is not a mere fiction, much less can the individual centre of experience which is the logical presupposition of every fact and fiction can be itself reduced to a fiction. If it is admitted that "God is an indispensable postulate of the thinking man", and that God and man are "like the prototype and the reflection," what follows from this admission is, not only that both the prototype and the reflection disappear with the disappearance of the reflecting medium, but also that God is real while the medium is there. There are many passages in Mr. Sastri's paper which appear to lend themselves to this interpretation, but I find it difficult to reconcile them with his conception of God as no more than a pragmatic necessity which "is real in so far as it works." This smacks too much of the subjectivistic and the sceptical tendencies of contemporary pragmatism to be of any value in a system of philosophy which seeks to indicate the path to spiritual

realisation. God, I must say at the risk of repetition, is not a fiction simply because the stage of God-realisation is transcended ; it is, on the contrary, an undeniable reality, representing a real stage in the entire process of realising the Absolute. It is true that with the realisation of the last stage of the discipline, there supervenes a radical change of attitude, and the entire universe of plurality reduces itself to a fiction, but this fact does not support the unreality or illusoriness of the universe at the pre-intuitional stage.

Mr. Sastri does not evidently think it necessary to discuss all the issues raised by the first paper, and, I believe, a full discussion of them would be impossible within the scope of a short essay. It is, however, equally difficult to enter here into a critical consideration of the new issues which he has himself raised in his own exposition. The advaita definition of the real as that which is never sublated, or as that which is neither originated nor destroyed, the description of the unreal as that which is perceived to perish in the very same locus where it was perceived, the possibility of a reality above all determinations, the question of the location of *māyā*,—these are some of the points which, again, are not less controversial than those referred to by Mr. Raghavendrachar. I shall, therefore, conclude with a reminder and a suggestion. It is well known how a great divergence of opinion exists even within the advaita school itself on the problem of the locus of *māyā* which led to a serious schism between the 'vivaraṇa' and the 'bhāmatī' schools ; similarly, there is anything but unanimity amongst the advaita philosophers in regard to their conceptions of the relation between 'cit' and 'māyā', and this has considerably influenced their opinions on the nature of *Īśvara*, some regarding *Īśvara* as the pure cit reflected in the *māyā*, others considering *Īśvara* as the cit in association with *māyā* and so on. In the face of such divergence of tendencies in the

advaita school itself, it seems to me to be very risky, if not rash, to remain content with such remarks as that *māyā* belongs to and is located in the *jīva*, or that *Īśvara*, though limited by *māyā*, is the controller of *māyā*. I do not mean to suggest that such remarks may not be true ; all I mean is that in view of the controversy on this head, any dogmatic assertions cannot be expected to throw much light on the advaita theory of God, particularly, in the present context. So much in the shape of reminder, I now pass on to the suggestion.

The history of the battle between Advaita and its critics has appeared to me to be mostly a history of what I have called the self-created delusion of philosophers ; for, the encounter is not in reality so fierce as the battle cries would lead one to imagine. That relation and difference are inseparable from our knowledge, and consequently even the highest conceivable reality must be relational,—this has never been denied by any type of absolutism. Such a reality, as rightly contended by the critics of absolutism, must be determinate, and the relation between it and the world of multiplicity may be one of dependence. And, then, it may be urged that God being the unconditioned ground of the world, the latter has no independent existence of its own. This, I repeat, has not been totally rejected by absolutism, though the supposition that it is an entirely anti-advaita conception is mostly responsible for the protracted controversy. The really puzzling question is whether the highest reality of relational thought is in reality the highest. The puzzle has survived all attempts made, in Indian as well as western thought, for a successful solution. It is well known how Plotinus, Spinoza, Schelling and a number of British absolutists have contested the pretensions of discursive thought to reveal the highest reality, in a spirit which cannot fail to remind us of the general attitude

of the advaita thinkers of India. Now, the really vital question, as repeatedly urged by the critics of the theory of ultra-relational reality, is: how can thought criticise itself? If thought is necessarily relational, the so called ultra-relational reality must fall beyond the scope of thought, and all discussions about it must be abandoned once for all. Even to remark that it is the non-relational ground of all thinking and other relations does not remove the difficulty, because the conception of ground is itself a relational category.

Anything like a detailed consideration of this puzzle cannot be undertaken at this place. I must, therefore, content myself with a brief analysis of the position of advaita, as a mere suggestion, in relation to this ultimate problem. That Reality is ultimately ultra-relational, and consequently above all determinations, is the central thought of the advaita philosophy. At the same time, it is clearly conscious of the relational character of all thinking and of all reasoning. It follows from these two positions that the ultra-relational is inconceivable for us. Yet, logical thought, according to it, being an indispensable stage in the entire process of realising the ultra-relational Absolute, the unthinkable has to be brought under the conditions of thought by means of attributing to it what really cannot belong to it; this, as is well known, is the necessity of superimposition. The Brahman, though absolutely distinction-less, is to be conceived as that to which belongs, as it were, the germ of all distinctions; and this may then be conceived as *māyā*, *śakti* or *prakṛti* of the omniscient Lord. Thus, superimposition, which is but another name for accommodation to the conditions of discursive thought, occupies a prominent place in the advaita method of stimulating thought to go beyond itself.

The status of consciousness in contemporary Realism.

By

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Throughout the development of modern Realism, the concept of consciousness has suffered a process of continuous attenuation. The position has been a little paradoxical, for while the reality and independence of consciousness have always been more or less systematically maintained, the concept itself has lost in content and detail. Beginning in Descartes, Locke, Reid and Hamilton with an unquestioning conviction in the reality of consciousness as a full-blooded entity or substance, one may observe the process of analysis and abstraction at work in Hume, Mach, Avenarius and James who resolve it into sensational elements constituting 'pure' experience, until we get, on the one hand, the 'neutral mosaic' of critical realists and the realism of Being of Holt and, on the other hand, Russell's 'constructs' and the realist notion of pure 'diaphaneity'.

The main motive for this disposition to repudiate or whittle down consciousness is the implicit assumption that the admission of consciousness and the mental states bound up with it eventuates in some form of subjectivism or idealism. And, most forms of realism arise as reactions to the subjectivist mode of thinking. Further, the reality and independence of the external world of objects is seriously jeopardised the moment consciousness is admitted as an entity. And finally, knowledge loses its directness and immediacy if consciousness is allowed to intervene between the objects. On these grounds Realism formulates its two important theses, viz. ,

(1) Independence of Objects, and, (2) Directness of perception. The minimum that a realist would claim may be formulated in the proposition "that some entities sometimes exist without being experienced by any finite mind"¹. Now, I am not concerned in this paper with the examination of the claim embodied in the two theses. I shall primarily attempt a critical review of the development of the notion of consciousness and the vicissitudes it has suffered in the history of modern realism, and incidentally consider the part it has played in realist theories of knowledge. I shall also try to show how the confusion between the epistemic and the metaphysical and epistemic and phenomenological points of view has been mainly responsible for the growing indecision and ultimate sterility of the realistic thought of today. In conclusion I shall make an attempt to suggest a way out of the impasse by pointing to pure phenomenology as a possible way of redemption.

Now, as we know, early realism in Descartes, Locke, and the Scottish 'philosophers of common sense' was not self-conscious. Its method is thoroughly naive and uncritical. The main problem is the explanation of 'given'. Givenness is characterised by externality and independence and as such, exists in its own right, i.e., independently of a knowing consciousness or subject. Like any other given the subject or consciousness is also real *per se*. The function of consciousness, if it can be said to *function* at all, is (1) to 'acquaint' us with itself and, (2) represent or image the given. It is a revelatory organ—a mirror which reflects all that falls within its focus. All the same, it is passive and does not affect the independence, that is, the reality of the given, the object. The latter far from being affected by consciousness is given as an 'instinctive belief'. Or, as Reid called it, "it is a judgment inspired by

1. Stace—"The Refutation of Realism". Mind, Vol. XLIII. p. 145.

our constitution". The problem of self-transcendence of consciousness is thus solved in terms of innate principles and instinct or belief. The device has however remained; for, some of the contemporary realists (viz Santayana) have acknowledged the problem to be ultimately insoluble save by the introduction of instinct and 'animal faith.' Thus, in their anxiety to secure independence of the object, the early realists made it so independent that it became utterly unknowable—and here too they have been followed by their modern protagonists. The only way in which it could be reflected in consciousness was by some occult power of representation. In any case, consciousness became either an impotent spectator or was itself identified with a medley of ideas. Like the Lady of Shalott it was condemned to a passionless existence among shadows and ghostly appearances.

So that, neither the independence of the object nor the directness of perception—the two fundamental theses of realism—could be vindicated by these thinkers. If independence of object appeared to be secured, at best it was a very doubtful achievement. As to the second moment of realism, viz. the immediacy and directness of perception, their failure was obvious.

Consequently, the second era in the development of realism opens with a strong protest against the doctrine of representationism and mediacy of knowledge. Immediacy and directness are considered the hall-mark of knowledge and reality. The real is presented directly. And as mind, subject, self and activity of consciousness are not thus given, they are forthwith repudiated and analysed away into sensational elements. Hume, Schuppe, Mach, Avenarius and James represent this point of view. The subjectivism and scepticism which resulted from the thought of early realists was due, says Schuppe, to their theory that subject and object are two disparate entities standing over against each other. So long

as the apprehending activity of consciousness is supposed to be a special endowment of the mind and the object is considered alien to it, the result must be scepticism. The notion of knowledge as activity has, therefore, to be discarded. Subject and object are two abstract moments which constitute being or *sein*. "It is purely arbitrary", says Schuppe, "to refuse to appearance (*sensum*) the corporeality of things and to conceive it as a mere idea which is mental and non-spatial and the opposite of the sensible and spatial'. There is no mystery in knowledge. Being in its nature is known being. This does not mean that the object is the affect or modification of the subject. The object is out there and is what it seems. It is one element of being or *sein* whose other element is subject—subject not as a separate activity but as one of the 'components' of Being

The one fatal defect in this theory is, as was pointed out by Meinong² that the independence achieved is not of the things that we are familiar with; it is on the contrary the independence of their transcendent conditions. Thus, Schuppe is falling a victim to the metaphysic of the thing-in-itself which it was his one aim to repudiate. In making consciousness a component factor of being and denying it of all activity Schuppe does not overcome the scepticism latent in subjectivist mode of thought. He is merely pushing the difficulties a step further back. Moreover, in order to make knowledge possible he brings the subject into the very heart of the object as a constituent factor in it. He could not conceive knowledge-event as a self-transcendent activity of the subject. This is like the fallacy of those who believe only in action by impact.

In Mach and James the process of analysis and attenuation reaches its completion. Things are apprehended directly and

2. Though whether Meinong himself escapes it is doubtful.

are independent of perception; they are constituted of *sensa*. All *sensa* are real and each *sensum* is by itself a self-subsistent reality. Ideas are of the same nature as *sensa*. They constitute the common world of the perceipients. They pass from the one I-complex to another without change. Ego or consciousness itself is nothing but a complex or mosaic of these same neutral *sensa*. "A given portion of experience" says James³, "taken in one context plays the part of a knower, of a state of mind, of consciousness, while in a different context it plays the part of a thing known, of an objective content. In one group it figures as a thought in another as a thing."

To the objection that without a conscious substratum experience will not be possible at all, Mach replies that it is a return to the old metaphysical ways of thinking, and James answers that "There is no *general* stuff of which experience at large is made"⁴. "There are," says he, "as many stuffs as there are natures in things experienced." If it is asked "what any bit of pure experience is made of", the answer is always the same: "it is made of *that*, of just what appears."⁵

But while James and Mach repudiate the notion of consciousness as an entity they insist on functional relation which is a relation of simultaneity, of mutual dependence and not of sequence or causality. But relation holds where there are terms to relate. Here, obviously, there are only body and object to relate, for there is no mind or consciousness. But this cannot be, for the physiological organism and the object all fall within the same class, are of the same series, and a *functional* relation between them seems unmeaning. A function implies an activity and activity has already been rejected.

3. *Radical Empiricism*—"Does consciousness exist"? p. 9

4. *Ibid.* page 26.

5. *Ibid.* page 27.

Further, James's repudiation of consciousness is hardly as thorough-going as it seems. His insistence on pure *experience* lends countenance to a view toward which he indeed inclines in his later writings, viz., Pan-Psychism : a position which would not be in keeping with the claims set forth in the opening essays of Radical Empiricism.

Thus, pure experience is either resolved into those psychical states which James vigorously denied ; or it stands for a dreary, uninspiring vacuum which sucks in all the chaos of the universe. In this sense it would not be very different from consciousness itself, looked upon by thinkers like Ladd, as a "Universal solvent, or menstruum in which the different concrete kinds of psychic acts and facts are contained whether in concealed or obvious form."⁶

Now, consciousness could not be conjured away so easily. Having once disappeared as an entity it still remained as a functional relation in Mach and James. In Twardowski, Meinong and Stout it reappears on the canvas as 'act' or 'act-quality', as Husserl has called it.

Brentano, it may be recalled, set out to discover some characteristic which would distinguish mental phenomena, or, as he called them, "psychical phenomena" from all other kinds of objects. This peculiar mark he found in what had been called intentional inexistence by the Schoolmen and what he himself proposed to call, "immanent objectivity". 'Every mental state', says he, "possesses in itself something which serves as object, although not all possess their object in the same way".⁷ Mental states (whether presentations judgments, emotions, or memories) have the distinctive peculiarity of pointing toward something other than themselves. The ability to direct itself to something different is,

6. G. T. Ladd—*Psychology ; Descriptive & Explanatory*, P. 30.

7. *Psychologie von Empirischen Standpunkt II, i, 5.*

according to Brentano, altogether peculiar to mental phenomena. No purely physical phenomena could exhibit such a power.

We shall not here examine the merits of Brentano's analysis: an analysis upon which Meinong and others have relied more or less implicitly. But, it may be observed (1) that it is far from clear whether intentional inexistence or any such single distinguishing characteristic can be found or exists at all, (2) whether the definite experience of 'activity' or 'direction' is not wholly illusory like the innervation sense of the early psychologists, and, (3) if Brentano's analysis is correct "it rules out *a priori* unthinkable all those modern theories in which something analogous to mental reference is attributed to entities which are nevertheless not held to have minds".⁸ For instance, Whitehead's 'events' which are "held to enjoy uncognitive apprehensions of other events and to mirror the modes of their predecessors and successors"⁹ would be utter nonsense.

Brentano makes no distinction between the 'content' (inhalt) of a mental state and its object (Gegenstand), and Meinong who follows him likewise employs the two terms in his early days indiscriminately. This at once results in a representationistic theory of knowledge. The 'act' being directed on the content or immanent object is always removed from the transcendent or real object of which nothing can be known except perhaps that it is a cause or part of a cause of the presentation of the immanent object. The real object is known, if it all, indirectly through its effects.

Under the influence of Twardowski, Meinong came to the recognition of the distinction between content and

8. Findlay—*Meinong's Theory of Objects*, p. 6.

9. Findlay—*Meinong's Theory of Objects*, p. 6. and, Whitehead—*"Science & Modern World"* P-86.

object and discarded the image theory. According to Twardowski, both judgment and ideas direct themselves to objects which is independent of our thinking. The true object of an idea or a judgment, says he, is not the image of that object but the object itself. "But in order to pass in this way beyond ourselves to the object we have to build up within our minds an image or sign of the object to which we refer." "We require some link (Bindeglied) which will make it possible for an idea to refer to one definite object and no other."¹⁰ According to this theory the content exists in the mind and through it as an intermediary the reference to the object takes place. The *Vorstellung* or mental act or consciousness is here an instrument by means of which the object is presented. The position is not a great improvement on the image theory and Meinong has to approach the matter in a different manner.

In order to ensure immediacy and independence of knowledge it would appear Meinong develops his theory of objects, the *Gegenstand theorie*. All that is, is object. And, there are three kinds of objects, (1) those that exist, (*Sein*) (2) those that subsist, (*Bestehen*), and (3) those that neither exist nor subsist but which nevertheless are real, the *Aussersein* or *Annahemensein*, or assumptions and suppositions.

The extreme objectivism implied in this theory has been one of the most plausible solution which realist thought has offered. Realism invariably breaks down in face of the problem of illusion and error. But the *Gegenstand theorie* adopts a bold device; it looks upon the illusory and fictitious as real because, like the objects of experience, these are also (1) objects and (2) independent of the mind. We fail to see this because we have an obstinate and a deep-rooted prejudice in favour of the real. The same

10. Findlay; *ibid.* p. 9.

logical and physical principles, however, which govern the real are exemplified in the so-called unreal or fanciful. The act or act-quality is the same in all objects. But an act does not refer as one might expect to a *whole* of experience, e. g., judging that virtue is good or desiring success in a venture etc. Meinong on the other hand means by an act a certain component or quality, an element in an experience which 'exhibits a variability independent of the reference to a given object'.¹¹ So defined, the act involved in an idea is the function of presenting which is common to all ideas. It is a "qualitative moment in a complete experience, the way in which the mind directs herself to an object",¹² rather than the complete experience itself

Thus, the act element does not affect the object, for it might be altered while the object remains unaltered. Meinong's instance of this is "the way in which the hearing of a tone passes over into an imaginative reproduction: the act alters, the experience changes in quality, but the same object is presented".¹³ This is more evident in case of objects called propositions which we may believe to be true, or "assume" or merely guess their truth with varying degrees of certainty. The attitudes differ while the object in each case remains the same. The act-element is that moment in our experience which changes in a wholly subjective way and which by itself does not present anything.

The act is neither a function nor an instrument though it has a peculiar property of being *directed* toward objects. This peculiar direction is an inexplicable mystery, and Meinong has not thrown any light on it. There, however, appear to be two statements which are intended as explana-

11. Findlay—*ibid.* p. 25.

12. „ *ibid.* p. 25.

13. „ *ibid.* p. 25.

it has adopted a frankly behaviouristic outlook. According to its theory, consciousness is merely a response of the nervous organism. It would be "a complex combination of reflexes". The so-called mental phenomena are all either quantifiable physiological processes or nothing at all. Knowledge on this hypothesis would be a certain reaction of the nervous tissue and meaning would be mere kinesthesia or twitches in the viscera.

In view of this to suggest that mind has certain peculiar characteristics whereby it cannot be an object to itself and that it "enjoys" its experience of knowledge as Alexander holds would be considered to be the most outrageous betrayal of the most fundamental principles of realism. Instead of admitting the ultimate identity of the act and the object (the content is constituted by the actual bodily presence of the known object), the central thesis of New Realism, Alexander holds them separate. The act, however, "is not an act of something but an ultimate entity; and so for him consciousness as *knowing* is not a relation, but a subjective entity of a sort, ultimate and indefinable".¹⁸ But though there is no relation in the ordinary sense there is a new relationship between the act and the content—the relationship of 'compresence'.

Now it will be evident that a compresence is no specific relation at all. Mere togetherness does not describe a relation, it rather implies the want of a relation. Further, the abstract contentless act which can be enjoyed or contemplated but not understood shows relapse into the metaphysics of the unknowable and all the mysteries connected therewith. It further shows how difficult it must be "to make plain the relationship between a diaphanous and indefinable fact, and an abstract quality—a relation with the peculiarity that one term is nothing but the awareness of the other."¹⁹ Having

18. A. K. Rogers—*Recent Theories of Consciousness*. Mind, XXIX. p. 297.

19. Ibid. p. 299 also, Russell, Mind XIII p. 510.

once reduced it to a condition of pure diaphaneity, Alexander perhaps would have been more logical to deny it or to treat it as a physical or mental existent among others, as the new realists have done. In any case, to assign it a privileged position in the realm of objects is to create insurmountable epistemological difficulties.

To sum up the position thus far we have seen how new realism in its attempt to maintain on the one hand the reality that is the independence of consciousness or the mental subsistent and on the other to deny any efficacy or substantiality or even activity to it has resulted in a very puzzling situation. If it has maintained the reality of all *sensa* or objects it has sacrificed the reality of the mental, and the problem of illusion and error has been impossible to solve. If it has maintained the reality of both the mental and the physical it has had to invent an intermediary (an idea, e. g.) to bring them together, and has resulted in representationism and scepticism. This is no less true of the old and naive realism than of the new and critical realism. In view of this some have maintained the neutral monism of being or of the universals (e. g., Holt), or the monism of neutral particulars (e. g., Russell) or, the theory of essences (e. g. Santayana). In the earlier views consciousness was taken as an instrument of revelation or discovery; even though an instrument which *did* nothing. This "searchlight theory" as Bosanquet²⁰ has called it, was given up and the view of consciousness as a relation of particulars or a set of facts or 'event-particles' came to be adopted. In the latter case, however, consciousness lost all that was distinctive: viz., subjectivity, activity, purposefulness, meaning etc. It became an object in the midst of other objects, or a pale contentless universal lacking in colour and concreteness.

²⁰ Bosanquet—*Meeting of Extremes in Contemporary Philosophy*; p. 20.

The result, though uninspiring, has nevertheless been logical. If it has not been acceptable it is not because consciousness is too precious a possession to lose but because the logical rigor in the heretics has not been unmixed with non-logical motives.

One great source of misgiving among the realists has been the horror of what Rosanquet has described "the contamination of nature by mind". This dread springs from the assumption that mind and nature are two distinct terms and that knowledge is some function of the two. Even where as in new realism the two terms are depressed into neutral entity or entities, the production of knowledge remains as inexplicable as on the earlier hypothesis. For, instead of having to relate two terms, now one has to explain the coming together in an epistemic situation of a multitude of independent neutral elements. The theory of universals and essences is a device for explaining the rationale and inner necessity implied in the knowledge-event. But the difficulty is that here the strictly empirical and epistemological view-point is given up. For, the universal or essence is now erected into a metaphysical principle invented for regulating and rendering knowledge, possible. Like James's pure experience, Holt's universal being appears to hold within it, in spite of disclaimers to the contrary, the active principle of knowledge. It is in virtue of this that *sensa mean* knowledge or give rise to the peculiar epistemic situation. The universal being bears a striking resemblance to the "pure being" of Parmenides, and like the latter cannot be understood except as a metaphysical category. In the same way the essences of which Santayana talks are like ideas in certain Platonic systems of thought *

* Except perhaps they lack the logical rigor which throughout characterises Platonic realism.

and are equally transcendental in character. Ultimately then the realist thesis of a separation of epistemology from metaphysics has not been justified. Indeed, but for the intrusion of metaphysics and its categories the realist theory of knowledge would hardly get under way.

Now, if we exclude metaphysics we do exclude it. A theory of knowledge may not lean upon a theory of reality; if it is to be really independent it must be based upon phenomenological data. From this point of view experience presents none of the abstract characters which customary language has enshrined in categories like mind, object, thing, etc.. And new realism has proceeded phenomenologically when it has discarded subject, consciousness, activity, causality etc., but it has not been thorough. It still accepts the notion of a general being. In this respect Russell has shown far greater insight. In the development of his thought, the object falls first, then the subject, and finally the act itself. Phenomenological reflection must be prepared to forego all that immediate experience does not guarantee.

By adopting an attitude of systematic "suspension" or "bracketing" as Husserl has pointed out, we find that experience is a certain peculiar flow in which there are stresses and strains but no halting places and rest-grooves. It is a "fluid" field (like an electro-magnetic field) in which no isolated quality like consciousness or object can be singled out except perhaps by an effort of abstraction. Says Whitehead, "The object cannot really be separated from its field. The object is in fact nothing else than the systematically adjusted set of modifications of the field. The conventional limitation of the object to the focal stream of events in which it is said to be situated is convenient for some purposes but it obscures the fact of nature".²¹ Experi-

21. *Concept of Nature*. p. 190.

ence as it is, comes upon us with an urgency and inevitability all its own. There is no causal effort which brings the various moments together.

In this way knowledge would be self-revelation of the object—though not perhaps a *necessary* self-revelation as Bosanquet and the idealists would have us believe. Knowledge-event is a living concrete phenomenon and to ask why it should arise in certain situations implies the investigation of the operative conditions in detail. Generally to describe these conditions is to describe the knowledge-event itself. Phenomenologically, the knowledge-event is prior to its conditions. It is not however, a mysterious emergence of a quality for it has been experienced in its uniqueness and familiarity right from the beginning. Strictly, there is hardly a beginning for a knowledge-event: it is like instant or point of the physicist though not abstract. It represents a whole situation, a 'gestalt' with its own proper principles and laws. The knowledge situation is no straightforward relation and no specific characters can be determined *a priori* in terms of abstract logical categories. The principles and laws which govern the knowledge-event like any other situation may be discovered by an adequate empirical and psychological inspection. In this sense psychology and the physical sciences and not logic would be basic to epistemology.

Looked at in this way, consciousness may be regarded as a construction from the data of experience. It is a construction, however, in which consciousness represents no single unity but exemplifies a situation, or an event where many factors are in indissoluble partnership. The object as one aggregate of phenomena is inseparably involved in the conscious situation which is a name for another class of events. It is not a concept, nor an inference nor even an 'implication'. It is a construction, but not in the

sense of a fiction as Stace thinks,²² for it is grounded in the given. But a construction is not to be treated as a product of deliberate and consciously motivated effort. We do not set about to construct. Constructions arise spontaneously in the course of experience. If there were a 'fossil mind' (in more than a mere metaphorical sense) it should already exhibit certain well-marked constructs in its possession. The question of the reality and unreality of a construct is irrelevant in itself; for, the reality or otherwise of a construct is determined by the system in which it is used and for which it may be of value. Thus, whether consciousness be real or no, whether it has certain attributes of activity, unity etc., are questions which epistemology need not answer. They will be of value to the metaphysician only. Phenomenologically directed epistemology has no concern with them. Phenomenology has to do with what might be called pure data and not with spurious ones. Consciousness as a self, substance, causal instrument or activity is an hypothesis and an 'assumption' based on certain experiences which in themselves may or may not justify it. When, however, these categories are taken as built upon facts or even as representing them they become dangerously spurious data. Our quarrel with the new realist is just this that he has introduced some of these spurious concepts (like Being, Pure Experience, Essence, etc., all with capitals! without knowing that they militate against his whole empirical outlook and render his attempts toward a phenomenology abortive.

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22. Stace : *Theory of knowledge and Existence*. p. 168.

The Status of Consciousness in Contemporary Realism.

By

B. N. Roy.

In his paper Mr. Kali Prasad has tried to give, in the first place, a critical review of the notion of consciousness, and the vicissitudes it has suffered in the history of modern realism, and in the second place, he has indicated the role which consciousness has played in the realistic theories of knowledge. After discussing the realistic theories from these two standpoints he concludes that they are characterised by 'utter sterility' and a 'growing indecision', and a way out of this impasse can be found only by resorting to the phenomenological view-point of Husserl. My own study of contemporary realism is mainly confined to the views of the British and the American realists, and it has led me to think that the attempts of the realists to formulate a theory of consciousness are not without elements of value. The changes which the notion of consciousness have suffered in their hands are neither sudden nor inexplicable. They have subjected the traditional notion of consciousness as a substance to a searching criticism, and the way in which they have analysed the concept has led to the annulment of the dualistic hypothesis. Consciousness is no longer conceived of as an entity absolutely sundered from the rest of existence. It has been brought into a line with other objects of nature from which it does not differ in stuff, but only in respect of its quality.

In the present paper I, therefore, propose to show firstly, that the changes which the concept of consciousness have suffered in the hands of the realists are to be explained as more or less inevitable, and secondly, to discuss the subject with special reference to the views of representative British and American realists with a view to adding some more

information about the subject to that which has been already supplied.

It is true indeed, as Mr. Kali Prasad asserts, that 'throughout the development of modern realism the concept of consciousness has suffered a continuous attenuation'. From the substance conception of consciousness, as held by Locke and Descartes, to the cross-section theory of Holt, the changes which the concept has undergone have been remarkable indeed. But this radical transformation is neither sudden nor inexplicable; it has been brought about by a complete change in the outlook of philosophy and in the method to be pursued by it. This change is explained as mainly due to the rapid progress in the domain of natural science as also to the researches in the fields of physiological and animal psychology. The modern physicist's investigation into the constitution of matter has revealed that its constituents are not to be conceived of in the analogy of microscopic tennis balls as inert static entities; rather they are to be regarded as units of electrical energy and as such essentially dynamical. Thus the character of matter has been rendered less material. In the realm of psychology, again, there has been an attempt to understand consciousness without assuming anything which is not open to external observation. This method has been applied by a certain school of psychologists to the study of human behaviour, in view of its success in the field of animal psychology. Careful observers of animals have gradually discovered that they can give a more reliable account of the actions of animals without assuming anything like what we call consciousness. The objective method has been mainly instrumental in placing animal psychology on a truly scientific basis. The success of the animal psychologist has led the behaviourists to introduce objective method in the sphere of human psychology, and as a result of this we find them dis-

carding the notion of consciousness altogether and resorting to behaviour as the proper object of psychological study.

The realist found himself in the midst of a situation which was perplexing to a degree. He could not ignore the new developments which were taking place in the domains of physics and psychology, resulting in the breakdown of the traditional dualism and in the removal of the barrier which had hitherto kept the two sciences apart. In view of these new developments he felt the necessity for reorientation of the whole field of philosophy. The idealist sought to build the conception of reality on apriori logic. Following the demands of such logic, he conceived reality as a coherent whole. The conception is indeed satisfying to thought, but it fails to explain certain features of reality, such as, time, change, plurality, etc, which exist as facts for our experience. These features could not be put into the crucible of logic without doing violence to their nature. These considerations have led to the abandonment of the apriori method. The realists have sought to introduce the scientific or empirical method in the domain of philosophy. Philosophy differs from science not so much in its method as in its subject matter. In spirit the philosophical method is the same as the scientific method. The scientist employs the method of analysis and description and resorts to hypothesis to bring its data into verifiable connection. The philosopher also does the same thing. The difference lies only in respect of subject matter. The scientist is concerned only with the particular features or aspects of experience, while the philosopher deals with its more comprehensive aspects. The philosopher must face the facts as the scientists do with an absolutely open mind. He must study them as they really are, and not as he wishes them to be.

One important effect of the introduction of empirical method in philosophy has been to treat finite mind as one among

many forms of finite existence. "Minds are indeed," as Alexander says, "the most gifted members in a democracy of things, but in respect of reality, all existences are on an equal footing". Mind does not occupy any central position in the scheme of reality, and as such it does not affect or determine the character of reality. This being the status of mind in the scheme of things, the science of knowing becomes independent of the science of reality.

These preliminary observations as regards the change in outlook and method of the contemporary realists will enable us to realise why the conception of consciousness has undergone such transformation in their hands. The realist, following the empirical method, formulates a certain hypothesis concerning the nature of consciousness and tests its validity by bringing it into relation with facts which it is supposed to explain. In the present connection the function of consciousness is exhibited particularly in the domain of knowledge and we have to see whether the theory of consciousness formulated by the realist adequately explains the nature of knowledge. If we wish to be fair in our criticisms of the realistic theory, the only way to deal with it is to test its adequacy by bringing it into relation with the facts which it is supposed to explain.

As has already been pointed out by Mr. Kali Prasad, the traditional conception of consciousness as a spiritual entity was vigorously challenged by W. James. In denying however, the spiritual and entitative character of consciousness, he did not intend to deny its existence. What he really wanted to deny was the conception of consciousness as being endowed with some peculiar stuff or quality of being. He does not find any evidence either theoretical or empirical for believing in the existence of an entity such as the self-conscious spiritual subject or the 'I think'. Introspection fails to reveal anything like spiritual or conscious activity,

and in trying to introspect, what one 'feels distinctly' is some 'bodily process', for the most part taking place within the head. The only activity that one is capable of discovering is composed of sensations of bodily exertion and strain, or of feelings of "the tendency, the obstacle, the will, the strain, the triumph or the passive giving up." From these James concludes "that our entire feeling of spiritual activity, or what commonly passes by that name, is really a feeling of bodily activities whose exact nature is by most men overlooked." (*Pluralistic Universe*, pp. 376, 380; *Principles of Psychology*, Vol. I, pp 300, 301-302). Thus for James conscious activity is identical with the feeling of bodily activity. As regards the nature of consciousness, the contention of James is that it is not endowed with any peculiar quality of being or any peculiar substantial character. The primal stuff of the world is pure Experience, and consciousness is explained as a particular sort of relation towards one another into which the portions of pure experience may enter. A given undivided portion of experience, taken in one context of associates, plays the part of a knower, of a state of mind, of consciousness, while in a different context, the same undivided bit of experience plays the part of a thing known, of an objective content. And since it can figure in both groups simultaneously we have every right to speak of it as subjective and objective both at once. (*Essays in Radical Empiricism*, pp, 9-10). Hence James denies the entitative and spiritual character of consciousness and regards it as a functional relation. That the formulation of such a theory of consciousness was not due to any mental perversity or inherent bias against the traditional conception becomes manifest to us if we remember that James was largely influenced in the formulation of his theory by the investigations he carried on in the field of psychology. The characteristic of the contemporary realism as distinguished from tradi-

tional idealism lies in the fact that the former in its solution of philosophical problems relies more upon the conclusions of science than upon apriori logic. If we bear in mind this fact, then the change which the concept of consciousness has suffered in contemporary realism will appear to us as inevitable, and not sudden or inexplicable.

The American Realists were profoundly influenced by the speculations of William James. His theory of Pure Experience gave rise to the doctrine of neutral entities, and his theory of the identity of conscious activity with the feeling of bodily activity was carried a step further in a frank adoption of behaviouristic attitude. Consciousness is no longer a spiritual entity or substance, but is the interested behaviour of the organism in relation to certain aspects of the environment, as Perry holds, or a cross-section of the environment defined by the specific response or the behaviour of the conscious organism, as defined by Holt. According to Holt 'behaviour' or 'specific response' is an emergent quality which appears in the nervous organism at a certain stage of its evolution. An organism endowed with this quality exhibits certain features and performs certain functions which are absent in the organisms of a lower level in the evolutionary process. Mere reflex action which characterises lower organisms, and which is largely conditioned by immediate stimuli, can not be identified with behaviour or specific response, which in a large measure functions independently of immediate stimuli and bears as its essential mark a genuine objective reference. But behaviour or specific response alone is not consciousness; It is only one term of the whole situation which constitutes consciousness. Specific response is essential, but in itself, it does not constitute consciousness. By "cross section" Holt understands "any part collection that is defined by a law which is unrelated (or but remotely related) to the laws that define

the whole in question". (*Concept of Consciousness*, p. 170). These part collections or cross-sections may be defined in an infinite number of ways. But when we have a collection of objects or a cross-section of the universe defined by the specific response of the organism then there is consciousness. This is due to the fact that specific response is "a striking novelty which does not occur anywhere in the evolutionary series prior to the appearance of organised response" (*Freudian Wish*, p. 167). Hence Holt maintains that the criterion of consciousness is specific response and Psychology is the science of Psychic cross-section. (*Concept of Consciousness*, pp. 205-206). The entire cross-section or collection of objects defined by the specific response of the nervous system is assumed to constitute mind or the psychic realm, and the individual members of this cross-section are, taken severally, the various contents of consciousness, such as sensa, percepts and ideas. Sensa and percepts are "objects in the hierarchy of being, and they are in the psychic cross-section when the nervous system specifically responds to them". (*Concept of Consciousness*, p. 219) Holt thus repudiates the contention of the representationist that the content and the object are existentially distinct, and maintains, on the other hand, that they are numerically identical entities. Sensa and percepts are not mental representations, but are integral parts selected from the objects by the specific response of the nervous system. Sensa and percepts, depend for their reality as contents of consciousness, strictly on the physical organism or the nervous system. (*Concept of Consciousness*, p. 208). But they "are something in themselves also aside from that which conditions them". (*ibid*, p. 209). It is true that the conscious cross-section is defined by the specific response of the nervous system, and thus several entities which belong to it constitute a new relational manifold, and by virtue of such relation assume the

status of conscious contents. But the several components of psychic cross section subsist even independently of such specific relation. In whatsoever context these entities may be, they still retain their distinct self-identity. Neither the elements nor their combinations are made by the mind, for they are strictly independent entities to which knowing makes no difference. Experience does not make any difference to facts, be those logical concepts, sensa, percepts, images or feelings. It thus appears that Holt, as against representationism, seeks to vindicate the two most important features of the realistic theory of cognition, viz., directness of perception and independence of objects. But in his anxiety to do so he runs into extreme objectivism and annuls altogether the distinction between the subjective and the objective.

The extreme objectivist character of Holt's theory of consciousness is largely due to his ontological theory of neutral being. The realistic universe which Holt describes is neither mental nor material, but strictly neutral in character, and the various entities which constitute it "are of the class of mathematical and logical concepts" (*Concept of Consciousness*. p. 136). The Ultimate entities are neutral in character and the category of being alone can be attributed to them. The world represents a realm of neutral entities, graded in a strict and inalienable order of complexities. Beginning with certain relatively simple entities where analysis terminates, it is possible to frame a deductive system in which the development, is an asymmetrical transition, from simple fundamental, abstract entities to entities complex, particular and concrete. The possibility of such a deductive system rests upon the theory that the propositions are active and can generate of their own motion further terms and propositions. (*Concept of Consciousness*, p 16). It is maintained that the funda-

mental logical propositions have intrinsic activity and generative power, and this being granted, it becomes possible to exhibit the order of advance in the deductive system wherein the neutral entities are graded in an asymmetrical order of simple-to-complex hierarchy. In this rigidly deductive system there is no gap anywhere. The transitions from mathematical concepts to space, from space to matter, from matter to life, from life to consciousness, and from consciousness to the realm of values are marked by an unbroken continuity. The different orders of being in the complexity series are not substantially distinct from one another, and even when consciousness appears there is absolutely no break in the series. Consciousness is not a simple substance and can be readily and completely defined in terms of the entities that have appeared before. It is ultimately neutral in character, and has its place in the realm of neutral being as an object among other objects. Consciousness as a cross-section of the universe is as much an object as any other physical entity. The neutral ontology of Holt has led to formulate the objective theory of consciousness.

The neutral monism of Holt has undoubtedly been influenced by James's theory of Pure Experience. Further, James's denial of the entitative character of consciousness, and the dualism of the content and the object, and his assertion of the identity of the feeling of the bodily action with conscious activity paved the way for Holt's cross section theory of consciousness. As regards Holt's theory of neutral being it may be compared to the Spinozistic conception of substance which is neither material nor mental. The logico-mathematical neutral entities from which consciousness is sought to be deduced are the simples where analysis terminates, and no quality can be attributed to them except the quality of being. Such a conception has been reached

by carrying the process of logical abstraction and analysis to its utmost limit, and the result has been the elimination of concrete differences. Such a neutral being is by its very nature unknown and unknowable, since it is absolutely predicateless and thus utterly incomprehensible by thought. The concrete, empirical world with its qualitative features is dissolved into a plurality of entities, characterless, abstract and non-temporal. The entities of the neutral realm are, as logical concepts, evidently universal, devoid of all sensuous and qualitative character pertaining to our temporal experience. How is it possible to deduce from these abstract, non-temporal and logical universals the concrete, temporal and particular existents of the empirical world? Holt fails to account for this transition from the universal and non-temporal to the particular and temporal. How is it possible to deduce consciousness from these bare abstract neutral entities?

As has already been pointed out, it is the neutral ontology of Holt which has given rise to the objective cross-section theory of consciousness. The cross-section theory implies that consciousness is a transaction between a neural organism and an independent environment defined by the specific response of such organism. In the conscious situation the nervous system selects by specific response certain elements from the physical universe, which constitute the contents of consciousness. The whole transaction here is a wholly physical affair. If certain elements are selected from the physical universe, and if selection is the work of the nervous system which is likewise physical, then the final result must also be physical and nothing more. The result is not altered in any way by calling it mind or consciousness; for it remains at the end what it was at the beginning, namely, physical. If we hold that the response necessary for consciousness is of the same nature as the objects which it selects, and exists alongside of them, is it possible to explain any awareness of object? Prof. Alexander, in cri-

ticising the cross section theory of Holt, points out that the response must be clearly distinct from the objects responded to, and in responding we should be aware of the fact that we are responding. In the words of Prof. Alexander it may be said that "whenever we know, we know that we know, or that knowing and knowing that we know are one and the same thing." (S. T. D., Vol. II., p. 112) This implies that in any cognitive situation the ultimate reference to the self is essential—without such reference no consciousness or knowledge is possible. The self in the present case cannot be the body or the physical organism, because the body is not conscious. (ibid. p. 113). We are therefore, compelled to admit the existence of a correlative responsive reaction which underlies the nervous processes, but which itself is non-physical. This non-physical or mental reaction is the response of the self.

Again, the extreme objectivism implied in Holt's theory has been the result of the doctrine of neutral being. The theory of neutralism has led to the definition of consciousness as a cross section or a class of objects among other objects, and has resulted in the obliteration of the distinction between the subjective and the objective. As a direct consequence of such a view errors and illusions have come to be regarded as objective and subsisting in a neutral universe with the real. If error and illusion have a place in the realm of neutral being side by side with the real and the veridical, by what criterion are we to distinguish between them? The neural organism responds equally to the real and the unreal object; but how is it possible for one to become aware of their distinction? Representationism accounted for this distinction by the hypothesis of a mental content forming the *tertium quid* between the mental act and the real object. But it led to subjectivism and ultimately to phenomenalism, rendering all knowledge of the real object impossible. In his anxiety to reject representationism and to avoid the consequences which such theory implies,

Holt has gone to the opposite extreme, and with the denial of the content has denied the subjective altogether. Thus the extreme objectivism of Holt has broken down in the face of the problem of illusion and error. The recognition of the vital distinction between the subjective and the objective, the distinction between the mental act and the real object, is essential for a satisfactory explanation not only of the problem of knowledge, but also of the problem of illusion and error. In this respect the theory of consciousness formulated by Prof. Alexander seems to me to be more satisfactory.

Mr. Kali Prasad has dismissed rather summarily the views of Prof. Alexander. The criticisms which he has levelled against his theory seem to be unjustified. The views of Alexander deserve more serious consideration than what Mr. Kali Prasad has bestowed upon them. For a proper appreciation of Alexander's theory of consciousness it is necessary to understand his ontological position. Alexander rejects the neutralism of Holt and does not seek to deduce consciousness from a few simple and indefinable logico-mathematical entities. So he is not faced with the difficulty which confronted Holt, namely, of explaining the transition from the universal and non-temporal to the particular and temporal. For him the basic stuff of the world is Space-Time, which is absolutely simple and does not possess any other quality of motion. The logico-mathematical entities, he contends, are not simple or ultimate, but on analysis are found to be complexes of Space-Time. Identity, Number and Difference, and the various categories are found to have a spatio-temporal structure. So for him there is no bifurcation of the realm of being into universal and particular, into temporal and non-temporal. Space-Time is an infinite given whole, and its elements are represented conceptually as point instants, or bare events. Existents are configurations of such events, crystals in that matrix. They are complexes of motions differentiated

within the all-embracing and all-compassing system of motion. Empirical existents possess two kinds of qualities, namely pervasive and variable, belonging respectively to categories and qualities. Categories emerge out of the elementary conditions of Space-Time which possess no quality except the Spatio-temporal quality of motion. Empirical things come into existence, because Space-Time of its own nature breaks up into finites. The qualities arising out of the motion of Space-Time stand to each other in a progressive temporal relation; they emerge in orders or levels and form a hierarchy, the quality of each level of existence being identical with a certain complexity or collocation of elements on the next lower level. The emergence of a new quality from any level of existence means that at that level there comes into being a certain collocation of the motions belonging to that level, and possessing the quality appropriate to it, and this collocation possesses a new quality distinctive of the higher complex. The higher emergent is based on a complexity of the lower existents. Thus physical and chemical processes of a certain complexity have the new quality of life; therefore, life is at once physico-chemical process, but is not merely physical and chemical. And higher than the living thing with its quality of life is mind, that collocation of motions endowed not only with the physical and chemical qualities, but also with consciousness, the last and the highest of the empirical qualities known to us. Now, mind as the highest empirical existent possesses the unique quality of consciousness. Alexander contends that while mental process is neural it is not merely neural, and that the mental process is not merely physiological, but also mental. Mental process being in the same place and time with the neural process, we are forced to go beyond mere correlation of the mental with the neural process and assert their oneness and identity. His contention is that consciousness is a quality which emerges

in the neural process when it has assumed a specific complexity in the course of evolution. There are not two processes, one neural and the other conscious or mental. When the neural process is apprehended from outside, from the standpoint of the external spectator, it appears as non-mental; but the same neural process, when enjoyed from within appears to possess the characteristic mental quality.

In stressing the distinction between enjoyment and contemplation as basal elements of conscious experience, Prof. Alexander clearly affirms his difference from the objectivistic conception of consciousness formulated by Holt. Consciousness according to him is not the 'cross-section' of the environment defined by the searchlight of response, it is the searchlight itself; it is within the responsive organism, and not 'out there' in the objective environment. The empirical method followed by Alexander precludes him from assigning any privileged position to mind in the scheme of reality. In respect of reality mind is exactly on the same level as the other finite existents, and its difference from the latter consists simply in the measure of perfection it has attained, being the last and the highest empirical quality that we know. The distinctive emergent quality which mind possesses cannot be experienced if it is apprehended from outside. It can be experienced or enjoyed from within. Alexander distinguishes two different modes of knowing, namely, enjoyment and contemplation. Mind is essentially activity, and this activity can be enjoyed by us in contemplating a non-mental object. In any conscious experience these two existences (the mental act and the non-mental object) are connected together by the relation of compresence, yet the two terms of the total experience are apprehended in different ways. The one is experienced, that is is present in the experience, as the act of experiencing; the other as that which is experienced. The one is an "ing", the other an "ed". In

my experience, the mind in contemplating its object enjoys itself, and these two existences, the act of the mind and the object as they are in the experience, are distinct existences united by the relation of compresence. The object contemplated is always a non-mental one, while the enjoyed experience is always mental.

The act of mind is never found by itself as a single existent. At any moment a special mental act is continuously united with other mental acts within the one total or unitary condition. Moreover, "not only is the mental act continuous with others at the same moment, but each moment of mind is continuous with preceding, remembered moments and with expected ones. The continuum of mental acts, continuous at each moment, and continuous from moment to moment is the mind as we experience it". (*S. T. D.* p. 14, Vol. I). Mind, thus, is the enjoyed synthesis of many mental acts, a synthesis we do not create, but find. (*ibid.* p. 14) It is the substantial continuum of mental processes which have conscious quality. (*ibid.* Vol. II p. 81). Not only is the particular mental act enjoyed, but the whole mind, as the substantial continuum of several mental acts, is also enjoyed. In the same way, the thing is the synthesis of its many appearances which are contemplated by the mind. The synthesis of the appearances is not the work of the mind, but is objective and belongs to things themselves.

According to Alexander, mental activity is conation, and the conative side of experience is the only thing which is mental. There is nothing in the mind but acts, and the term 'act' does not imply any special form of mental activity, such as desire, or willing, but is equivalent to what we understand by the term 'process' and as such includes passive acts of sense as well as activities of volition. The term conation used in an extended sense includes all mental acts, active as well as passive. Cognition is neither a separate kind of action

from conation, nor is it a separate element in a mental act which is distinguishable from the conative element in the act; it is nothing but the conation itself in so far as it is compresent with and refers to an object. Our perception of the object means our behaviour in a certain manner towards the object we perceive. In so far as the conative act refers to its object it is a cognition.

Consciousness is identical with conation and it is essentially mental activity. It occupies time and occurs in time and moreover it has direction and its direction varies with the physical object to which the activity is related. Besides these features it possesses different degrees of intensity and is variably toned with pleasure and pain and emotional excitement. Apart from these affective modifications, consciousness is without quality, except the quality of being consciousness. The only difference which characterises consciousness is the difference of direction. With the variation of the object the response or reaction also varies. According to the quality, the complexity, the grade of the object (as *sensum* or as *perceptum*), the mental quality varies in direction. Thus while the direction of consciousness changes with the variation of the object to which it is related, consciousness itself retains the same quality. It has no difference of quality to correspond with the difference of its objects. Again, Alexander clearly distinguishes mental action or consciousness from motor processes. Although consciousness always finds expression in such motor reactions as bodily movements, gestures, words and the like, yet it should be distinguished therefrom, because these motor reactions are themselves *sensa*, and physical processes of the body merely. They are part of the object of mind, but they are not mind itself. Thus Alexander clearly and unequivocally affirms his difference from the behaviourists. For him consciousness cannot be identified with the bodily

behaviour, since the latter can be an object of consciousness, but consciousness can never be an object to itself.

His difference from the behaviouristic standpoint is most clearly brought out by his defence of introspection which the latter rejects as altogether useless as a method of psychology. It should be noted, however, that Alexander does not accept the traditional notion of introspection. He does not regard introspection as a self-objectifying process. It does not give us any knowledge of *sensa*, percepts or images, but can make possible only the experience of mental acts, such as sensing, perceiving, imagining, remembering, etc.. *Sensa*, percepts, etc. are rather objects of *extraspection*. Introspection only enables us to report more distinctly the condition of our enjoyment. For psychological purposes it means simply the enjoyment lived through with a scientific interest. Introspection is thus to be distinguished from ordinary enjoyment in the sense that it is enjoyment lived through with a definite purpose in view and thus makes us more clearly aware of the nature of mental act than it is possible in ordinary enjoyment.

It appears from the foregoing that if we are to have knowledge of the self, we can not have it by converting it into an object. Self can be given only in enjoyment. Self-consciousness means the enjoyment of the self, the activity is lived through by the self as a part of itself. Consciousness and self-consciousness are regarded as identical. Consciousness cannot be an object of knowledge in the same way as physical things are objects of knowledge. Consciousness can not be related to consciousness in the way in which external physical things are related to consciousness. It can be an object of knowing not to another consciousness, but to a being who is superior to a conscious being, that is, who belongs to a higher order of existence, namely, an angel. It is only the lower order of existents

which can be made objects of knowledge to a higher order of being. The distinction which Alexander draws between the act and the object, enjoyment and contemplation, is ultimate. If consciousness is an act, it must always remain an act; it can not be converted into an object. It should be clearly noted, however, that for Alexander enjoyment and contemplation are not to be regarded as two distinct mental acts. It is one and the same mental act which in contemplating a non-mental object enjoys itself.

Alexander thus recognises the essentially subjective character of consciousness, and affirms clearly that it cannot be an object, which is always something non-mental. Consciousness is not a 'cross-section' of the environment, an object alongside of other objects; it is a process, an activity, and essentially distinct from non-mental object. This theory enables him to account for the cognitive situation more satisfactorily than the American realists for whom cognition is a merely physical affair, a transaction between the physical organism on the one hand, and the physical environment on the other. Alexander is emphatic in his insistent upon the fact that the knowledge-relationship is inexplicable unless one of the terms of such relationship be regarded as mental. If the activity of the self is reduced merely to the specific response or the behaviour of the physical organism, and if it is thus conceived merely as an object among other objects, it is difficult to imagine how cognition or awareness can result from the transaction between two objective entities. The knower or the subject in some sense must transcend the object which it knows and must therefore be essentially distinct therefrom. Alexander thus rejects the extreme objectivism of the American realists, but at the same time retains in his theory the essential features of realism. He maintains on the one hand the directness and immediacy of knowledge, and on the other hand the mind independent character of

object. As against representationism he holds that in cognition the object is directly revealed to mind, and at the same time he denies the idealist thesis that there is no object without mind. Further, the recognition of the subjective character of conscious acts enables him to cope with the problem of illusion and error more successfully than it is possible in the objectivistic theories of the American realists. We are not led to hold, by the denial of the subjective, that every content of cognition is equally objective, error as much as truth, the real as much as the unreal. The American realists, having denied the subjective, place errors and illusions on the side of the objective, and in order to explain their distinction from the true and the veridical, they bifurcate the realm of Being so as to find within it place for two kinds of entities, subsistents and existents. The rejection of the subjective thus creates for the American realists insurmountable difficulties. The recognition of the subjective enables Alexander to offer an explanation of the problem of illusion and error.

In many respects, then, the theory of consciousness formulated by Alexander seems to us to be more satisfactory than the extreme objectivistic theory formulated by the American realists. Let us now proceed to deal with the criticisms which Mr. Kali Prasad has levelled against the theory of Alexander. In discussing Meinong's theory of objects Mr. Kali Prasad points out that for him "all that is is an object and consequently the act is a component or element in the midst of other elements or objects. But nevertheless Meinong persists in distinguishing between the act and the object because he is under the dominance of Brentano and the Act School. His position is therefore inconsistent, because his ontological theory does not justify the distinction between the act and the object. Holt, whose ontological position is similar to that of Meinong, is more logical and annuls this distinction and defines consciousness as a cross-section

of the environment or as a class of objects. Mr. Kali Prasad next shows that the conclusions of naturalistic realism are even more drastic than those of Holt. It is not disposed to look upon consciousness even as a cross-section or a class of objects. Under the influence of biological sciences it adopts a frankly behaviouristic attitude and defines consciousness as a physical response of the nervous system. Having shown how consciousness has gradually come to be defined in terms of behaviour or physical response, he next proceeds to deal with the theory of Alexander. Although he is not quite explicit, yet from the manner in which he criticises the views of Alexander it seems that he takes Alexander to belong to the group of natural realists. From the exposition of Alexander's ontological and epistemological position given before, it is clear that he cannot be classed either with the natural realists or with the behaviourists. He repudiates clearly the behaviouristic account of consciousness and maintains that mere physical response as such cannot explain the awareness of objects. To constitute consciousness of objects it is not enough that the response should be merely physical and thus exist alongside the object to which it is a response, but it must be something which experiences itself. In responding to the object 'I must be aware of my response. Every act of consciousness is self-consciousness, in the sense of enjoyment. Thus conscious act is essentially distinct from the object towards which it is directed, and cognition is explicable only on this hypothesis.

The realism of Alexander does not owe its origin to, and is not influenced in any way by, the movement initiated by William James in America. It develops along an entirely different line. American realism directly originates from the speculations of W. James and reaches its natural culmination in the extreme objectivism of Holt and the behaviourism of the natural realists. But the realism of Alexander does not

follow the same line of development. If we bear in mind these two distinct lines along which realism has developed in modern times a good deal of confusion can be avoided. It is true that American realism has culminated in extreme objectivism, and the consequence is entirely due to its presuppositions, its theory of neutral being. But from this it by no means follows that objectivism is the logical sequence of all forms of realism. When, therefore, Alexander asserts the distinction between act and the object as vital, his position cannot be characterised as the betrayal of the fundamental principles of realism. In regard to Alexander's theory of mental act Mr. Kali Prasad approvingly quotes the criticism of Mr. A. K. Rogers. The act, it is said, is not the act *of* something, but an ultimate entity, and so for him consciousness as *knowing* is not a relation, but a subjective entity of a sort, ultimate and indefinable. Alexander never says that the act is not an act of something. The act is always directed towards an object. The direction is according to him one of the characteristic features of cognitive acts. The mental act is enjoyed in the contemplation of the non-mental object. It is one and the same mental act which in the contemplation of the non-mental object enjoys itself. Consciousness as conceived by Alexander is indeed subjective but he would not admit it to be ultimate and indefinable. The position that consciousness is a simple, indefinable, ultimate entity is taken up by the idealists. Alexander with his hypothesis of Space-Time defines consciousness as an emergent quality belonging to mind and which can be ultimately explained in terms of Space-Time. So he does not leave us in mystery about the nature of consciousness. Objectively, it is a spatio-temporal entity existing among other objective entities, but subjectively, it is consciousness.

The cognitive relation, Alexander holds, is a relation of compresence. The relationship of compresence is a universal relation holding between any two finite existents, and should

not therefore be supposed to be distinctive of cognition. The character of the cognitive situation is indicated not so much by the relation of compresence as by the nature of the terms related. The relation between two physical existents is also that of compresence. But there both the terms of relation are physical, whereas in the case of cognition at least one term should be mental. So Alexander does not say that compresence is a specific relation. Further, Mr. Kali Prasad is wrong when he says that "the abstract contentless act can be enjoyed and contemplated but not understood." Alexander nowhere says that the act can be contemplated; for him it can be enjoyed only. He distinguishes between two modes of knowing, enjoyment and contemplation. We contemplate non-mental objects whereas we enjoy our own mind. So if the act is to be known at all, it must be known in enjoyment. We can only live through our mental acts and can never contemplate them as objects. I cannot see anything wrong in what Alexander says here. His theory does not lead us to the metaphysics of the Unknowable, as Mr. Kali Prasad asserts, since he does not deny knowledge of the mental act. It seems that some of the criticisms of the theory of Alexander arise from a misunderstanding of his position.

It appears from the foregoing considerations that consciousness in modern realism does not occupy a central position in the scheme of things. It does not condition the nature of the real, and is not regarded as the ultimate or absolute category. Once the a priori logic of the idealists is abandoned as a useless instrument of philosophic research, consciousness loses its absolute character and comes to be considered as a finite among other finites having no privileged position in the scheme of things except that which it derives from its greater perfection of development as the last and the highest of the empirical existents. If we approach the problem of consciousness in a purely scientific spirit, it cannot be given a

central position in the scheme of reality, it is to be regarded as one among other finite existents within the all-embracing reality. The category of Reality, therefore, looked at from this standpoint is more fundamental than consciousness. Knowing thus falls within reality and is not in any sense prior to it. Thus ontology is not dependent upon epistemology, but epistemology is in a sense dependent upon ontology. The method of philosophy is empirical in an extended sense. Following this method the theory of consciousness is to be formulated strictly on the basis of those features which consciousness reveals in experience. The validity of the hypothesis should be determined by bringing it into verifiable connection with the data which it is supposed to explain. Applying this test it is found that the extreme objectivistic theory of the American realists cannot satisfactorily account either for the cognitive situation or for the problem of truth and error. The theory of Alexander which holds consciousness as essentially dynamical, subjective activity or process, explains these facts more satisfactorily. If our choice lies between the traditional conception of consciousness as a transcendent entity and the extreme objectivism of the American realist on the one hand, and the subjectivistic conception of Alexander on the other, we should not hesitate to accept the latter alternative as more faithful to experience.

The Status of Consciousness in Contemporary Realism.—iii

By

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I have read the papers of Mr. Kali Prasad and Dr. Roy with considerable care and have found that they have dealt with certain points bearing upon the subject of the symposium in such a manner that very little is left for me to add on those points. Mr. Kali Prasad's account of the development of the concept of consciousness, however brief it may be, is comprehensive and is of non-controversial character. I need not deal with that part of his paper. Dr. Roy has supplied what was wanting in Mr. Kali Prasad's historical sketch by attempting to trace the development of the concept of consciousness to its various sources. I must here confess that my interest in the history of philosophical concepts and the discovery of the causes of their historical development is not much, although I am aware that they throw considerable light on them. However my real difficulty begins when I come to consider the attitude which Mr. Kali Prasad and Dr. Roy have taken up towards the modern realistic doctrines of consciousness, and the suggestions which they have made to get over the difficulties of these doctrines. Mr. Kali Prasad

accuses contemporary Realism of indecision and sterility. In this I partly agree with him. For I have found that contemporary realism in its solution of the problem of consciousness in some of its aspects has made little advancement and is in fact moored to traditional doctrines. But I am not quite sure that the solution of the difficulties of modern realistic doctrines of consciousness can be found in the phenomenological speculations of Husserl and others. My acquaintance with the present day phenomenological school is so inadequate that I am not competent to pass any judgment upon its merits nor am I able to judge how far Mr. Kali Prasad has followed that school in providing a solution of the difficulties of contemporary Realists. I have therefore decided not to tread upon the ground on which Mr. Kali Prasad stands and shall follow an independent line in criticising the realistic doctrines of consciousness and in suggesting remedies for their difficulties. Dr. Roy is not, however, so doubtful about the success of modern realists in solving the problems of consciousness and, as a matter of fact, credits the greatest success so far attained in this respect, to Alexander. I, like Mr. Kali Prasad, think in a different way, as I have found that Alexander no more than any other realist succeeds in providing a satisfactory solution of the various problems of consciousness.

Before I proceed to the discussion of our problem I must however state that I have followed an altogether different method of approaching the present problem. I have found it necessary first to state the problem of consciousness in its different aspects and then see how far contemporary realists have succeeded in solving them. I have also thought it proper to mention the typical classical solutions of this problem in order to show that modern solutions do not take us further than they. Lastly I must observe that my difference from the modern realists as well as from Mr. Kali Prasad's and Dr. Roy's treatment of them is so great and so vital that I have

no option but to follow an independent line of thought and to leave my predecessors in this symposium undisturbed, so that the readers of this paper may form an independent opinion of the relative merits of my position as well as of that of my predecessors.

I

Of the problems that have received serious consideration in contemporary philosophy, especially in its realistic Schools the most important are those which concern the status of Sense-data and its correlate, the status of consciousness. Although we are here concerned with the latter problem, reference to the former is essential in as much as they are, or at least, have been presented to be interdependent. The peculiar difficulty of the investigation of the current doctrines of consciousness, however, follows from the absence of unanimity among philosophers in regard to the meaning of the term "Consciousness," which is only partially explained by the interdependence of consciousness and sense-data. If sense-data are variously viewed, consciousness which is intimately related to them, must indeed come to be variously conceived. But my reason for stating that the interdependence of consciousness and sense-data does not wholly account for the differences of the views of consciousness is that consciousness is used not only in the sense of perception, external knowledge, or apprehension of the external world but also in the sense of inner apprehension or the self's knowledge of itself. The doctrine of sense-data now-a-days primarily relates to perceptual knowledge, and is rarely associated with self-knowledge, although some older philosophers viz. Malebranche, Locke and Kant tended to obliterate this distinction between perception and self-knowledge and place them on an equal footing by first introducing what they called 'Inner sense', then by treating

inner-sense as parallel to outer sense and lastly by recognising data of inner sense corresponding to the data of outer sense, that is to say, sense-data properly so-called. That being so, the problem of consciousness as a whole is wider than the problem of consciousness in its relation to sense-data, i. e. of consciousness in the sense of perception, and is, as a matter of fact, divisible into two distinct problems viz. of *perception* and *self-knowledge*.

As regards the former problem, it has two aspects in so far as perception, on the one hand, implies certain data out of which its object may be said to be constructed and, on the other, perceiving as such in so far as that is to say, perception, has, to use current terminology, the *objective* and *subjective* aspects. The problem of perception in its objective aspect, is in fact, the problem of sense-data which is distinct from the first division of our problem of consciousness in as much as consciousness as perceiving is distinct from sense-data. Objections against this position may, however, be urged on the one hand, by older materialism according to which consciousness is the epiphenomenon of matter, and the neutral monism of the American New Realists, according to which consciousness like physical things, is ultimately deducible from neutral entities, and on the other, by all those philosophers who hold that sense-data, like consciousness, are mental.

As regards the latter objection, I might indeed satisfy myself by thinking that it does not hold good against the able criticisms urged against subjectivism by modern Realists in general, and especially by Moore, the pioneer of the realistic movement in England. But I will not do that for two reasons. In the first place, these criticisms really miss their mark and fail to disprove the doctrine that sense-data are mental. Let us first take into account Moore's objections against this doctrine. The main point of his anti-subjectivist

criticism in his Refutation of Idealism is that the Idealist has been led into this doctrine in virtue of his erroneous view that consciousness and sense-data are *analytically* related and that this doctrine would vanish as soon as it is realised that their relation is really *synthetical*, that sense-data no more depend on consciousness for their existence than the latter depends on the former for its existence. Now, apart from the question whether it is a fact that Idealism really treats consciousness and sense-data as analytically related, Moore's conclusion that sense-data are proved to be physical or, let us say, at least non-mental by the view of the relation between consciousness and sense-data as synthetical,—does not follow in as much as sense-data, even if they are separate from, or are synthetically related to consciousness, may like consciousness, be mental just as two physical things synthetically related to one another may be equally physical, or two minds related to one another in the same manner may be equally spiritual. The position of certain modern Realists e. g. Stout, etc., who are no less insistent on the separation of the act of awareness from sense-data than Moore and his followers and yet regard sense-data as mental, may here be cited as contradictory to Moore's expectation. It must be particularly noticed here that subjectivism is the epistemological counterpart of, and is really deduced from the metaphysical doctrine called Spiritualism, according to which the whole universe including physical things is ultimately spiritual or mental. That being so, the refutation of the subjectivist position that sense-data are mental is not possible in the manner in which Moore and his followers attempt it, but must depend upon a deeper enquiry viz., the enquiry into the metaphysical foundation of that position which they have not undertaken.

Moore found later that although the failure to separate the act of awareness from its object is the foundation of

Idealism, the special argument of this doctrine proceeds from the relativity of sense data. This argument may be expressed as follows: Since it is a fact that one and the same object may, for instance, be apprehended as red under certain circumstances and as gray under certain others and since we can not treat any one of these sense-data as unreal but should rather regard both as real, in as much as both appear to be equally due to some real cause, and yet cannot hold that one and the same independently existing object is both red and green, the conclusion is that these sense-data are real as *mental* and not as *non-mental* or independent. This argument has been very seriously considered by most modern Realists. It is in fact the centre towards which the bulk of new realistic polemic gravitates. Before we proceed to assess the value of the Realist's criticism of this argument it is, however, necessary to analyse it carefully. This argument has two parts. One of these consists in the Idealist's assertion of the reality of conflicting sense-data, both red and green in the above instance being on his view, real. The other consists in his denial of 'independence' and ascription of 'mentality' to them. Now, although the second element in the second part of the argument viz. the ascription of the mental status to sense-data presupposes the first part in as much as mentality which is an existential status, could not have been ascribed to sense-data except on the view of them as real, yet the former does not follow from the latter alone but must also presuppose the first element viz. the denial of independence to sense-data. Granted that conflicting sense-data are equally real, as they are on the Idealist's view, there is nothing to prevent their being non-mental i. e. independently real except the denial of their independent reality. This denial on the part of the Idealist, however, follows from the fundamental logical principle of non-contradiction, according to which a thing which is, for ins-

tance, red cannot be not red, i. e. green etc. Now, some of the realists who agree with Idealism in admitting the reality of all sense-data and at the same time seek to avoid their subjectivistic interpretation think that it is possible to maintain the *independent reality* of all sense data without violating that logical principle. Bertrand Russell's attempt to work out this possibility is wellknown and consists in stating that there are, so to say, two different kinds of nonmental, spatial worlds 'the Private' and the 'Common'—the former of which are many and various and are, as a matter of fact, constituted by sense-data of a relative character, whereas the latter, although it is, on his view, constructed out of private sense-data, is somehow relieved of the former's relative character, i. e., is common to all percipients and is, in fact, the physical universe of science. The real point of this position of Russell consists in the substitution of the new logistic conception of the thing as logical 'Construct' for the older Cartesian conception of it as substance, based upon the traditional logical principle of identity. It must be noticed here that while on Descartes view the opposition between 'common' and 'private' seems to be the same as the opposition between substantiality and unsubstantiality, reality and unreality, according to Russell, the former opposition is not only not the same as the latter but has not even the sense of opposition and consequently we can ascend from the private to the common and descend from the common to the private. However that may be, even if it be conceded in favour of the realists and against Descartes that the opposition between the common and the private is not the same as the opposition between reality and unreality, it is at least an opposition between the unconditioned and the conditioned or contingent,—between the independently existing physical universe and sense-data which, if not dependent upon consciousness, are at least conditioned by physical and physiological processes.

That being so, we fail to understand how by means of Russell's logistic device the construction of the unconditioned and independently existing physical universe out of contingent sense-data is possible ?

The parallelism between Russell's and Berkeley's attempt to avoid the conflict between the theory of perception and the above-mentioned logical principle may be noticed here. Just as Berkeley refers relative sense data to individual minds and the physical universe to the divine mind, so Russell refers the former to private space and the latter to common space. Again just as Berkeley holds that there is no opposition between the world of the individual mind and the world of the divine mind in as much as the former may be said to be a participant in the latter, so Russell holds that there is no opposition between private spaces and common space, the latter being, on his view, a construct out of the former. The advantages and disadvantages of both positions seem to be the same except that Russell may claim greater plausibility for his position on the ground that both worlds—the private as well as the common are, on his view, independent or non-mental whereas on Berkeley's view they are mental. But neither Russell nor any other Realist has justified this claim. This can be shown as follows :

Although, as pointed out above, the Idealist's denial of independence to sense-data in accordance with the above-mentioned logical principle is a presupposition of his view that all sense-data initially accepted by him as real or existent are mental, its real value consist merely in *demonstrating* that sense-data, initially accepted as mental in virtue of the metaphysical doctrine viz , spiritual, *cannot be mental* in view of the logical contradiction that would follow upon the conception of them as independent or non-mental but not in *proving* the proposition that sense-data are mental. That being so, the Realist, even if it be conceded to him that he

has succeeded in showing that the ascription of independence to all sense-data involves no logical contradiction, may at best take away the demonstrative certainty of the Idealistic *proposition* that all sense-data are mental, while the proposition itself stands unaffected, being ultimately dogmatic. This lends additional support to my earlier statement that in order to refute Idealism the realist must dive much deeper than he has done, i.e., must undertake an enquiry into the validity of Spiritualism, the metaphysical aspect of idealism.

I must now mention that from the point of view of strict realism the most objectionable part of the subjectivist argument is the assertion of the reality of all sense-data, which has been quite curiously admitted by most modern realists. Although it is a fact that one and the same object may, for instance, be apprehended as red under certain circumstances and as gray under certain others, it is equally a fact that object must be *either* red or gray and not both red and gray ; and consequently either red or gray must be unreal. The question how we are to determine which of the two conflicting sense-data is real and which is not, is indeed difficult but may not be impossible to answer. Even granted that the answer is impossible, that does not seem to warrant the ascription of reality to conflicting sense-data. What seems to weigh most with philosophers in this ascription is not so much the *fact* of relativity as the consideration that the conflicting sense-data are all due to real causes. If that be so, illusory and hallucinatory images, which, as physiologists and psychologists would tell us, are also due to certain real causes, are also real. This is a position which must be admitted by those who advocate the reality of all sense-data. But Berkeley, although he is logically committed to it, avoided a scandal by refraining from talking about it, whereas many modern Realists have gone to the extent of openly declaring the reality of illusory and hallucinatory images. Here we must keep ourselves clear

of a serious confusion that may possibly arise. What I am denying is not that illusion etc. are *facts* and are in that sense real but that illusory objects are real. Similarly I admit the *fact* of the relativity of sense-data but deny that all sense-data are constituents of real objects.

The net gain of the recognition of the distinction between real and unreal sense-data is that the above-mentioned logical difficulty in the way of the construction of a satisfactory theory of sense-perception is altogether avoided and consequently the prolixity involved in Berkeley's distinction between the world of the individual mind and the world of the divine mind as well as in Russell's distinction between the private and the common spatial world is eliminated. But that recognition has not the significance of the refutation of the subjectivistic thesis that all sense-data are mental. If some sense-data are unreal, the remaining that are real may very well be mental. As regards the real ground for the strict realistic view that real sense data are non-mental or independent, I cannot exhaustively deal with it here but will merely mention that it is nothing but the simple, ultimate fact of the *givenness* of sense-data. In being conscious of an object the subject is conscious of it as *given*. And this implies that what was *not previously* an object of its consciousness is *now* such an object. The object of the subject's consciousness, in other words, exists not *merely at the moment when* it is an object of consciousness but also *beyond* it. It is thus an *independent* object.

I am not suggesting here that modern Realists are not alive to this implication of the fact of givenness. In point of fact, they yield to none in their insistence on it. But since, as already indicated, they do not distinguish between real and unreal sense-data but regard all sense-data as alike real they fail to realise that the so-called sense-data are identically the same as physical things - which is the real implication

of the fact of givenness, and consequently arrive at the new doctrines of sense data. My second reason for not having recourse to modern realistic criticisms in disputing the idealistic thesis is now within sight and consists in that these criticisms involve the doctrine of sense-data in some form or another and that this doctrine in whatever form it is held, is as I shall immediately show, as unsatisfactory as the older doctrine of ideas.

I have already indicated that the fact of the givenness of sense-data may be regarded as the sole ground for the strict realistic view that sense-data are non-mental or independent and that they are identically the same as physical things which we are said to know by means of perception, so that we cannot have any reason for drawing a distinction between sense-data and physical things, which is generally drawn by modern Realists. The position expressed here is essentially the same as that of the Naive Realist. There is however an important difference between them which is due to the fact that Naive Realism is utterly unconscious of certain phenomena having a bearing upon the theory of perception and consequently makes no attempt to show that these phenomena are not opposed to it, whereas the present position is fully cognisant of them and is thoroughly convinced that they, far from offering any opposition to Naive Realism, are quite in harmony with it. The phenomena in question are relativity of sense-data, error, illusion and hallucination. Now it has been pertinently observed that "in a world in which there was no such thing as error, this theory of the knowledge-relation (i. e. The naive realistic theory) would remain unchallenged; but with the discovery of error and illusion comes perplexity." (*The New Realism*, pp. 2-3). Here I must add that this perplexity equally follows from the facts of the relativity of sense-data, in as much as it is no less difficult to hold in the Naive realistic manner that sense-data

which conflict with one another, are alike identical with physical things than hold in the same manner that the sense-data of our erroneous experiences are such. However that may be, Naive Realism is wholly ignorant of this perplexity and so has no solution of it, whereas modern schools of realism are fully cognisant of it and, while attempting to remove it, come to differ very widely from Naive Realism. This difference consists in that whereas on the Naive Realistic view the so-called sense-data and physical things are *not distinguishable* but are identical, according to modern realistic theories they are distinguishable, no matter whether they agree with or differ from each other in regard to existential status.

The distinction between physical things and sense-data which is involved in modern Realistic doctrines of sense-data seems, at first sight, to follow necessarily from the above-mentioned phenomena. But my contention is that these doctrines, in the first place, explain away, rather than explain the facts of the relativity of sense-data, error, etc., and secondly fail to construct a satisfactory theory of sense-perception. Let me first take up the former point. I must here begin by emphasising the ultimate qualitative difference between veridical perception and the various kinds of erroneous experience and also by noticing that the same difference is involved in our experiences of relative sense-data in as much as only one among several sets of conflicting sense data can really be said to belong to physical things, whereas the remaining are as unreal as the objects of our erroneous experience and consequently, some of our experiences of the so-called relative sense-data are veridical while others are erroneous. That being so, the doctrine of sense-data must be so constructed that this qualitative difference may be explained. But when we turn to the different forms of this doctrine we find that far from explaining that differ-

ence, they all ignore it. According to one of these forms all sense-data are alike *physical*; according to a second they are alike *logical*, i. e. are subsistents; according to a third they are neutral, or, pure beings—neither physical nor mental in character; according to a fourth, as according to the older Representationists e. g. Descartes and Locke, they are mental. All these forms, inspite of differing from one another in regard to the status of sense-data, agree in viewing them as qualitatively alike. That being so, they all must fail to offer an explanation of the qualitative difference between veridical perception and our experience of relative sense-data, error, illusion, etc, with reference to their conception of sense-data. In this respect, the modern Schools of Realism, which profess to be strictly realistic, hardly differ from Idealism which also suffers from the inability to explain that qualitative difference with reference to its view of all sense-data as alike mental.

I must however, observe that modern Realists have done a singal service to Epistemology by emphasising the importance of the phenomena of relativity, etc. in that science. But I cannot forbear mentioning that they seek to mislead us by mixing up the problem of veridical knowledge with the problem created by these phenomena and by regarding the success of the solution of the former as dependent upon the success of the solution of the latter. Since the facts of the relativity of sense-data, error, etc. *are nothing to us except* in so far as they are recognised as such, and since that recognition presupposes right knowledge, the modern Realists have no justification for mixing up the data of veridical perception with the data of erroneous experience and for assigning the same status to both. It is far from my mind to suggest that the problem created by these phenomena is not genuine and requires no solu-

tion. My only question is—what should be the character of its solution ?

The answer is that it can never be metaphysically consecutive in view of the consideration that erroneous objects as well as the diverse shapes sizes, colours, etc. of perceived objects with the exception of those which really belong to such objects and are in point of fact, the object of right knowledge, are non-existents or negations and therefore have no definable metaphysical status. The modern Realistic theories of perception failed to realise this and accordingly vitiate themselves by attempts to define the indefinable and to find out a place for the indefinite and indeterminate alongside of the definite and the determinate, resulting in a hopeless misunderstanding of the true nature of that data of right knowledge. The solution in question can only be empirical or scientific consisting merely in the reference of these phenomena to variable physical, physiological and psychical conditions which in one respect indeed limit the knowing subject, but are in another transcended by it—viz. in that respect in which it is in possession of right knowledge and is thrown into the relation of compresence with the object of its knowledge.

The second point of my previous contention is still more important since it relates to the theory of perception as such. It must first be observed here that all the above-mentioned forms of the modern realistic doctrine of sense data aim at vindicating the strict realistic view that the objects of our perception is the independently existing physical thing—a view which was thrown everboard by the idealistic doctrine that sense-data are ideas. Now my contention really is that they have all failed to realise this aim. I have previously shown how modern Realists have failed to attain their principal object not only by not being able to refute idealism but also by failing to diagonalise the real disease of that theory and shall now add that the real difficulty of Idealism lies not so

much in the doctrine that sense-data are mental as in its consequence viz. that the object of our perceptual knowledge, according to it, cannot be the independently existing physical thing—a consequence from which the modern realistic doctrines have not been able to extricate themselves. The critical realist who substituted subsistents or logical entities for ideas can no more deduce physical existence from subsistence than idealism can from ideas or mental existents. American New realism according to which sense-data are pure beings i.e. are neutral—neither physical nor mental, is open to the following difficulty. Supposing we agree with it in holding that the distinction between the mental and the physical is functional and not substantival, it seems that it has no reason for explaining how one functional collocation of neutral entities is mental and not physical and another physical and not mental. I think that Descartes, in admitting an ultimate and irreducible distinction between the mental and physical, was wiser than those of his successors who, in the name of removing the difficulty of his dualism, have advocated a doctrine which is really more difficult than his own. As regards Stout etc. who like the older Representationists regard sense-data as mental and yet affirm the independent reality of physical things, their difficulty is that since sense-data must be the ultimate constituents of the object of our knowledge, the view of them as mental contradicts that affirmation and renders the construction of physical things impossible. Lastly, those Realists who hold that the data of perception are physical and generally advocate an ultimate distinction between the mental and the physical and correspondingly, between 'introspection' and 'perception' 'enjoyment' and 'contemplation' seem to come nearest to strict Realism. But the truth is that these philosophers are divided from Realism by the consideration that the objects of our perceptual knowledge, in so far as they are

ultimately constituted by sense-data which, on their view, must be contingent on account of their being determined at least by physical and physiological processes can never be relieved of the contingent character of sense-data and, therefore, can never answer to the independently existing objects which we are said to know.

The contingency of the external world, which follows from the last mentioned type of Realism as well as from others is flagrantly opposed to the verdict of common sense and as a matter of fact, renders the so-called Realistic schools of the present day essentially ante-realistic and brings out their secret affinity with Idealism. Time has therefore come for as vigorous an attack against these schools as they themselves have already launched against idealism. I have previously suggested a few lines on which contemporary schools of Realism must be corrected and shall offer a few more suggestions in the sequel.

The main object of this long digression has been to show that modern realistic theories can be no better substitutes for Naive realism than Idealism is and thereby vindicate the Naive Realistic thesis that the so-called sense-data are not distinguishable from, but are identical with physical things. Once this is done, the separation of sense-data from, and their irreducibility to consciousness to which they are given are indisputably established, and consequently not only spiritualism which treats physical things as ultimately mental and serves as the foundation of the main Idealistic thesis, is definitely disproved but also materialism which commits the opposite mistake by reducing consciousness to matter as well as neutral monism which reduces both consciousness and matter to neutral entities, lose their ground. This definitely demonstrates the truth of my main contention that the problem of sense-data falls outside of the problem of consciousness. Now although I have been insisting on the separation

of consciousness from sense data which are on my view identical with physical things, it is far from my mind to accept or defend the traditional view that consciousness is mental and is for that reason separate or distinct from non-mental physical things. My reason for this will be brought out in course of my treatment of the problem of perceiving which I shall immediately take up.

II.

The Problem of Perceiving.

(A)

In dealing with the various forms of the doctrine of sense-data in the previous discussion I pointed out that they have reduced the independent existence of the external world to a contingent status. My present object is to trace the mistake of this reduction to its primary source and suggest a remedy for its correction. This object, as we shall presently see, may be best attained through a discussion of the present-day realistic theory of perceiving. Before I undertake that discussion I must however observe that one of the most important grounds to which the doctrine that sense-data are distinct from physical things, owes its origin, and which, therefore, results in the contingency of the external world, is the reference of perceiving, which is a form of consciousness, to its physical, physiological and psychical conditions. This reference seems to be unavoidable in as much as perceiving is not possible except in so far as some object first acts on the percipient's bodily organism in virtue of certain physical processes, then certain physiological processes arise within his nervous system and lastly his hereditary and acquired mental make-up functions in its characteristic way. Since an object is given to perceiving through such a chain of processes, it cannot, as will be easily argued, be the same as the independently existing physical thing. Hence the plausibility of the doctrine

of sense data. But the main point here is that since our object is to construct a *theory* of perceiving which demands the most satisfactory understanding of the nature of perceiving, we must first see whether there is any reason for going beyond the conditional character of perceiving before we actually stop at the view that perceiving is finally conditioned by a whole gamut of psycho-physical processes, however obvious that view may be. And, as a matter of fact, there are two important reasons which take us beyond the conditionality of perceiving—one *logical* and another *empirical*. The former is that since it is ultimately by means of perceiving that the fact of its own conditionality can be asserted, perceiving itself is unconditioned or at least, is such in one of its aspects. It might be, however, be contended that that act of perceiving which is conditioned and that which asserts its conditionality are separate and that the latter is in itself as much conditioned as the former. But if this argument is pressed to its furthest point, it would result in an infinite regress. From the logical point of view the acceptance of the view of perceiving as conditioned in one aspect and unconditioned in another is however preferable to the admission of a *regressus ad infinitum*. Perceiving, on this view indeed has a paradoxical character. But there is no way out of this position since it has not only the sanction of logical reason but is also demanded by an empirical fact which demonstrates more conclusively than mere logical reasoning, that perceiving, inspite of being conditioned is characterised by unconditionality. This fact is no other than the *compresence* of perceiving and the object perceived. No one can deny that inspite of the space that may separate the percipient from the object of his perception and inspite of all events or processes which may intervene between them, perceiving and its object, as it were, occupy a single point of space and a single moment of time. Thus perceiving is, *par excellence*, the point of contact between

two different kinds of world viz.—the world of persons who happen to be percipients and the world of impersonal things which become perceived objects on the occurrence of the phenomenon called perceiving. This relation of compresence is really unique and for that reason, is indeed very difficult—its difficulty arising from the fact that it can not be understood on the analogy of easily understandable physical relations. The metaphysical theory called Dualism as well as the various forms of the epistemological doctrine of sense-data betray the failure to realise the unique character of this compresence.

The above argument seems to be sufficient for the demonstration of the freedom of perceiving from physical, physiological, and psychical conditions. I may mention here that two prominent philosophers of modern times, Descartes and Kant, for their own reasons, recognised this freedom of perceiving. But, as we shall presently see, they failed to notice that aspect of perceiving in which it is free not only from physical, physiological and psychical conditions but from all possible conditions—which freedom is really implied by “compresence”.

Now the discovery of the error of the view that external objects are apprehended by the percipient through the intervention of the above mentioned conditions or in other words, that knowledge is conditioned by them is not sufficient to finally obviate the erroneous doctrine of the contingency of the external world. For there may be other ways of conceiving an intervening medium between the percipient and the perceivable thing and of arguing the conditionality of perceiving so that the external world may again be reduced to a contingent status. And in point of fact, at least one such way is already widely current and consists in pressing perceiving and its condition into a unity, with the result that perceiving comes to be viewed as an existent, and in

holding that the existent event called perceiving is the intervening medium between the percipient and the perceivable thing. It must be observed here that the bare fact of perceiving, inspite of being determined by conditions which must be *existent*, may not itself be existent and yet may be *real* and thus may not be an intervening medium between the percipient and the perceivable thing, since that medium must be existent and not otherwise—and that the only way to treat it as such a medium is to conceive it as an existent, which conception really follows from the view of perceiving as at once an event and the condition of that event.

It would appear at first sight that the view of perceiving as at once a *condition* and the *conditioned*, i. e., as an existent is more satisfactory than the view of it as determined by extraneous psycho-physical conditions in as much as the former does whereas the latter does not bring out the uniqueness which perceiving really possesses and which divides it from physical events subject to the operation of mechanical conditions. The truth however seems to be the opposite. By holding that perceiving is mechanically conditioned, i.e. that the external object must be given to the percipient through psycho-physical conditions, the latter view indeed reduces the external world to contingency. But since it is not necessary for it to pronounce a definite opinion in regard to the status of perceiving as such or at least it need not necessarily subscribe to the view of perceiving as mental, it may be free from the difficulty which that view may give rise to, in regard to the status of the self that perceives, although it may even then be said to be inadequate on account of its ignorance of the question regarding the status of the self; whereas the former view not only reduces the external world to contingency by means of its view of perceiving as an existent and therefore as an intervening medium between

the percipient and the perceivable thing but also finds itself confronted with the problem of the status of the self in virtue of its definite view of perceiving as a form of mental existent which leaves it no option but to solve the problem in the most objectionable manner. This solution is classical and was offered by Descartes. According to him consciousness which includes perceiving is the attribute or essence of the self. "Perceiving" is, in point of fact, as much a temporary event in the life-history of the Ego as "being perceived" is in that of a physical thing. So by viewing perceiving as the essence of the self, Descartes really mistakes a contingent state of the self for its concrete and complete existence and thereby reduces the self to a contingent status. Contemporary realistic theories of perceiving, I shall now show, are not free from the difficulties of the traditional theories.

(B)

I must mention at the outset that contemporary Realists, as a class have not devoted so much thought to the problem of perceiving as they have devoted to the problem of sense-data. This is evident from the fact that in all the different forms of their doctrine of sense-data an attempt to remove the difficulties of the older doctrine of ideas is clearly traceable whereas in their doctrine of perceiving most of them with the exception of a few seem to be moored to tradition. We may here separately consider the views of perceiving of the different schools, without expecting however that they must all differ fundamentally from one another.

1. We may first take up the position of that group of Realists who hold that sense-data are physical. Moore, Alexander and Bertrand Russell, (so far as his earlier writings are concerned) are the most prominent members of this group. It must be first observed here that these Realists who, like other Realists of the present day, aim at

obviating Idealism, think that this aim can be attained only by showing that sense data are physical. And they hold that this can be done in the first instance by keeping clear of the idealistic view of sense-data as conditioned by perceiving, i. e. by the mental existence called consciousness which necessarily results in the main idealistic proposition that sense-data are mental, and secondly by positively declaring that sense-data are conditioned merely physically i. e. are conditioned only by external objects, sense organs etc. In this they easily ignore the truth that the true interest of Realism cannot be furthered and the real consequence of idealism cannot be averted except on the realisation of the unconditioned aspect of the data given to the percipient. However, they further hold that perceiving is a *mental* act i. e. is the act of awareness. And in this they obviously admit a qualitative difference between the mental and the non mental. Moore treats this difference as ultimate and in his Refutation of Idealism stresses the importance of the ultimate character of this difference with the greatest force. He further seeks to account for the failure on the part of philosophers to notice the distinctness of the act of awareness by means of his doctrine of the diaphaneity of awareness. This 'act' on his view is so transparent that when we look for it we miss it and only see the data which are given to it. Russell in his earlier position also views the distinction between awareness and sense-data as ultimate. There is, according to him, the subject on one side and the objects on the other and the subject apprehends the data produced by the latter in conjunction with sense-organ. But while both Moore and Russell thus eschew the metaphysical attempt to resolve the ultimate character of that difference, Alexander like American New Realists makes a metaphysical attempt to get over it by reducing both mind and matter, the mental and the physical ultimately to Space-time. However, that

may be, from the epistemological point of view Alexander like Moore and Russell holds that the act of awareness and sense-data are distinct—the former being mental and the latter physical.

Now in holding that perceiving is not a condition of sense-data these philosophers not only seek to avoid idealism but recognise an important truth. Again, while thus setting aside the most objectionable conception of the relation between perceiving and sense-data viz. as the relation between the *condition* and the *conditioned*, they seem to admit the right conception of that relation viz. as the relation between that to which something is given and that which is given i.e. as the relation of compresence. The fact however is that they in the first place miss the true sense of compresence and secondly fail to account for it. Let us take the former point first. Alexander, while realising the uniqueness of the phenomenon called perceiving, holds that the relation of compresence which it implies, is not in itself unique and that its uniqueness follows from the peculiarity of its terms. The relation between the table and the floor and the relation between the percipient and the table, *as relations*, are, on his view, of the same kind; and the fact that the latter is knowledge and the former is not, is according to him, due to the latter's having the percipient instead of the table as one of its relata. In this Alexander obviously ignores the ultimate qualitative differences of relations. Even in regard to spatial relations, we find that two physical things may stand in different relations to one another on different occasions so that the relata are the same while relations are different. Now just as we distinguish between such relations as coexistence, succession etc. on account of their individual peculiarity, so we must distinguish between compresence and any of these relations. Not only that; compresence must be distinguished from, and must be said to be in a class apart

from all relations which are spatio-temporal, in view of the fact that the percipient and its object come together in spite of the space and time which may divide them. Alexander, in spite of merely asserting the uniqueness of knowledge, fails to notice this peculiarity of compresence and may be said to understand it on the analogy of physical relations in virtue of his mistaken view that all relations are qualitatively alike. Moore, unlike Alexander, makes no secret of his misunderstanding of the true nature of compresence and in his essay on "The Nature and Reality of the Objects of Perception" openly declares that the relation of the object and the percipient is a spatial one, i.e. of togetherness in one space like the relation between the table and the floor.

Secondly, so far as Moore and Russell are concerned, since the distinction between perceiving regarded as mental and sense-data regarded as physical is, on their view ultimate, compresence must, according to them, be theoretically impossible. In point of fact, the problem of awareness of sense-data is as difficult at their hands as the problem of mind body was at the hands of older Dualists. It may be stated here that the present view of sense-data as physically conditioned—the view, i.e., that the data of perception, prior to their being given to it, are fully formed by the operation of physical causes, however satisfactory it may otherwise be, is not only subject to the difficulty just mentioned, but also involves the main difficulty of the more general view viz. that sense-data are at all conditioned, which as previously observed, consists in the reduction of the external world to contingency. As regards Alexander, he seems to be free from the present difficulty of dualism, in so far as he holds that mind and physical things are ultimately reducible to, or are deducible from some common entity viz. Space-time. The plausibility of this attempt on the part of Alexander to get rid of dualism would entirely depend upon the success

of his metaphysical construction of ultimate reality as space-time.

Again their view of perceiving as a mental act seems to be a great improvement upon the older Cartesian view of it as the essence of the self in so far as the former does and the latter does not involve the recognition of the really temporary character of the event of perceiving. Their view rightly points out that the self perceives only under certain circumstances and not always. Nevertheless, the ultimate gain of this improvement seems to be very little. Whereas Descartes, by means of mistaking a temporary state of the self viz. perceiving for its essence really reduced the ego to a contingent status, notwithstanding his admission of the soul-substance, these philosophers, who profess to proceed empirically and have, on the side of the mind, nothing but temporary and contingent mental acts, can conceive of the self either by assigning these acts to a spiritual substance accepted on merely apriori grounds, contrary to their initial intention, or by making an attempt in the manner of old empiricists and in strict accordance with their original intention, to construct the ego out of contingent mental acts. Bertrand Russell in his earlier position and Moore seem to be open to the former alternative whereas Alexander who sticks fast to empiricism all through, accepts the latter.

We may next turn to the Critical Realists' view of perceiving. These philosophers, as we have previously seen, hold that sense-data are logical subsistents and these data are mechanically conditioned. From this it would seem to follow that the external world, on this view, must be as contingent as it was on the view of Moore and others. But the fact is that Critical Realists seek to avoid this difficulty by means of a twofold device viz. their recognition of the difference between sense-data and the physical thing in regard to existential status—the former being subsistent and the latter

existent, and their peculiar conception of perception which, on their view, consists in the awareness of sense-data, together with the apprehension, or, to use Drake's own word, "imagining" of the external object which is logically implied by sense-data, that difficulty vanishes altogether.

The distinction between sense-data and the external object which is involved here, agrees with the similar distinction which older Representationists drew except in that sense-data are mental existents on the view of the older Representationists, whereas they are mere subsistents on the Critical Realist's view. But if, as the Critical Realist himself says, the view of sense-data as mental cannot make room for the belief in the physical thing, the view of them as non-existent subsistents can have no more success in making room for a belief in the existent object. So the Critical Realist's device cannot save the external world from being reduced to contingency.

Then as regards the subjective side of perception, the Critical Realist's view of it is indeed an improvement upon, and a corrective of the view of Alexander etc. according to whom perceiving consists merely in the subject's reception of the effects produced by the object, i.e. in the mere awareness of sense-data. This view misses the real meaning of compresence, which implies that the subject and the object are alike important in cognition. The Critical Realists follow Kant in correcting the mistake of Moore and others by holding that perceiving consists not only in the subject's passive awareness of sense-data but also includes an active process viz. believing or imagining.—Compresence, as I understand it, signifies revelation of the object to the subject—which is such that it *can only be stated* but cannot be causally explained. Once the idea of its causal explanation is set on foot, the step which philosophers must take is to avail themselves at first of the scientific concept of mechani-

cal causation and ultimately of transcendental causation and declare that perceiving involves the subject's activity or transcendental causality. But the right course is not to make use of the causal category in any form in understanding perceiving.

The Critical Realists, like the former group of Realists, admit the distinction between mental states e.g. perceiving etc. and physical things as well as sense-data and like Moore and Russell regard this distinction as *ultimate*. Some of them e.g. Drake, have sought to establish the ultimate character of this distinction through a polemical discussion with the American New Realists who reduced both mind and matter to neutral entities. However that may be, these philosophers seem to be confronted with the same problem as to how things can be said to be given to perceiving. Drake says that "perceiving is a *logical*, essential, virtual grasp of objects, not the existential identity of object and experience". But what does he mean by the subject's *logical grasp* of the object? It is by considerably modifying the notion of mental states that Drake explains his notion of this logical grasp. Mental states on Drake's view are not non-physical but include some of the physical qualities—at least, the most general of them. Drake's "mental states" as a matter of fact, appear to be similar to Kant's "schemes" which partake of the nature of universal categories as well as of particular sense-data. Drake's attempt almost amounts to a surrender of the view of the distinction between experience and object as ultimate and really brings him into the company of Alexander and the American New Realists. But this is not the most objectionable point; finding himself unable to affirm an actual relation between experience and object Drake declares their relation to be *virtual* or *logical*. But this implies a serious misunderstanding of the nature of perceiving. For the proposition, e.g., "I see

the table" really means that 'I *actually* see the table, whereas on Drake's view, it would mean "*As if* I see the table". But every act of an erroneous perception and the recognition of its erroneous character are *two acts* and *not one*, it is wrong to press them into a unity and declare that all acts of perception signify a *virtual* and not an *actual* relation between experience and object. .

The Critical Realists and the older Representationists agree in affirming the independent reality of physical things as well as the self. Again, they agree so far as our knowledge of the self is concerned in as much as the data of this knowledge, according to both, are mental states. The self, on the view of the Critical Realist, as on that of the old Representationist, is the independent reality which is implied by mental states. The difficulty of this position is that the construction of the independent reality of the self from contingent mental states is an impossible task.

Stout etc. substantially agree with the Critical Realists in regard to our present problem,—in spite of their difference from the latter regarding the status of sense-data. In viewing sense-data as mental in the manner of older Representationists these philosophers are indeed under a great difficulty which I have previously noticed.

As regards perceiving as such, they rightly recognises its temporary and contingent character, and by giving up the older Cartesian conception of it as the essence of the soul, agree with other Realists in holding that it consists in mental acts. But they differ from Alexander etc. in finding that the purely empirical interpretation of perceiving as constituted merely by awareness, is inadequate, and agree with the Critical Realists in advocating the Kantian empirico-rational understanding of it as awareness mediated by a logical process or an element of thought. They therefore, commit the same mistake in understanding compresence as

we have previously noticed in the case of the Critical Realists. Again, although in virtue of their view of sense-data as mental they avoid a difficulty which other Realists can not—viz. in regard to the possibility of the givenness of sense data, they lay themselves open to a fresh difficulty in virtue of that very view—the difficulty how physical things, by acting on sense-organs, can give rise to data of a mental character. Lastly as regards the self, their theory of it is essentially the same as that of the Critical Realists and so is open to the difficulty of the latter.

We have so far seen that the Realists agree amongst themselves in so far as they all proceed on the assumption that the universe has two distinct sides viz. the mental and the physical or, rather, the subjective and the objective—which they find sufficiently demonstrated by the fact of knowledge, necessarily implying the knower and the object known. But the American New Realists hold that the universe consists merely of objects and that there is nothing which can be called subjective. They don't, however, deny that there are such things as knowledge or rather consciousness, the self or the subject etc., but they hold that these are not *sui generis* but are deducible from objects. They are convinced that the independent reality of the external world cannot be vindicated as long as we continue to admit the independent reality of the subjective.

My contention now, is that these philosophers are wrong in attributing their failure to vindicate the independent reality of the external world to the admission of the independent reality of the subject, and that if they reduce the subjective to the objective, they fail to account for that side of the universe which is ordinarily regarded as subjective viz. that which consists of knowledge, or rather consciousness, the self etc. Holt, who is the most prominent representative of American New Realism, holds that consciousness or perceiving

is physically conditioned and that it is dependent on the reaction or response of the nervous system. Again, he states that consciousness is not in the nervous system but outside it. Now the question is : on which side of the nervous system ? Other realists admit two distinct sections of reality on the two sides of it viz. the subjective and the objective and assign consciousness to the former section, whereas these philosophers who admit only one section, relegate consciousness to the latter. They do not, however hold that consciousness is coextensive with the whole realm of objects which spreads beyond the nervous system but state that a specific response of the nervous system cuts off only a small cross-section of the realm of object and that consciousness is the aggregate of the objects included in the cross-section thus cut off.

The difference between a *mere object* and an *object that is known* is, on this view, that the latter stands in relation with an organic response while the former does not. But the difficulty is that although the fact of an object's being known presupposes an organism's response to it, the presence of that response does not necessarily result in the knowledge of it. This really means that there may be unconscious responses. But Holt seems to get over this difficulty by holding that unconsciousness is really consciousness and thereby implying the absurd position that even in a state of dreamless sleep when our organism may respond to stimuli, we must be conscious. Secondly, the cross-section of the objective world, which is cut off by the organic response must, on his view be the object as well as the consciousness of it. That being so, the object is inseparable from the consciousness of it. Since by an object is meant something definite and determinate, i.e. what Holt calls a cross-section of the objective world and not the indeterminate world of neutral entities and since the object as such a cross-

section is inseparable from consciousness, Idealism follows as a necessary consequence. Thirdly, not to speak of the deduction of that special form of particular actual fact called consciousness from neutral entities which are universal logical beings characterised by mere possibility, it is impossible to deduce particular actual existents as such—no matter whether objective or subjective, from the latter. Drake rightly observes "You cannot deduce existence from logical terms and propositions. The essence of existence is not existence itself. You can have the essence consciousness in a conceptual universe. But to have actual consciousness you have to have really existing minds". Fourthly although Holt says that the object and the consciousness of it are not separated by anything but are the two sides of one and the same thing, the truth really is that Holt altogether misunderstands the nature of compresence in so far as he fails to notice that 'compresence subsists between two terms which are not reducible to one another and so are such that one of them cannot be said to be the same as the other in another aspect. Lastly Holt's theory of consciousness is fundamentally defective in that the subject, Ego, or the I which is necessarily involved in every act of consciousness, has no place in it. He would indeed, hold that our conscious life is governed by one law, one supreme purpose, to which all our actions are subordinated and which is the I in the proper sense of the term. But the difficulty is that the category of purpose is of a relative character in that it implies not only that to which the purpose belongs but also that to which it is directed. That being so, the unity of the self as the unity of such purpose cannot really be said to be its own unity. Moreover, although it is true that great men are actuated by a unity of purpose in most of their activities, to reduce the unity of the self to the unity of purpose is to deny the self to most human beings. Modern Realists, no less than other philosophers have failed

to vindicate the independent reality of the external world as well as of the self on account of their failure to understand the true nature of consciousness especially of perceiving.

I suggest the following as the remedy for the difficulties of the Realists. In the first place, we must realise that knowing, perceiving or, for that matter, any other mode of consciousness, although it logically presupposes certain conditions viz., physical, etc., is, as an actual fact, unconditioned, so that that which is given to it may be what is in itself. I have deliberately used the word "may" here in order to indicate that the identity of a given data with the external object would depend not only on the unconditionality of perceiving but also on what status we assign to it. This really brings in my second point. That identity, which is absolutely needed for the vindication of the independent reality of the external world, would be possible provided we hold that knowing, perceiving etc., are *relations* and not existents or qualities of existents. The Realists of modern times indeed mention cognitive relations, and yet regard knowing, perceiving etc., as mental acts which are existents. Mental acts as existents cannot themselves be relations, but stand in need of being related to its data in virtue of some relations, which is non-existent for these philosophers. William James did a signal service to philosophy by first raising his doubt about the existence of consciousness, and he was perfectly right in holding that it does not exist but he failed to see that it does not exist because it is a relation. Now perceiving as a relation is unique ; and on account of its uniqueness it is compresence which is qualitatively distinct from other kinds of relation.

The peculiarity of relation is that while it implies relata which it relates, it does not enter into the existence of them. So the physical thing, which is given to perceiving, is no more conditioned, determined or modified by perceiving than

the table which stands in the relation of co-existence with the chair, is, in any way affected by that relation. Thus it is the view of perceiving as relation that alone can vindicate the independent reality of the external world. This is not however, the only purpose which this view can serve. For, on this view, perceiving as relation no more enters into or affects the existence of the self, than the existence of the external object so that the self is an independent reality, being thus free from the determination of perceiving etc. However different our cognitive activity may be from our moral activity, they both agree in that they equally bring the self and the not-self into relation with one another. That being so, there seems to be nothing to prevent us from arguing that cognition is characterised by the same unconditionality which Kant claims for moral activity. Kant was indeed very bold in extricating knowledge from the operation of every kind of mechanical principle, but ultimately succumbed to the influence of the traditional causal conception of knowledge in subjecting knowledge to the transcendental activity of the logical self.

III

The Problem of Self-Knowledge.

By the term, 'self-knowledge' is here meant the self's *apprehension of itself*, corresponding to its apprehension of the external world—no matter whether apprehension as a process is alike or different in nature in the two cases. This serves to eliminate an important meaning of the word 'knowledge', namely, that we do not or cannot apprehend a thing and yet *can assert that it exists or is real* in some sense. Abstract mathematical knowledge as well as our knowledge of what Kant called noumenal or supernatural. e. g., immortality etc. are instances of knowledge in this sense. Since knowledge in the present sense is fundamentally different from knowledge in the sense of apprehension, I might call

the former *logical awareness* and the latter *empirical apprehension* in order to express their difference. There is yet another sense of the term 'self-knowledge' which is also precluded by the view of sense-knowledge as a form of empirical apprehension. It was clearly brought out by Descartes in his famous statement : "cogito ergo sum". The self, on his view, is neither empirically apprehended nor is asserted to exist in virtue of what I have called logical awareness, but is said to know itself in the sense that it is, on account of having consciousness as its essence, a self-luminous or self-revealed existent.

Now, as regards the modern Realists those among them, who believe in the possibility of self-knowledge, agree among themselves in starting with the distinction between the independently existing self and mental acts and in holding that the former can be said to be known in the sense that its existence can on some ground or grounds be asserted, while the latter can be *apprehended*. In regard to the nature of this apprehension they however differ from one another, and, as a matter of fact, hold two distinct views. One section of them e.g., the Critical Realists, like Malebranche, Locke and Kant, state that mental acts must be apprehended as indirectly and mediately as physical things, whereas another section which includes Alexander etc., hold that this apprehension is direct and immediate. However, I have already shown that none of the important schools of contemporary Realism have been able to construct a satisfactory theory of the self. Then as regards the question how far they have been able to make out a case for the possibility of our apprehension of mental acts, I might also state at once that since mental acts, as previously shown are not existents but relations and since relations, although they can be said to be known in some sense, are certainly not known in the sense that they are *apprehended*, the question of that possibility can not arise.

Now when we turn to the writings of these philosophers in our search for the *positive* grounds on which they affirm the possibility of our apprehension of mental acts, we find that all that they have done in this respect is to state dogmatically that such apprehension is a fact. Alexander grants without question that mental acts are lived by the mind, that the mind "enjoys" them. Enjoyment, on his view, involves no object and so is wholly immanent in the self, whereas "contemplation" or perceptual knowledge transcends some object outside the self. Alexander's whole position here may be summed up in one sentence of his own. "My self knowledge is knowledge consisting in my self." The Critical Realists likewise assert that we can "introspect" not necessarily mental acts themselves but certainly their appearances. "Like outer perception" says Drake, "it (introspection) gives us, strictly, merely, a passing show of appearances, which may or may not be the actual character of the mental states introspected."

Now both of the above positions assume that mental acts are existents, which I am not questioning for the present. I must however observe that the Critical Realists, who place self-knowledge on the same footing as perception by holding that just as in the latter we pass on from sense-data empirically apprehended to physical things themselves by means of the non-empirical processes called "imagination," "projection" or "belief," so in the former we pass on from empirically apprehended appearances of mental acts to mental acts themselves by means of the same non-empirical process, must find as much difficulty in accounting for our knowledge of mental acts themselves as they have already found in accounting for our knowledge of physical things themselves. Now since both perception and self-knowledge, on the Critical Realist's view, really shut us within the domain of mere

appearances and can show no way to physical things and mental acts as they are in themselves, we have no means of distinguishing between the appearances of physical things and of mental acts and consequently cannot distinguish between perception and self-knowledge. Be it noted, however, that in spite of this absurdity of his position, the Critical Realist is fully cognisant of an important truth viz. that knowledge as empirical apprehension must involve the distinction between subject and object and that self-knowledge is no exception to this. The Critical Realists thus throw out a challenge to Alexander and others who hold that the self, in living its mental acts, enjoys or apprehends them. But the real point here is ignored by both and can be indicated thus. Knowledge is unquestionably a relation between two terms, and is direct if nothing intervenes between the two terms except that relation and indirect if what intervenes between them is not merely the relation but some form of existence. In other words, knowledge *qua* knowledge—no matter whether it is held to be direct or indirect, presupposes two distinct terms. That being so, to hold that self-knowledge, which obviously does not involve two distinct terms, is an actual form of knowledge is to admit an absurdity. The Critical Realists seek to avoid this absurdity by stating that one and the same mental act can itself be two distinct terms demanded by the cognitive relation, in so far as it is *in itself* and also *appears to itself*—which is an equally absurd position; whereas Alexander and others dogmatically assert that it is not absurd to hold that knowledge e. g. self-knowledge involves only one term. That self-knowledge i. e. apprehension of mental acts is not a fact has also been held; but Moore points out that this is due to their diaphanous character. Broad makes a strenuous effort to vindicate the fact of our knowledge of mental acts. He states that just as we can have a direct non-inferential knowledge of the relating relation of “between” when a pattern

of three dots in a line is presented to our inspection, so we can be said to apprehend a mental act in the sense that we have a direct non-inferential knowledge of the relating relation of a "complex" which is constituted by such "terms" as toothache etc., and is a mental act. (cf. *The Mind and its Place in Nature*, pp. 308-309). This, far from vindicating the fact of self-knowledge in his sense of the term, rather explains it away. For, in the first place, "mental act" which is here understood as a relating relation is not the *existent* event which Broad understands by that term; secondly, although it is a fact that we can know relations, our knowledge of them is certainly not empirical apprehension so that self-knowledge which on Broad's view is the knowledge of a relation, cannot be empirical apprehension, which, according to him, it should be.

The only form of the doctrine of self-knowledge which cannot be *theoretically* disproved is that according to which we can directly and immediately apprehend mental acts. This is due to the fact that it is ultimately dogmatic. Our choice, therefore, lies between the present form of that doctrine and the view that the empirical apprehension of these mental acts is not a fact—which may also be said to be dogmatic in character. So far as I am concerned, I choose the latter alternative. Since the so-called mental acts are nothing but *relations* and since relations are such that we can be *logically aware* of them but cannot *empirically apprehend* them, the present form of the doctrine of self-knowledge is absolutely unacceptable from the point of view of this paper. This does not, however imply that by self knowledge I mean logical awareness of the cognitive relations. Since the cognitive relation, on my view, is something which merely relates the self and the object of its knowledge but does not enter into the existence of either, the logical awareness of it can no

more be self knowledge than knowledge of the external world. Self-knowledge in the strictest sense of the term is, on my view, the logical awareness of the independently existing self.

"The Calling of the Philosopher"

ADDRESS

BY

PRINCIPAL J. MACKENZIE

*(General President, Tenth Session of the Indian
Philosophical Congress).*

When you did me the honour to invite me to preside over the Tenth Session of the Indian Philosophical Congress, I felt some difficulty in choosing a subject on which to deliver the usual Inaugural Address. One of my first impulses was to give you my own views on one of the more important problems of philosophy, but after much thought I came to the conclusion that I might more profitably try to pass on to you some of my thoughts on the more general question of the place and function of philosophy itself. This is a living question. It has been a living question since philosophical thought began. But at the present time I think it may be claimed that there is more evidence of mutual respect between those who are concerned with ultimate questions and those who are concerned with the discovery of truth within the spheres covered by the natural sciences. We see less of that "scornful antagonism of men of science to the philosopher of which Professor Mc. Dougall speaks, and a great deal of genuine respect, if not for the philosopher himself, at least for some of the problems with which the philosopher is concerned. The philosopher is not yet in danger of experiencing the woe threatened to those of whom all men

speaking well, but at least the importance of his task is being more fully recognised. It may therefore not be amiss to raise afresh the question of the nature of that task and of that calling.

In speaking of philosophy there is an initial prejudice which one has to overcome. There are many who have been alienated from philosophy by the belief that it is a study possessed of no living human interest. It is supposed to be concerned with problems of a highly artificial kind, which could only have arisen in a certain eccentric and desiccated type of mind, and which are capable of discussion only in a jargon as dreary as the minds which invented it. There certainly are philosophical works which may seem to confirm this belief, but they do not give ground for any sweeping conclusion. If philosophy be concerned with the most fundamental of all questions that can be asked regarding reality, it is not to be expected that these questions will always be capable of being answered in terms that will be intelligible to every idle reader. The study of philosophy requires no less persistent application and self-discipline than any other branch of human enquiry. I think I may take it that no member of this Congress has undertaken it from hedonistic motives, and yet I think many will agree that the study brings a rich reward. I do not know if even Milton would have subscribed to the words which he puts into the mouth of the younger brother in *Comus*, but at least they will strike a sympathetic chord in every philosopher's heart :—

How charming is divine philosophy !
Not harsh and crabbed as dull fools Suppose,
But musical as is Apollo's lute,
And a perpetual feast of nectared sweets,
Where no crude surfeit reigns.

Whether philosophy be charming or repellent, it is not

possible to evade her, for she is concerned with questions which men have not conceived in moments of airy fancy, but which have persistently forced themselves upon them. I am speaking to-day not primarily to the professional philosopher but to a more general audience of people who believe that there is something in philosophy, and who wish us well, but many of whom doubtless have a lingering suspicion that we live in a region far remote from practical life, and that in our discussions there is a considerable element of what our American friends call "hocus pocus." I believe there are people present here who have these doubts and suspicions, who would be comforted to think that they were unwarranted, and who are prepared to hear us in our own defence. What, they ask, is philosophy about? What useful purpose does it serve in the world? To what solid achievements can it point?

I hope my philosophical friends will bear with me while I try in a very simple way to answer these questions. I can give only a very partial answer to them, but I hope I may be able to say enough to convince some that we are not so completely out of touch with the world as our detractors have sometimes alleged.

Let me say then that what the philosopher is out after is truth. This may seem a very unsatisfactory and inadequate statement, for it does not differentiate the philosopher from any other person who uses his mind. The historian is out after truth; so is the scientist in every branch of science; so is the ordinary workman in his conversation with his fellows; so is the child in the unending questions which he puts to his elders. I think it is important that in the first instance we should realise that in a certain sense there is no differentiation. Truth is truth. There is not a historical truth, and a scientific truth, and a workman's truth, and a child's truth. It may be that for particular

purposes or in particular conditions an answer may satisfy me as being true, which to another person or to a person in other circumstances would appear to be quite untrue. What has happened is that we have been given an answer that is relevant to a particular set of circumstances, but which no one would claim to be the whole truth on the subject. To answer fully even the simplest question is an infinite task. It has, I believe, been described better by Tennyson than by anyone else in the lines :—

Flower in the crannied wall,
I pluck you out of the crannies,
I hold you here, root and all, in my hand,
Little flower—but if I could understand
What you are, root and all, and all in all,
I should know what God and man is.

It is obvious that it is easier to ask the kind of question with which the philosopher is faced than to answer it. We have all been embarrassed by the questions of children—simply asked, yet requiring wisdom far beyond ours to answer. In the childhood of the race these questions were raised, and child-like man invented and was satisfied with explanatory myths, just as the child at all times may be temporarily put off with a fairy story. Wordsworth has described the child as the “best philosopher,” but it is in a sense other than this. He thinks of the child untroubled by restless questionings, in a unity with the universe which is as yet unbroken. He addresses him thus :—

Thou best philosopher, who yet dost keep
Thy heritage, thou eye among the blind,
That, deaf and silent, read'st the eternal deep,
Haunted for ever by the eternal mind,—
Mighty prophet ! Seer blest !
On whom those truths do rest,
Which we are toiling all our lives to find,

When the myth-forming stage has been reached the unity is broken. The questions are there and the answers, answers that to us have all the charm of childish prattle, but which may possibly not have stirred identical emotions in the breasts of those to whom they came not as poetry but as truth.

Philosophy, in the true understanding of the word, begins when men have not merely taken to asking questions, and when they are no longer content with any kind of an answer, but when they have divined that behind all the diversity of the world there is unity, or at least coherence. The ancient Milesians became both scientists and philosophers when they set out to discover the first principle from which all things took their origin. We may not think that men like Thales and Anaximenes were great scientists or great philosophers—Thales with his theory of ‘water,’ and Anaximenes with his theory of ‘air,’ as the first principle. But they asked questions, and they set the direction of a movement, that was to lead to Socrates and Plato and Aristotle, and that was to influence thought to our own day and for untold centuries to come. They sought the truth and the truth in its fulness. Others with their aid saw farther and deeper and more clearly, but they, so far as we know, were the first in Greece to seek for a principle of coherence among things and to suggest where it was to be found.

The Greeks went on to discover many kinds of relations among facts. There is nothing in history till we come to our own times to equal the marvellous progress which they made in many branches of science—in mathematics and astronomy, in what we would call physics and chemistry, in biology and in medicine. And one of the most interesting things about them is that they did not allow all this variety of detail into the pursuit of which they were led, to divert them from the overmastering desire to see things as a whole and to know the “why” as well as the “how” of things. I

doubt whether in the history of human thought we have anything more significant than the account which Plato reports Socrates as giving of his own intellectual experience in the *Phædo*. He tells of his disappointment with the older thinkers, and with their physical theories. He was delighted when he found that Anaxagoras held that mind was the disposer and cause of all, but was disillusioned when he went on to read his works for himself.

“What expectations I had formed, and how grievously was I disappointed ! As I proceeded I found my philosopher altogether forsaking mind or any other principle of order, but having recourse to ‘air’ and ‘ether’ and ‘water’ and other eccentricities... I wonder that they cannot distinguish the cause from the condition, which the many feeling about in the dark, are always mistaking and misnaming.”

This is a passage which is worthy of attention, because it reveals the fact that while the greatest Greek philosophy grew out of science, it transcended science in both the range and depth of its enquiries. The connection between science and philosophy continued to the great advantage of both. In Aristotle we have the phenomenon of a thinker who had mastered, extended and systematised all the knowledge of his time and who held it together in the unity of a philosophical system.

In modern times it has been much more difficult to do this—indeed it has become impossible. We hear occasionally of a man possessed of encyclopædic knowledge, but this is a comparative matter. No one nowadays can know a fraction of what is to be known ; even in any one of the more important branches of science the specialist does not profess to be cognisant of all that has been discovered in every part of his subject ; he must be content with a more limited sphere.

We have seen the process going on of the fragmentation of the field of knowledge—a process not unlike the fragmentation of the land which is so much deplored in some parts of India—and we have seen to each new plot a new name given, until few of us are able even to name all the sub-divisions which have been made among the sciences. It is not to be wondered that many have lost sight of the whole in their absorption in the parts. Nor is it to be wondered at that there should be investigators who in the light of the sure results which they seem to have reached in their own department are suspicious of all attempts to reach a truth that is more fundamental and more comprehensive. They suspect that the philosopher is seeking a short and easy way to a goal which is to be reached not without dust and heat.

That is a misunderstanding of the task of the philosopher. There is no doubt that there have been thinkers who have erred through ignorance of the ways in which truth is being sought in the various fields of enquiry and of the results which are being reached. But the philosopher is not simply an encyclopædist. The truth is not to be reached by piecing together bits of truth. If the philosopher be a wise man—a true “lover of wisdom”—he will never attempt to belittle the work of the empirical scientist. He will always regard him as an ally. But at the same time he will remind the scientist, if he needs reminding, that he has artificially isolated one aspect of reality for study and investigation that even in regard to this he is concerned with the ‘how’ and not the ‘why’ and that however important may be the principles which he discovers, they are not the whole of truth, and they may not be used without rigorous examination and criticism in the building of the structure of truth. There is a common belief that the scientist, as simply waiting upon nature, is of necessity a much more faithful reporter of what nature does than any philosopher can be. The truth is that the scientist is not

usually a student of nature at all in the full meaning of the word. He is not concerned with nature as a whole, but with one phase or with a few phases of it. The actual performance of the philosopher may be no better. Indeed it may be worse, for he essays something more ambitious than the scientist, and there is the possibility, accordingly, of a more ignominious failure.

In saying this I may have given the impression that the scientist is one person and the philosopher another and that the philosopher claims the right to keep a fatherly and pedagogic eye on the scientist. If that were so, the scientist might reasonably—or unreasonably—resent it. But it is not really so. Much of the greatest philosophy has come from men who were also scientists, and these have been among the greatest of the scientists. Further, it is good to know that the greatest of our living scientists are fully aware that no particular science can give us “the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.” The British physicists, Sir James Jeans and Sir Arthur Eddington, have in different ways given very striking expression to this. I am not concerned now with the particular philosophical views to which they have been led, but with the fact that in common with all the greatest scientists they have realised the limitations of their particular quest and the need of wider horizons.

This is an all too summary characterisation of the function of philosophy in relation to the search for truth by all the multitudinous ways which the human mind has taken. I have given no idea of the variety of problems which arise and have to be faced by the thinker who would be satisfied by nothing less than the truth. Philosophy is rather an attitude of mind than a programme of enquiry. The name itself means simply “love of wisdom”, and historically it has been common to call anyone who had the spirit of the intellectual enquirer a philosopher. The word “metaphysics” is in some ways equally suggestive. It is not uncommonly understood to apply to what

lies "behind physics". Actually the name, first applied to one of Aristotle's treatises, had the more humble significance of "after physics", in the order in which it appeared in Aristotle's collected works. But the name has never lost the significance which it got from its application to the work which Aristotle himself called "first philosophy", the subject of which is "being so far forth as it is being". It is in this sense that Bradley has defined metaphysics as "an attempt to know reality as against mere appearance, or the study of first principles or ultimate truths, or again the effort to comprehend the universe, not simply piecemeal or by fragments, but somehow as a whole." The spirit of the philosopher is the spirit of the thinker who cannot rest in partial truths or in unproved or uncriticised assumptions, but who will always push his enquiry further. When that spirit is present and active there will arise the whole range of problems which have been subsumed under the general name of philosophy.

It may be of interest to those who are not professional philosophers if I try briefly to show how one famous line of philosophical thought began—how from a single question there began a process of investigation and discussion that was destined to have the most far-reaching effects. I refer to it not for its own sake, but as an illustration of the way in which the spirit of enquiry works. In the Introduction to his "Essay concerning Human Understanding" Locke tells us how the Essay came to be written. He says:—

Five or six friends meeting in my chamber, and discoursing on a subject very remote from this, found ourselves quickly at a stand, by the difficulties that arose on every side. After we had a while puzzled ourselves, without coming any nearer a resolution of those doubts which perplexed us it came into my thoughts that we took a wrong course; and that before we set ourselves upon enquiries of that nature, it was

necessary to examine our own abilities, and see what objects our understandings were or were not fitted to deal with. This I proposed to the company, who all readily assented; and thereupon it was agreed that this should be our first enquiry. Some hasty, undigested thoughts, on a subject I had never before considered, which I set down against our next meeting, gave the entrance into this Discourse.

From this first beginning his great work took its rise. The problem may have seemed at first sight a comparatively restricted one, but it widened out as the enquiry proceeded, so that he was faced with the fundamental problems not only of knowing but of being. The enquiry did not end with himself, for it started a line of thought which was continued by Berkeley and by Hume, and which with the latter came to a stop in a scepticism that could be met only by a radical re-thinking of the problems with which they had been concerned. Kant's spiritual lineage was elsewhere, but it was the sceptical conclusions of Hume that set him on his great philosophical enquiry, and that led to the formulation of the Critical Philosophy, which has so deeply influenced all modern thinking. What I wish to impress is the simple fact that you cannot limit the scope of intellectual enquiry. There are always people even people of eminence, who would counsel us to keep to enquiries which give surer promise of results than metaphysical speculation does. But this is impossible. When once you have the question which Locke raised as to the abilities of man and the objects which his understanding is fitted to deal with, you cannot ignore it. You may give a hasty and a bad answer, or you may give thought to it and formulate a considered answer. But if you do the latter you will find yourself faced with all the problems connected with God, the world and the self with which philosophy is concerned.

I think it is probable that in a gathering like this the thought has by now arisen in some minds that I have been talking about philosophy from the purely Western point of view, and that I have failed to give due consideration to the fact that all philosophy has not followed the course which we see in ancient Greek and in modern European philosophy. It was not through oversight that I took this line. I have deliberately chosen to deal in the first place with the Western approach to the problems of philosophy, but I wish now to draw attention to the fact that it is not the only approach. The Indian approach has been different. The actual content of Indian philosophical thought is in many respects different. The presuppositions with which Indian thinkers have worked have been different. (Let no one in his pride imagine that even the greatest of Western philosophers has shaken himself free of all unproved assumptions). But the great problems of knowing and being, and the problems implicated with them, have been faced as truly, as freely, and as fearlessly in India as in the West.

I feel it to be important to say this, because there have been philosophical thinkers of competence and even of eminence who have thrown doubt upon the truth of the statement that historically there has been any other approach to philosophy than that which we have seen in the West through Greek thought. The late Professor Burnet, for example, repeatedly asserted that all philosophy took its rise in Greece. Here is a passage from one of his writings :—

Unless we are to use the term in so wide a sense as to empty it of all special meaning, there is no evidence that philosophy has ever come into existence anywhere except under Greek influences. In particular, mystical speculation based on religious experience is not itself philosophy, though it has often influenced philosophy

profoundly, and for this reason the pantheism of the Upanishads cannot be called philosophical.

He goes on to say :—

By philosophy the Greeks meant a serious endeavour to understand the world and man, having for its chief aim the discovery of the right way of life and the conversion of people to it.

The Legacy of Greece. p. 58.

Burnet rests his position partly on historical and partly on theoretical considerations. He suggests that Greek influences were at work in the earliest Indian philosophy to which the name can properly be given, for he does not go so far as to deny that India did produce philosophy. And he suggests Greek influence in spite of the fact that he admits that at the time at which this influence must be assumed, "the barrier of language was sufficient to prevent any intercourse on important subjects, for neither the Greeks nor the Indian cared to learn any language but their own. I do not think that the latest historical scholarship gives much support to the idea that Greek influences were of any determinative importance in early Indian philosophy. They were certainly absent in the earliest thinking which must be admitted to be philosophical.

Burnet's doctrine on the subject is bound up with the theory that the germ of philosophy can be found only in rational science. He admits that "the only Eastern people that can bear comparison with the Greeks in science and philosophy are the Indians", but he goes on to say that "no Indian scientific work, and therefore nothing we count as philosophy can be dated with probability before the time of Alexander". (*Greek Philosophy* Part I. p. 9). He elsewhere says that "Indian science was demonstrably borrowed from Greece after the conquest of Alexander." I am not in a position to speak of the origins of Indian science, and I understand that the question is still open whether in regard to certain detailed points in philosophy India was influenced by Greece

or Greece by India. But as regards Indian philosophy in the essential lines on which it has been conceived there can be no doubt whatever. It is native to the soil of India, and it certainly did not spring from "natural science".

There is, no doubt, a sense in which it may be justly claimed that philosophy is the offspring of science. It represents an intellectual quest, and in this, as we have seen, it agrees with science, and differs from such other spheres of human experience as religion and morality and art. If we say that in India philosophy found its origin in religion, we must make it clear that by this we do not mean that philosophy may be simply an extension of religious experience, in the same way as we have found that in the West it is an extension of scientific enquiry. Science and religion as sources of philosophy do not stand on the same footing. Religion in India has been rather the soil in which philosophy has grown than the seed from which it has germinated. The analogy is not perfect, because but for the cognitive element in religious experience, philosophical thought could not so directly have grown out of it. But what I wish to make clear that in India it did originate, under conditions radically different from those under which it originated in the West. It may indeed be said that in India as in Greece there was "the endeavour to understand the world and man and the endeavour to discover the right way of life." But in these endeavours the thinkers of India did not begin with a study of the principles underlying the varied detail of the phenomenal world. They were moved by a profound sense that man's true good was not to be found in the phenomenal, and that the phenomenal itself was unsubstantial. The things of sense and of time were not the objects either of their study or of their desire. Enough for them to know that they were shadows; their business was with the Real. So they define the object of their search in such terms as these :—

The Self which is free from sin, free from old age, from death and grief, from hunger and thirst, which desires nothing but what it ought to desire and imagines nothing but what it ought to imagine, that it is which we must search out, that it is which we must try to understand. He who has searched out that Self and understands it, obtains all worlds and all desires.
(*Chand. Up.* VIII, 7, 1).

There are probably people who would say that that is not philosophy, and there are perhaps people who would say that the great Upanishadic text, "tat tvam asi," is not philosophy. It is true that the writers of the Upanishads do not present us with closely reasoned philosophical arguments of the kind to which we are accustomed in Western philosophy but they contain brilliant philosophical thinking, and they are the fountain-head from which the great streams of Indian philosophical thought took their rise. I shall not pursue this thought further. It is to my mind a matter of profound interest that we should have in the West and in India these two approaches to the problems of philosophy, and it means, a great enrichment of the thinking of the philosophical student in India that he should be in touch with the working of the minds of the great thinkers of East and West.

I have developed this point because I think it is important that we should recognise that historically there were different approaches to the problems of philosophy, just as there are great differences in the approaches of individuals in our own day. Further it is of interest to observe that the marks of their origin have remained upon the philosophies of the East and the West. I think these marks have sometimes been misinterpreted, as when for example, it is laid down categorically that in the West the philosopher's great motive has been the desire to know the truth while in the East it has been the desire to attain deliverance from

individual existence. There is an element of truth in this, but it is not the whole truth, and it is not the most essential part of the truth. Both in India and the West philosophy was born out of the needs of the human spirit. It was an intellectual quest, but the intellect has usually sought more than her own satisfaction ; or to put it more truly, what is sought in philosophy is satisfaction not merely of the intellect but of the whole man.

We might find grounds in an examination of the thought of both Indian and Western thinkers for denying that this is universally true. In the *Theaetetus* Plato puts into the mouth of Socrates the words that "wonder is the feeling of a philosopher, and philosophy begins in wonder". I do not think we can argue from this that Plato looked upon philosophy as being directed merely to the satisfaction of curiosity. He gives us various characterisations of the philosopher, and everywhere he makes it clear that in his view philosophy is a life. There is one famous passage in the *Republic*, where he tells us that the philosopher is not merely a seeker after truth ; he is a *lover* of truth and of all true being. He is a lover of the pleasures of the soul, and therefore temperate, free from all covetousness and illiberality. He is the spectator of all time and all existence, and so does not fear death. He is just, gentle and sociable—and so on. These are simply some of the heads of one of his descriptions. (Rep. VI, 485), and they are sufficient to show that for Plato philosophy was not a barely intellectual exercise. Aristotle may seem to hold a different point of view, for he adds to a similar statement to the effect that the earliest philosophers began to philosophise on account of wonder, the following words :—

Since they philosophised in order to escape from ignorance, evidently they were pursuing science in order to know, and not from any utilitarian end.....As the man is free, we say, who exists for his own sake

and not for another's, so we pursue this as the only free science, for it alone exists for its own sake. (*Meta.* 982b).

There is something here that is comparable with the thought of the Vedanta. Sankara thought of the goal of attainment as lying in knowledge; not simply of its being reached by means of knowledge, but of its consisting in knowledge. It is true there is a great difference between what Aristotle and what Sankara understood by knowledge. For Aristotle this knowledge at its highest means participation in that pure thought in which the being of God consists. But this thought is not the negation of discursive thought but its crown. With Sankara, on the other hand, the knowledge which is the goal is a knowledge in which relations are completely transcended. I am not going to develop this thought now, but would content myself with pointing out that in so far as there is truth in the statement that in Western thought intellectual satisfaction is the end of philosophy, the same statement may be made with truth of Indian thought. But it is a very inadequate statement to make about the thought of either East or West. For with both Aristotle and Sankara the end is really the adjustment of the spirit of man to reality; it is not intellectual satisfaction in any narrow sense of the term. Aristotle for example speaks of the blessedness which man attains according as he resembles the Gods in their speculative activity. "The greater a man's power of speculation, the greater will be his happiness, not as an accidental fact, but in virtue of the speculation" (*Eth.* X, viii). And the motive of the Vedanta has nowhere been more truly or more clearly expressed than in the familiar prayer of the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad:—

Lead me from the unreal to the real! Lead me from darkness to light! Lead me from death to immortality! (*Brihad. Up.*, I. 3. 28).

I would urge that both in the East and in the West philosophy has had this close connection with life. The implications for life of any given system of philosophy have depended on the actual view of reality which it has represented. This has been recognised all through history, and it has only been disguised and never really concealed by the fact that there have been thinkers who have held that it is in knowledge or contemplation that man finds his true life. To say this is not in any way to detract from the high claims that we make for philosophy as the unbiassed search for truth. In the words of the late Dr. Hastings Rashdall "To be indifferent to the results of enquiry is not really a love of Truth". Dr. Rashdall goes on to say :—

A strong sense of the practical importance of truth for purposes of life is possibly less injurious to calmness and clearness of judgment than the love of paradox, the childish desire to shock, or the mere parade of intellectual force. (*The Theory of Good and Evil*, Vol. I. p, 416.)

There is no real divorce between philosophy and men's practical needs. The enemy of philosophy both in India and in the West has not been the desire of man to reach a solution of the deepest problems of the universe which will bring satisfaction to his whole being. It has been the spirit which would allow the mind to be inhibited in its pursuit of truth by the fact that a certain satisfaction has been found in conclusions reached after a partial survey of the ground.

I can conceive that some of our friendly critics may offer the comment that in all that I have said so far I have made no attempt to show that philosophy implements the claims that have been made for her. In particular, it is common for critics to point to the certainty of the results of scientific enquiry, and to the unanimity of scientists in recognising

them, in contrast to the uncertainty of the theories of the philosophers and to the unending warfare waged against each other by the different schools. This is a case that can be very effectively put. The criticism would be completely devastating if science could be so liberated from all philosophical implications. The trouble is that the scientist is not merely a scientist; he is also a man. As a scientist he may content himself with some limited line of enquiry; as a man he has somehow to adjust himself to the universe as a whole. In making this adjustment he will probably be determined partly by his own thought and partly by judgments or prejudices which he has inherited, but not thought out for himself. The most dangerous man in the intellectual world to-day is not the man who lives by the thought of others, but he is the man who, like the figure in the comedy who had talked prose all his life without knowing it, talks philosophy or pseudo philosophy without knowing it. It is always difficult for the scientist to avoid ultimate questions. It has become no easier for him to do so with the increasing degree of specialisation among the sciences. To take a concrete illustration: it is all to the good that the science of Psychology should have been separated off from Philosophy and should have taken its place among the experimental sciences. But if all psychologists were to celebrate their emancipation from philosophy in the way in which a few of them have done, this statement might require some qualification. When Dr. J. B. Watson says that "we need nothing to explain behaviour but the ordinary laws of physics and chemistry," or when he objects to the "dogma" of the soul, on the ground that "no one has ever touched the soul, or has seen one in a test tube, or has in any way come into a relationship with it as he has with the other objects of daily experience," we realise that without knowing it he has taken a step into metaphysics.

The scientist cannot free himself from the pressure of philosophical questions. They force themselves upon him, and the choice is not between facing them and ignoring them, but it is between giving a hasty and ill-considered answer to them and taking pains to think out a satisfying answer. We may deplore the fact that with all their thinking philosophers have not reached agreement on many of the profound questions with which they have concerned themselves. But there is still more confusion among the the facile solutions offered by shallow thinkers. And philosophers of all schools continue to feel with Socrates that even the discovery of their own ignorance is no mean achievement.

It is one of the hopeful signs of the present time that leading scientists have been frankly facing the fact that they cannot evade philosophical problems. I am not going to say anything to-day about the actual views to which they have given expression. The important thing is that they should have become aware of the existence of great questions which carry them beyond the limits of their own sciences. We are led to hope for a great strengthening of that co-operation between science and philosophy, which in the history of human thought and enquiry has been so fruitful. This co-operation has never ceased, but there have been times when it has been less close than it ought to have been. The late Professor James Ward in an essay on the *Progress of Philosophy* has shown how modern science and philosophy began together, and how in their development they have influenced each other. He declares that "all the emancipation the sciences can claim was wrought for them by philosophy ; wrought not by those who were the representatives of the modern *savant*, but by men who in these days would be stigmatized as "genuine metaphysicians". He declares further that "the founders of modern science in breaking with the old philosophy did not abandon philosophy altogether. On the

contrary, they founded the new science on a new philosophy, and but for this new philosophy the new science would have been a very feeble thing, and its future would have been most precarious and uncertain." One has only to remind oneself of the work of men like Descartes and Galileo, Bacon and Locke, Leibnitz and Kant, to realise how close the association was. And the association cannot be broken. If science is not allied with good philosophical thinking, it will be allied with unphilosophical dogmatism.

One is conscious in these days of a widespread desire on the side of the scientists as well as on that of the philosophers for the strengthening of the association. It is unfortunate that our courses of studies should have become so highly specialised that many students are condemned to the study of fragments of the whole of reality, and never have their attention directed even to the fact that they are fragments. A teacher of philosophy who suggested that philosophy should find some place in the curriculum of every student of science would probably be regarded as a crank, but the words of a scientist may receive a more favourable hearing. Here is a quotation from a leading article in a recent number of *Nature* in which the relations of science and philosophy are discussed :—

An important step in the right direction would be for the academic authorities to introduce the study of philosophy and scientific method as compulsory subsidiary subjects in the official curricula for a first degree. But this brings us back to the attitude of the wise men of ancient Greece, who naturally thought of human knowledge as essentially one, as against the atomised outlook of most thinkers to-day.

I do not know whether, with University curricula overloaded as they are at present, there is much hope of the introduction of such a reform. But whether it be done through reforms in

the curricula or through the ordinary teaching of the sciences by men whose horizons have been lifted, there can be no doubt that one of the greatest of our needs at the present time is for an education that will enable the student to see beyond the fragmentariness of the particular sciences, and, according to his capacity, to apprehend the Whole.

I have spoken perhaps as if this task were related only to scientific enquiry. I would remind you of what I said earlier in this paper of the fact that philosophy has originated not only from scientific enquiry. It has grown also apart from natural science out of the questionings to which religion has given rise. And I think it would not be difficult to show that at the present time there is a spiritual movement (in the stricter sense) that is no less significant for philosophy than the scientific movement. The most outstanding scientists of the day are aware of it, and they are fully prepared to recognise that any true interpretation of reality must take account of experience in all its richness.

So the philosopher has to-day a place of as great importance as he has had at any time in history, and he has a task as great as ever was laid upon his predecessors. It is not only knowledge that has been fragmented; so have the purposes of men. The philosopher's first business is to seek and to teach the Truth as against all fragmentary truths. But the Truth is not something that subsists in cold isolation from life and in indifference to the deeds and the destinies of those who live. We cannot so separate fact and value. Rather, I think it is true, in the words of Dean Inge, that "the truth which we seek is a kingdom of values". It is in the light of this conception that he declares that he is unable to distinguish between philosophy and religion. "If the perfectly real can alone be perfectly known, and if to know God, the perfectly real Being, is eternal life, the goal of philosophy is the same as the goal of religion—

perfect knowledge of the Perfect''. I believe the philosopher rises to the full height of his high calling only as he realises that his function is not merely to harmonise all thought, but to point the way to the harmonising of all life.

Ethics and "Normatics."

By

K. R. SRINIVASIENGAR.

(*Presidential Address to the Ethics, Religion or Social Philosophy Section, 1934*).

While I am deeply sensible of the honour done me by the Congress Executive Committee in asking me to preside over the Ethics and Religion Section of this year's Congress, and I am highly grateful to them for their kindness, I am at the same time painfully conscious of my inability adequately to discharge the duties of my station, and seek the co-operation of all concerned so as to make this Section a success.

1. *The "Great Error" in Contemporary Ethics and the need for an independent Science of Value.*

A few years ago, Prof. A. R. Wadia, my revered teacher, and a great inspirer of students, who has helped to mould my thoughts by his constant encouragement and criticism, drew my attention to the incompatibility that exists between the ethical teachings of the *Dharma Sutras* like the *Manu Smriti* and those of the philosophic systems like the *Vedanta*. As early as 1925, even before the publication of Perry's *General Theory of Value*, it struck me that the incompatibility referred to by Prof. Wadia could only be explained on the assumption that ethics, as a science of moral problems relating to character and conduct, must be distinguished from the "General Science of Human Well-being" as I then called it, ¹ or from the "General Theory of Value," as Perry subsequently named it. The science of Value, such as economic, intellectual, aesthetic, political etc., is surely a larger science than ethics which, as we teach it now, is concerned with

1. In my paper on "The Theory of 'Moral Goods' ": Indian Philosophical Congress . 1925.

but a single value, viz., moral value. The scientist, the statesman, the law-giver, etc. may, from the stand-point of value or social happiness, advocate certain things, as Plato has done in his communism of wives and property, or Nietzsche has done in his conception of the superman, which may not, from a strictly moralistic point of view, be quite commendable. But usually ethics mixes up these two different and even opposed considerations of value and character. It may be asked: What harm is there in combining the two, as we do at present? Great harm, I should say, apart from the resulting confusion. For moral value being only *one* of the values, we cannot determine the nature of a specific value unless we know beforehand the nature of generic value. It has been customary, e.g., to ask in ethics the question: What is the *summum bonum*, the highest good of man, that for the sake of which all other things are good only as means? To ask a question like that implies several things. It implies (1) that there is such a thing as "good" and that it is objective in nature; (2) that its nature can be understood; (3) that 'goods' can be ranked according to a scale of quality, or quantity, or both; (4) that "goods" can be distinguished into "goods-in-themselves" *and* "goods-as-means"; (5) that "goods" are commensurable; (6) that there is or can be one supreme good (whether it is a single good by itself, or a synthesis of all the other "goods" is not clear), etc. Now, all these are more or less metaphysical questions relating to value *per se* which are still unsettled, and ethics, I submit, if our conception of it as a science of morals be correct, has no more right to discuss them than, say economics, politics, or æsthetics. It doesn't of course now discuss them systematically either, but only touches upon them here and there with implicit assumptions and prejudices; but my objection to it is that this is a ruinous procedure for both the sciences concerned, and that without a specific

discussion of such questions beforehand, we cannot answer the question of the *summum bonum* or other similar questions which now loom so large in our ethical studies. My suggestion is that the general science of Value, after discussing and pronouncing upon questions illustrated above, may hand over its findings to the several social and philosophical sciences, every one of which would then adjust its programme accordingly and attempt to work out those conclusions in detail. This failure to recognise that more ultimate questions are involved in the problems which ethics now discusses—this confusion of ethics with the General Theory of Value—I call “the Great Error” in ethics. A recognition of its moorings would, moreover, set relation of ethics to metaphysics altogether in a new light different from the one we are now accustomed to discuss.

Further, the very employment of the term ‘good’ in a loose fashion sometimes to denote value in the generic sense and sometimes moral value in the specific sense, has been a source of endless confusion and difficulties as readers of the three or four stimulating booklets recently published by the Oxford group of thinkers (such as Ross, Prichard and Joseph) on the relation between the right and the good, are well aware. What *makes* right actions right?—is the question they ask. I should be inclined to answer: the question itself is illegitimate and cannot be answered from the standpoint of morals. It is suspiciously like that other and more famous question:—What *causes* the Absolute to manifest itself?—which our Adwaitic friends tell us is an illegitimate question because it makes a transcendental use of an empirical category. Similarly, I would say, given rightness of action, its cause or reason lies beyond itself—in some other and larger science which discusses the first principles of good or value.

II. *The dangers of equating Ethics with the Science of Value illustrated by reference to some fundamental problems of value.*

Unless, then, the questions of generic value are settled in advance, we can't profitably discuss moral value. On the other hand, the attempt to answer these questions from the standpoint of morals alone naturally results in a two fold danger. On the one side, it must ignore or cover up the peculiar problems of moral value (the *āvaraṇa śakti* of the ethicist's *māyā* !) ; on the other, it would give an unduly moralistic bias to and distort the general problems of value (its *vikshepa śakti* !). Moore's *Principia Ethica* is a classical example of the first result. In reading a work like that, one hardly knows whether one is reading a work on value or morals, what with his indefinability of good, and peculiar laws and tests of intrinsic value, and his still more peculiar conception of duty as the merely expedient and of organic wholes as ideals of perfection. A most impressive work illustrating the second result is the recent *Ethics* of Prof. Hartmann of Berlin. This work is undoubtedly the greatest work on ethics written in recent times, for (amongst other reasons), besides showing remarkable metaphysical insight in the treatment of his problems, for the first time in the history of ethical thought, Hartmann recognises the distinctness of the two problems involved in ethics. Three quotations must suffice. The task of a philosophical ethics which stands at the parting of ways between the old and the new kind of philosophising is, he says, two-fold: "To bring man into the conscious possession of his moral faculty ; to open to him again the world [of values] which he has closed against himself".² "An ethics exclusively of the Ought is a moral delusion, is a blindness to the value of the actual"³. "For how shall I recognise what I ought to do so long as I do not

2. *Ethics* Vol. I, p. 45.

3. *ibid*, p. 36.

know about the values and disvalues within situations . . . ?"⁴ These are the "Two Fundamental questions" of ethics.

Such is the possibility of a 'new ethics'⁵ according to Hartmann—an ethics consciously reorientated to the problems of value. Convinced thus that the problem of values is the more fundamental, Hartmann devotes the major portion of his three volumes to what may be called the metaphysics of values.

I propose to take up some of his important conclusions on the general theory of value and show how they have been warped by the moralistic bias which lies patent on every page of his work, and how entirely different conclusions regarding value could be reached by an impartial independent investigation of its problems.

(1) Hartmann starts with the conception of "values" (plural) such as moral values, e.g., justice, truthfulness, love etc.; foundational values, e.g., consciousness, activity, freedom etc.; "goods-values" e.g., property, law, education, trade etc; and concludes that such values possess an objective, independent, transcendent ideal self-existence. They form, like Plato's Ideas, a realm of ideal essences or subsistents, neither subjectively determined by consciousness nor objectively emanated from things. While they are related to persons, they are in no sense relative to them, i.e., dependent on their longing or desire. This is of course, to use Urban's language, the "Great Tradition" in philosophy.⁶ Traditions apart, one cannot help feeling that had only Hartmann attempted to investigate the *generic* conception of *value* as such, he would probably have arrived at a different conclusion regarding

4. *Ethics*, p. 37. Also vide pp. 35, 41-44, and especially 93-94, and the whole of the Introduction.

5. Vol. I, p. 46.

6. In *The Intelligible World*.

its character. Because the *specific* values mentioned above are ordinarily taken to be desirable things worthy of being striven for to a greater or less degree, we naturally tend to objectify them as independent ideal self-existences. This is especially the case with moral values. Hartmann feels, like Kant, that moral values should possess universality and necessity and so he takes our consciousness of good and evil as the primary moral factum and identifies it with the consciousness of value.

An independent analysis of the concept of value, on the other hand, would reveal three "constants" in a value-situation: (1) the conative-affective activity of the agent, determined by the purpose he wants to realise; (2) the object which in his opinion will fulfil his end; (3) the ensuing relation between subject and object. Desire represents the heart of the situation and we desire an object, not for itself, but on account of its specific qualities which are believed to be capable of satisfying our desire, e.g., the sweetness of sugar, the speed of a car, the glow of iridescent colours lit up by the play of soft rays in a sunset etc. But surely these qualities themselves are not values? They may be a *condition* of value but do not in themselves *constitute* or *contain* value. It is only when consciousness of some kind comes into relation with the object that value arises. Value is neither in the object (which has only qualities or potencies⁷), nor in the subject (who has only feelings and desires) but in the interrelation between desire and qualities. Otherwise, if value were also a quality (as Hartmann believes⁸), the value of an object must not only be patently perceptible

7. It does not affect the the validity of this argument even if it be held that the so-called "qualities" are mind-dependent as e.g. in the "generative theory" of *sensa*.

8. *ibid*, p. 185.

to any one to whom its other qualities are so perceptible, but, like the latter, be common and constant to all normal experients. But such notoriously is not the case. There is no parallelism at all between mathematical and axiological judgments.

To say that an object is valuable is thus to employ a transferred epithet. What we really mean is simply that the object *would be found satisfying some one's desire, if some one desired it, and so long as the existence of the same universe of desire is guaranteed*. But according as our desire for this or that object alters, their value also alters. Value, then, if not exactly created by desire, at any rate *occurs* or *emerges* only when the subjective desire relates itself to an objective quality capable of satisfying it. "Values," Hartmann himself admits, are not "categories." While categories are valid for, and exercise compulsion over, the real, values do not hold true of the real sphere, but are only 'norms,' 'ideals'.

Value, then, is not a quality but a 'property'⁹ of the object *acquired* by it when it enters into effective relatedness with a mind. This inter-relation is the 'locus' of value. The relation itself is not the value—for it is asymmetrical—but it is the source of value. Value is the *product* of the inter-play of the two relations involved, and not their *sum*. It is the *function*, so to say, of desire and objective quality. Or, if we regard the "function itself" (the inter-relation), value would be "the value" (dependent variable) of the two "arguments" (independent variables), viz., desire and objective quality. We can represent this by the formula, $a = b \times c$, or,

9. I owe this useful distinction to Lloyd Morgan in his *Emergent Evolution*. In the language of Alexander, value may be called a "tertiary quality," but his exposition of value, it will be noticed, is fundamentally different from mine.

more generally, by, $f(xy)$. Shortly, value may be defined as *the status of satisfyingness of an object emerging out of the contemplation of it by a subject attached to a given universe of desire realisable by that object.*

This is what I have called "the Emergent Theory of Value", which distinguishes itself alike from the subjective as from the objective theories so far current. It necessitates objective *reference* for value, but is not objective in the ordinary sense. It shows that value is an emergent—a new and unpredictable entity springing up on the basis of the old elements, desire and quality. The causes determining its emergence are two-fold : teleological desire, (agency) and natural (physical and mental) relatedness. "Satisfyingness" is the generic value that emerges in each case ; but according as the objective situation with which mind or consciousness, led partly by natural causes and partly by purpose, enters into effective relatedness, is different in different cases, we name the emergents differently and speak of every one of them as *a* value, e.g., beauty, goodness, freedom, love, truth, etc. In every case, the primary matrix out of which various kinds of value emerge is the motor-affective continuum of psychical life, just as in Alexander, Morgan and others, the matrix out of which life, mind, reflective thought etc. emerge is the space-time continuum of the physical universe. In the actual emergence of value, however, there are three factors to be studied, viz., (1) the desires or dominant interests of the individual (subjective or teleological explanation in terms of self-preservation, e.g., gregariousness or acquisitiveness or curiosity etc.); (2) the qualities or characters of the object found satisfying the desire ; and (3) the processes of relatedness (natural interpretation in terms of integration, individuation reproduction, counteraction, dynamogenesis, sublimation etc.)

I claim that Hartmann's own statement that values find

a locus in the human subject¹⁰ who in "sensing" and realising them is said to exercise the divine attributes of providence and creativity, transforming non-being into being, supports my theory that value springs into existence where there was none before.

What, then, is the ontological status of value, defined as an emergent?,—it may be asked. Following Mc Taggart's analysis of "existence", I would say that there is no distinction between subsistents and existents, that whatever is real is also existent while the non-existent is the unreal. Since value is a real emergent event, it is certainly an existent. But it differs from an ordinary existent such as a table or its colour in these respects: (1) the *esse* of value-existent is *entirely* dependent upon the union of mind and its object; (2) with the cessation of a mind's contemplation, the value which had emerged *during* the contemplation ceases also; with the resumption of contemplation, value reappears; (3) a positive value may subsequently become an evil or a dis-value and later on turn out to be a good. A whole cluster of interesting metaphysical problems—e.g., whether the same value reappears or a different value; if the same, its mode of existence in the interim; the final destiny of these values; the problem of evil, etc.—tantalizingly await the metaphysician's reach here. I shall content myself with stating that this feature of values—that they once emerge, then are "immersed," and then probably resurge, thus undergoing alterations in their mode of existence—requires us to characterise them as *transistents*. Transistents are not universal or eternal in the sense in which subsistents are claimed to be. Rather are they particular-universal, a peculiar variety of existents whose mode of existence is subject to transition depending

10. By shooting forth a tendency—the 'positive-ought-to-be,' as he calls it, distinguished from the "ideal-ought-to-be".

upon the motor-affective life of the valuing agent. But, it may be said, to call values transistents is only to practise a verbal trick, suggesting, as it does, that, after their emergence, they float into nowhere and float in again from nowhere. What is their *locus standi* after they have emerged? How are they grounded in reality? I recognise the force of this question, but I can only plead my inability to enter into a discussion of it here for want of space. I may, however, refer the reader to the fifth problem discussed below where it is suggested that transistents find their metaphysical grounding in spirit in which they are transmuted into intrinsic value or worth.

(2) Regarding values as independent, objective, ideal essences, Hartmann talks of the "sensing" of values. It is certainly a long-desiderated improvement upon Kant that he has been able to establish convincingly the validity of what he calls the "material *a priori*" on the one side, and the "emotional *a priori*" on the other. But what passes our comprehension is that he should hold that "the material *a priori*" of value is grasped, directly intuited, only by the *a priori* of feeling and that the rational or intellectual *a priori* has nothing to do with it. Concrete moral life shows no trace of the function of judgment; every moral preference is intuitive and immediate and does not wait for a judgment of the understanding¹¹

Intuitionism of this kind is rather disconcerting to moralists, for it easily degenerates into emotionalism and, worse, fanaticism. But apart from such dangers attending practical life, it is not true, even in theory, that in the consciousness of value there is only feeling present and not reason also. This would imply that affective states are themselves modes

11. Vol. I, pp. 174—178. "Ethical intellectualism" needs to be "overthrown," *ibid*, p. 179.

of apprehension and the only faculties by which value could be apprehended and these are palpably false assumptions. Both in practice and theory, the valuational consciousness does involve an element of judgment or reasoning, however rudimentary in form. In fact, value does not exist prior to valuation or appreciation. Whether, and if so how far, the object fulfils or realises the interest (or 'universe of desire ') of the subject can only be determined through the judgment of value, and this determination is precisely the determination of value, i. e., is the point at which value emerges. The act of valuation does not consist simply in liking, desiring, or otherwise being favourably disposed towards the object, as Hartmann, Perry and others hold; in addition to such liking etc., the act also involves finding, deeming or judging valuable. The process of mind which determines or conditions the existence of value (and in this sense generates value) is not different from the process which apprehends, knows or discovers value through valuation.¹² Appreciation, it may be said, is neither judgment merely nor feeling merely, but judgment-feeling. Where the conformity or otherwise of the object to the norm of expectation is not perceived through judgment, there no value can arise. Mere interest acts only to appropriate or possess the object, but this process of interest-enjoying-object may go on for any length of time without there occurring any value in the whole process.¹³ Our valuation of an object may prove to be wrong or incorrect, and in this sense it involves a leap a jump. To value is to risk, to dare, to venture, to entertain an "as if".

12. Messrs R. B. Perry, Prall, Sheldon, Reid etc. think that the two processes are different, while Dewey holds they are identical.

13. Of course, R. B. Perry's distinction between interest-judgment and judgment of value is borne in mind here, but it cannot be discussed in this connection.

Further, conformity is the character in the object (corresponding to the subject's desire) which is the object of appreciation. But conformity has a different categorial structure in different cases, and thus the constitution of different values, of truth, goodness, beauty, etc., is necessarily different.

This, I believe, is a convenient place to refer to a question which must have been haunting the reader's mind from the beginning. Value, it is here maintained, exists only in appreciation involving self-awareness and awareness of objects as conducive or non-conducive to the individual's interest. Is there no value, then, in that part of the universe where reflective consciousness does not obtain, in the activities of animals and plants, for instance, or, lower still, in the inorganic kingdom? Alexander, e. g., maintains that value (as he interprets it) in a more extended sense not only reaches lower down than man, but perhaps is a common feature of all finites,¹⁴ nay, is founded in the nature of Space-Time itself.¹⁵ On the subjective interpretation of value here defended, it may be said that wherever there is mere interest in an object not involving conscious appreciation, there is, not value, but *validity*. The milk is *valid* for the infant, but the infant does not *see* its value.¹⁶ Food is valid for hunger, drink for thirst; water for fishes and frogs, the sky for birds; rain for crops, the breast for the babe; magnet for iron filings, poison for death. Shortly, any kind of adaptability or fitness of one thing for another, any kind of appetition or attraction below the level of conscious desire, is guided, not

14. Space, Time & Deity, Vol. II, p. 302.

15. Ibid, p. 311

16. On my theory that *seeing* is *creating* value, the milk, we should say, has no value for the infant.

by value, but validity. Provisionally speaking, we may note the following features of validity:

(1) Validity is objective, belonging to the nature of things themselves. It is not caused by the desire of a finite object primarily, for it is part of the constitution of things themselves and their relations. A babe's 'liking for the breast' does not thereby make it valid for the babe; its liking is only a concrete expression, through a particular organism, of the objective validity of breasts for babes in general, inherent in the nature of things themselves.

(2) Validity is thus purely a naturalistic conception and involves no idea of *moral* (in the large sense of the term) application or appreciation. It does not, *as such*, apply to human actions or desires, though, as we shall see, it may be *implied* in them.

(3) Value always implies validity in some sense and is something more, whereas validity excludes value and is something less. The attraction of one object for another is an *expression* of validity; the attachment of a person for an object is the *cause* of value. Value belongs to things which might have been, or may be, otherwise, but validity as between two things can never be otherwise than it is, and so, validity is not value. (4) Validity is not merely objective, but it is universal and timeless—not indeed as eternal or super-temporal—but as out of relation to any particular instant of time. It is however, also an existent, for only as 'holding for,' or embodied in, concrete existents has it any significance.

(5) Even the validity of an object is always 'for' some other objects. That is, validity is also instrumental like value.

The metaphysical presuppositions of validity cannot be discussed here for want of space, but I should like to say that the idealistic theory of value, as embodied in the doctrines of individuality and self-realisation, can, it seems to me, be

satisfactorily explained in terms of validity. There is no value in a plant putting forth flowers (value arises only when some mind appreciates it); but flowering and fruit-bearing are valid for plants and trees. That is, the plant has an appetition towards flower-bearing, or towards the realisation of its inherent possibilities. Likewise cutting is valid for a knife, and good speed for a race-horse, and clear sight for the eye. That means, affinity may also exist between an object, or an organ, and its function, and then there would be an appetition in the object or the organ towards expressing or realising that function. Good therefore (at the natural level) means fulfilment of function or validity as involving affinity and appetition. There are, then, no values, but only validities, in the natural world. For value, as we have seen, belongs only to things which might have been, or even may be, otherwise, and since the process of self-fulfilment is the process of attaining individuality or becoming a "whole," it represents only a *natural* process—the whole can never be otherwise than what it is—and so, it has no value.

(6) Value, then, is an emergent "property" an object struck in the process of appreciation, and not an ideal self-existence "sensed" by feeling alone. Hartmann emphasises feeling as the medium of the valuational consciousness, because with the admission of reason he fears that the nature of ethics as a normative science (as he interprets it) would be destroyed. But his interpretation of ethical normativity is peculiar and bound up again with his predilection for intuitionist morality. Normativity for him has nothing to do with judgment or reason; it is the values themselves which are primarily normative in character, and their normative character is later on transferred to ethics through their being brought to the forefront of rational consciousness. This is like putting the cart before the horse. In what sense is it intelligible to say, that value as such, or even *a* value,

like power, prestige, property etc., is a norm, an ideal, a commandment? Moral values may be so, but is it true of *all* values? The right meaning of normativity (as I understand it), applied to value *per se*, is that value is determined by the degree to which an object conforms to our norm of expectation. Value is in its very nature instrumental. We value objects not for their own sakes, but for the sake of a wider interest (universe of desire) realisable by them. If so, instrumental value naturally involves the idea of comparison with, or determination by, a norm of expectation. Satisfaction is never solely the appeasement of desire as such, but also in its true nature the fulfilment, either complete or partial, of an expectation, a goal. In the enjoyment of a piece of poetry, or a song, e.g. the enjoyment always holds some proportion to the piece "coming up" or "falling below" our expectation. Since appreciation is always by reference to the degree of the object's conformity to a norm¹⁷ or standard, the science of value may conveniently be called "Normatics" (the science of the application of norms), if the coining of such a new term be permissible.

4. The nature, the ontological status, the modes of apprehension—and creation, as I would say, or realisation, as Hartmann says,—of value have been discussed so far. The corner-stone of Hartmann's metaphysical exposition of value is his categorial law of height and strength which, according to him, governs not merely the relations between the different strata of being (involved in the principle of the multiple stratification of the universe), but all cases involving gradation and distinction between higher and lower. As applied to values, the distinction between height and strength I would interpret as the distinction between intrinsic and

17. Naturally, questions like, How are norms constituted? Are they subjective or objective? etc. arise in this connection, but they cannot be discussed here for want of space.

instrumental value. Otherwise, what is meant by saying that the higher value "uses the lower as its material," "unifies it in a new way" and "builds a higher structure above it"? When Hartmann claims that the higher values are always "weaker," and "dependent"¹⁸ on the lower, and not *vice versa*, it seems to me he is confusing two kinds of dependence, ontological and axiological. His claim is true only with reference to ontological dependence. Axiologically, the lower value, it must be admitted by Hartmann, is a means for the realisation of the higher, and in so far, dependent upon the latter. Is not the "goods-value" of property, e.g., a means to the realisation of the values of personality?

And yet I would not so rigorously hold to the distinction between intrinsic and instrumental value which Hartmann nevertheless accepts in a rigid sense.¹⁹ All utilitarianism—all "social eudæmonism"—is mistaken enthusiasm for Hartmann, for it raises mere utility to the rank of an end by itself.²⁰ The good is good in itself. Not to be good for anything else, never to be the useful, is of the very essence of its nature. I am afraid this is a perfect *reductio ad absurdum* of the whole position. The good-in-itself is never good for anything, and so is of no good! The Kantian goodwill, call it "the categorical imperative or fitzi-putzi" has laid its clammy hand here. The voice is that of Esau, but the hand is that of Jacob. Ethics has suffered more by this one false doctrine than by all the other false doctrines put together. I have always maintained that the distinction between intrinsic and instrumental value is only relative and that value

18. Another interesting, but so far as I know, hitherto-undiscussed, problem relating to the "Notion of Dependence," so freely made use of in Philosophical systems, needs discussion in this place, but space considerations prohibit the discussion here.

19. Vol. I, pp. 138, 140.

20. Ibid. Ch. X.

in its essential nature is instrumental only. Unless we take into account the relation of any given object to conscious existence, its usual results for, or effects upon, sentient beings and their happiness, it is chimerical to hope to decide whether it has any value. Value-science must in this broad sense be pragmatic or utilitarian. Elsewhere²¹ I have discussed this question at greater length. I have discussed several methods—notably Moore's method of isolation, and what I have called the "method of opposite effects"—for determining intrinsic value. There are other tests of intrinsic value²². I would propose such as incorruptible maximisation, absolute uniformity of causal connection, non-addibility, indivisible shareability, independence, incommensurability, universalisation, comprehensive compatibility, etc. Applying all these methods and tests, I have been led to the conclusion that the values of the things of this world are always relative to the consequences which they produce upon the life of sentient beings²³. A sunset does indeed appear beautiful to a person whose mind is in a fit condition to be pleased with it; to a prisoner condemned to the gallows at sunset, the approach of sunset would, I imagine, have an entirely different value from that usually ascribed to it.

5. I shall take one more illustration from Hartmann to show the unfortunate influence of ethics upon 'normatics.' An unbiassed investigator of value should be prepared to

21. Vide, "The Theory of Moral Goods": Ind. Phil. Cong. Proceedings, 1925; "The Methods of Ethics" I. P. C. P. 1929; "Cathartic Theory of Morals" I. P. Quarterly; "Values as objective," Ibid, 1933 and 1932 respectively.

22. Or "Worth" as I have called it to distinguish it from instrumental value.

23. My main inspiration for the pragmatism or 'utilitarianism' here defended I have drawn from the teachings of Prof. Wadia, though probably he may not agree to the route I have taken to find it or to the region of religious speculation which I see lying beyond it.

follow whither the logic of his premises leads him. What is the *raison d'être* of the existence of the Realm of Values? What is their relation to the existents of the universe? What constitutes the *ideality* of their existence? Plato, it will be recalled, was confronted with similar questions regarding the realm of ideas, and he answered them by saying that the ideas, are the final causes of the things of the phenomenal world and that "the Good" is the highest among the ideas imparting reality and meaning to the other ideas, while in one dialogue at least he identified 'the Good' with God, who fashions the world after the teleological patterns, viz., ideas. One would have supposed that the champion of the objective *ideal* existence of values would make some such attempt to organise, centralise, and give a habitat to his floating homeless denizens of the ideal sphere. But no, the very phrase Divine Person, or any higher personality than man, is a red rag to the moral eyes of Hartmann ²⁴. If, as he believes, in the case of man it is true that the finalistic nexus is able to invade the causal nexus of cosmic events, insert itself into it without opposition, and canalise it for its own purposes, may it not be the case that in the case of natural evolution also where a large number of gaps, loops and zigzags are observed, where the causal theory confessedly breaks down at many points as in quantum mechanics, spontaneous origination and emergent evolution, there *may* be in operation a finalistic nexus attributable to a higher than human consciousness? The pity of it is that Hartmann is not willing even to consider this possibility, his only reason being that to posit cosmic teleology is to negate human freedom—which is plainly no reason but prejudice. Ethics is final for him. Metaphysics must heed ethics, not ethics metaphysics. So be it, and the present

24. Curiously enough, in one place at least he talks of "eternal wisdom and justice" as the plan of the universe : Vol. I, p. 151.

writer is prepared to subscribe to Lotze's dictum that the true beginning of metaphysics lies in morals (provided we substitute 'values' for 'morals'). But why slam the door unceremoniously on poor metaphysics? For it may be that after all man's freedom and God's purpose are complementary to, and not conflicting with, each other. For, if we accept the Indian view, it is the totality of the *Karma* of the *purushas* (selves) themselves that determines the progress of natural evolution. Again, according to the Idealistic theory of the state, the moral purpose of the state coincides largely with that of the individuals, and in order to help their moral self-realisation, the state maintains certain external and indispensable conditions of moral life under which alone the individuals can develop their free disinterested morality. Thus, it seems to me, is to be conceived the relation between human freedom and Divine Purpose. Thus at any rate does the logic of norms in contemplation, instrumental validity and value and "transistent" entities point the way to a wider horizon where values find their final focus.

III. A New Interpretation of Philosophy as Value Science.

I think I have sufficiently illustrated my contention that our conclusions upon the general problems of value are liable to be seriously warped or distorted if we view these through the spectacles of ethics or any other science dealing with a specific value. A science dealing with a specific value would, as I have already pointed out, be in a better position to deal with its problems when it has received beforehand the general principles of valuation from normatics. The most crucial problem in ethics, e.g. is the existence of the double contradiction in the very heart of morality so ably 'pointed out by Bradley—a contradiction which, he thinks, justifies him in dismissing goodness as an appearance. How to combine goodness or purity of will with objective efficacy of

action, how to reconcile the desire for self-development with the equally legitimate desire for self-sacrifice inherent in the very nature of the self, how to harmonise the claims of the partial self with the claims of the total self—this is the impregnable rock upon which, according to Bradley, the ship of moral life is sundered to pieces. The problem would become easier of solution if we introduce here our distinction between what properly belongs to morality and what to values. Doubtless moral values have a predominance over other values but when it is remembered that they also share in the general nature of value as such, they reveal their obvious limitations. I have attempted a solution of this age-long question—which appears in other forms as well, as e. g., the question of reconciling form and content in morality—in my paper on “The Cathartic Theory of Morals” from the standpoint of values²⁵.

Value Science, then, must be recognised and treated as a separate independent science with peculiar problems of its own. Nay, I would go further and say that the problems of axiology or normatics (as I call it) are central or basic in all philosophy and not merely incidental to other problems. In logic, epistemology, metaphysics, aesthetics, philosophy of religion, economics, law, etc,—in every one of these sciences, the really philosophical problems are problems of value. In logic and epistemology, it is a question of probability and certainty—establishing a scale of logical values; in aesthetics, the criticism of art, the meaning and criterion of beauty, the place of art in life etc,—all these being value-problems; in religion, it is a question of conservation or transmutation of values; likewise in law, economics, philosophy of education, etc. Metaphysics is sometimes claimed to be purely a non-value study. Urban's contention (in his *Intelligible World*) that the very distinction between the real and the unreal, being and non-being, the existent and the non-existent,

presupposes the acknowledgment of value and therefore metaphysics is value-science *par excellence*, is rather of doubtful force. But I would say this much : if the real is treated as the significant or the meaningful, if the conception of "degrees of reality" is interpreted as meaning degrees of perfection or excellence, if the All-Whole or the All-Soul implies not mere quantitative comprehensiveness but also *qualitative richness*, if, not mere Existence—Absolute, or Knowledge—Absolute but also *Bliss—Absolute* is emphasised as constitutive of the Real, then surely metaphysics is at bottom a study in value. But if reality be interpreted merely as existence, and the primary concern of metaphysics is to determine what exists, then existence is not a value category. Then metaphysics would properly belong to the class of the positive sciences, concerned, of course, with the determination of the broad *a priori* characters of the existent and their relations.

Philosophy proper, then, has to be regarded as the study of the general and particular fields of value. Problems relating to the laws and principles guiding our basic assumptions as to the true, the good, the beautiful, the right—in short, the valuable in general, would constitute what I would call "The Metaphysics of Value," while the formulation of the principles involved in a synthesis of all the special types of valuation, the determination of the place and the importance in life of knowledge, morality, art, religion etc., would be the task of a "Critique of Values". Such would be the two broad divisions of Axiology or Normatics covering the whole range of value experience in human life. In short, such a science would be the only kind of philosophy which could give us that synoptic view and attitude to life and the world which we would fain believe is the function of philosophy. It is only such a re-orientation of philosophy to the problems of life which would restore to it its ancient and true dignity as a *Way of Life*. Philosophy would then truly become a

humanistic study from first to last. From what I have already said in connection with metaphysics, it should have become clear that the strength and spirit of Indian Philosophy (as I conceive it) lies precisely in this—that it humanises life from the standpoint of values. Value-conception is fundamental in Indian Philosophy and rules its treatment of all the fundamental problems, nay, its very division into different schools.²⁶

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26. The problems of Value dealt with imperfectly in this essay are treated of more fully and critically in a work of mine, called "The Metaphysics of Value", under preparation.

Purnaism in Indian Philosophy—the Wholism of Ancient India.

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS

Delivered by

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(*Indian Philosophy Section,*)

Friends.

I would first express my thankful appreciation of the kindness of the Executive Committee of the Indian Philosophical Congress for having given me this opportunity to participate in its great and noble work.

Bādarāyana's *samanvaya* or Plato's synoptic method, when applied to Indian philosophical thought with an attitude of mind which may be described as holistic in the language of a distinguished modernist—General the Right Hon. J. C. Smuts, is sure to yield results of considerable philosophical interest and value. One of such results may be found in what may be called *Pūrṇaism* or the wholism of ancient India ; and I propose to discourse upon this subject in the address which I have to deliver as President of the Indian Philosophy Section of the tenth session of the Indian Philosophical Congress.

What *Pūrṇaism* is requires explanation ; and what it is not should also be made clear. The term *Pūrṇaism* is based on the Sanskrit word *Pūrṇa*. This Sanskrit word is derived from the root *pr* (to fill) and is usually understood to mean 'filled or full'. But it may also be taken to mean filling or 'that which fills'. Śrī Saṅkara takes this word in the latter sense in his *bhāṣya* on the Bṛhadāraṇyaka mantra

"Pūrṇamadaḥ Pūrṇamidam" (V, i, 1). The suffix in the word *pūrṇa*, according to Sri Śaṅkara, should be taken in an *active* sense. Thus, the Upaniṣadic *Pūrṇa*, as elucidated by Sri Śaṅkara, is the illimitable, whole-making, all-filling, all-whole, all-soul, Absolute; and it is not a mere *whole* appearing as an evolute in what is claimed by General Simuts to be an ever progressive, but in what logically appears to be an endlessly regressive, texture of holistic evolution. *Pūrṇaism* is the view which recognises the Upaniṣadic *Pūrṇa* in Sri Śaṅkara's sense, as the ultimate reality implied in all empirical knowledge and in all finite existence—as the supreme, undetermined, all-whole, all-soul, Absolute, which is the ground and consummation of all processes—creation (*ārambha*), transformation, evolution or emergence (*pariṇāma*), and transfiguration (*vivarta*). In it the Upaniṣadic *pleromaism* which maintains that on the *pleroma* or fulness of the Absolute are grounded all the wholes of life and all the wholes of mind, and matter, larger or smaller. The *Pūrṇa* of Sri Śaṅkara is the philosophic absolute whole, which is not a mere composite or complex structure consisting of parts, but is whole in the sense that it comprehends everything and that it is the fundamental, all pervasive, all-including reality serving as the substratum in which all the parts and the wholes find their being. The *Pūrṇa* is *that*; the *yonder whole*, the infinite, all-pervading, all-filling whole, the supreme unconditioned Brahman; the *pūrṇa* is *this whole*, the conditioned Brahman, emanating from the *infinite* as effect and manifesting through name and form in the empirical universe; from *that whole*, *this whole* rises up; in this process, the wholeness which is the essence of *that* infinite, *this* conditioned whole continues to have in itself; and when all this is realised, the seeming otherness of *this* whole is removed and the infinite whole remains as the unbroken pure *cit* or consciousness, transcending all the parts and distinctions of inner

and outer and past and present. This is *pūrṇaism* and it is the greatest Vedāntic message conveyed in what is traditionally regarded as the pivotal text (*śāntimantra*) of the Brhadāranyakopaniṣad :—

“*Pūrṇamadaḥ Pūrṇamidam Pūrṇāt Pūrṇamudacyate
Pūrṇasya Pūrṇamūdāya, Pūrṇamevāvaśiṣyate*” (v, i, 1).

The *Pūrṇaism* described above is the central theme of the Brhadāranyakopaniṣad and it is also the theme of the mahāvākyas like “*Tattvamasi*” and “*Aham Brahmasmi*.” It involves a type of *wholism* which should be carefully differentiated from the *holism* of General Smuts. In the Upaniṣadic *Pūrṇaism* set forth and maintained by Śrī Śaṅkara, the cosmic process of creative evolution is but a transfiguration of the absolute *Pūrṇa* in several ways and all this transfiguration is the result of the delimiting of the absolute *Pūrṇa* by the *non-whole* or *non-pūrṇa* called *avidyā* (nescience).—In all the creative activities of the empirical world, the absolute whole projects itself and shows out in the three predications ‘is’ (*asti*), comes to be known or illuminated (*bhāti*), is good and desirable (*priya*)—through name and form (*nama, rupa*) belonging to the world.

“*Asti bhāti priyam rūpam nāma cetyaṁśapañcakam*

Ādyatrāyam brahmarūpam prapañcasya tato dvayam.”

The active, creative function of the *pūrṇa*, which consists in filling or pervading (*pūrṇa vyāpana*), is also the result of the delimiting of the *pūrṇa* *avidyā*. It is this function by virtue of which the monistic absolute of *Pūrṇaism* cannot justly be said to be sterile or barren. This function obviates the antithesis which, in its absence, might arise between *Pūrṇaism* or Absolutism and progress or evolution. In the light of this function, all the activities and processes which take place in the world may be interpreted as tending towards the unfoldment and realisation of the *Pūrṇa* and as the striving of the lesser wholes to become the *all-whole* or the

absolute-whole ; and all the lesser wholes are but fragmentary appearances of the *absolute-whole*. This again is a beneficent function of the primal *non-whole* called *avidyā* and is the *holistic nisus* of General Smuts, "which rises like a living fountain from the very depths of the universe." According to General Smuts, *holism* is the "fundamental, synthetic, ordering, organising, regulating activity in the universe" and it is "the inner, shaping, directive activity working through the wholes and in the variations which creatively arise from them." General Smuts is unwilling to go further and fears that the metaphysical concept of the *all-whole* or the eternal absolute whole might be ruinous to the holistic *nisus* which forms the most vital part of his holism. The unsoundness of General Smuts' metaphysical position has been explained in an admirably telling manner by Professor Sir S. Radhakrishnan in the last chapter of his work "*An Idealist View of Life*." Smuts' holistic *nisus*, as a creative force running through all nature, becomes intelligible only when it is understood as the primal *viksepa-śakti* of the primal non-whole called *māyā* or *avidyā* in Upanisadic Pūrṇaism; and the whole-making potency of the primal non-whole may be explained as the result of its association with the external, absolute, all-whole, which the Upaniṣads have called Pūrṇa. If holism constitutes and connects the four great series in reality—matter, life, mind and personality and if these series are but "steps in the progressive evolution of one and the same fundamental factor, whose pathway is the universe within us and around us," Smuts is certainly presupposing a *whole* which includes all the others. He chooses, however, to adopt an agnostic attitude about the nature of this all-comprehending whole and about its relation to the other wholes in the universe. The needed explanation in this connection can be found in the *Pūrṇaism* of Śrī Sankara, which recognises

one eternal all-pervading absolute whole (Pūrṇa) and postulates also its association with the primal non-whole called *avidyā*, though the empirical relation of identity-in-difference (*tādātmya*), the distinctive feature of this relation being that it is self-multiplying and self-discrepant in its character and that any attempt to analyse it would only lead to a beginningless chain of *tādātmyas* within the empirical plane. If, in Smuts' holism, "the ideals of well-being, of Truth, Beauty and Goodness are firmly grounded in the nature of things and are not endangered or lost," they must be connected with an eternal and never-failing source and spring of Truth, Beauty and Goodness ; and all this, one may find in the Pūrṇa of the Upaniṣads, which is explained by Śrī Sankara as the never-failing source and spring of Truth, Beauty and Goodness, of *asti*, *bhāti* and *priyam* and of *sat*, *cit*, and *ānanda*. Mr. Smuts' holism reduces God to a stream of holistic tendency and is in no way better than naturalism in this respect. The Upaniṣadic Purnatism, on the other hand, views God as the highest Pūrṇa in the empirical sphere, though He is a lower Pūrṇa as compared with the Absolute Pūrṇa viz. *Suddha-brahman*. Smuts recognises *selection*, *direction*, and *control*, right through the entire forward movement of holism, but fights shy of *Teleology* or *purpose* ; while Śrī Sankara's Purnatism can easily find a place for Teleology or Purpose within the empirical sphere and can base it on the eternal and absolute intelligence (*suddha-cit*) otherwise known as Pūrṇa. Smuts refuses to view the ideal or spiritual element in the universe as the dominant factor or as implicit in the beginnings of things and warns that the spirit to-day "should not be retrospectively antedated to a time when the world existed without it." Smuts asks : "Where was the Spirit when the warm Silurian seas covered the face of the earth, and the lower types of fishes and marine creatures still formed the

crest of the evolutionary wave ? Or going still further back, where was the Spirit when, in the Pre-Cambrian system of the globe, the first convulsive movements threw up the early mountains which have now entirely disappeared from the face of the earth, and when the living forms, if any, were of so low a type that none have been deciphered yet in the geological record ? Where was the Spirit when the Solar System itself was still a diffuse fiery nebula ?" To all these questions, the answer which Sri Sankara's *Pūrṇaism* gives is 'everywhere'; and the answer which the Upaniṣadic *Pūrṇaism* vouchsafes should be found in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* text "This was verily *Brahman* in the beginning. It realised only itself—I am Brahman. Therefore it became all." "*Brahma vā idamagra āsit. Tadātmānamevāiet aham Brahmāsmi. Tasmāt tat sarvamabhavat.*" (I, iv, 10). Smuts' questions would remind an Indian Theist who believes in *Pūrṇaism*, of similar questions raised and disposed of in the following well-known verse of Puṣpadanta's *Mahimnasstuti* :—

"*Kimīha kim kāyah sa iha kimupāyastribhuvanam
Kimādhāro dhātā Sṛ Jati kimupādāna iti ca.*"

"*Atarhyaiśvaryē trayyanarasaradusstho hatadhiyah
Kutarkoyam kamscin mulharayati mohāya kudhiyām*"

"When God created the three worlds, what did He want to get ? What was His body ? What means did He employ ? Where did He take His stand ? What was the material which He used ?—Questions like these are unwarranted and deserve to be brushed aside by saying that they never arise in the case of God whose omnipotence is of a transcendental character."

The most attractive feature of Smuts' holism is the emphasis which it rightly lays on a holistic synthesis of things. The attitude of holistic synthesis which Smuts advocates is one that may, with advantage, be adopted in a general review of Indian philosophy. The element of authoritarianism

in Indian philosophy and its attitude towards the *Sabdapramāṇa* or valid verbal testimony would become perfectly intelligible to a modern student of philosophy, if he approaches the question with a holistic attitude of mind and view it in a holistic setting. Perception and inference (*pratyakṣa* and *anumāna*) are, in their very nature, subject to several empirical limitations and cannot be considered adequate, in any sense, to grapple with the ultra-empirical, absolute, ultimate reality called *Pūrṇa*; and these two *pramāṇas* are adapted to the requirements of the *non-pūrṇa* in their very nature. In so far as the *Pūrṇa* is concerned, *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna* have to be reinforced by the trustworthy records called *āgamas*, which embody the great intuitions of the disciplined minds of the past. Such agamic intuitions remove the imperfections of *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna* and all these three together constitute an acceptable approach to the absolute *pūrṇa*.

In a similar way, a holistic view of the *Gītā* discloses a holistic synthesis as the dominating feature of that great scripture. The *gītā* is a great scripture of synthesis (*yoga-śāstra*). It deals with the three main types of synthesis—the *Karmayoga*, the *Bhaktiyoga* and the *Jñānayoga*. All activities spring from a sense of imperfection and are whole-making in their nature. Their aim is to create a sense of wholeness through the attainment of their fruits in one who happens to labour under a sense of non-wholeness without such fruits. But the wholes thus formed through the attainment of the fruits of actions are only smaller wholes, as compared with the absolute all-whole called *Pūrṇa*. To be subjected to the thralldom of smaller wholes in the form of *karmaphala* is certainly an obstacle in the way of the realisation of the absolute *Pūrṇa*; and this obstacle has to be removed only by doing what one has to do without any thought of the result. Thus, the scheme of *karmayoga* or *nirabhisandhikarma*

should be understood as a holistic scheme making for a progressive realisation of the absolute all-whole in the form of *Pūrṇa*. In the holistic setting, *ananyābhakti*, or whole-hearted and exclusive devotion to the Lord, is but the dedication of the *non-pūrṇa* to the nearest approximation of the *Pūrṇa*, with a view to eventually realising the *Pūrṇa* itself. From the way in which the Lord of the *Gītā* equates the man who knows with Himself (*jñāni tvatmaiva me matam*, VII, 18), it may be easily seen that *jñāna* in the Vedantic sense consists in the perfect realisation of the *Pūrṇa*.

It would be highly interesting here to review from the holistic standpoint some of the more important doctrines of Indian philosophical systems. The *Cārvāka* doctrine is but an effort to fit the *pūrṇa* into the scheme of *pratyakṣa*; and the only way in which this has to be done is by travestying the *pūrṇa* by equating it with the corporeal and material aspects of individual personality. The *Upaniṣadic pūrṇa* appears to glimpse in one way, in the *Jaina* conception of the liberated soul freely soaring higher and higher in an eternally blissful condition in the immense ultra-mundane space (*alokākāśa*); and it appears to glimpse in another manner in the *Buddhist* conception of *nirvāṇa* and *nihil* (*śūnya*). The *Mimāṃsaka* touches the fringe of the *Upaniṣadic Pūrṇa* in his conception of *svarga* and ascribes to the Vedic law all the holistic nusus of his ritualistic universe. The *pariṇāma-vāda* of the *Sāṅkhyas* assign all holistic functions to the *Prakṛti*, with a view to setting free the *puruṣas* and finding in them what may be regarded as a pluralistic miniature of the *Upaniṣadic Pūrṇa*—a wholly unsustainable position. The *yoga* system proceeds a little further in the direction of *Pūrṇaism* by super-adding a *Purnaic Teacher of teachers*—viz. God or *Īvara*. The efforts of the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* realism in the direction of *Pūrṇaism* have become crystallised in two of the most important doctrines of *Nyāya*—firstly, in the

cumulative view of *prāmāṇas* according to which *anumāna* or *anvikṣā* is a necessary ancillary to *Pratyakṣa* and *āgama* ; and secondly, in its scheme of *mukti* which presents the innumerable *jīvas* as so many all-pervasive wholes stripped of all producible qualities and in its conception of *mahāpralaya* as a state of universal liberation (*sarvamukti*.) The Upaniṣadic Pūrṇaism exhibits itself in a marked manner in the sphere of Vedānta. Śrī Mādhva's dualistic or pluralistic form of pūrṇaism lays particular stress upon the perfection of the relation of master and servant between the *Pūrṇa* and the *non-pūrṇa* (*jīva*) and thus detracts from the absolute wholeness of the *All-whole*. Śrī Rāmānuja's Pūrṇaism is of the organic type and conceives of the Upaniṣadic *Pūrṇa* as the organic whole, of which all the lesser material and spiritual wholes are the constituent parts. Śrī Sankara's *Pūrṇaism* is the genuine Upaniṣadic *Pūrṇaism*, which exhibits the *Pūrṇa* in its full glory, as the absolute *All-whole* which ought to be recognised as the ground and goal of Smuts' holistic universe and through which flows a progressive and perennial stream of lesser wholes.

The strongest point in the Upaniṣadic Pūrṇaism is that it conserves satisfactorily all the values of life within the empirical sphere. In terms of the universally accepted value of *ānanda* or bliss, the *Pūrṇa* of the Upaniṣads glimpses everyday, of your life, in dreamless sleep, in *susupti*.

Here, what the polymathic philosopher—Vācaspatimiśra—has said deserves to be remembered and revolved in our minds.

"Alas ! This is a great wonder and pity that the creatures, who fail to understand the nature of *reality*, miss the absolute real whole though they have it themselves. The travellers who proceed on their life's journey in quest of wealth tread on pieces of gold scattered on their path and overgrown with dense, age-long, dirt and yet do not take these golden pieces,

mistaking them for groups of pieces of stones :—with this idea and with a mingled feeling of wonder and pity, the *Sruti* says “All these creatures reach this world of the blissful whole every day and yet do not know it.”¹

1. *Batāho kaṣṭamidam vartate jantūnām tattvāvabodhavi-kalānām, yadebhiḥ svādhīnamapi Brahma na prāpyate. Tadyathā cīrantananīrūḍhanibīḍumalapīhitānām kaladhā-utaśakulānām pathī patitānām uparyupari sancaradbhirapi pānthairdhanūyadbhirgrāvakhaṇḍanivahavibhramānaitāni nopādiyanta ityabhisandhimati sād bhutamiva sakhedamiva śrutih pravartate :—“Imāḥ sarvāḥ prajāḥ aharahargacchan-tya etam Brahmālokaṁ na vindanti.”* (*Chāndogya, VIII, iii, 2*)

[*Bhāmatī, 1, 3, 5, 15.*]

Presidential Address:

Metaphysics and Logic Section.

By

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A new school of thought, known as New Realism, is a marked trend of contemporary philosophy. The motive which actuates the advocates of this philosophy is a worthy one : they would give to Philosophy a status equal to that of Science. It furnishes some fine, acute criticism and analysis, particularly of the problem of Perception. But its metaphysical position involves very considerable difficulty. Its fundamental assumption is that mind is a thing among other things, and on the same level with them, i.e. it has no privileged position in the scheme of the universe. The universe is really a *pluri*-verse. Descartes' "*cogito ergo sum*," and Berkeley's "*Esse of a thing is its percipi*" when closely examined, turn out to be sophisms. Epistemology is not the foundation of philosophy—it is Logic or Mathematics. Kant's principles of the Transcendental Unity of Apperception and that the Understanding prescribes laws to Nature, are without justification. The understanding or the mind is a category which emerges much later out of antecedents which are purely physical or objective. This school allies itself with the doctrine of Emergent Evolution according to which the higher categories emerge out of the lower ones, e.g. subject out of objects, consciousness out of unconsciousness, reason out of unreason, teleology out of mechanism, beauty, value, liberty, character, truth out of the dead level of a multiplicity of original indifferent physical facts.

The derivation of higher categories from lower ones may be allowed for certain purposes. There are two orders in which categories may be arranged ; the order of *existence* and the order of *knowledge*. That which is later in order of knowledge is earlier in the order of existence. In the order of knowledge we may derive God from the Self or the World, though in the order of existence God precedes them both. Emergent Evolution may be right in following the psychological order, but it ought not to deny or ignore the logical or existential order. A set of telescopic tubes may be used in either order, the smaller ones being drawn out of the larger ones or the smaller ones being pushed into the larger ones.

It cannot be denied that the original data from which New Realism derives the realities of the present, concrete world, are strictly logical or mathematical abstractions (philosophical construction) e.g. space, time, mass, configuration, perspectives etc, and that such abstractions imply the existence of something which is responsible for the abstractions and for all the processes which abstraction presupposes viz. comparison, judgment, generalisation. In other words, they imply the function of consciousness and some process of epistemology. If that be so, we derive, or rather profess to derive, mind from antecedents which already presuppose mind. In all such derivations mind is surreptitiously assumed.

This would be evident to all careful readers of Herbert Spencer and of Alexander. The derivation is slurred over under the cover of some convenient words, phrases and analogies. Thus Spencer explains the origin of mind by the reduction of the *simultaneous* order of neural phenomena to the *serial* order through the development of compound and doubly compound nerve-centres, and then by the reduction of the serial order to the *punctual* order i. e. when the

serial order terminates in a single point. Similarly Alexander's illustration by an appeal to the angelic vision and his use of such terms as *nisus*, effort, perspectives etc. unconsciously presuppose some kind of mental existence behind his matrix of Space-Time.

New Realism is a legitimate protest against the extravagances of the old Idealisms of the Post-Kantian type, and as such it has done real service to the cause of philosophical speculation. The supporters of this new doctrine may possibly think that it imparts or guarantees a greater measure of reality to the world than Idealism does. But if so, the notion is an erroneous one. Idealism ensures as much reality to things as Science and Morality may demand and the practical relations of every-day life may insist upon. And this conviction of the reality of things is the natural resultant of the assumption that there is an Ultimate Consciousness at the back of things.

Some Reflections on the Nature of Philosophic Truth.

By

G. R. Malkani.

We know what truth is in science. We study there certain phenomena. The phenomena are to start with grouped in a general way. The specific study of each group is undertaken by a distinct science which studies the phenomena within the frame-work of certain postulates which it does not question. Scientific truth necessarily takes the form of certain generalisations or what are called laws of nature. These laws are not eternally true and do not explain anything. They are provisional formulations of truth limited by human powers of perception and of co-ordination, and may need to be radically modified or entirely given up in favour of more luminous generalisations. There is nothing ultimate about them.

They do not really explain. Let us suppose that they are the formulations of certain causal connections. Given certain things, certain other things follow. But why do they follow? We do not know. And after all, any such formulation can only be provisional. We are never sure. We have no complete apprehension of the cause. As it is said, in any occurrence, however limited in time and space, the whole universe may be involved. Or as Lotze would probably put it, the nature of the unity or the nature of the whole dictates to each element what it is to be and how it is to act. No element of physical nature acts in isolation or has a will of its own. Its whole character, and its whole action in which that character finds expression, is bound up with the nature of the unity. It is what it is because of this unity. If the unity were different, or as we might say, if the world as a whole were n instead of being m , every element in it would

be different and would act differently ; or other words, it would be quite a different set of laws that would govern such a world. The fact is that we never get at the whole cause of things. We therefore disregard the wider causes, or causes which we cannot determine, limited as we are in power and comprehension, or causes over which we can exercise no kind of control. Our humanity and our finiteness prescribes us our problem (which is never the whole cause or the ultimate cause, but only the immediate cause or the controllable cause), and also the kind of solution which would for all purposes pass as satisfactory. Thus science is entirely a human affair, an expression of our finiteness.

The same reasoning applies to all scientific truth that is not merely the formulation of a causal connection. All scientific truth is some kind of generalisation ; and all generalisation is merely a matter of theorising. There is no question of *seeing* things to be so. We make a hypothesis (wholly a matter of the imagination), and then try to see whether it can be verified or explain the relevant facts. If there are alternative hypotheses equally plausible, we expect that some crucial instance, or failing that, simply in the course of time one hypothesis would be found to square better with known facts. There is no question of any theory being ultimate or incapable of modification. Limited as we are in the grasp of all relevant facts and in our power of suggesting the right explanation (i.e., both in the formulation of the question and in our ability to reach the right solution), we can only be certain that facts being as they are hitherto known to be, a certain explanation or a certain theory would do. We cannot possibly provide before-hand against all possible discrepancy in facts that may challenge it. The truth is that in the realm of theory which is the realm of hypothetical thinking or imaginative understanding of things (as opposed to direct seeing or intuiting) we can never reach certitude. It would be

opposed to all scientific sanity to claim ultimacy for anything that is simply theory, or generalisation or law. Indeed, certain theories are said to be "as good as facts". The distinction between fact and theory is supposed to be only relative. But for the same reason, there are no absolute truths in science. There is only a growing presumption in favour of a certain view of things. But it may be falsified by a new observation or a new set of data that have come to light. There can be no final view of things or an ultimate explanation in science. It is in the very nature of things impossible. We never see the truth. We only theorise. We make an empirical generalisation; and no empirical generalisation can ever be self-evident or final.

Is this truth? Or if it is, can we be satisfied with it? Is there no higher form of truth? We suggest that philosophic truth is this higher form of truth. The question naturally is, what is philosophic truth?

It is sometimes argued that philosophy has no distinct sphere of its own. The sphere of the sciences is the sphere of philosophy. Only it answers a different set of questions. Each empirical science is limited by its own assumptions which prescribe its subject-matter. Philosophy is not thus limited. All the phenomena studied by the empirical sciences are equally facts to it. It is not limited by any assumption whatsoever or by any partial view of things. Reality to it is one and entire, and the truths which it seeks to know are the truths about the whole of reality and not about any particular aspect or part of it.

The question here is, are there any such truths? We know that scientific truths are based on the validity of certain postulates; they are truths about a group of phenomena bound by a general principle which is not questioned by the specific science studying those phenomena. If we take away all these postulates and all these principles, if we regard

all phenomena indifferently as phenomena of reality, can there be any questions which they can suggest or questions that demand an answer? Evidently, no science studies phenomena in this generality. Philosophy may be supposed to do so. But what would be the nature of the questions that philosophy would have to seek answer? If we take away all the postulates by which we group phenomena, and face the bare facts, they seem to offer no kind of common problem. There is no known unity of experience that can be said to embrace all the facts without distinction. If the subject-matter of philosophy is the whole of reality and not any department of it, if it is a kind of universal science as opposed to particular sciences, we not only have no common question but also no common truth. The only conception we can form of a common truth is what we know as a generalisation of science, which is based upon certain particulars and is illustrated by them. But a generalisation which is to embrace the whole of reality will be based upon no particulars, and there can be no particulars that can be spoken of as its instances. For a generalisation is necessarily selective. It rejects certain aspects of things in order to subsume them under a unity or a law. But when a generalisation is to apply to the whole of reality in all its entirety, can there be any room for this selectiveness? Can we reject or abstract? If we cannot, can there be a generalisation at all? A generalisation is no generalisation if it is not a form of abstraction; and abstraction necessarily means rejection, and consequent de-concretisation and de-individualisation. Can the entire reality be thus treated? If it cannot be, then philosophy is not a universal science differing from other sciences merely in its scope

The first thing to note about philosophic truth is that it is reared on no accepted facts or data that necessarily prescribe the form of the solution. In this, it differs fundamentally from scientific truth. The latter starts with certain

undeniable facts or data that set the problem and to which every solution must conform. Philosophic truth has no such limitation. It has not to conform to any given fact. A true philosophy can only be based on a thorough-going scepticism. We must doubt all, question all. If we do not, we lack the first essential of philosophy. There is no immutable fact. Facts are here *as* we understand them, not *vice-versa* ; i.e., the given does not prescribe the understanding or restrict it or dictate to it ; it is the understanding, the outlook, the concept, the point of view, the meaning, the intuition that dictates to facts and makes them significant. The given is mere fodder to be consumed, not an enthroned monarch to be worshipped. The given has to be annulled that truth may shine. The point of view or the understanding is the whole thing, the given relatively nothing.

It may be said that in science too we are not concerned with immutable facts. We are always trying to reach beyond the given to the explaining concept. It is this concept that gives meaning to the facts as known by us. And as we reach higher and higher concepts or more luminous generalisations, the given is seen in a new light ; it changes its meaning and becomes a different fact altogether. There are no immutable facts even here.

This view of scientific truth however is not quite true. Science necessarily starts with certain facts which it does not doubt and which set a problem to it. And even when a fact is doubted, it is not with a view to reject it but to incorporate it in a whole system of things, or what is the same thing, in order to explain it. Every known fact is explained in the sense that it is subsumed under a law, and is a particular instance of it. The illusions which science takes note of are not entirely rejected. They are explained, or understood as due to certain laws of things. There is no known fact that is not regarded as capable of explanation. The scientific

point of view is an entirely realistic point of view. The so-called rejected size of a distant object, such as the sun, is resurrected as part of a law or an instance of a law according to which size varies with distance and both are correlated with the human eye and the human position. Science recognises no such things as "no-facts". In the end, every known fact is to be taken up, incorporated, explained.

Philosophy has pre-eminently to deal with this region of no-facts. It is in the recognition and the study of these no-facts that the whole philosophical meaning is involved. Hence what are facts for science are not facts for philosophy. Everything is doubted, everything is questioned. The truth may be said to be unlimited by contrast. It is wholly personal. The intuition or the understanding is the whole thing. The rest must conform to it or be rejected as no-fact. This intuition is not our ordinary experience or a generalisation from it. It interprets experience, and is therefore logically prior to and more fundamental than it.

Scientific truth is truth about the phenomena ; and as we know more about the latter, truth changes its form. Its content does not remain the same. Old laws are replaced by new ones. The concepts of philosophy are not concepts that may be held for a while and then given up as false. The concepts of philosophy are those concepts which do not enter into the panorama of changing experience. If you know a new experiment, or a new mode of handling things or observing them, you have a new system of scientific concepts. Philosophical concepts can never similarly vary. They are in contrast pure concepts. By "a pure concept" we mean a concept that is not drawn or generalised from experience, and is therefore timelessly true of things to which it applies. There is no possible experience that can reduce it to falsity. Its truth is independent of experience. Philosophical truth

is therefore timeless truth. It is truth that remains unchanging whatever our experience.

It may be said that this ideal is never realised and that there is no such immutability about the concepts of philosophy. No two philosophers hold identical concepts, and the same philosopher does not feel bound to hold the same concepts just in the same sense permanently. Now this would be a just criticism if we held that everybody who philosophises, philosophises just in the same way, or holds a common philosophical system. But this is in the very nature of the case impossible. There is no common philosophy and therefore no common philosophical concepts held by all. What we mean is that a philosophical concept, just because it is philosophical, has a truth-value that is independent of the experience of the person holding it. For the same reason, a person may change his philosophy, and thereby substitute one set of philosophical concepts for another. But whatever the set of concepts that he holds, he holds them as constituting for him *the ultimate truth*. A philosopher may change his faith. But that only means that what he once regarded as the ultimate truth is no longer the truth for him. There can be change in one's philosophy as there can be change in all things human. Still, a truth because it is philosophical must necessarily be regarded as unchanging, timeless and ultimate.

Philosophical truth is personal truth. The only way to resolve differences between philosophers is not to appeal to experience as is done when scientists disagree. Experience may be the basis for different systems of philosophy. It may warrant any kind of world-view, and each philosopher may think that experience supports him. The only way to resolve differences here is to make the other man, through persuasion or through symbolical thinking, see things as I see them and adopt my way of thinking in its entirety. There can be no piece-meal agreement. What appears such only hides funda-

mental differences. What is important to note is that we cannot thrash out any truth through mere reasoning or formal argument. There are no objective checks here which set a limit to scientific thinking and scientific argument. The question here is principally one of seeing or insight ; and unless we see identically, we cannot think identically. Philosophical truth is essentially personal truth and therefore incapable of verification.

What is a Proposition ?

By

RASVIHARY DAS.

I propose to discuss in this paper what sort of being, if any at all, we are entitled to ascribe to a proposition. It used to be supposed that a judgment expressed in language was a proposition. That opinion appears no longer to be held generally by logical writers. It is recognised now-a-days that propositions are "not the same as sentences, facts and judgments". (Eaton, *General Logic*, p. 22). A proposition is not the same thing as the sentence in which it is expressed, because the sentence may be English or un-English, ambiguous or obscure, but is not properly characterised as true or false, whereas truth or falsity is the distinctive characteristic of a proposition. Similarly propositions are to be distinguished from facts. Either there is a fact or no fact answering a certain description. But a fact is never appropriately described as true or false. A judgment, as distinguished from what is judged, is a psychical process, which is different with different individuals, and cannot therefore be identified with a proposition which maintains its identity in different contexts.

But what can it possibly be if it is neither an objective fact nor a subjective process nor again a linguistic or other symbolic expression ? Some people are therefore led to deny that there is any such thing as a proposition understood in the above sense. They contend that what we really have is a subjective thought (judgment) in respect of some objective fact, but there is nothing intermediate between them, which is neither the one nor the other. When I judge 'The flower

is red', the whole situation is completely analysable into my thought of the red flower which is a subjective fact and the red flower itself which is the content of my thought. The red flower is a fact and we know it. But 'that the flower is red' or 'the flower being red' is no actual entity at all which can be indifferently affirmed or denied. There is no standing neutral entity like a proposition which we can believe, disbelieve, doubt or question. In all real judgments we are face to face with some objective facts. When however the believed fact turns out to be no fact, as it happens in the case of illusion or error, the judgment also turns out to be illusory, i. e., no judgment at all. Thus there appears to be no ground to believe in propositions apart from facts and judgments. At best we may take a proposition to be an abstraction from actual judgments, beliefs and disbeliefs. But it would be wrong to credit this abstraction with an independent being of its own.

Still there is a case for propositions. It appears to be a fact that one and the same thing can be thought by different persons. If this were not possible, there could be no intelligible discussion about any matter. You understand my words only when you are able to apprehend the content which I have sought to express through them, when, that is, the content of my thought becomes the content of your thought also. This identical content cannot be the same as the psychic acts which are different from one another. We know cases where what is believed by one person is exactly what is disbelieved by another, and what is affirmed by one is the very thing that is denied by the other. What can this self-identical thing be but a proposition ?

Formal logic is supposed to study the forms of certain things. These things are not physical substances or mental events. And at the same time we cannot suppose that these forms do not belong to anything at all. We have therefore

to admit such entities as propositions to provide material for logic.

When I judge truly, what I judge may be a fact. But when you understand my judgment, you do not necessarily take it to be a fact. When I judge that Calcutta is smaller than Waltair, you surely understand exactly what I mean, but your understanding does not require you to take my judgment (what I judge) to be a fact. Thus it appears impossible to deny propositions altogether. But the question again comes, what sort of entity can a proposition be if it is neither an objective fact nor a subjective thought ?

Some people supposed that the dichotomous division of reality into mind and matter was not exhaustive, and that there was a third realm of subsistence to which propositions belonged. I imagine that the present-day opinion is not in favour of a distinct world of subsistence separated from the world of existence. At least I think that if anything is to be real, it must be accommodated in the one actual world in which we all believe. Can we really find room for propositions in this world ?

Two things have to be borne in mind in this connexion. When we have seen that a proposition is not a subjective act, we have to recognise that it is something objective, that is, our thought forms no part of its being and so it can subsist by itself, whether one thinks it or not. When we think, a proposition no doubt is our content, but the proposition is not brought into existence by our thought. Our thought only makes us conscious of the proposition. Secondly, we should remember that there are false propositions as well as true ones. In the case of a true proposition it is possible to identify the proposition with some objective fact. But a false proposition cannot be so identified. Therefore a proposition as such cannot always mean a fact. It should therefore

be so conceived as to combine fact and no fact, and that too objectively.

Fact means actuality and no fact means lack of actuality. Now, what sort of entity is that which can be both actual and not actual also ? We find that the idea of the possible provides such a combination. What is possible can be actual as well as not actual also. We do not of course mean that what is actual can be also not actual at the same time. That would be sheer contradiction. We mean simply that the possibility of a thing is compatible with its actuality as well as with its non-actuality. What is possible may be actual or may not be actual, and in either case its possibility is not denied. Moreover possibility is an objective determination. What is possible or not possible in a certain case is determined exclusively by the nature of the things concerned and not certainly by any of our thoughts about them.

Some logicians are thus led to suppose that the proposition is a possible. (Stout, *Mind*, 1932, p. 299 ; Johnson, *Logic*, pt. 1, p. 14). When we affirm or deny that the flower is red, the common content to our different attitudes of mind is the possibility of the flower being red. When the possibility is a realised possibility, the proposition that the flower is red is true ; and when it is not so realised, the proposition fails to be true.

Let us try to understand this position. If a proposition is a possibility, when we assert a proposition, do we assert a possibility ? When I say 'The flower is red,' do I really mean that the flower may be red ! Again, when I deny the same proposition do I mean to deny the possibility of the flower being red. That can scarcely be the meaning. We have therefore to suppose that although a proposition is a possible, when we affirm or deny it, we affirm or deny actuality of what is possible.

Now the question comes, when a proposition is affirmed

and is found to be true, do we still find it to be a proposition, i. e., a possibility? It seems, on the one hand, that a proposition cannot cease to be a proposition by being affirmed or by being true. For truth must belong to a proposition, and affirmation is the only possible knowledge-function in regard to a true proposition, and it seems absurd to suppose that affirmation and truth will turn a proposition into no proposition. On the other hand it is highly unusual to speak of a realised fact as still a possibility, and there is no doubt that in the case of a true proposition, we have a possibility that has realised itself and turned itself into a fact. Is it then still a possibility? If the actual fact is no longer a possibility, then we have to admit that a proposition is no proposition when it is true.

The paradox may be resolved if we suppose that a realised possibility is still a possibility, because what is possible is sometimes actual, and so actuality is no negation of possibility, but only a further determination of it. What is possible does not become impossible when it happens to be actual also.

But the main difficulty of this position is as to how the possible is to be conceived purely in objective terms. Objective reality consists of actual facts. What is not an actual fact or a part of it, can scarcely be understood as objectively real; and by the term possible something over and above the actual seems surely to be meant. There is nothing in the objective world that declares itself to be merely possible. We can conceive of many possibilities on the ground of some actual facts, but these possibilities have no objective being apart from our thought. If we grant this, we admit that a proposition has no being apart from our actual thinking.

Whitehead has given a metaphysical treatment of propositions and he also speaks of them as possibilities. Propositions for him are not unlimited possibilities like eternal objects. They are possibilities understood in reference to a

limited range of actual entities. They occupy a definite place in Whitehead's metaphysics which cannot be discussed here. Suffice it to say that their claim to reality is fulfilled ultimately in the conceptual realisation of God who is an actual entity. Whitehead plainly recognises that a mere possible, unless realised in the conceptual feeling of some actual entity, is indistinguishable from nonentity. God who envisages all possibilities is always available for him to give reality to whatever we can conceive of as possible. A proposition is a hybrid entity, requiring an actual situation (from which the subject is derived) and an eternal object (a possibility which serves as the predicate) referred to it. The situation is constituted by some actual entities which are real by themselves, and the eternal object or the possible is real ultimately in the mind of God. Whitehead can thus secure the objective reality of his propositions.

But if we are not yet prepared to accept the metaphysics of Whitehead and do not feel justified to call in God in every case to solve our metaphysical difficulties, how should we then understand the objectivity of a proposition ? Let us see how we understand a proposition when we do not know whether it stands for a fact or even know that it stands for no fact. It is to be noted that even in such a case we do not fail to understand a proposition as a proposition. When I say 'Waltair is larger than Calcutta,' you are able to understand me because you know the terms Waltair and Calcutta and also the relation 'larger than.' These are all objective realities and therefore you can know them. We cannot know what is not real at all.

We may take 'larger than Calcutta' to be a universal. This universal is real in the objective world. It is found in London and indeed in all places which are in fact 'larger than Calcutta' is understood in one unique sense of a universal. Every proposition can ultimately be analysed into a given

particular and a universal, however complex that universal may be. I take a hint from Whitehead and say that in knowing a proposition, I know a particular and a universal, and these have their appropriate place in reality and are real.

But in knowing a proposition we do not know a particular *and* a universal, but a universal *in reference to* a particular. How is 'in reference to' to be understood objectively ?

I take it to stand for mere relatedness. Mere relatedness is a very general relation subsisting between any two terms by virtue of their belonging to a common world. So when we understand a proposition we know two terms as merely related. The terms and their mere relatedness are objective facts. The proposition is true, when the general relatedness is further determined in an appropriate form proper to the terms concerned, and it is false when it is not so determined. But whether further determined or not, the general relatedness between them is never annulled. If you insist that there are only determinate relations between terms, and no general relatedness, then I say you cannot possibly understand a false proposition, since the determinate relationship is lacking between its terms. And if two terms are absolutely unrelated, the absence of relation between them cannot be determined.

But there is a difficulty. If a proposition stands for a universal in relation to a particular, and if these are all objective facts, how is a proposition ever false ? And moreover we do not seem to assert a general relatedness between the terms which is available everywhere. We assert a particular relation and it is altogether absent in the case of a false proposition.

Here we can see the obvious advantage of a subjectivist view. One can think or speak of any relation between two terms, but the relation posited in thought may not be present in fact. When I understand a false proposition, I understand someone thinking or speaking of a certain relation between

two terms. I know the terms which stand for facts, and also the thinking or speaking of the relation which too is a fact. We thus understand falsity by introducing an element of subjectivity. If falsity too were objective, it would be indistinguishable from truth.

But there is another side to this question. What is false is not the subjective thinking, but only the objective meaning which is equally intelligible to all. The difficulty is to find out the real status of this non-subjective propositional meaning which does not yet amount to fact. I confess I do not feel sure as to what may be the right solution of this difficulty. Tentatively, however, I venture to make the following suggestions.

Since we cannot know what is not, and since in understanding a proposition, even when it is false, we certainly know something, a proposition must stand for certain aspects of fact or certain objective entities. They are not understood merely in their diversity, but only in a mode of unity. This gives their propositional status. Even in the proposition 'Waltair is larger than Calcutta,' the terms are certainly related to one another. Waltair is related to 'larger than,' as we find it illustrated in 'Waltair is larger than Amalner' and 'larger than' is also related to Calcutta, as we clearly see in 'London is larger than Calcutta.' These entities themselves are facts and they are also related, but they are not related in such a way as to constitute a single fact. We conclude then that in all propositions we have facts in relation to one another. In a true proposition these facts also constitute one single complex fact. In a false proposition they are related but do not constitute one single fact.

Illusion as Confusion of Subjective Functions.

BY

T. R. V. MURTI.

The paper attempts to explicate but mainly to extend the thesis elaborated in Professor K. C. Bhattacharyya's paper, "The False and the Subjective."¹ Therein the Professor proves the two twin theses that the consciousness of the false is the consciousness of the subjective and *vice versa*. His main contention is that the consciousness of the false is the consciousness of a content that is not speakable except as the content of a belief, which again is apprehended only as it is rejected or disbelieved; the consciousness of the subjective too implies belief. Our present endeavour is to see whether this contention can be extended to all subjective forms. The attempt is to define and enumerate all the subjective forms and not merely to prove the subjective in general. Instead of starting with an *a priori* and hypothetical formulation of the possible modes of relation between consciousness and content and then identify the abstract modes with knowing, feeling and willing, which may have an air of architectonic neatness about it, we ask to be told how we arrived at the notion of functions or subjective forms at all in the first place and then their exhaustive formulation. We claim that illusion, the realisation of anything as illusory is impossible without implying a consciousness of the functions. Any ordinary mode of consciousness, as veridical perception etc. would equally involve them; but the preference for illusion is that nothing shows up the inner working of a mechanism as

1. *Calcutta Review*, Oct. 1932.

disorder ; when it is well-attuned and smooth-working we seldom appreciate the precise functions of the several parts. Our starting-point may thus be justified *prima facie*.

The thesis elaborated in this paper is two-fold : the possibility of illusion depends on the confusion of functions and secondly wherever there are functions there is illusion. The second thesis may seem a mere verbal converse of the first. It would however become evident that it is more in the nature of a demand that something be realised as illusory than that it is so actually. The whole paper can also be taken as an essay on matter and form.

Illusion in contrast to a thinking error, involves an original belief ; it is a perceptual fact, to all intents. The belief is so complete that we are not conscious of meaning its negation, the possibility of its being otherwise. A thought, even an affirmative judgment, is always conscious of its possible negation. Again, it refers to, or seeks, a percept ; it involves belief only in a very general sense, bearing general applicability to fact or percept. It is however to be sharply distinguished from figments of imagination, which are avowedly felt to have no such reference at all. When we become aware of an error in thinking, as in fallacious reasoning or miscalculation of a happening, we only realise what we apprehended even initially, namely the possibility of its negation. Hence the correcting thought does not intrude upon us as a shock like the cancellation of illusion. Nor is the correcting thought capable of negating, in entirety, the reference of the previous thought to fact ; for, like any other thought, it carries the possibility of its own negation.

§ 2. To take up the first thesis that illusion is not possible without confusion of functions, or that a consciousness of anything as illusory is at once to be reflectively aware of the operation of subjective functions. The thesis may be denied in two ways : first, by contending that illusion and cancellation can be explained without reference to the subjective, i. e.,

purely in objective terms ; second, that even if the subjective were necessary, it is to be conceived as unitary in function and determinate, i. e., there is no confusion of subjective forms. We have to develop our thesis by refuting both these contentions.

The first view is the mainstay of all forms of realism in diverse sorts and degrees. They would take illusion as objective confusion or non-distinction of several objective entities. We have, for instance, a radical and uncompromising type in the bold statement of Holt that contradictions and confusions are as much objective facts as any others. We have the Prābhākara who interprets illusion as the non-distinction of objects with a parallel non-distinction of the respective cognitions. A more modified type would have the confusion only in the relation of the terms. Objective confusion or non-distinction is unintelligible. For, each entity being definite and distinct from all others, how could there be confusion among them ? It is not that their natures are lost in each other. Obviously, the confusion has reference to our powers of discrimination only and is not a fact of nature without reference to a subject. Suppose we grant an objective confusion, which gets clarified later on. But at the time of confusion it was a real state of things, and when they are clarified later on it would be another real state of the now existing situation. But our notion of illusion is that even at the very time things were not what they seemed to be. To put it in a slightly different form, the transition from illusion to cancellation is not an objective change, a becoming in nature ; it is something subjective. It is in the interest of realism to deny illusion in the last resort. But the very denial is paradoxical ; for it means correction of illusion.

To avoid all these predicaments suppose we took illusion to be a subjective affair, a sort of *representation* of facts in thought, and being but a representation it is quite intelligible

that it is sometimes false. The falsity of the first subjective fact is evidenced by a subsequent one. It may be that the second state may, for aught, turn out to be false in the long run ; but for the time being this is not so patent and hence cancels or replaces the first. This view of illusion and cancellation as both subjective facts one following the other seems to take the subjective as unitary and determinate. It has of course the merit of being simple and readily appealing. We have to bring home, from a correcter interpretation of illusion and cancellation, that more than one subjective function is involved.

Any view of cancellation must make provision for two evident characteristics about the cancelling consciousness. That unlike illusion, cancellation is at once aware of itself *as cancelling* ; it is reflective. And even if we hold that illusion and cancellation are subjective states equally, we must make a vital distinction between the two. We are necessarily conscious of illusion only later on. Second, cancellation is not a state that merely supervenes on the first ; the cancellation is hardly temporal. We have got to find out its corrective force. If it were merely an other which succeeded the first, then any two states in the order of prior and later would be illusion and cancellation respectively. We shall see that the two questions are intimately connected.

On the theory that illusion and cancellation are two unitary subjective states, we shall be told that illusion has for its object, mistaken it may be, an external or physical fact. The reflective nature of cancellation is accounted for by its having as object a previous subjective fact ; or that the inner sense is operative in cognising the prior subjective state. Both these grounds of accounting for reflection are untenable. For the structure is the same whether we have an internal object or employ a different sense ; the inner sense may acquaint us with a presentation not accessible to the outer senses ; it cannot make known anything *as* object. This predicament is unavoidable :

either every state is self-conscious, illusion included, or none is. Nor is the peculiar corrective character of cancellation explained on the notion that illusion and cancellation have two different objects—an external fact and an internal one, the illusion itself, respectively. Referring to different contents, there is no opposition between them at all, and hence no correction. And if to have an object is to believe in it, the cancelling consciousness will usher in another belief—belief in the illusion as a subjective fact. But our idea of cancellation is that it is disbelief or withdrawal of belief and not a new belief.

We maintain that illusion has no object presented to it ; there is no awareness of an object *as* to a consciousness, as it *appears to it only* ; for this is precisely the state of affairs in cancellation. There is thus no distinction of subject from object or *vice versa* in illusion. It is not proper then to speak of illusion as having an object or content which it grasps. Instead, we should say that illusion is the content of cancellation ; for only the latter knows it *as* illusion, *as* object ; cancellation has no other content. There being no diversity of content, correction is intelligible as withdrawal of belief from the content or appearance, and as we withdraw, the distinction between content and belief emerges. This also evidences that such a distinction was not made in illusion *Prima facie*, there is thus a case for conceiving cancellation as the analysis or distinction and illusion as the confusion of functions.

§ 3. To determine the nature and number of functions involved in illusion, let us take an example, the stock one of “rope-snake,” which might be expressed as “That is a snake.” Now we are considering illusion from the standpoint of cancellation. 1. We are conscious of the rope or the ‘substratum’ as having been there at the time of illusion, though not perceived ; we credit it with a being or existence

of its own. If the rope came to have a being *as* it is known as rope, the "snake" could have hardly appeared as *that* snake, an existent; illusion would have been impossible. Our attitude towards the rope is that it need not appear to have being; it is self-evident and self-existent. This attitude may well be called knowing, being determined entirely by the object; all knowledge is, or should be, of some being independent of our subjective act of knowing.

In contrast to the consciousness of the "is" or being, there is the appearance—"the snake"—which gives a character to the illusion. The "snake" may be said to be all surface and no depth; its being is exhausted in consciousness; its existence is one with knownness. We call the "snake" illusory precisely because it has no being of its own like the rope; it is not an "is". Is it nothing then? It appears as something standing. No distinction however can be made between *it* and consciousness. Any apparent distinction would be due to its history, as *that* snake which appeared *to* consciousness, a history that is realised as untenable in correction. We may call this attitude feeling, for want of a better term. There is a felt and inherent lack of separation between content and consciousness characteristic of all feeling.

The above two functions alone are not enough to engender illusion; the "is" and the "snake" would have remained separate then; the snake would not have been taken as an 'is', nor the "is" identified with the "snake". Cancellation evidences the *withdrawal* of belief from the "snake", of the "is" from the appearance. Belief really pertains to the "is". No belief is created; it is only transferred to the appearance, and cancellation is *disbelief* or dissociation of belief from the content. Unlike the other two functions, the transference or withdrawal is not intelligible as something in itself, not a being, nor an appearance; it is not speakable

without reference to the negating activity of consciousness. This is willing, to all intents.

These three functions—attitudes as we have called them—we consciously become aware of only in cancellation, which at once evidences that they were present before too. Otherwise, we would be considering that illusion and cancellation have two different contents or that illusion is a unitary fact—a view that has been already refuted. Cancellation, without adding any new factor, merely analyses and clarifies the previous situation. The distinctive nature or self of each subjective function shines out. In contrast, illusion has to be conceived as the confusion or self-alienation of each form. This is object or matter *par excellence*. An epistemological definition of matter would be what is indeterminate, confused, and form is what is determinate, with a self as it were. The difference between the two is directly felt as in the transition from illusion to cancellation. Any other definition of matter, as what is external, dead, inert etc, is open to objection as lacking experiential support. On our view, matter is the confusion or self-alienation of forms, not an independent, or self-sufficient entity, the confusion itself not being another form. If it were so, there is nothing to prevent it from persisting in the full light of discrimination; to discriminate is to dispel confusion. Primordial illusion or matter is the utter lack of all determination, a glimpse of which we have in deep sleep. Empirical illusions are determinate in varying degrees. In the order of discovery, matter is prior to form, as in consciousness the sequence is from the indeterminate to the determinate; there is no obligation or need to pass from the definite to the indefinite; it is all just the other way about. In terms of reality, however, matter is nothing at all; it lacks self-hood. It thrives by not being the forms, so long as they are not realised as distinct.

The implications of the view presented here are many:

1. Without a plurality of subjective functions illusion or confu-

sion is not possible. 2. Illusion and objectivity are coincident ; object is the primitive denial or alienation of form or self ; we know anything as object only in cancellation. 3. Any reflective consciousness is *ipso facto* a cancelling or analysing consciousness. 4. And reflection is the analysis into distincts or the return to the self-hood of each form. Cancellation is self-conscious because of this inwardising or denial of self-alienation. Illusion is not an analytic or inwardising consciousness, but just the opposite ; so it is unreflective, indeterminate and false.

§. 4. So far our view contends that each subjective function is a self-sufficient, distinct form owing nothing to others, though to engender illusion each should be confused with others. In might be pointed out that the distinction of the subjective into three forms is itself illusory. We have however to ask for the evidence of the cancelling consciousness. But this, if our contentions are cogent, leads us into a vicious circle ; for any cancelling consciousness is an analysing consciousness ; we would still be left with the functions. No illusion without plurality of functions. Attempts may however be made to show how some of the functions are derivative. We showed that belief in a being not depending for its existence on its knownness, in the substratum like the rope, was essential for illusion, for the "snake" to be perceived as there. Now it might be pointed out that this belief is a pure creation along with the "snake" : not only is the "snake" created but at once the belief in its existence. But can belief be manufactured at all ? I can easily build castles in the air ; but it is not so obvious that I believe them to have a being apart from my imagination. If I do, as it sometimes happens, it is through self-forgetfulness, through a lapse from pure imagining. Anyway, the belief in the independence of the castle is not part of the building of it. A pure sport cannot be consciously degraded

into a grim alien reality opposing us. All this is to say that we can start with illusion ; but cannot consciously arrive or aim at it. There is no demand to pass from the determinate to the indeterminate.

Likewise, the attempt to derive appearance from being is futile ; for being does not need to appear ; its intelligibility is complete without the appearance ; this is really our attitude towards the rope or the substratum. That it seems to require to be known is to be realised as false in the last resort. Nor can appearance put forth being ; the "rope-snake" does not demand that it is to be realised as an existent being ; rather it requires to be realised as appearance *only*. It is evident that we have three independent self-sufficient attitudes.

The argument used is that as each attitude is complete, the complication of some other factor in any one attitude is not intelligible from that attitude ; it has to be referred to some other co-ordinate function. The argument is on a par with the following one. What is not perceived cannot be imagined to be perceived ; and only that can be perceived which is actually sensed, i.e., in the last resort we have to refer to some actual sensing, as the *sensa* are qualitatively distinct. Take for example a case of sense-complication, the *cold look* of a slab of ice. Coldness, though appearing one with the look, is really a tactual sensum. It is of course not realised separately in that context ; for that would hardly make for complication. The eye cannot give the tactual sensum as well ; it is a new quality altogether ; and the function of the eye is complete with the colour sensum. So too with regard to each of the subjective functions. As each is self-sufficient and determinate, the complication of other forms with it introduces an element of indeterminateness or matter. They are to be regarded, from the stand-point of each function, as accidental accretions which may well be rejected ; they are its free adjectives as it were.

It thus follows from our analysis of illusion, as the confusion of subjective forms each being complete in itself, that it is capable of *alternative* interpretations. By this we mean that each is a comprehensive explanation and includes all, though the place assigned to each function would necessarily be different in each interpretation. An attempt at such an explanation is here made. We have in each case to take something as basic and indubitable, the ground of illusion as it were. We may consider the being of the rope as the most indubitable fact which makes illusion, the illusion of the "snake," possible. Its being is so deep and intrinsic that it need not appear at all. The "snake" is its *free* appearance then. How and why being puts forth the appearance is not intelligible at all. It is its degradation in a sense ; for it engenders the semblance that existence belongs to the "snake," or at least that it requires to be known to be. That is we say that the "*snake*" *is*, whereas, if we had a proper view of things, it should be that the "snake" *belongs* to the "is," the *belonging* itself being peculiar. There is thus a duality of the "snake" and the "is," a duality made possible through the self-alienation of the "is"; for the "is" becomes, in illusion, a mode of the appearance ; it appears as object. Cancellation would mean the negation of the self-alienation—the reinstatement of the "is" in its pristine eminence, by the elimination of all "knownness", knownness being illusory on this view. This would be the Vedāntic interpretation of illusion.

Instead of belittling the appearance, we may consider that alone as the one thing which is immediate and patent ; the belief in the "that" is made possible *through* it. It is not false or nothing ; for the utmost that we can retract from it is its relationship to the "that" or externality, not its intrinsic character of appearance. True, we cannot say that it "is," but that we can say anything at all is *through* it. It may be taken therefore as the ground or the basis of

illusion ; the illusion here being its externality, its appearing as *that* snake divorced and set against consciousness, engendering thereby the false duality or abstraction of subject and object. The formula for feeling is not that A and B constitute C, but A and B are false abstractions of C which is their necessary basis. The "thatness" of the "snake" is a free accretion taken by it, the matter or indefiniteness which it sheds in cancellation. The true character of the "snake" as an immediate presentation is felt only by denying thatness, its self-alienation or objectivity. If it still seems to be distinct from the subject, it is because of its past history.²

In the above two interpretations we took our stand respectively on being and the appearance ; we may now hold as our ground something more immediate—the negating or cancelling activity itself. For in that alone is the illusion apprehended as such, as object. The activity is pure and something in itself ; we negate illusion, not because we believe in something else but the very fitness of things demands it. And the negation applies to both the "is," and the appearance. Take away the "that" or the "is," the "snake" also collapses ; its distinctness is bound up with the "is" ; and what is the "that" except the snake ? It is not that the "is" and the appearance are the necessary creations or completions of the conscious activity ; for as we have pointed out, though we can negate the given we cannot pass from the negative activity to the given, i.e., from the determinate to the indeterminate.³

It is however to be admitted that not all classes of illusion are explainable with equal plausibility in all the three alter-

2. This interpretation of illusion approximates to the *Atmakhyāti* of the Vijnānavādin.

3. This interpretation broadly corresponds to the *Sunyakhyaṭi* of the *Mādhymikas*.

natives, the reason being that empirical illusions are already determinate, to a certain extent, one way or the other. Where the sense of objectivity is predominant, as in external perception, the knowledge-interpretation would be more natural. Hallucinations, where subjective projection counts for much with little or no objective basis, are best explained on the will-interpretation. The cancelling consciousness denies the self-forgetfulness of the projective activity. Dreams are best interpreted as feeling-illusions ; cancellations just denies the externality of the dream-pictures, leaving intact their æsthetic appearance. The case of what may be called permanent illusions or real appearances presents some peculiarity. Such are, e.g., the elliptical shape of the coin, the bent stick in water, the small size of the moon etc. Here though we are reasonably persuaded that the elliptical shape cannot belong to the coin, it continues to appear all the same. There is a curious alternation of attitudes : Either we reduce, siding with the idealists, all, the thinghood included, to the status of the æsthetic appearance, or, with the realists, we take all the appearances as *in* the thing irrespective of the percipient. The illusion persists and gives rise to alternation because the percipient is embodied and is not able to effect a separation between the intellectual and affective elements of his composite nature.

§. 5. In the previous section we spoke of the alternative interpretation of illusion and of the complication of forms, one form being the substantive or the ground and the others its free adjectives. The complication, in spite of the distinction of forms, introduces an element of indeterminateness or matter. This indeterminateness is to be contrasted with that of illusion or confusion, where there is not even the distinction of functions. Illusion is purely indeterminate ; we may call it *primary* matter and the other *secondary* matter. There is another vital distinction between the two

kinds of matter : primary matter can never be realised as form ; it is matter *par excellence*, realisable only in the transition from illusion to cancellation ; secondary matter however is some other form or forms in complication ; it is intelligible from some other stand-point. It is thus something positive, while primary matter is negative, being the self-alienation of *all* the forms and not of one only.

§. 6. We now take up the second thesis, namely that the presence of several forms spells for illusion. What is the need for this proposition it might legitimately be asked. In proving the first proposition that illusion is possible through the confusion of functions, we could rely upon an actual cancellation, upon the consciousness of something as illusory. But it is conceivable that there may be cases in which such a consciousness is either lacking or impossible to attain on the reflective level. In such a situation this proposition may be of value as voicing forth a demand and providing a warning that the work of cancellation is not complete.

Cancellation we took to be a reflective consciousness ; reflective in the sense that there is an inwardising of the subjective attitudes ; the denial of self-negation. That landed us with the several functions ; and as each form is complete and distinct in itself, we attempted the alternative interpretation of illusion by taking one function as the self or the sole ground of intelligibility putting others as *its* matter. Unintelligibility or matter still lurks ; there is a necessary demand to realise each form as absolute, complete in itself without any complication with other forms, a demand to get rid of, what we have termed as, secondary matter. It might be even stated that it is a necessary implication of illusion and cancellation that each of the forms should be available without complication whatsoever, that the complication is an accidental affair. In fact, any relation would demand the existence of at least one of its terms without the relation ; otherwise, if the nature

and existence of the terms were exhausted within the relation, no distinction of terms even within the relation is possible—the very impossibility of any relation. It is not enough to realise the distinctness of the appearance and the substratum, the rope, but to free the latter from all semblance of relation with the ‘snake’ and *vice versa*.

So far the second proposition may set to voice a demand. But the demand is not to be satisfied in reflection. A reflective cancellation, will be, as we have seen, an analysis of the given, the illusion, into the several functions by denying their self-alienation, by distinguishing them from one another. This would lead us, at best, to some other forms more ultimate, it might be. Still there would be plurality and indistinctness but no realisation of the absolute character of each function. Suppose we held to avoid this predicament, that there is no distinction of functions, then there would be nothing to distinguish cancellation, i. e., reflection, from illusion. So we conclude that reflective cancellation points to a higher stage of consciousness, without itself giving it. It hardly falls within the scope of the paper to deal with the modes of realising the Absolute in each case. But one thing seems implied on our view : we can realise the Absolute in *one* of these modes only.

Bradley's Doctrine of Immediate Experience.

By

Dr. S. K. DAS.

"In the beginning," as Bradley persuades us to believe concerning the problem of psychogenesis, "there is nothing beyond what is presented, what is and is felt, or is rather felt simply. There is no memory or imagination or hope or fear or thought or will and no perception of difference or likeness. There are in short no relations and *no feelings*, only feeling. It is all one blur with differences, that work and that are felt, but are not discriminated"¹ This earliest text on the nature of our 'psychical beginning' recurs often in his writings, with variants of expression merely, such as a dissertation on 'Sentience' or 'Immediate Experience.' It is, as we are finally told, 'an experience in which there is no distinction between my awareness and that of which it is aware, 'an immediate feeling, a knowing and being in one with which knowledge begins,' and which is indispensable both for psychology and metaphysics.'² For, 'at every moment my stage of experience, whatever else it is, is a whole of which I am immediately aware. It is an experienced non-relational unity of many in one.'³ Before proceeding to examine this doctrine of 'a positive non-relational non-objective whole of feeling,'⁴ it will be worth our while to take notice of the qualified support it has evoked from un-suspected quarters. While acknowledging his obligations to 'Bergson, William James, and John Dewey' in the *Preface*⁵ to his *Process and*

1 MIND, 1887. 2 *Essays on Truth and Reality*, pp. 159, 174.

3. *Essays on Truth and Reality*, p. 175 ;

4. *Ibid*, p. 189 ; 5. Vii.

Reality, Professor Whitehead remarks as follows :—"Though throughout the main body of the work I am in sharp disagreement with Bradley, the final outcome is after all not so greatly different. I am particularly indebted to his chapter on the nature of experience, which appears in his *Essays on Truth and Reality*. His insistence on 'feeling,' is very consonant with my own conclusions. This whole metaphysical position is an implicit repudiation of the doctrine of 'vacuous actuality' " Premising that 'in feeling, what is felt is not necessarily analysed' and in 'understanding, what is understood is analysed, in so far as it is understood,' Prof. Whitehead⁶ concludes that "in the analysis of a feeling, whatever presents itself as also *ante rem* is a datum, whatever presents itself as exclusively *in re* is subjective form, whatever presents itself *in re* and *post rem* is 'subject-superject' " ⁷ In the *Adventures of Ideas* he further expatiates on this theme with the faithful exegesis that "Bradley uses the term Feeling to express the primary activity at the basis of experience. It is experience itself in its origin and with the minimum of analysis. The analysis of Feeling can never disclose anything lying beyond the essence of the occasion of experience. Hence Bradley terms it 'non-relational.' Here Bradley by 'non-relational' apparently means that experience is not a relation of an experient to something external to it, but is itself the 'inclusive whole,' which is the required connectedness of 'many in one.' In this I thoroughly agree, holding that the connectedness of things is nothing else than the togetherness of things in occasions of experience. Of course, such occasions are only rarely occasions of human experience." ⁸

6. *Process and Reality*, p. 214

7. *Ibid.*, p. 329.

8. Part III—Philosophical, pp. 296, 299-300.

This piece of criticism, summing up, as it does, the points of concurrence as well as divergence between Bradley and Whitehead is both informative and instructive. Without attempting anything like a detailed criticism what I should like to indicate is the *impasse* to which he is driven in resolutely maintaining the existence of 'a positive non-relational non-objective whole of feeling'.⁹ He does indeed frankly admit that "the nature of the earliest stage of soul-life must be largely conjectural", and that we can only "construct a sketch that is probable but which we cannot quite verify".¹⁰ But then a sketch, that essays a construction which claims to be not merely a probable but a plausible one, cannot reasonably enjoy immunity from criticism. There is certainly truth in the contention that "in the lowest stages of mind there is as clear a difference between the *datum* that is given and the construction that is made as there can be in the highest", so that 'in the sense of invariably transcending the given' the 'earliest and the latest intelligence are the same from one end to the other of the scale of life',¹¹ if by these statements Bradley means to emphasise the generic sameness and genetic continuity of the different stages in the life of intelligence. As Adamson once observed, "there is nothing in the most advanced, the most developed stage, which enters into the simplest".¹² The only argument advanced by Bradley on the point viz., that "it is one thing to have a difference in the mind and another to perceive it",¹³ does not appear to meet the difficulty in question. Stout and Ward seem to have been driven to the same predicament in their views concerning 'uncetic consciousness' and 'presenta-

9. *Essays on Truth and Reality*, p. 189.

10. *MIND*, Xii, 1887, p. 363.

11. *The Principles of Logic*, Vol. I, pp. 30,38.

12. *The Development of Modern Philosophy* Vol. II p. 193.

13. *The Principles of Logic*, Vol. I, p. 30.

tional continuum' respectively. It is true that they have sought to defend their position by reminding the would-be critics of 'the psychologist's fallacy' which springs from a confusion 'between the standpoint of a given experience' and 'the standpoint of its exposition' between 'psychical analysis' on the one hand and 'psychological analysis' on the other.¹⁴

But it should have occurred to Stout at least that this argument cuts both ways and conceals an inverse 'psychologist's fallacy'. If, as Ward held from first to last, 'of all the facts with which he deals the psychologist may truly say that their *esse* is *percipi*, in so far as such facts are facts of presentation', and if the exclusive business of psychology is to analyse and trace 'the development of individual experience as it is for the experiencing individual',¹⁵ then, assuredly, they have stultified their own position. With reference, in particular, to Ward's conception of mental development, it is worth noting that fruitfully as he applied biological categories in the field of psychological thought, yet in all fairness it may be remarked that he overstrained the biological analogy in working out the correspondence between 'psychoplasm' and 'bioplasm'. Like-wise his view regarding the gradual differentiation of a 'presentational continuum', which as 'a *totum objectivum* is, for the subject, so to say, all there is, is the universe',¹⁶ proceeds from, what I take to be, an illegitimate extension of the biological category. Suffice it to note that the real world of facts, the world of common sense, whatever else it may be, is not a 'presentational continuum'. Against this entire procedure of playing fast and loose with a pre-logical, hypothetical, stage of soul-life which is constructed on considerations 'largely conjectural' and about which 'I do not

14. *The Monist*. Jan. 1926 (Ward Commemoration Number pp. 26-7)

15. *Ibid.* pp 25, 27.

16. *Psychological Principles*, pp. 117-8.

know and dare not guess'¹⁷—a stage of 'immediate experience,' or 'anoetic experience' in which there are 'presentations without fulfilling presentative function'¹⁸—one should like to press Adamson's verdict on the question of mental development. "Perhaps in no region" says Adamson, "is the notion of implicit existence really justifiable: it is just the Aristotelian potentiality re-expressed. It is least of all justifiable in the region of consciousness where, so to speak, everything is just as it appears."¹⁹

In short, this habit, of accepting at times the evidence of 'psychical fact' as final and authoritative and at other times not, is in Bradley's procedure at once characteristic and perplexing—of taking a thing to be in reality what it appears to be and not accepting in like manner a thing of the same order to be really what it appears to be.

Now, we pass on to the consideration of another aspect of the problem. Granted that the 'lower stages of the mind' are not 'really what they are in most English-psychologies'²⁰ but that, as it has been contended, 'from the very first beginnings of soul-life universals are used,'²¹—then, certainly those 'very first beginnings' cannot conceivably constitute the stage of a simple 'redintegration of ideal elements with sensuous presentation, in such a manner that the two are not distinguished, but run into one whole'²²—a whole which 'merely is' or a 'whole that is given'²³ (in Bradley's sense of 'that which is simply, and comes as it is'). I shall discuss later on whether this 'whole' can rightly be called a whole

17. *Analytical Psychology*, Vol 1, p. 47.

18. Stout: *Some Fundamental Points in the theory of Knowledge* (1911)

19. *The Development of Modern Philosophy*, Vol II p. 191.

20. *The Principles of Logic*, Vol. I, p. 34.

21. *loc. cit.*

22. *Ibid.* pp. 26-7

23. *Mind*, XII, 1887, P. 365.

of 'feeling' or 'immediate experience.' What I am here concerned to maintain is that however far back we push our analysis, we do not come across 'a stage where experience is merely immediate,'²⁴ and even supposing the existence of such 'an experienced non-relational unity of many in one' of which 'I am immediately aware,'²⁵ the machinery of 'redintegration,' 'blending' or 'fusion' will be unequal to the task of accounting for the transition to the later stages of 'mental development.'²⁶ If, as Bradley believes, "from this basis [of mere 'feeling' or 'sentience'] the machinery [of redintegration etc.] has to bring about subject and object, volition and thought"²⁷ and if he sees "no reason to doubt that the laws of redintegration and also of fusion.....will hold in this field,"²⁸ then, assuredly, he has to clear, as Schelling said of Hegel in another connection, an 'ugly broad ditch' and the machinery he draws upon will not avail. It is, I think, very unfortunate that this remnant of 'psychological Atomism', backed by the machinery of 'mental chemistry', of which he was so unsparing a critic, should persist, though in an attenuated form, in his own constructive attempts—as is clearly evidenced by his employment of quasi-mechanical metaphors of 'redintegration', 'blending' or 'fusion'. That his criticism of "the whole doctrine of 'Association of of Ideas'"²⁹ was effective, no one can gainsay. But that is exactly the reason why the frequent use of these chemical analogies is all the more to be regretted, and why the shortcomings of the construction that proceeds by way of them become increasingly apparent in his treatment of the problem of mental development. Bradley starts, as we have seen, in his account

24. *Essays on Truth and Reality*, p. 175

25. *Ibid.*, p. 175

26. *The Principles of Logic*, Vol. I. p. 37

27. *Mind*, Xii, 1887, p. 367.

28. *Essays on Truth and Reality*, p. 174.

29. *The Principles of Logic*, Vol. I, p. 34.

of this 'natural development' with 'a continuous mass of presentation in which the separation of a single element from all context is never observed', and maintains that 'the atomism' inherent in the idea of 'our mind' as 'a train of perishing existences' must 'go wholly', and therewith 'association in its usual sense' which has 'failed at the end because wrong at the beginning'.³⁰

But as he proceeds to work out later his own theory of development with the machinery of Redintegration, Blending or Fusion and Individuation in lieu of the laws of Similarity and Contiguity and such other 'associative links' at the disposal of the traditional 'doctrine of association', it becomes apparent that the discarded doctrine somehow creeps back into the account and re-asserts itself under a different guise. Having once argued that 'association marries only universals' and that it can by itself advance from sentience through 'connexions of content' to thought 'which aims at and is controlled by individuality, an end, however to be realised not in existence but solely in content',³¹ he seems to be using the principles which he had initially condemned 'in the name alike of metaphysics, of psychology and of logic'.³²

The free use of 'fusion' or 'coalescence' is suspiciously similar to the employment of such mechanical metaphors as 'striving' 'tendency' or 'collision'—which he himself once deprecated in William James³³—with reference to the primitive constituents of our soul-life ; and this seems to be an unconscious surrender to the Herbartian 'mechanics of the soul' with its admission of isolated *Vorstellungen* as so many competing forces. Bradley's procedure in this regard is reduced to much

30. *Mind*, Xii 1887 p. 357

31. *Ibid*, pp. 358, 381

32. *The Principles of Logic*, Vol I p. 342

33. *Mind*, N. S. No. 46 April, 1903, p. 160 (f. n)

the same position as that of the Herbartian psychology of 'presentations' as an extreme recoil from the '*ülte Vermogens-theorie*', just as the Associationist psychology in England arose as a protest against the Scottish School with its interminable 'faculties'. On the whole the resurrection of 'Association' from the grave of psychological atomism, and the retention of it in a transfigured form in Bradley's system are parallel to Ward's substitution of a 'presentational continuum' for the so-called theory of 'Presentationism'.

To sum up our review then the supposed 'lowest stage' of one 'blurred whole' which is at the same time a 'unity felt below distinctions' is an hypothetical limit of abstraction—about which Bradley has himself observed that 'we hardly possess it more than that which we are in the act of losing'.³⁴

However far back we go in the scale of intelligence, we never come across a stage of mind in which there is, in some sense, awareness but awareness that is awareness of nothing. 'To be able to be aware in any intelligible manner of a whole that is given or 'is simply,' the minimum that is requisite is an act of positing, and an act of positing is already in essence an act of judgment. One is thus driven to a dilemma: if you abide strictly by the nature of this 'blurred whole,' you cannot even intelligibly speak of it without committing a contradiction in terms, or a covert *ὑστερον προτερον* ('Hysteron Proteron'.) It is easy to see that the 'non-relational awareness, a knowing and being in one' which Bradley posits is the result of an essentially false assumption,—namely, of a separation between the form and matter of awareness. For awareness *qua* awareness is always awareness of some content, and as an integral act it is one in which process and content, though distinguishable are clearly inseparable aspects. By thus proposing to trace the development of soul-life from 'sentience'

or 'immediate experience' to 'thought'—when he has postulated an absolute difference of kind between these—he was in fact propounding an illegitimate problem ; and what he has to offer is rather of the nature of a conundrum than the solution of a problem of first beginning.

A New Orientation of Logical Ultimates.

By

JOGENDRA KUMAR SENGUPTA.

Logic has been distinguished from psychology in two ways :—

(1) As regards its subject-matter it is maintained that while psychology deals with mental contents the business of logic is with the modes of their expression, expression being understood as merely linguistic. (2) As regards method, again, it is held that while psychology is a positive science giving a *descriptive* account logic is normative in that it enquires into the principles of validity.

Both these distinctions however are untenable. There cannot be a sharp separation of the subject-matters of psychology and logic. Mental contents and their expressions are so closely related to one another that it is impossible to give a full account of the one without a detailed investigation of the other. Again, expressions themselves are mental contents. As regards this distinction of methods it is overlooked that what a normative science does is not more than giving a descriptive account of some specific facts. Logic, whether normative or not gives a descriptive account of what is its subject-matter. And since this subject-matter can not be separated from that of psychology, logic and psychology coincide. The present paper is an introductory chapter of this logic which cannot be separated from psychology.

Psychology has no direct concern with objects in themselves as physical sciences have. It gives an account of the forms of our apprehension of them. We propose to call forms of apprehension 'contents', objects in themselves being called

'objects' merely. Object thus may be described as whatever can be apprehended and content as the form of our apprehension of object. By apprehension and its form we mean no function that is not a state. Function is an act while state is an accomplished phenomenon.

Logic should first give a preliminary description of all types of content and the relations among them.

Content is apparently of three types (1) as they first make their appearance in the mind, (2) as they are retained in the mind, and (3) as they are expressed out of the mind. To illustrate. When we perceive an object what first appears in the mind is presentation. This presentation is flickering, but it tends to remain in the mind in the form of an image-latent of patent. Then this image is expressed out in the form of speech, speech being either oral or written. The content of the first type we call 'initial content', of the second type 'persistent content', and of the third type 'expressional content', or simply 'expression'. The most apparent relation between the three types is that there is a temporal sequence between any two consecutive types. But this is not all. Between the first two types there is a logical or essential sequence also : the essence of the initial content is developed and continued into the persistent. This will be demonstrated in detail as we proceed.

Each type of content has again three sub-types. There are three classes of initial contents, 'presentation,' 'assertion' and 'axiom.' Presentation is whatever is directly received in our mind when the senses are open. The white patch, when we see the wall, is presentation. Presentation, however, is not merely sensation. Whatever is felt to be immediately apprehended, with or without assertion and the consciousness of logical validity is presentation. The third dimension, distance etc. are all presentations, though there are many psychologists who deny that they are sensations.

Co-ordinately primitive with presentation there is assertion. Assertion is the belief that the presentation corresponds to an existence which is independent of apprehension. Assertion thus is the psychological source of knowledge. Knowledge differs from other forms of apprehension in that in it there is belief in an existence corresponding to a content. Assertion as the source of knowledge is this belief. It is sometimes argued that presentation and assertion are not two separate contents, but that they are either identical or identical-in spite of-being-different. But this view is evidently wrong. There can be presentation without assertion though not *vice versa*, and this possibility at once establishes that presentation and assertion are two separate contents. It has again been argued that what appears to be a presentation without assertion is always a presentation with rejected assertion, so that presentation and assertion cannot be separated. But this argument is untenable. First, it goes against the testimony of consciousness. Secondly the conclusion does not follow. Presentation and assertion may always go together in some form or other. But that is no reason why they should not be separate. If analysis reveals several components they are immediately believed to be separate, if there is no special reason. For some reason or other this belief is checked in the case of some non-mental objects. But in the case of mental entity this belief is never checked. Again, distinction means that the contents corresponding to the distincts are separate, so that contents cannot be merely distinct. For, what would be objects corresponding to these contents? The corresponding objects cannot be separate. And they cannot be merely distinct even, for contents corresponding to distinct objects are separate. From all these considerations it follows that assertion is an initial content co-ordinate with presentation. It should not be forgotten that by assertion we do not mean any function that is not

a state. Assertion here as a state has nothing to do with will. It is only the passive apprehension of existence.

The third sub-type of initial content is axiom. It is the primitive principle by which we make out thoughts rational or valid. Thought is made rational when it becomes acceptable to all. Rationality of a thought means that though the persons having the thought differ the thought is the same. Thought is thus made rational by communication. But why do we at all communicate if there is not something identical amongst us? This identical something is axiom. It is this axiom which therefore is the primitive source of the rationality of our thought. What we call axiom differs much from what is ordinarily understood by the term. First, our axiom underlies *all* rational thoughts and not simply inferences and deduction. Secondly, it is no mystical entity. It is no doubt a *universal* initial content. But there is nothing particular about its universality. Universality is not directly apprehended, but inferred as explaining the universality of rational thought.

The list we give is exhaustive : there is no other initial content. A content is either true or not-true, either rational or not-rational. Mere presentation is the content which is not-true and not-rational. Assertion is the content which makes the presentation true, and axiom makes it rational. Hence the given list of initial contents is exhaustive. It will no doubt be objected that 'not-true' means either that of which the question of truth and falsity has not yet arisen or that which is definitely false. So that over and above mere presentation which is not-true in the first sense there is presentation which is false. False presentation thus, it will be argued, is a new initial content. Similarly about irrational content over and above non-rational one. This objection is valid. But logic has nothing to do with it. Logic has concern with a content that (is or) may be true

or rational, and has nothing to do with one that is definitely rejected.

It was demonstrated that the relation between initial, persistent and expressional content is that the first-born initial content is retained in the mind as persistent content and then expressed out as expressional content. It is the same entity that first arises, is then retained and lastly expressed out. A similar though not identical relation obtains among the sub-types of initial content, nay, of all the three general types of content. From presentation, e. g., we pass to assertion, and from assertion to axiom. This passing is compulsory. But yet it is *we* who are compelled to pass. There is no entitative relation between the three sub-types in question. No one of the three depends upon another for its existence. Yet certainly there is a regular rule of one passing from one of the sub-types to another. Presentation, assertion and axiom, considered from the point of view of what they are, are independent of one another. But there is a dependence of each next upon the just preceding from the point of view of our holding them, i. e. from the point of view of their development.

So far about initial contents. Now about persistent contents, i. e. contents that are conserved in the mind. Conserved content is not other than initial content. It is the initial content that endures. In this enduring state we are not always conscious of it. Nevertheless it must be in the mind all the time. How otherwise can their re-emergence in consciousness be accounted for?

Presentation e. g. is conserved as image. Image is a very ambiguous term. Generally it means something of which we are conscious. But then in what state did the presentation remain in the mind till we became conscious of it later as image? It will be said that in the intermediate state it was 'disposition'. But 'disposition' is such a vague term that to

use it is in other words to leave the problem unsolved. And, indeed, if two names, viz. disposition and image, are used the identity of the two is not sufficiently stressed. It is better to call the enduring state of presentation image and to say that it is a form of consciousness—either latent or patent. Latent image is the limit of the consciousness getting thinner and thinner, so that really there is no gap between latent image and conscious image. The distinction between the two is only one of degree. The more attention is directed upon image the more it becomes conscious. Again, when sufficient attention is directed upon it, it becomes as *clear* as presentation. It does not indeed acquire the full status of presentation, for, unlike it, presentation has an aggressiveness which is due only to its being received from object through senses. But although the clearest image does not acquire this aggressiveness its clearness is just as much as that of presentation. The process from presentation to the clearest image is as follows. Presentation which is clear for a moment only is conserved in the mind in the thinnest possible form. The unconscious is only this thinnest state. Then with attention directed upon it it grows clearer and clearer till it attains the clearness of presentation again. The advantage of this view of image over the traditional view is that it dispenses with all difficulties concerning trace, disposition etc. Image then is the persistent content corresponding to presentation.

The persistent content corresponding to assertion is knowledge. Assertion is momentary. But when it is stabilized or conserved in consciousness it is knowledge. The assertion "The wall is" ceases to be when I cease to think of the wall. Nevertheless I can remember this assertion-content. How can we remember this if the old assertion has not been stabilized in some way in my consciousness? This stabilized form remains as unconscious till I attend to it. Unconsciousness here means, as usual, the thinnest form of consciousness.

As I attend to it it begins to acquire the vividness of assertion. The essence of what we call knowledge (as a permanent acquirement) is the stabilized or permanently retained awareness of existence. If I once have asserted "the wall is" the assertion may have ceased to be ; but I have still attained the knowledge "the wall is".

Knowledge indeed is not merely the existential import of a judgment. There must be images knit together which are said to have the existential import. Knowledge for its existence must then depend upon image. In spite of this dependence, however, its essence must be recognised as the existential import which the images combined are said to possess. For, images without this import are not knowledge, and it is only when this import is introduced is knowledge attained. Existential import is primarily apprehended in assertion. Hence knowledge is the conserved form of assertion.

Lastly, corresponding to axiom, we have rational thought. But just as knowledge is not merely the continued assertion, so is rational thought not merely the continued axiom. Before rational thought we must have thought simply. This mere thought is nothing but a congeries of images and is presupposed by rational thought. But though presupposed it is not, for that reason, the essence of rational thought. The essence is axiom. For so long as axiom was absent thought was not rational, and it becomes rational only when axiom is introduced.

Axiom, it has been already said, means the fundamental principle, which makes out thought rational. And rational thought is consistent. Consistency is nothing more than rationality. Axiom then is the principle of consistency. Rational thought signifies correct inferences, correct definitions etc. Since these are correct there must be some principle or principles which have made them correct. These princi-

ples are axioms. All immediate and mediate inferences (including syllogisms) are nothing more than the application of these axioms. (The so-called different types of inferences are only due to the complexity of the application of the axioms, and are not therefore really different types.)

The relation between rational thought and knowledge is peculiar. Knowledge becomes universal only when it is made rational. But rational thought is itself universal without being knowledge. The reason is clear. Knowledge primarily is personal, because it is but continued assertion, and assertion is personal. When I assert "The wall is" my assertion is not yet rationally established, and therefore not acceptable to all. In order to be acceptable to all axiom must supervene. Knowledge in this way gets universalized into rational thought. But rational thought by itself is universal without being knowledge for the reason that even mere images i. e. images without existential import, when combined according to axioms, give rise to rational thought. Even such a system of images is acceptable to all. Universality thus has no necessary connection with existential import. From all these it follows that logic has business only with consistency according to axioms and not with the reality of a thought. It should however be remembered that this self-sufficiency of rational thought is from the point of view of what it is and not from the point of view of development. From this latter point of view rational thought depends upon knowledge and indirectly upon assertion. From this point of view the universality of rational thought which is due to the universality of axioms is ultimately due to the identity of assertion from which it has been developed.

It is only in rational thought that the absolute need of language arises. Language is generally required for the expression of a content and not for its existence. But in the case of rational thought its very existence requires language.

To illustrate. There can be presentations, images, combinations of images, assertion and knowledge without language. It may be that as matter of fact, they are clothed in language. But it is conceivable that they can dispense with it. In rational thought, on the other hand, language is absolutely necessary. For thought is said to be rational only when others understand it. Without the consideration of at least two persons viz the speaker and hearer, the need of rationality does not arise at all. And language is necessary exactly for this purpose of communication.

To make my thought intelligible to others may be called its universalization. Both axiom and language universalize thought. Are these two universalizations identical? People will indeed argue in the negative saying that while the aim of universalization by language is to make my thought understandable to others the other universalization aims at what is called logical consistency through axioms over and above this understandability. This argument however is untenable for the reason that real understanding there cannot be without rationality in definition and definition requires the application of axioms. The error of the argument lies in the fact that logical consistency or the application of axioms has been taken as necessary in inference only and not in definition. It has not been seen that definition is as much a function of logic as inference. If definition is thus the universalization by axioms it follows that it is the same as linguistic universalization.

Ordinarily we do not aim at definition. Common language is enormously inaccurate. So there the hearer often misunderstands the speaker. This misunderstanding does not much affect our practical ongoings, but will be detected immediately we attempt at accuracy.

The linguistic expression of a thought is a sentence. When this expression is made logically accurate both respect-

ing its evidence and its formation as definition it is called proposition. We have said that expression has to be made logically accurate. As already pointed out, this does not mean that it must have existential import. Logic has nothing to do with any reality corresponding to a thought. It is enough if the thought is consistent both in respect of evidence and definitive formation.

Thus is demonstrated the close relation between thought and language, as also the necessity why language should be a subject-matter of logic quite as much as thought and its components are. But more requires to be said for a clearer exposition.

Expression is a content. Rational expression is 'proposition'. It is rational in two ways. First it has to be rationally established, that is to say, it must have precise evidences in the mind of the speaker to support it. Secondly it has to be rationally formulated. That is to say, the concept thought out or rationally established must be defined in a proposition according to the accurate logical doctrine of proposition. It is not that one process is prior to the other. What is meant is that the two processes are different.

To illustrate : the concept of 'Gravitation' is rationally established by combining certain experimental and observational images according to certain axioms. This concept is then rationally defined as "Bodies attract one another". Here indeed establishment is prior to definition, but it is clear that the establishment itself is based upon previous rational definitions ; so that rational thought is an intertwining of establishment and definition, both according to axioms.

Now proposition as expressional content has three subtypes, (1) 'Componential content,' or the analytical exposition of the components of the proposition, (2) 'Conceptual content,' or the synthetic exposition, i.e. the total concept in the proposition, and (3) 'Vehicular content,' or the medium of

exposition, viz. English or Sanskrit language. In the definition of 'Gravitation' given above, viz. "Gravitation is 'bodies attract one another'" This expression with subject, predicate and copula analytically presented is componential content; and 'Gravitation' which is the total concept is conceptual content; and English is the medium of expression.

Expression expresses not only persistent content but also object. Expression being a content is a form of the apprehension of object. Now both componential and conceptual contents are such apprehension. The difference between the two is that the former being an analytical exposition expresses the nature of object much better than the latter which is the synthetic apprehension of object.

Of the three sub-types of expression there is no correspondence with any other set of sub-types *taken distributively*. But there is a correspondence between the sets taken as wholes. There is, in other words, correspondence between initial, persistent and expressional contents. The correspondence is so thoroughgoing that we are led to conceive of the three as identical in some respects. That initial and persistent contents are identical has already been demonstrated. The identity of persistent and expressional contents can be demonstrated as follows. Expressional content being oral or written can be perceived. Its presentation then is conserved in the mind as image. But there is already in the mind an image of the object itself of which the expression is in question. These two images not only get associated within one another; there remains no means whatever by which any difference of the two can be detected. Thus they become one.

Thus is given an outline map of our consciousness. All its forms, their relations to one another and to object itself have been clearly brought to light. Of the forms axioms, rational thought and componential proposition are what logic

is in direct concern with. Of the different forms of proposition again the vehicular is of least importance to logic though by itself it is not unimportant. As regards the conceptual form of proposition this is not also the direct concern of logic. As for presentation, image, assertion and knowledge, these are studied only in order that the contents with which logic is in direct touch can be expounded in their proper perspectives. One important point established in this essay is that logic has no direct concern with assertion and knowledge. Truth or falsity of componential or conceptual contents is irrelevant to logic. Formal consistency according to axioms in definition, deduction etc. is its sole concern. Logic in this sense is a formal science. Only it must not be forgotten that 'formal' here does not mean 'linguistic'. It is only a contrary of 'philosophic' or 'metaphysical'.

Construction.

By

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We shall define a construct in the following manner. When there arises from certain experiences the awareness of an entity related to the said experiences 'as one to many,' we have a 'construct.' The term entity in this connection does not possess reality reference. It is, however, a content which can be named. Now, constructs as they are in use, are of three types :

- (1) When the experiences referred to are of a sensory character and when the construct is related to space-time or, as Russell has said¹, when it obeys the laws of physics, we call it a *thing*.
- (2) When the experiences are essentially sensory as red, yellow etc., or affective as pleasure, pain etc., the construct is a *qualitative construct*. Such concepts invariably possess an experienced character (quality) and are relative to space-time.
- (3) When the experiences are of a complex situation rather than of any particular quality or sense-experience we have a construct which we may call a *functional construct*. It may or may not be relative to space-time. 'Force', 'behavior', 'honesty' etc., may be cited as examples.

A construct is 'complete', or 'incomplete', or 'indefinite'. It is *complete* when there are limits to the series and when the members can each be presented in 'There is X'. That is, when what is true of the class is also true of the individual members constituting the class. It is *incomplete* when

1. Russell : *Knowledge of the External World* p. 110.

either the series does not possess limits or when the members *can not* all be named by virtue of their nature. It is *indefinite* when both of these possibilities are absent, as for instance 'self', 'world' etc.

Now, a construct is very often confused with an hypothesis or an assumption and is even sometimes regarded as a fiction.² But a construction is not a creation of the mind ; it is, on the contrary, always *grounded in the given*, though the whole of it is not apprehended in any one particular moment of experience. 'It asserts a content never apprehended as whole.'³ The table of everyday experience, for example, is not given as a whole in any particular apprehension or perception. It is only one aspect or another that is present to experience at any one moment. Each perspective that we have of it stands as a symbol or a cue, as it were, for the whole table which, of course, no one perceives, though everyone *thinks* of it as a whole. When we thus speak of the table we must remember that it is construct and not a fact of immediate experience—not, at any rate, wholly a fact of such experience. Thus, whenever we identify the particular perspective *t* with the construct table *T* we commit the fallacy of identification as we have called it. Because *T* is supposed to have certain relatively stable qualities or characters arrived at by abstraction we invest *t* with the same character and thus mutilate its nature and falsify the immediate fact of experience. Further, the same fallacy is committed when we assume that *T*, the construct, is a *transcendent entity* and that it is more real than the elements (*t*) out of which it is constructed and on which it is ultimately based.

2. As, for example, by Stace in his '*Theory of Knowledge and Existence*' pp. 168, who uses it interchangeably with fiction.

3. Hobhouse : *Theory of Knowledge* p. 83.

A construct is not a fiction because, as we said above, it is rooted in the given. Nor is it a mere abstraction. It is not a simple, individual, or particular. Like a 'class', or 'point', or 'event' it is a complex and concrete entity.⁴ It is not, however, another individual, nor a property ; it is the set of things which have the property.

Nor is construction an inference ; for it is given in immediate apprehension—at least in a way. In this connection Russell has formulated his principle of 'construction versus inference'. 'Wherever possible', says he 'substitute construction out of known entities for inferences to unknown entities'.⁵ 'When some set of supposed entities' he says, 'has neat logical properties, it turns out, in a great many instances that the supposed entities can be replaced by pure logical structures composed of entities which have not such neat properties'. Neglect of this principle, Russell has shown, has been a potent source of confusion in philosophy and particularly in epistemology. There is always a tendency to pass from the given or elements in the given to inferences which are in their nature unverifiable and unknown—at least, which it is not the business of the epistemologist to verify. Russell gives various examples of this.⁶ For instance, because matter is a construct we may regard impenetrability *really* to belong to it, that is, it may be logically necessary. In fact, however, matter may not be impenetrable at all. Whenever we make this inference we are likely to be wrong. Similarly, the 'subject' may be retained in a theory of knowledge as a construct, but not as an inferred reality. In such cases the question is whether it is necessary and useful to have a construction. If it is, constructions may be allowed, otherwise they would be

4. Stebbing : *Modern Introduction to Logic* p 455.

5. Russell : *Contemporary British Philosophy* Vol I pp 362 foll.

6. Russell : *Ibid.* pp. 365 foll.

unnecessary ; for Occam's razor prevents the multiplication of useless principles.

But why we make any constructions at all may well be asked now. What are its motives ? This is, however, a question which would seem strictly to belong to Psychology. Besides, in asking about the *motives* of construction we are already implying a *theory* about them. We are assuming that (1) there are motives for their construction, and (2) that we are *conscious* of them. In reality neither may be true, for it does not seem to be necessary that there should be motives for all construction and that we should be conscious of them. Some writers, however, think that the two points mentioned are essential. Stace, for instance, says that 'the motive which has guided the mind to the constructions has been either (1) simplification or (2) consistency'.⁷ He mentions six constructions in connection with the construction of the external world and says that the first (*viz.*, perceptions of one mind resemble those of others), second (*viz.*, corresponding presentations are identical and that the universe is one and not many), fourth (*viz.*, objects exist when no mind perceives them), and the sixth (*viz.*, with different senses we perceive the same object) "are made for the sake of simplification", while the third (*viz.*, presentations of a mind may continue in existence provided some other mind perceives them) and the fifth (*viz.*, that there are things which may not have qualities presented to the mind) 'are made for the sake of consistency'.⁸

From such an account it would appear that constructions are consciously conceived and pragmatically motivated. We construct in order to overcome contradictions or difficulties and to gain a simple view of things. As such the process of construction would appear to be an extremely arduous

7. Stace : *The Theory of Knowledge and Existence* p. 158

8. Stace : *Ibid.* p 158.

undertaking and would be attained like Locke's abstract general ideas, after experience and training by individuals endowed with the gift of speculative insight. But obviously this need not have been the case at all. Experience would seem to testify to the spontaneous emergence of constructs. Neither in the race nor in the individual can we conceive of a time when the mind was not already employing some construct or other, may be of the vaguest kind. If there were a 'fossil' mind (in more than a metaphorical sense) it would already exhibit certain predispositions and tendencies, and certain ways of interpreting and ordering experience. Thus, far from there being a conscious motivation for constructs one must recognise, as indeed Stace himself does on an earlier page of his book, that the process 'must have gone through deep down in the dim regions of our unconscious selves'.⁹ The very fabric of language which one imbibes and adopts already implies them. So that our practical needs and utilitarian interests of simplification and consistency can hardly be said to supply the necessary stimulation for construction. We may not, however, deny that construction is often dominated by ideals of usefulness and purpose; what we do deny is that it must always and necessarily be so.

Again, there is the question about the existence of the constructs. It is sometimes asked what kind of existence and reality, if any, the constructs have. It may be stated at once that the question begs the issue. For, the question of the existence and reality of the constructs depends on the *interest* or *purpose* for which they are made; that is, in so far as they are made at all. Existence or reality is a further judgment and will depend on the system in which constructs occur. Existence always means existence in a particular universe of discourse. Absolute existence is itself a cons-

9. Stace : *The Theory of Knowledge and Existence* p 98.

truction (for certain purposes of theory) and there does not seem to be much use in asking as to whether constructs exist or not. The question is unmeaning.

In short, constructs are (1) grounded in sense-experience, (2) not given as a *whole* in apprehension, (3) not fictions, inferences or hypotheses, (4) not transcendent entities invoked for the explanation and elaboration of knowledge, (5) not more real than the elements out of which they are constructed and (6) not always consciously constructed in the interests of purpose or end.

Indian and Western Theories of Truth.

By

SATIS CHANDRA CHATTERJEE.

There are two main questions with regard to truth, namely, how truth is constituted, and how truth is known ? The first question relates to the nature of truth and the answers to it give us the definitions of truth. The second question refers to the ascertainment of truth and the answers to it give us the tests or criteria of truth.

With regard to these two questions there seem to be two possible answers. Thus it may be said that truth is a self-evident character of all knowledge. Every knowledge is true and known to be true by its very nature. Knowledge does not depend on any external conditions either to be made true or to be known as true. This is the theory of the intrinsic validity (*svataḥ prāmāṇya*) of knowledge as advocated by the Sāṃkhya, Mīmāṃsā and Advaita vedānta systems of Indian Philosophy. According to the last two schools, the truth of knowledge consists just in its being uncontradicted (*avādhita*). The absence of contradiction, however, is not a positive but a negative condition of truth. Knowledge is both made true and known to be true by its own internal conditions. It is only falsehood that is externally conditioned. So truth is self-evident, while falsity requires to be evidenced by external grounds. The Sāṃkhya goes further than this. It maintains that both truth and falsehood are internally conditioned and immediately known, i.e., are self-evident.

There is no exact parallel to the above theory of truth in Western Philosophy. It is true that in modern European Philosophy, knowledge, in a strict sense, is always taken to mean true belief. But truth or validity is not regarded as

intrinsic to all knowledge, independently of all external conditions. It is in the writings of L. A. Reid, a modern realist, who owns no allegiance to the current schools of realism, that we find some approach to the view that truth is organic to knowledge. But even Reid makes it conditional on knowledge efficiently fulfilling its function, namely, the apprehension of reality as it is. He thinks that truth is nothing else but knowledge doing its job. Thus he says: "Truth is, indeed, simply..... the quality of knowledge perfectly fulfilling its functions." Again he observes: "If knowledge were not transitive, if we were not in direct contact, joined with reality, then all our tests, coherence, correspondence, and the rest, would be worthless".¹ Here truth is admitted to be a natural function of knowledge, but not as inherent and self-evident in all knowledge. In the theory of Intuitionism, we find a close approach to the above view of self-evident validity (svataḥ prāmāṇya). To the question: 'how do we know that a belief is true or valid?' Intuitionism has a simple answer to give, namely, that we know it immediately to be such. As Hobhouse puts the matter: "Intuitionism has a royal way of cutting this, and indeed most other knots: for it has but to appeal to a perceived necessity, to a clear idea, to the inconceivability of the opposite, all of which may be known by simply attending to our own judgment, and its task is done."² Among intuitionists, Lossky has made an elaborate attempt to show that truth and falsity are known through an immediate consciousness of their objectivity and subjectivity respectively. For him, truth is the objective, and falsity the subjective appearance of the object. But how do we know that the one is objective and the other is subjective? The answer given by Lossky, as also by Lipps, is

1. L. A. Reid, *Knowledge and Truth*, pp. 185, 199, 204.

2. Hobhouse, *Theory of Knowledge*, p. 488.

that we have "an immediate consciousness of subjectivity" and "an immediate consciousness of objectivity." To quote Lossky's own words : "It is in this consciousness of objectivity and subjectivity, and not.....in the laws of identity, contradiction, and excluded middle, that our thought has a real and immediate guide in its search for truth." ³

It should be remarked here that the above theories of self-evident truth or intrinsic validity give us a rather cheap and untenable solution of the logical problem of truth. It leaves no room for the facts of doubt and falsehood in the sphere of knowledge. This is the gravamen of the Nyāya criticism of the theory of intrinsic validity. But any theory of truth which fails to explain its correlate, namely, falsehood becomes so far inadequate. Further, it makes a confusion between psychological belief and logical certainty. Psychologically a wrong belief may be as firm as a right one. But this does not mean that there is no distinction between the two. Subjective certainty, as such, can not be accepted as a test of truth. It is true that the theory of intrinsic validity does not appeal to any test of truth than the truth itself. It proceeds on the assumption that the truth of knowledge is self-evident, so much so that we can not think of the opposite. In fact, however, there is no such self-evident truth. It is only in the case of the self that we can speak of self-evidence in this sense. The self is a self-manifesting reality. It is manifest even in any doubt or denial of its reality. Hence self-evidence belongs really only to the self. It is on the analogy of the self that we speak of the self-evidence of any other truth. A truth is self-evident in so far as it has the evidence of the self or is evident like the self. But as we have just said, there is no such self-evident truth other than the self itself. In the case of any other truth, we can always think of the opposite in a sensible way. That 'two

3. Lossky : *The Intuitive Basis of Knowledge*, pp. 227-29.

and two make five' is not as non-sensical as 'adacadabra'. Even if the opposite of a certain belief be inconceivable, it does not follow that the belief is infallible. What was once inconceivable is now not only conceivable but perfectly true. Hence we can not say that self-evident validity is intrinsic to all knowledge.

The second answer to the question: how is truth constituted and known ? leads us to the theory of extrinsic validity (parataḥ prāmāṇya). According to this, the truth of any knowledge is both constituted and known by certain external conditions. As a general rule, the validity of knowledge is due to something that is not inherent in it. So also the knowledge of validity depends on certain extraneous tests. Validity is thus assigned to one knowledge on the ground of some other knowledge. This is the theory of extrinsic validity as advocated by the Nyāya and the Buddhist systems. In western philosophy, the correspondence, the coherence and the pragmatist theories of truth all come under the doctrine of extrinsic validity. In each of them the truth of knowledge is made to depend on certain external conditions other than the knowledge itself. According to almost all realists, old and new, it is correspondence to facts that constitutes both the nature and test of truth.⁴ Of course, some realists differ from this general position and give a different view of the matter. Thus Alexander⁵ makes coherence the ground of truth. But in speaking of coherence as determined by reality he accepts indirectly the theory of correspondence. Reid,⁶ on the other hand, treats correspondence to the given only as a test of truth. Russell⁷ defines truth in terms of corres-

4. Vide *The New Realism and Essays in Critical Realism*.

5. *Space, Time and Deity*, vol. II p. 251f.

6. L. A. Reid, *Knowledge and Truth*, chap. VIII.

7. *Problems of philosophy*, chapters, XII, XIII, *Our knowledge of the External world*, p. 58; *The Analysis of Mind*, p. 165,

pondence, and accepts coherence as a test of some truths, while others are said to be self-evident. In the philosophy of objective idealism⁸, coherence in the sense of the systematic unity of all experiences is made both the ground and the test of truth. The truth consists in the coherence of all experiences as one self-maintaining and all-inclusive system. It is in this sense that Bosanquet⁹ says that 'the truth is the whole and it is its own criterion'. Truth can only be tested by more of itself. Hence any particular knowledge is true in so far as it is consistent with the whole body of experience. On this view, the truth of human knowledge becomes relative, since coherence as the ideal of completed experience is humanly unattainable. For pragmatism¹⁰, truth is both constituted and known by practical utility. The truth of knowledge consists in its capacity to produce practically useful consequences. So also the method of ascertaining truth is just to follow the practical consequences of a belief and see if they have any practical value. With this brief statement of the realistic, the idealistic and the pragmatist theories of truth, we proceed to examine the Buddhist and the Nyāya theories of extrinsic validity.

The Buddhists adopt the pragmatist theory of truth and reality. For them, practical efficiency is the test of both truth and reality. The real is what possesses practical efficiency (arthakriyā), and the true is the useful and so practically efficient (arthakriyāsamartha). But the pragmatic conception of truth is embarrassed by serious difficulties. The Nyāya criticism of the Bauddha conception of pramāṇa has brought out some of these difficulties. Here we may note that to reduce the true to the useful is to make it almost

8. Vide Joachim, *The Nature of Truth*, chap. III.

9. Logic, vol. II, p. 265-67.

10. James, *Pragmatism*, Lct. VI; Perry, *Present Philosophical Tendencies*, pts. IV, V.

meaningless. It is by no means the case that truth is only a matter of practical utility. The atomic and the electron theories of matter make very little difference in our practical life. Similarly, the different theories of truth involve no great difference in their practical consequences. But in the absence of any other test than that of practical utility we can not say which one is true and which is false. Further, there are certain beliefs which are admittedly wrong but which are otherwise useful for certain purposes of life. It may sometimes be useful even to tell a lie. But no one would claim any truth for a wrong belief or a lie on account of its practical utility. Hence the Buddhist and the pragmatist theories of truth can not be accepted as sound and satisfactory.

The Nyāya theory of truth, it will be seen, combines the correspondence, the coherence and the pragmatist theories with certain modifications. According to it, the truth of knowledge consists in its correspondence with objective facts, while coherence and practical utility are the tests of truth in such cases in which we require a test. It defines the truth of all knowledge as a correspondence of relations (*tadvati tatprakāraka*). To know a thing is to judge it as having such-and-such a character. This knowledge of the thing will be true if the thing has really such-and-such a character; if not, it will be false. The Nyāya view of correspondence is thus different from the new realistic idea of structural correspondence or identity of contents. That knowledge corresponds to some object does not, for the Naiyāyika, mean that the contents of the object bodily enter into consciousness and become its contents. Nor does it mean that there is a one-to-one correspondence between the structure of knowledge and that of its object. Nor again does the Nyāya follow the critical realists' idea of correspondence between character-complexes, referred to the object

by the knowing mind, and those actually belonging to the object. When we know anything we do not first apprehend a certain logical essence or a character-complex and then refer it to the thing known. Our knowledge is in direct contact with the object. In knowing the object we judge it as having a relation to certain characters or attributes. Our knowledge will be true if there is correspondence between the relation, asserted in knowledge, and that existing among facts. Thus my knowledge of a conch-shell as white is true because there is a real relation between the two corresponding to the relation affirmed by me. On the other hand, the perception of silver in a shell is false because it asserts a relation between the two, which does not correspond to a real relation between them.¹¹

While truth consists in correspondence, the criterion of truth is, for the Nyāya, coherence in a broad sense (saṃvāda). But coherence does not here mean anything of the kind that objective idealism means by it. The Nyāya coherence is a practical test and means the harmony between cognitive and conative experiences (pravṛttisāmarthya) or between different kinds of knowledge (tājñātiyatva). That there is truth in the sense of correspondence can not, as a general rule, be known directly by intuition. We know it by inference from the fact that the knowledge in question coheres with other experiences of the same object as also with the general system of our knowledge. Thus the perception of water is known to be valid when different ways of reaction or experiment give us the same experience of water. It is this kind of coherence

11. Compare : "Smith's judgment that it is the light of a ship is true just because 'it', the light, is in fact so related to a real ship. Jones' judgment (that it is the light of a star), on the other hand, is false, because.....his thought is not an apprehension of the existing present complex fact, light-belonging-to ship.....", Reid, *Knowledge and Truth*, p. 209-10.

that Alexander accepts as a test of truth when he says: "If truth is tested by reference to other propositions the test is not one of correspondence to reality but of whether the proposition tested is consistent or not with other propositions"¹². Hobhouse¹³ also means the same thing by 'consilience' as a measure of validity. According to him, validity belongs to judgments as forming a consilient system. Of course, he admits that such validity is relative and not absolute, since the ideal of a completed system of consilient judgments is unattainable. The Nyāya idea of samvāda or coherence may be better explained as a combination of Reid's methods of correspondence and coherence. If we take the judgment, 'that is the light of a ship,' we can test its truth by what Reid calls the "correspondence method" of approaching the light and seeing a ship. This is exactly what the Nyāya means by pravṛttisāmarthyā or successful activity. Or we can employ, so says Reid, the cheaper "coherence method" of comparing this knowledge with other kinds of knowledge and see if it is consistent with them.¹⁴ In this we have the Nyāya method of testing one knowledge by reference to some other valid knowledge (tājñātiyatva). But the Nyāya goes further than this and accepts practical utility also as a test of truth. Thus the validity of the perception of water may be known from correspondence and coherence in the above sense. But it may be further known from the satisfaction of our practical needs or the fulfilment of our practical purposes in relation to water such as drinking, bathing, washing, etc. But the Nyāya never admits the pragmatist contention that the truth of any knowledge is constituted by its utility or serviceableness. Knowledge is made true by its correspondence to some reality or objective fact. It is true not because it is useful, but it

12. *Space, Time and Deity*, Vol. II. p. 252.

13. *Theory of Knowledge* p. 499-500.

14. Reid : *Knowledge and Truth*, pp 203-4, 211-12.

is useful because it is already true. Hence truth consists in correspondence and is tested by coherence and practical efficiency.

But from the standpoint of modern Nyāya, all truths do not require to be tested. Some truths are known as such without any test or confirmation. There are manifestly necessary and so self-evident truths. Here the Nyāya view has some affinity with Russell's theory of truth.¹⁵ In both, truth is defined by correspondence to fact, but in different ways. Although truth is thus externally conditioned, some truths are admitted by both to be self-evident. For the Nyāya, however, such truths are only necessary truths or what Russell calls *a priori* principles. Of the different kinds of knowledge by acquaintance,—direct perception, memory, introspection, etc.—which are admitted by Russell to have self-evident truth, it is only self-consciousness (*anuvyavasāya*) that is admitted by the Nyāya as having self-evident validity (*svataḥ pramāṇa*). The validity of self-consciousness is self-evident because there is a necessary relation between consciousness and its contents. When I become conscious of a desire for food, I find that my consciousness is necessarily related to the desire, it is the desire itself as it becomes explicit. Here I not only know something, but know that I am knowing it, i.e. the truth of my knowledge is self-evident.

But on the correspondence theory of truth we do not see how any truth can be self-evident. If the truth of knowledge depends on such external condition as its correspondence to fact, we must first assure ourselves of such correspondence before we can know the truth of any knowledge. It can not be said that in some cases the correspondence is directly known. To be true, even the direct knowledge of correspondence must correspond to an objective fact of corres-

15. *Problems of Philosophy*, chapters, XI, XII, XIII.

pondence. That is, there must be real correspondence if my knowledge of correspondence is to be true. In fact, we can not go beyond our knowledge and see if it corresponds to a reality outside of knowledge. As Alexander has said, "If the reality is something other than what appears to us 'by all the ways' of sense, ideas, imagination, memory, conception, judging, it cannot be appealed to."¹⁶ When we first infer something and then perceive it, the truth of the inference consists, not in any kind of correspondence to a reality beyond knowledge, but in the consistency or coherence of the inferential knowledge with the perceptual knowledge of the thing. Hence the truth of knowledge consists in the consistency between different kinds of knowledge with regard to the same object. Russell contends that on this view a consistent fiction should be true. But we are to say that a fiction, although it is self-consistent, is not yet consistent with the other parts of human knowledge. If it be so consistent, it becomes virtually true. Hence we conclude that truth both consists in and is tested by coherence, in its ordinary sense of the consistency of one knowledge with other kinds of knowledge or the whole body of human knowledge. It is true that the logical question about truth or falsity does not arise with regard to all knowledge. Some knowledge may be a matter of firm or undoubted belief without there being any explicit affirmation of truth with regard to it. When, however, the logical question of truth arises with regard to any knowledge we have to explain and justify the truth of that knowledge in terms of its coherence with other forms or parts of human knowledge.

16. *Space, Time and Destiny*. p 252.

Some Difficulties of the Sankhya System.

By

D. M. DATTA.

The object of this paper is not so much to solve any problem as to draw the attention of competent persons to certain problems which a teacher and a student of the Sāṅkhya system of philosophy always feel. These problems are fundamental to that system and only the possibility of their satisfactory solution can prove the way for the understanding and the acceptance of that system. In the statement of these problems we shall not generally refer to any particular treatise of that school. But we shall throughout take the Sāṅkhyā-Kārikā as the representative work.

The very first problem concerns the possibility of creation. The Sāṅkhya shares the general faith of the orthodox schools that the world is beginningless and proceed by alternate cycles of creation and dissolution. Consequently when it speaks of creation (Sarga), it obviously speaks not of the first creation, there being no absolute beginning, but of creation as succeeding any of the states of dissolution.

Now creation, according to it, involves the disturbance of the equilibrium of (the three constituents of) Nature (*prakṛti*) prevailing during dissolution and it is initiated by the association of Nature with the spirit which is imperfect, the removal of this imperfection being the end of the creative process.

A great difficulty arises here. What is the meaning of dissolution? Does it not mean the disintegration of all specific products into the homogeneous material cause *prakṛti* in which there is no distinction and differentiation of specific objects? If so, does it not imply the cessation of determinate products like *buddhi*, *aṅkāra* etc.? If that be so again,

how can we then understand the imperfection or the bondage of the spirit during dissolution? Imperfection cannot surely be conceived without ignorance,—without intellectual confusion, which implies the functioning of the very *buddhi* which can not be conceived to exist before creation at the state of dissolution. If bondage be a precondition of the creative process and if bondage means the existence of at least the intellect, (*buddhi*) which is again said to be a product of creation, we get into a vicious circle. In fact, however, bondage is said to involve the association of the spirit not simply with the intellect but with seventeen other determinate subtle products of nature namely egotism, the eleven *indriyas* and the five subtle essences (*tanmātras*). The difficulty is then still greater.

Are we to suppose then that though the eighteen factors of bondage do not exist as such in the state of dissolution, they exist yet in their constituent *guṇas* which make up the homogeneous state of *prakṛti*? But this supposition implies that the bondage of the spirit during dissolution means the association of the spirit with the dissolved constituents of its own fetters, namely the intellect etc. which it owned previously. Even here we have to face another *petitio*. Does not the spirit own or appropriate its fettering conditions through the intellect and does not dissolution mean the breaking up of this intellect too?

We find then that dissolution of the objective world and the conservation of the conditions of bondage without which a fresh creation is impossible contradict one another and make the understanding of creation extremely difficult.

Closely connected with this there is another difficulty namely whether transformation of *prakṛti* is partial or total. The ordinary way in which the process of the evolution of the different products is described seems to mean that

prakṛti is transformed, without any reservation, into *buddhi* and that again, without any reservation, into *ahankāra* and so on. From this the student is apt to understand that *prakṛti* is completely transformed into the next determinate state and so on till the most determinate products are evolved. But this meaning is not tenable, for the simple reason that it would imply that when the five gross elements and the eleven *indriyas* are evolved there would remain neither *buddhi* nor *ahankāra*, which is absurd. It would, therefore, seem obvious that at least, from *buddhi* downwards transformation of the matrix is partial and not total. Are we similarly to suppose that it is true upwards of *buddhi*, too, and that *prakṛti* also is only partially transformed into *buddhi*? This interpretation would be quite acceptable but for the express statement that the unevolved i.e. *prakṛti* is not *sāvaśva*. (Kār 10). If we are forbidden to conceive three constituents of *prakṛti* i. e. *sattva*, *rajas* and *taṇas* as parts conjoined in *prakṛti* (*Tattva-Kaumudī*, on Kār. 10), how can we think of its partial transformation? This difficulty arises also on other grounds. Space (either as *ākāśa* or as *dik*) is a gross evolute of *prakṛti* and, therefore, *prakṛti* cannot itself be supposed to be extended.

But is the partial transformation of *prakṛti* or its subtle evolute to be conceived in the light of the modern conception of the transformation of energy? Are we to conceive the evolutes as the state of Kinetic energy and the unevolved as the potential energy and thus explain the quantitative predicates 'partial' and 'total' without importing any spatial relation of part and whole into them?

But another difficulty in connection with transformation is felt and it is further increased if evolution is conceived in the light of transformation of energy. Transformation of the potential energy to the Kinetic one is a process in time

without which we can hardly think of it. Is the process of evolution also a temporal process ?

The answer to this question seems to be in the affirmative. The texts and commentaries describe the different stages of evolution exactly as a successive series, the numbers of which are said to precede or succeed one another as the case may be. But this apparently valid description begins to be a doubtful one as we are told towards the end of the process that time itself is but a mode of the gross evolute ākāśa, before the evolution of which, therefore, the process cannot be conceived to be in time. How is this riddle—another *petitio*—to be overcome ? The only escape from the difficulty seems to be to deny the temporal character of evolution. This makes evolution itself a meaningless category and quite inapplicable to the Sāṅkhya process, which has to be viewed then as a logical process by which, for example, the conclusion is derived from the premises. Thus interpreted the Sāṅkhya theory will resemble that of Spinoza, *prakṛti* being conceived like Spinoza's substance, as the absolute logical *prius* which is presupposed by the conception of every object and the relation between *prakṛti* and its so-called evolutes being conceived like that between the substance and its attributes and modes. This Spinozistic or logical version of the Sāṅkhya theory will require us to climb up to *prakṛti* from the finite objects by the reverse logical process of finding out the logical presupposition of the given objects. But the greatest difficulty in accepting this innovation is that this will reduce the process of evolution or creation to a subjective one and will fail to preserve the realistic conception of transformation as found in Sāṅkhya and therefore, the distinction between Vedānta and Sāṅkhya theories of creation will be unintelligible.

Turning from the conception of nature to that of the spirit we find similar difficulties, the chief among which is the theory

of the plurality of spirits. The Kārikā tries to establish this theory on the following grounds :—"The plurality of spirits certainly follows from the distributive (nature) of the incidence of birth and death and of (the endowment of) the instruments (of cognition and action), from (bodies) engaging in action, not all at the same time, and also from differences in (the proportion of) the three constituents." (Kā.18 trans. by Suryanarayana Shastri). It is readily seen that diversities of birth, death, instruments, actions and the proportion of the guṇas which are made here the grounds for the inference about the plurality of the spirits are all empirical conditions which are dependent on the association of the spirits with the bodies. But as these are separable and even illusory accidents of the spirits according to Sāṅkhya, are we to conceive that this plurality is also an empirical and apparent one? If it be so, then what is the distinction between the Sāṅkhya and the Vedānta conception of the spirit? But if the plurality is not simply apparent but real, what distinguishes one spirit from another, when both are free? The intrinsic nature of every spirit is like that of every one else and there being no discernible ground for distinction one can easily apply here Leibnitz's principle of the identity of indiscernibles and declare that all spirits are really one. It may be recalled here that this difficulty arises also in the Nyāya-vaiśeṣika system, which also conceives the intrinsic nature of every spirit in the same manner. But that system realises this difficulty and tries to avoid it by the technical dodge that each eternal substance has uniqueness (particularity or Viśeṣa) of its own which distinguishes it from the rest. The plurality of atoms being the result of an analysis and therefore known otherwise to be unavoidable, it may be reasonable to admit some uniqueness of each atom in order to make that plurality imaginable. Such is not, however, the case of the plurality of spirits, the ground for which if any, are the empirical ones dependent on the

spirit's relation with the body and unless other grounds are available it is difficult to admit the intrinsic differences among spirits dissociated from bodily relations.

Again if there be many spirits, how are we to understand the cessation of evolution on the attainment of freedom as described by the Sāṅkhya writers? While one spirit is free, another is in bondage, and then there is at the same time the necessity of admitting the disappearance and the appearance of the world. This can be possible either if the process of evolution and disappearance is a subjective one and, therefore, a personal affair or if there are as many simultaneous objective worlds evolved as there are spirits in bondage. Which of these is to be accepted and which to be rejected? All these difficulties regarding the conceptions of nature, creation and spirit usually incline one to seek for their solution in Vedānta. But is there no escape from them in the realistic way that is generally known to be the Sāṅkhya way? Is it necessary to believe that Sāṅkhya perfected itself in Vedānta and therefore its literature did not develop as it should have if the realistic Sāṅkhya movement of thought did really continue?

The Philosophy of Parasarabhaṭṭa.

By

T. R. CHINTAMANI.

Raṅganātha, alias Parāśarabhaṭṭa, the worthy son of Śrīvatsankamiśra, otherwise known as Kuraṭṭālvar, a close associate of Śrī Rāmānuja, is familiar to students of the Viśiṣṭādvaitic philosophic thought of the Rāmānuja school, as the author of the famous *Viṣṇusahasranāmabhāṣya*, known as *Bhāgavadgūṇadarpaṇa*. Parāśara lost his father even while Śrī Rāmānuja was alive, and came under the influence of Rāmānuja, early in his literary career. The profound devotion of Rāmānuja to Lord Viṣṇu was transmitted to the pupil in all its virility; the *bhakti* in the Lord grew as time went on and it finally took outward expression in the *Viṣṇusahasranāmabhāṣya*, an exposition of the one thousand names of the Lord, and in stotras, like *Śrī Rāṅgarājastava*, *Śrī-Guṇaratnakoṣa*, etc., dedicated to Lord Śrī Raṅganātha, of whom he was an ardent devotee. It is traditionally said that in recognition of his devout bhakti, Śrī Raṅganātha himself gave him the title of Parāśarabhaṭṭa and from that time he was known only by that name. The *Sahasranāmabhāṣya* and other devotional lyrics of Parāśarabhaṭṭa reveal in an able manner the devotional and philosophic mysticism of the author.

In the realm of Viśiṣṭādvaitic philosophic literature we find Parāśarabhaṭṭa as the author of some minor treatises like the *Aṣṭaśloki*, *Pranavavivarana*, dealing with the mysticism of the symbol OM, *Kriyūdīpa* and *Tattvarayaśloka*, dealing with the three fundamental reals peculiar to the school of Rāmānuja. His *magnum opus* was, however, the *Tattvaratnākara* of which nothing more remains than mere

name. The ravages of time have been felt on the work and it is not known whether it will be recovered at all. All we know of it is based upon the references to that work in the compositions of Vedānta Deśika and other writers.* An attempt has been made in the following pages to bring together all the available extracts from that work and determine, of course in an *apriori* manner, the contents of that work.

As a representative of the Viśiṣṭādvaitic tradition, Parāśara believed in the unity of the entire Mīmāṃsāśāstra, consisting of the *Karma kūṇḍa* portion of Jaimini, the *Devatūkūṇḍa* of Kāśakṛtsna and the *Brahmakūṇḍa* of Bādarāyaṇa. In this he comes clearly into conflict with the traditions recorded by Rāṇānuja, who cites an extract from the works of Bodhāyana, wherein we find Jaimini as the author of the 16 adhyāyas. The basis for the ascription of the *Devatūkūṇḍa* to Kāśakṛtsna is not known, for it is uniformly conceded that Jaimini himself wrote that portion. In fact, Vedānta Deśika himself remarks in his *Adhikaraṇa Sarāvalī* that this view of the author of *Tattvaratnākara* has no basis. (Sainikarsaḥ Kāśakṛtsna prabhava iti katham Tattvaratnākaroktiḥ).

Like most of the technical philosophic treatises the *Tattvaratnākara* seems to have devoted one section to the *Pramāṇas* or instruments of valid cognition and another to the *Prameyas*, or object of valid cognition. In the section on the *Pramāṇas*, the problems of epistemology like the theories of truth and error seem to have been well explained. Beginning from *Pratyakṣa*, we find a consideration of the *indriyas* or organs of sense divided into six, with mind as

* Works like the *Tattvaṭīkā*, *Nyāyapariśuddhi*, *Nyāyasiddhāñjana*, *Tattvamuktākālāpa* etc. contain copious extracts from it.

the sixth and inner organ. Various kinds of *sannikarṣas* like *sanniyoga* etc. have been set forth in detail ; *Anumāna* is twofold, *svārtha* and *parārtha* ; the five members of syllogism are explained ; the conception of invariable concomittance, how that concomittance is known even at first sight etc., are then dealt with in detail. The *hetvābhāsas*, *tarka*, *anukūla* and *pratikūla* as aids to inference etc., are all discussed. In the opinion of Parāśarabhaṭṭa, the place assigned to *Tarka* in *anumāna* by his predecessors has been unduly great ; in other words, it has been given undue predominance. The topic of *Sabdaśakti*, i.e. *abhidhā* and *Lakṣaṇā* received detailed treatment. The *anvitābhidhānavāla* doctrine, formulated by the Prābhākaras and adopted into their system by Yāmuna etc., is given prominence. *Pratibhā* also is considered in detail.

Regarding the nature of knowledge, it is said to be *svayamprakāśa* and not *būddhigocara* ; naturally the conception of *prakāṣya* of the Mīmāṃsakas is refuted in detail.

The section on *Prameyas* should have apparently included a consideration of the various padārthas, including the *ātman*. The section dealing with *ātman* should have been termed *ādhyātma-khaṇḍa*, subdivided into two — (i.e.) one for the individual and the other for the Universal soul. In the scheme of padārthas, a separate place is assigned for *tamas*, identifying it with *Prakṛti* or *Pradhāna*. Parāśara criticises the Kāśyapiyas who say it is the negation of light ; the Prābhākaras who deny *tamas* ; the Kaumarilas, who, in their scheme give a distinct place for it ; *Sūlīśya* is accepted as a distinct category. *Śabda* is regarded as a quality of *ākāśa* : as a natural corollary, the doctrine of *sphoṭa* is refuted in detail. Number is a quality, coming into existence only in the second moment of the existence of the object, with which it is associated. *Prthaktva* which is regarded as

a separate quality by the Vaiśeṣikas is discarded as a separate entity and brought under *bheda*.

In the ādhyātmakhaṇḍa the discussion turns upon the real nature of *ātman* and *paramātman*, the relation between the two, the means of liberation, the nature of mokṣa etc. The theory of *Śarīraśarīribhāva* found a place in this section. From the extracts we find that Parāsarabhaṭṭa has relied on the Āgamaprāmāṇya, in certain places and Yāmunācārya in other places. He should have been indebted to other works and authors, but that information is not available.

The Conception of the Soul in the Nyaya System

By

HARI MOHAN BHATTACHARYYA.

Though admittedly an orthodox system of Indian thought the Nyāya, because of certain peculiarities in its tenets, may be said to have developed a spirit of disaffiliation, like a forward child, from the tradition of Upanisadic speculation to which it does not hesitate to trace its genealogy. Its preference for logic and methodology as against absolute reliance on Scriptural texts and contexts, its comparatively strong emphasis on the analysis of the Given or the World of Facts as against that of the ideal or spiritual and above all, its general and apparent acceptance of the view that the soul as a substantive reality is an intrinsically unconscious substratum to which consciousness is related as accident to substance—all these features have the cumulative effect of creating a suspicion in the speculative mind of India against even its orthodoxy, so much so that the student of the history of the Nyāya System will not be surprised to find the totally unorthodox designation of Lokāyata or Lokāyatika, though unmerited, applied to it by Kautilya and the authors of the Ramayana and Harivamsa.¹ Now in this paper I would attempt an examination of the last and the most significant of the problems of the Nyāya system, viz., whether the soul of the Nyāya can be consistently maintained as essentially unconscious (Jada) so that its cognitions, feelings and volitions

1. Samkhyam, Yogam, Lokayatama yanviksiki

Kautilya's Arthasastra. 1. iv.

Also,

Aikyānanatva—samyoga—samavayavasaradaih
Lokayatikamukhyaisca Susubuh Svanamiritam.
Harivamsa—Bhābisya Purāna. 67-30.

are mere empirical *addenda* to its non-psychical essence, pointing out at the same time some important grounds, historical and metaphysical, that may suggest an opposite conclusion.

Now in this attempt I would do well to present in brief the traditional Nyāya account of the nature and attributes of the soul. From Bhāṣya of Vātsyāyana on the Laksana Sutra of Gautama, we know that the soul is an eternal substance having the qualities of desire, aversion, conation, pleasure, pain and cognition. These qualities are the *lingam* or *hetu* which helps us to infer the existence of the soul by the particular form of inference known as *Sāmānyato dṛṣṭa*. Then comes the series of the well-known arguments as to how these forms of consciousness cannot belong either to the body, or to the senses or again to manas. These arguments, which it is needless for my present purposes to repeat here in detail, are scattered over the first and second Ānvikas of the third chapter of the Nyāya Sūtra ;² and the student of the Nyāya system is also aware how Vātsyāyana, Udyotakara and Vācaṣpatimiśra have elaborated the teachings of Gautama. In these arguments it has been pointed out by Gautama and his commentators that if consciousness with its various modes belonged to the body then it would exist in its various parts and constituents, so that the consciousness of an individual would be a mere conglomeration of several consciousnesses. The further in-consequence of such an assumption would be that all material objects which are of the nature of body would also be conscious, and even the dead body of an animal would have to be regarded as conscious. Nor can the senses possess consciousness in themselves for in that case we have to admit that the ear hears the sound, the eye sees the vision and so on, and it would be impossible for us to assert

the well-known fact that I, who am seeing a thing at present have also heard of it. And the fact of the matter is that the senses are the mere instruments whereby the soul, as an agent becomes conscious of these different facts of the world. Nor can the *manas* replace the conscious self, for the *manas* is atomic and as such cannot account for the simultaneous cognition of things. Further if *manas* were regarded as conscious and for the matter of that as an agent of activities (*pravṛttis*) then the soul would be reaper of the fruits of the activities for which it is not at all responsible (*akṛtābhyāgama-dosāpattiḥ*). Rather it would be consistent to maintain that consciousness and therefore agency only belong to the soul which can therefore be the legitimate enjoyer of the results of its activities. And the permanence or persistence of the soul has been demonstrated by the fact of memory and recognition which is possible only when we can maintain that the percipient persists as identically the same agent up to the subsequent recognition of the percept.

Now all this goes to show that consciousness empirically originates in the soul and not in the body, the organs or *manas*; and the Naiāyikas in general—and more particularly the commentators—Vātsyāyana, Udyotkara Vācaśpatimiśra and Jayantabhaṭṭa³ point out that consciousness though thus originating in the soul in its empirical relation with the world of objects is not essential to and co-extensive with the life of the soul, only *occurs* to it and comes and goes, but the soul is for ever and for ever.

And this accidental or adventitious character of consciousness as related to the soul is further corroborated by the traditional Naiāyikas by their conception of salvation (Apa-

3. Nyāyamañjarī :

Jñānasamavāyanibandhanamevatmanascetayitritvam.

varga) which, according to them consists in absolute freedom from pain (*ātyantika dukkhanivṛtti*). Cognition, merits and demerits and their consequent pleasure and pain are but the transient qualities of the soul and salvation is that quiescent state wherefrom all the accidents of merits and demerits and the corresponding pleasure and pain must be eliminated. It is not proper to contend, so says the Naiāyika, that such an unconscious existence is never to be coveted as a *pūrūsārtha* ; for it is also a matter of common experience that a man of this world, when disgusted with pain in return for his life-long thirst after pleasure declares his preference for quiescence to feverish fits of pleasure and pain. Vātsyāyana goes further than this and with clever dialectic argues that the manifestation of the state of the eternal joy cannot be the lot of the saved. He points out that the manifestation of eternal joy can be neither eternal nor non-eternal. For if it were eternal then every soul would be eternally happy which is not the case, and again if it were not eternal then at the time of its absence the soul cannot be said to be liberated. And he adds that the scriptural description of salvation as a state of eternal bliss is to be taken in a figurative and not in a literal sense. Hence he concludes that liberation is practically a falling back of the soul upon its original and essential state of unconsciousness which in its mundane concerns is disturbed into the conscious aberrations when the soul enters into empirical relations with its objective environment through the instrumentalities of the body, the organs and *manas*. And a great majority of the later commentators have followed in the wake of Vātsyāyana.

Now to attempt at a reconstruction of the soul of the Nyāya system in its relation to consciousness is to fight a losing battle. Against the stupendous weight of tradition created by *Vatsyayana* and augmented by Udyotkara and Vāchaśpati it indeed sounds almost hazardous if not ridiculous,

to institute any reconstruction of the soul. Yet some considerations are still left unsifted which may lead to a different conclusion. Among these considerations we may take note of the following :

1. The first and foremost of these considerations is the fact that the Nyāya is admittedly an orthodox system as we all know. From this it may be suggested that the Nyāya has its root in the Upanisadic soil from which it draws its sap. The Upanisadic conception of the soul never encourages unconsciousness in the soul-substance.

2. The second consideration is one of Gautama's own important Sutra viz., "*Smaranantvātrnanojnasvābhavyāt*". In this Sutra Gautama, while demonstrating that knowledges in the form of memory belongs to the soul lays down that the very nature or essence of the soul, is consciousness, for *jñā* means cogniser and *svābhāvya* means nature or essence. It is not sane to take the term *svābhavyat* to mean *svakiya dharma* i. e., the soul's own quality and yet not its essence as Vātsyāyana has done, for he has had to pay dearly for it when he has tried to explain consciousness merely as a 'mechanical glow' arising out of two unconscious substances, soul and matter. Unless we mean by *jñā svābhavyat* a conscious essence as might have been the meaning of Gautama himself, explanation of knowledge becomes an impossibility. It is perhaps in view of this that Annam Bhaṭṭa has defined *Ātman* as *jñānādhikarāṇam* taken as a Vahubrihi compound.⁴

3. The third consideration is the Nyāya conception of liberation which may be said to constitute the whole *crux* of the Nyāya view. Now the general traditional explanation of the Nyāya liberation is that it is a negative existence, a sheer blank, the liberated soul being entirely free from pain.

4. Cf. Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, (Meiklejohn's translation) page 83.

The main arguments against joy or bliss as the essence of liberation, are that no happiness is unalloyed with pain or misery and that since whatever is produced is subject to destruction and bliss of liberation is produced, therefore it must perish and further that if there is the supposed solicitation for bliss in liberation, it would rather bind than free us, for all solicitations are the sources of bondage. And hence the Naiāyika has concluded that absolute cessation from pain is liberation. And Vātsyāyana has tried to strengthen this conclusion by pointing out that none of the sources of knowledge namely, perception, inference and scriptural authority can account for such a state of manifested bliss in the soul in liberation.⁵ As regards the argument that whatever is produced must perish we might meet the Naiāyika on his own ground and say that as destruction according to him though produced is not itself destroyed, even so the bliss of liberation does not perish when attained. Further absolute non existence of pain is found in stocks and stones but cannot constitute value or pūrūsārtham for a conscious human being. Vātsyāyana's contention that the manifestation of bliss in Moksa is not an object of perception is due to his confusion between ordinary and transcendental perception. Again it is not difficult to rebut Vātsyāyana when he says that inference does not apply for the establishment of consciousness of bliss as the essential constituent of liberated state of the soul. For there is no bar to the analogical inference that just as with the removal of a wall (*kudya*) the cognition of the pot is rendered possible even so with the gradual elimination of demerit and the consequent misery the consciousness of bliss shines forth in its own light. And finally his contention

5. Na pratyaksyam nanumanam nagamo va vidyate nityām
sukhamatmano mahatvavanmokse bhibyajyate iti.

that there is no scriptural support for the manifestation of bliss-consciousness does not stand to reason when we remember the whole gamut of the passages which reverberates the Upanisadic literature such as the Aitareya, the Taittiriya and the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upanisad which last has the famous passage : Anandam brahmano rupam tacca mokse bhiyayate ; Vijñanam anandam brahmeti (Brh. iii. 9. 28) ; also another passage, Sukhamatyantikam yatra buddhigrahyam atindriyam tam bai moksam vijaniyat duṣṭapamakṛitatmabhiḥ, is in point.

Now if we try to probe into the real situation it appears that Gautama's conception of mokṣa does not stand against any of the orthodox views. It is admitted on all hands that mokṣa does not mean anything if it is not a state of absolute suspension of pain and misery. Again it is also to be admitted that Gautama himself is not very definite in his assertion whether over and above this negative aspect there is also the positive one in the state of liberation. We have on the other hand a long historical tradition of commentators who have with their superior intellect and imagination piled comments upon comments on the laconic sutras of their master. It is not unlikely therefore that the great ancient Commentator Vyātsyāyana, who antecedes even Dignāga the celebrated Buddhist philosopher who often criticises Vyātsyāyana might have taken it into his head to criticise the positive side of mokṣa probably emphasised by any of his precursors in the field of commentation. In the light of this suggestion when we study the interpretative literature on the subject we should not be surprised to find why Sankarācāryya is giving out the positive aspect of mokṣa as the true conception of it entertained by Gautama, as distinct from the negative aspect which, he thinks, constitutes the essence of mokṣa from the Vaiśeṣika standpoint as described in the '*Samkṣepa Samkarajaya*' of Madhavācāryya.

When we come to the more recent times we notice the attempt to work on the positive side of moksa on the part of Bhasarvajna the famous author of *Nyāyasāra*, the notable Saivaite Naiāyika and his equally notable commentator Nayabhusan, who is described by Gunaratna as the foremost of the eighteen Scholiasts on the *Nyāyasāra*, has supported his master's positive conception of moksa.⁶ This is also echoed with equally unmistakable emphasis by Venkatanath, the famous author of *Nyāyaparisūddhi* of the Sree Sampradaya. These considerations lead one to suppose that the balance of evidence is in favour of connecting the soul with consciousness as its essential quality and that the stigma of 'Gotama' the prince of the bovine species as cast by Sree Harsa in his 'Naisadha Charita' really loses its sting in the case of Gautama the greatest rationalist and logician of India.

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6. Nityasambedyamanasukhena visista atyantika
dubkhanivrittih purusasya moksa.

Redemption according to Locacarya.

By

P. S. NAIDU.

The idea of atonement as symbolised by the Cross, whose real significance is rarely understood, is claimed to be peculiar to Christianity. The reconciliation of the sinning world with His own God-head, which the Divine Father effected by the supreme sacrifice of the Son at Calvary, constitutes, it is said, the basis for a doctrine of salvation unparalleled in the history of religion. If the historic event of the crucifixion of Christ is to be taken as the sole foundation for the redemption of the human soul, then, it must be said that the Christian doctrine is unique. But the general view of salvation signified by the event is not the monopoly of Christianity.

Goethe, in his letter to Eckermann, comments on the lines sung by the angels at the final deliverance of Faust and says 'This salvation is by no means the achievement of the aspiring soul alone. On the contrary, it involves an act of Divine grace freely bestowed by God on the soul unable to save itself.' 'The freely bestowed Grace of God !' exclaims Buckham in an article on 'Goethe' in the '*Personalist*' (Summer 1934), 'here is a word that sounds strangely, coming from the pagan romanticist-classicist who is supposed to have so little of the spirit of Christianity.' True, Goethe had so little of the narrow spirit of the organised church; but he had in abundance the broad spirit of true religion. In another clime and another religion the same voice speaks from the very depths of the soul and gives expression to a profound experience which is very similar to the Christian mystic experience. The object of this paper is to draw attention to that voice in the little known Tamil Religio-philosophical

treatise of an Ācārya who proclaims that salvation is not a reward merited by the conduct of the seeker, but a free gift from God.

Pilla Lokācārya, the author of *Srī Vacana Bhūṣaṇam*—the treatise under review—belongs to the venerable line of Vaiṣṇava Ācāryas. He lived in the 13th century A.D. (1213-1309) at Srīrangam (Trichinopoly Dt.), and devoted his life to the furtherance of the cause of Vaiṣṇava reform. Of the *Ashtādaśa Rahasyams* composed by him, *Vacana Bhūṣaṇam* is the most important and is likely to become a potent factor in any renaissance of Hindu theology.

The work is composed in the traditional sūtra style and the two commentaries, one by Manavāla Māmuni (1370-1443) and the other by Jananyācārya are as difficult to understand as the original aphorisms. Anantācārya, who lived in the 16th century A.D. wrote a Mīmāṃsa Bhāṣya of the work in Samskrit. Four glossaries of the technical terms used in the sūtras were also compiled by Virarāghavācārya (1765-1818). Recently, in 1927, Annangarācārya of Conjeevaram published 'Srī Vacana Bhūṣana Sāraṁ' which is an exposition of the sūtras in readable Tamil based on Manavāla Māmuni's commentary. In 1893 Yogi Pārtha-sārathi of Triplicane translated the original sūtras into English. An abstract of this translation was submitted to the first Parliament of religions held at Chicago, and was published in Dr. Barrow's history of the Parliament.

The entire work is very short indeed, consisting as it does of only 463 Tamil sūtras which cover about 30 pages in print. But it is difficult to understand the terse aphorisms and utterly impossible to follow the arguments involved in them without a knowledge of the extensive background of Itihāsa and Pūrānas. The treatise is divided into four parts; the first consisting of 114 aphorisms, the second of 129, the third of 137 and the last of 83. Beginning with the

depiction of the glory of Laxmi as the Saviour, Lokācārya proceeds to discuss the nature of Prapaṭṭi and the course of conduct which the seeker after salvation should pursue. Our author's significant contribution is the establishment of the thesis that God's mercy is to be secured only as a free gift, and not through merit. He concludes his book by showing how Ācārya becomes the means of salvation.

Lokācārya opens his great treatise with the significant verse :

'The meaning of the Vēdās is elucidated by the Smritis, Iṭihāsas and Purānas.

By the Smritis the meaning of the former part (Pūrva Kādam) is elucidated, by the other two the meaning of the latter part (Uṭṭara Kādam) is elucidated.'

It should be stated at the outset that there is no question here at all of borrowing ideas from any source outside the Hindu fold. Although twelve centuries of Christian tradition had been in existence in his days, our Ācārya was entirely unaffected by it. This is not the occasion for proving this statement which may appear to be dogmatic.

Firmly convinced as he was that the Iṭihāsas and Purānas are the expositors of the Veda, our author takes these and the devotional literature of the Alvars as his authority and distils their essence into his renowned doctrine of Prapaṭṭi.

Moksha Sāstram (as the doctrine of salvation is called in Vaiṣṇava theology) is divided into two parts—Tattvaparam and Upāsanaparam. The former, which describes the constitution of the three verities forming the very basis of Viśiṣṭadwaitic metaphysics, is the main theme of Tattvatrayam ; and the latter which defines the course of conduct demanded by such a constitution is dealt with by 'Śrī Vacana Bhaṣanam.'

The three tattvas discussed in Tattvatrayam are Matter, consisting of suṣṭa satva, misra satva and satva sunya ; jīva

divided into *nitya*, *mukta* and *baḍḍa* and *īśvarā*. Salvation is to be understood as signifying the union of *jīva* with *īśvara* after overcoming the obstacles raised by *prakṛti*. This view of salvation is strikingly symbolised in one of the important incidents in *Bhāgavata Purāṇa*. *Rukmini*, on the eve of her marriage with *Sri Kṛṣṇa*, performs the famous *Gouri Pūja*. *Gouri* is here identified with *prakṛti*, *Rukmini* with the *jīva* and *Kṛṣṇa* with *īśvara*. The worship is an invocation to *prakṛti* to keep out of the path of the *jīva*'s union with *īśvara*.

For the achievement of such union the means prescribed by the *Veda* (when understood aright) is *prapaṭṭi* or *saraṇāgati*, and it is this *prapaṭṭi* that is expounded by our *Ācārya*.

Before dealing with the theory of salvation advanced by *Lokācārya* let us analyse his views on sin and suffering. The problems of sin and suffering are tackled by all religions, but it is claimed that Christianity alone has solved them.

Dr. Shepherd in his recent book on 'Sin, Suffering and God' deals with the problem and as his interpretation of the life of *Jesus* is thoroughly modern in its dependence on current physical, biological and psychological theories, it may be very briefly summarised here as the most representative exposition of contemporary Christian view.

The implicit faith in the law of causality as being utterly inviolable has penetrated the realm of theology and from the time of the apostles down to our own day the moral law has been interpreted in a narrow and rigid sense. It holds supreme sway over the whole of creation; even *God* cannot interfere with it. So sin must be punished. The actions of the sinner should work themselves out into their natural consequences. Man must suffer in his body and mind for all his evil deeds. How then is he to be saved? 'What shall deliver me out of the body of this death? I thank *God* through *Jesus Christ* our Lord' says *St Paul*. The death of *Christ* on the cross has, therefore, been interpreted as

signifying a ransom that He paid for rescuing man, or as an act of vicarious penitence.

But men have now become suspicious of the law of causality and consequently suspicious of the prevalent theories of punishment also. Besides man is not wholly responsible for his sins. Psychology and biology have established that heredity, environment, the sub-conscious mind etc., are powerful factors in shaping his conduct. 'Furthermore' mankind even corporately is not responsible for its environment, its nature, its tendency to sin. Indeed, in a measure, their responsibility seems to be God's.

Hence a fresh interpretation of the Gospel teaching is needed to satisfy the demands of the modern mind. If evolution is a fact, as it undoubtedly is, then God ought to have been aware even at the beginning of the existence of those factors which gradually developed into the elements—free will in man and the good and the bad in the environment—which while making for the growth of the moral personality also paved the way for the possibility of sinning. God was aware of these elements and He met the situation in His characteristically divine manner 'with an unbounded love and grace.

The cross is a symbol of the unfathomable grace and forgiveness of God. God's love demands nothing in return. 'It is a love that has no personal resentment, no retaliatory spirit towards the sinners, even where there is no repentance. Love does not meet the refusal of itself with hostility. The attitude of God to men *yet in their sins* is one of unchanging, ever-seeking love. God's love is a love of a new quality. Love that courted, faced, endured, what it could have avoided in order to manifest itself, love that deliberately sought to share the sorrow and suffering that are the result and accompaniment of sin, in order that thereby it might save the sinner.'

'In Jesus crucified we see God Himself revealed in His relation to the great human problem of sin and suffering..... God's love, just in proportion as the wrong committed is a wrong done to itself, only reacts against it with free forgiveness.'

Such in brief is Dr. Shepherd's interpretation of the parables of the Good Shepherd, the Good Samaritan, the Prodigal Son; of Christ's relations with the outcastes of society: and of the most marvellous judgment which Jesus pronounced on the conduct of the woman taken in adultery:

'Neither do I coudemn thee.'

'I came not to judge the world, but to save the world.'

But, and this is the most surprising thing, it required 19 centuries of Christian indoctrination, a whole host of theologians, and above all a world-devastating war to open the eyes of the West to a truth which, more than 600 years ago was preached in unmistakable words by Lokācārya.

In sūtras 381 and 382 which open the fourth part of Vacana Bhūṣanam our author says:

'Vaikuntanātha feels strangely dissatisfied although he is surrounded by nityas and muktas. Just as a father does not feel completely happy in the midst of the many sons who are always with him, but longs for the return of that one who is in exile, so also the Divine Father longs passionately for the return of sinning baḍḍas. We may deny Him; we may spurn Him away from us; we may cause Him untold pain, yet He pursues us with infinite love. He is not to be turned away by the most heinous sins we commit. He is jealously guarding over us and if in the midst of our wicked life we perchance do unintentionally some kind deed pleasing to Him, He gives us full credit for it. His love does not demand any return'.

Lokācārya also points out that this aspect of Divine love is expounded in the 14th chapter of Pāncarātra. Rudra tells

Nāraḍa that the nigrāha and anugraha qualities of Īśvara are the two means of salvation for man. 'Imagine' he says, 'a traveller who keeps his bag under a tree and goes a short distance. In his absence thieves grab the bag, but the moment the rightful owner returns and lays his hand on it the robbers vanish into thin air.' Similarly the moment the mercy of God descends on the sinner (without the latter deserving it) his sins vanish, and he becomes a Mukta'.

Comment is needless on these refreshingly original and modern views on the love of God.

What then should man do in order to make it possible for Īśvara to approach him and claim him. Man should do prapaṭṭi or saraṇāgati. He should completely and unreservedly surrender himself to the Divine will.

We have already mentioned that salvation is a gift from God; it should now be noted that this gift is made through a mediator or ācārya who opens the eyes of the baḍḍa to the truth and thus befits him to receive Divine mercy. In prapaṭṭi the soul in bondage passively expects to be saved by God's kṛpā. Of karma, jñāna, bhakti and prapaṭṭi mārgas prescribed for attaining salvation, the last is the only one consistent with the pāraṇṭṛyam of the soul.

When we study the lives of such great prapannas as Sītā, Draupadi, Gajendra, Vibhishana, Rāma, Laxmana, Kākāsura and Darmapūtras we find that the prapaṭṭi mārga may be pursued by men of all castes, in all places and at all times. Ceremonial cleanliness is not demanded of a prapanna. But there is one rigorous condition to be observed. The prapanna should not get into a frame of mind in which he would feel that by his prapaṭṭi he has a right to demand the gift of God. He should not become self-conscious lest the efficacy of his prapaṭṭi should be nullified. Lokācārya takes infinite pains to prove that the essence of prapaṭṭi consists in its not being a sādhanam. In sūtra 32 he says, 'Prapaṭṭi viewed

as a means (or cause) of salvation is like an infant son demanding a document from his father that he would maintain him.'

II, 115. 'Apart from prapaṭṭi, certain other means for salvation have been prescribed, namely, karma, jñāna and bhakti. These should be discarded not because they are difficult or impossible for ordinary men, but because they are inconsistent with the Svarupa of God.' (The truth of this is established by the incident which resulted in Śrī Kṛṣṇa's utterance of the famous carama sloka in the Gīta.)

II, 129-131. 'Just as a mother loves her sons who are defective of limb, as well as those who are whole in body, so does God love the sātṛvika, the rājasi and the tāmasi alike.' 'His love for the erring sons is thousandfold greater than the love of the mother. In His ceaseless anxiety to redeem them, He has devised means suited to their respective status. Of such means prapaṭṭi is the most suitable for us.'

II, 136. 'An apparent obstacle might be raised here. Is it proper to throw the whole burden on God and live in a state of utter inaction? Should not the prapaṇna do something to please God?'

Our answer is, if the prapaṇna attempts to propitiate Iśvara, then his efforts should be commensurate with the immensity of God's qualities. As this is manifestly impossible, it is enough if the sinner attains the prapaṭṭic state of mind.

II, 139. 'Iśvara is satisfied with very little. When Śrī Kṛṣṇa visited Dṛiṭarāṣṭra as the ambassador of the Pandavas, the mighty king desired to give Him a fitting reception, but Sanjaya pointed out the futility of his attempts and said, 'The Lord would be well pleased if His feet were washed with water.'

II, 148. 'Although Iśvara is a Svatantrin, yet He exhibits His pāraṭantryam in His relations with His devotees. In His

infinite mercy He lets Himself be bound by those prapannas who have sought Him as their sole refuge.'

II, 177. 'The prapanna should on no account attempt to seek any benefit through his own efforts. He should passively receive those that are given to him by the Lord.'

(The so called benefits received through self effort may prove in the end to be ruinous to the soul.)

[In a short paper it is not possible to do justice to the great work of Lokācārya. Such important topics as the characteristics of the ācārya, the relationship between the gūru and his sisya and the daily practical conduct of prapannas have not even been touched upon. Yet the few sūtras that have been discussed point to the unmistakable conclusion that our Ācārya has succeeded in extracting the essence of the Vedas through the Itihāsās and Purānās. The work, 'Sri Vacana Bhuṣanam,' deserves to be known much more widely than it is at present.]

A Review of Leuba's Studies in Religion and Mysticism.

By

G. HANUMANTHA RAO.

Leuba's studies in religion and mysticism have attracted much attention in recent years. It has been felt by many that they have definitely proved once for all that religion and mysticism are illusory rather than objective. But a close examination of them makes it clear that his efforts at reducing religion and mysticism to the status of illusions are not as successful as they are supposed to be. Considered as psychological studies of religion and mysticism they are open to serious shortcomings. It is the object of this paper to refer to three of them. They are : (1). Confusion of stand-points; (2). Bias of Abnormal psychology; (3). Incorrect analysis and characterisation of religious experience as experience.

I. *Confusion of standpoints* :—Leuba's studies are professedly psychological but their assumptions and arguments are not infrequently metaphysical. As a psychologist, it is his business to describe religious experiences as fully and accurately as possible and to bring out their distinctive character as religious experiences. Evaluating them or inquiring into their objectivity or validity falls outside the scope of his task. As a strict psychologist, he should confine himself to a positive study of religion and mysticism, but he very often strays away from it. When we are expecting him to analyse religious experience psychologically, we find him actually engaged in asserting that it is essentially illusory. He himself becomes conscious of this tendency and when the question of the ultimate validity of religious experience is clearly in

sight, he declares that such a question lies outside his domain¹. To this open declaration of his is opposed his metaphysical conclusion that religion has no objectivity. From this it is clear that though he is not prepared to argue metaphysically he has not the least hesitation in assuming a metaphysical conclusion. This makes him doubly blameworthy: firstly, because he does not confine himself to the psychological point of view which he clearly professes and secondly, because he fights shy of metaphysical argument even though his assertion demands it.

As though to silence the qualms of his conscience, he now and then breaks into metaphysical argument. But this does not go far enough. It confines itself to proving the absurdities of a crude anthropomorphic God of popular religion; it leaves untouched the God that thinking men have espoused. He does admit however, once in his book on mysticism that it is possible for religion to be consistent with science and philosophy. But this admission, on his part, affects in no way either the main argument or conclusion of his books. For, he does not take into account the serious attempts at reconciling religion with science and philosophy such as those of Plato and Plotinus, Spinoza and Hegel. Nor does he dwell upon the Upaniṣads or the systems of Vedānta though he makes a show of his knowledge of Indian mysticism by devoting to its exposition a whole chapter. His treatment of Indian mysticism is a gross caricature. For him, Indian mysticism is merely Yoga and "the philosophical foundation of this Yoga is Vedāntic metaphysics."² These are far too elementary mistakes to be committed even by an European. Thus his documentary study of occidental as well as oriental literature on mysticism

1. *The Psychology of Mysticism*, p. 304. "As this is a scientific enquiry we can discuss neither the nature of the metaphysical arguments nor their degree of validity".

2. *The Psychology of Religious Mysticism*. p. 7.

is far too incomplete for his study to rank as science. The strong point of science is the emphasis it lays on relevant data, both positive and negative, those that support one's hypothesis as well as those that are opposed to it. It is just here that Leuba's studies are weakest; they lay him open to the fallacy of non-observation. He takes into consideration only such facts as satisfy his bias and ignores such as do not suit him.

2. *The bias of Abnormal Psychology :*

It is not merely a metaphysical bias that vitiates his studies: they are vitiated by the bias of abnormal psychology that Leuba brings to bear upon it. In recent times, it is not uncommon for psychologists to bring the bias that they have acquired in one department of study to bear upon others clearly different from it. The studies of Freud are noted for this vicious tendency and Leuba's studies add further examples of it. The concepts of repression, suggestion, obsession and delusion that are valuable in the study of abnormal experiences are made to do extra-duty in the field of the normal and healthy. Leuba has made excellent use of them in analysing abnormal religious experiences and in showing them to be diseases of the mind rather than divine revelations. By showing that such experiences are delusional he thinks that he has proved that all religion is a delusion and that all mysticism is a delusion. He is here committing what is called the "particularistic fallacy". In addition to this there is in evidence the fallacy of non-observation also. In quoting cases of mystic experience, he cleverly confines himself to the sickly forms of it and avoids altogether the more robust and intellectual types of it.

3. *Incorrect Analysis and characterisation of Religious Experience.*

Leuba is taken up so much with the abnormalities of religious experience that he is hardly able to spare himself

for the treatment of the normal and healthy features of religion. And when he comes to this task, he finds that there is nothing distinctive of religious experience as experience. His reasons for looking upon religious experience as devoid of anything distinctive are three : (i). The religious emotion is a compound emotion and hence there is nothing specific about it. (ii). Between the feeling of dependence upon Wall Street, upon a mistress, upon a father, upon Yahve or upon the Absolute, there exists no introspective difference sufficient to make the distinction possible. (iii). If we distinguish between them, "it is not because the feeling in each case is qualitatively different, but because the objects are clearly distinguishable".³ All three of them are assumptions which are not borne out by facts. i. To argue that a compound emotion has nothing distinctive about it because it is a compound emotion is very much like arguing that water which is a compound of hydrogen and oxygen has no specific qualities simply because it can be resolved into elements. Leuba is here subject to the vicious tendency that is prominent in certain contemporary scientists, of reducing phenomena of one science into terms of another science. The psychologists are trying to reduce the religious, the moral, the aesthetic experiences into purely psychological terms and to deny of them everything distinctive. Similarly, the biologists are trying to reduce psychology into a branch of biology and the chemists, in their turn, are attempting to annex biology into their own domain. The physicist likewise tries to reduce chemistry into physics ; finally the mathematician wants to reduce everything into mere equations.

ii. Nor does introspection support Leuba's contention. The introspection of psychologists like McDougall gives a different account of religious experience. According to him the

3. *Psychological Study of Religion*, p. 37.

emotion of reverence which Leuba wrongly brings under affective experience⁴ is conative in character. It is a quaternary compound emotion involving wonder, negative self-feeling, fear and gratitude as distinguished from awe which is a ternary compound of wonder, negative self-feeling and fear and from admiration which is a binary compound of wonder and negative self-feeling. If the above analysis of McDougall is acceptable, Leuba's contention that the religious emotion is not distinguishable in subjective terms, falls to the ground.

iii. His view that we discriminate one kind of feeling of dependence from another on the basis of the difference in the nature of their objects, is equally untrue. By making the nature of the object the distinguishing feature of emotion, he is attributing to it a cognitive function which it does not invariably have. As McDougall correctly points out, "the emotional qualities signify to us primarily not the nature of things, but our impulsive reactions to things." "In this way they are subjective rather than objective; their function primarily is cognitive not of the object but of the subject, of the state or activity of the organism."⁵ If as Leuba tells us the distinguishing mark of an emotion were the nature of the object, the religious emotion should have only one kind of object. But this is not the case. It may be excited even in the absence of the appropriate religious object, just as fear may be excited by a stimulus other than an object of danger which is its appropriate stimulus. Just as hunger may be excited by the ring of a bell, even so the religious emotion may be evoked by a mere building, a stone pillar or a mere mark. This clearly proves that the mere fact that a religious emotion has been roused offers no guarantee that (what is usually

4. Emotion as McDougall has clearly proved is conative rather than affective in character.

5. *An Outline of Psychology*. p. 326.

considered as) an appropriate object is there as its stimulus. As Hocking very aptly points out "the misinterpretation of mysticism here in question is due to the fact that what is a psychological report (a true one) is taken as a metaphysical statement (and a false one). From the fact that one's experience of God is 'one, immediate and ineffable' it does not follow that God Himself is one, immediate and ineffable...It is true that this inference from the nature of the experience to the nature of its object is here of the closest order and it is also true that many a mystic has committed himself to that inference. But it is possible and necessary to reject it."..... "I judge then that the marks commonly attributed to the mystic absolute are in the first place so many contributions to mystic psychology."⁶

These quotations from Hocking that we have here employed to criticise Leuba are just those that Leuba himself has chosen to prove that Hocking repudiates mysticism. Merely because Hocking has shown that many a mystic has taken a mere illusion for a fact it does not follow that he holds that every mystic commits the same fallacy. From the fact that Hocking has shown that some mystics go wrong it does not follow as Leuba seems to think it does, that Hocking looks upon every mystic as going wrong. From the fact that Hocking asserts that the mystic experience in itself is no guarantee to its validity, it does not follow that mystic experience is necessarily invalid. In order to become valid it must square with reason. Hocking repudiates such as are not consistent with reason, not every form of mystic experience.

There is yet another false conclusion that Leuba draws from Hockings's statements. From Hocking's statement that the "That" of mystic experience has no meaning until interpreted, Leuba draws the conclusion that the immediately

6. The meaning of Mind as seen through its Psychology of Religion, *Mind*, N. S. XXI. 1912. p. 44.

given in ecstasy is no longer isolated as a unique experience and in the search for God, no position of vantage might be claimed on behalf of it. Mystic intuition, epistemologically considered, is of the same status as other forms of immediate experience but its content is different and the emotional qualities connected with it are also different. Hence what it reveals is not irrelevant to the search for God. It is more relevant to the quest of the divine than the contents of other intuitions, though in respect of its validity it is on a par with other intuitions.

On the whole Hocking's standpoint is both psychologically and metaphysically more sound than that of Leuba who brings to bear upon the study of religion and mysticism neither the insight nor the impartiality that a scientific study of religion demands.

Ethical Relativity and its Bearing on "Sittlichkeit."

By

M. S. SRINIVASA SARMA.

If the keynote of the zeitgeist today is uncurbed individualism, unbridled subjectivism, unrestricted passion for change and revolution and inordinate lust for new sensations, then the correct antidote to its pernicious influence is to bring home to the minds of all, the essential nature of morality, namely, *mores*. Customs, manners and usages are not merely habitual ways of acting ; they are ways *approved* by society. In a genuine sense all morals are merely customs that *matter*. Morality is the unique feature which develops simultaneously with the consciousness of human beings, and becomes an essential condition for the existence of the individual as well as that of the community. Morality therefore is our social attitude towards the human environment ; and character which is the goal of ethical conduct, means the power of social agency, the organised capacity for social functioning. Duty or Dharma which "*holds*" society together in integrated unity resides in the individual, but arises in society, and works for social solidarity. The inter-personal relation whether it is communal or national is always essentially a moral relation. The self is not an isolated atom, but is comprehensible only as

a member of society. Man is what he is because of and in virtue of the community. It is his social significance that makes life valuable to him ; and it is the emptiness of social content that makes life worthless and drives him to suicide. The child inherits everything valuable from the race before it comes into the world ; and its long period of infancy consisting of about twenty years is spent in assimilating from society the system of knowledge, the code of morals, and the form of religion which are indispensable to its development as a full blown personality. That is the say, as Hegel puts it "Each of us has been suckled at the breast of the Universal Ethos."

Similarly a group survives according to its unity and power, according to the ability of its members for common ends. Despite the interesting adventures of the Nietzscheans and ultra-individualists, all conceptions of morality have always revolved about the good of the whole, and the norm of conduct in every case is taken to be the welfare of the group. Morality always comes to us in the concrete, and is relative to, and dependent on the conditions of the social group of which we are members. And the criterion which settles for us what our specific duties are is to be found in the customs and traditions which embody the codifications of law-givers and the actual experiences and rational convictions of countless generations of men. The Germans have a very suggestive term to express this characteristic function of morality, namely, *sittlichkeit* which Fichte defines as those principles of conduct, which regulate people in their relations to each other, and have become a habit and second nature at the stage of culture and of which therefore they are not explicitly conscious. *Sittlichkeit* thus comprises the social conventions and rules of manners, and is the source of instruction regarding conduct, without which the individual would be practically helpless in determining the right courses of action in various situations.

It holds before him certain possible aspects of the act, and warns him against taking a selfish and narrow point of view. It guides him in his thinking by suggesting to him the important considerations for which he should be on the look-out.

The good is what will profoundly satisfy us, what will yield us abiding satisfaction in respect of the totality of our needs and desires ; and what has come down to us by way of knowledge and art and social organisation is a mighty help to us in our efforts towards the good. The whole of man's life, all its purposes, meaning and value receive their tone and color from the ideals, institutions and moral habits among which his life develops. The influences of heredity, education and social living are embodied in the *sittlichkeit*. Human beings do not drop from the blue skies all on a sudden. They are born with particular aptitudes and in a particular environment ; and they generally find their sphere of activity more or less clearly marked out for them by the *sittlichkeit*. The mental and moral habits of children are shaped in the atmosphere of *sittlichkeit* ; and they ultimately become full members of the group interested in its solidarity and ready to do their part in maintaining and promoting its welfare.

Bradley points out that "the wisest men of antiquity have given judgment that wisdom and virtue consists in living agreeably to the ethos of one's people". He even goes to the extent of asserting that 'the man who seeks to have a higher morality than that of his world is on the threshold of immorality'. This truth requires to be brought home to the minds of the ultra-reformers of the modern day who pose as champions of a new ethic ! Society is an unconscious and gradual formation ; it is characterised by inevitable unity and continuity in its evolution. It conserves in its *sittlichkeit* the achievements of the past and the unrealised aspirations of the future. It is fortunate for progress that this is so ; without these rules, each would be thrown on his own resources

of reason and experience. Such a course would quickly reduce social life to chaos. Again if every one had to start anew to frame all his ideals and make his laws, we should be in as melancholy a plight morally as we should be intellectually if we had to build each science afresh. The fundamental safeguards which the *sittlichkeit* provides against individual impulse and passion, the conditions of close association, interdependence and mutual sympathy which the group affords, the habituation to certain lines of conduct valued by the group—all this is the root on which the stem and flower of personality naturally grow and thrive. As Bradley says "the morality already existing ready to hand in laws, institutions, social usages, moral opinions and feelings is the element in which the young are to be brought up. It is not wrong, it is a duty to take the best there is and to live up to the best. We should consider whether the encouraging oneself in having opinions of one's own in the sense of thinking differently from the world on moral subjects be not, in any person other than a heaven-born prophet, sheer self-conceit."

Psychologists tell us that the integrity and the sanity of the individual are entirely dependent on the vitality and continuity of his memory. Even the smallest injury to memory results immediately in incipient insanity. In the same way, to break sharply with the past is to court social amnesia which means the death of society and the extinction of its culture. The sanity and the unity of the group consists in the continuity of its traditions. The saving of a great legacy of culture, the maintenance of the best racial type, the welfare of succeeding generations must be guided by a sobering intensity of purpose and a profound sense of responsibility. The lesson of this line of argument for us is that we should not insulate ourselves against the living stream of thought and action that is our heritage, the right assimilation of which alone can give us strength.

But it should not be imagined that it is proposed to put up a reactionary plea against any progress. That would be neither desirable nor possible. But the path of progress is not the Nietzschean programme of moral revolution, but the safe and steady path of reconstructing and re-interpreting moral ideals and principles in the light of varied experiences and new circumstances. *Natura non facit saltum*. Even if it were desirable to cut ourselves adrift from the past and strike out an untrammelled course, we should soon find that it is absolutely impossible to do so. A society, as John Morley says, can only pursue its normal course by means of a certain progression of changes; and these have a definite origin and ordered antecedents, and are in a direct relation with the past.

In our country we find the norm of conduct which is at once objective, all-satisfying, and universal in the ideal of Dharma evolved by the Vedic religion which guarantees the highest object of man both in this world and in the next. Every nation has its own personality. The set of institutions, virtues, rights and duties peculiar to it constitutes its individuality, its unique personality. The Hindu ideal of life based on Dharmic lines is the unique achievement of this country, and should be our protecting anchor in the welter of revolutions and miasma of changes. It is a living tradition, and has helped us to evolve our own culture and guaranteed its continuity. It is the living past, and is being worked out afresh and recreated by the free activity of its best exponents and revered savants. It is therefore no rigid standard but only a stage in the realisation of the ultimate end. It is a standard that moves with every movement of the human spirit, that adapts itself to all groups of circumstances. Manu says that there are four essential characteristics pertaining to all right actions, namely, conformity to holy scriptures, the codes of laws and the conduct of respectable persons, and that which

is liked by oneself :

श्रुतिः स्मृतिः सदाचारः स्वस्यच प्रियमात्मनः ।

एतच्चतुर्विधमाहुः साक्षाद्भूमस्य लक्षणम् ॥

The Hindu thinkers are convinced that we have to depend entirely on the Holy Scriptures for establishing Dharma and Brahman. The organisation of society is in accordance with eternal moral principles. Therefore the Gita affirms that the Scriptures should be our authority in determining what ought to be done and what not, and that we ought to work in the world according to the ordinances of the Sastras :

तस्माच्छास्त्रं प्रमाणं-ते कार्याकार्यव्यवस्थितौ ।

आत्माशास्त्रविधानोक्तं कर्मकर्ममिहार्हसि ॥

But it should be remembered that the ethos of a people is not a stationary thing. It develops by the constant effort of the best members of the community to reach a higher standard of life than that in which they find themselves. In every society we have a set of people—the chosen few—who are the best exponents of the culture and ideals of that community. They have no vested interests ; their main concern is the welfare of society. They are not only the custodians of achieved culture, but the ready sponsors to the forward march of that society in every direction ; and it is to them that its individual members look for light, life, and guidance. They are called the Aptas (आप्त) whose statements bear the stamp of pramana (प्रमाण) authoritative statements. They see into the life of things, and are great fountain-heads of spiritual wisdom. They are the inspired teachers of humanity who through years of self-restraint and self-culture so purified their intellectual and moral nature as to recognise in their fulness and glory the invisible spiritual realities around. They are the true reformers, since by spiritual intuition they see things *sub specie aeternitatis* :

स्वकर्मन्यभियुक्तो यः रागद्वेषविवर्जितः ।

निर्वैरः पूजितस्तद्भिराप्तो ज्ञेयः स तादृशः ।

He who is devoted to his duties devoid of attachment, free from hatred, revered by the good—such a person is to be known as an Apta; and to them belongs the glorious privilege of effecting the necessary and salutary reforms calculated to advance society in every direction.

The influence of the personal example of great men well-versed in Sastras and statements of Rishis constitute the authoritative guide and inspiration to point out to us the path of moral doing :

यद्वाचरति श्रेष्ठस्तद्देवेतरो जनः ।

स यत्प्रमाणं कुरुते लोकस्तदनुवर्त्तते ॥

Whatsoever a great man doeth, that other men also do; the standard he setteth up, by that the people go. Thus the responsibility of effecting sane and necessary reforms rests on these natural leaders. It needs the alchemy of personal lives of these great leaders to transmute the lead of old ideas into the gold of compelling motives, to get the dream out of the dead pages of the long-lost past into the realm of everyday living. We must at every stage be prepared for transvaluation of values, but should on that account never lose hold of the eternal verities and abiding truths. It is the habitudes of thought and action of the best representatives of the community which organise into the *sittlichkeit* and serve as the criterion of everyday conduct. That is why Tiruvalluvar, the great Tamil Moralist proclaims that wisdom consists in acting according to the ways of the world; but he took care to point out that the world is not the vulgar crowd represented by Mrs. Grundy.

Thus if a man is to know what is right, he should have

imbibed by precept, example, and experience the spirit of his community, its general and special beliefs as to right and wrong. The individual has to grasp the meaning of these customs over and above the bare fact of their existence and has to guide himself by their true value and significance. Therefore when Bradley asks us to realise ourselves in our "station and its duties" because "there is nothing better nor anything higher or more beautiful than it," what he wants us to do is to identify ourselves with our society and its *sittlichkeit*. It is a fact that nobody can realise himself as a perfect man without trying to be a perfect member of his society. Morality requires us to cultivate equality of treatment, community of interests and impartiality of regard. So when Bradley condemns the man who is in advance of the *sittlichkeit* as being already immoral, what he intends to say is that we must *first* try to be as good as our world, and after that we may seek to make it better.

The Hindu thinkers were not ignorant of the essentially mobile and progressive nature of society. They knew that change was the primal law of life ; but they were wise enough to emphasise that the path of progress must be evolutionary, and never revolutionary. The ideals of progressive society and mobile social order are boldly and concretely embodied in the conception of "Yoga-Kshema," which is personally guaranteed by God in the Gita. Yoga is progress, and kshema is order. The one connotes steady growth and progressive realisation of the goal, and the other signifies the conservation of what has been achieved. Sri Sankara in his commentary on this verse in the Gita says that Yoga means the acquisition of what is not on hand and Kshema as the preservation of it. Thus it is wrong to think that we are tied down to an effete, dead antediluvian tradition. Ours is a moving, growing, developing ideal of all-round social

development. The moral act is that which sustains the whole complex system of social values ; and the *sittlichkeit* enables the individual to have the insight and inspiration how best to order his own life in the service of the highest ideal ; and let us leave to the Aptas, the great luminaries and the best exponents of the moral culture of the race the most difficult and onerous task of the legitimate criticism and the necessary transformation of the *sittlichkeit*. Let us therefore not be in a hurry to effect changes in our moral system just for the sake of change. Progress is not the intrinsic quality of changes ; nor is it inevitable. It can come about only by long range thinking, sublime vision, and determined effort. Change may be for good ; it may also be for bad. There is no inherent principle of betterment in the evolution of the universe. Swami Vivekananda, who knows what he is speaking 'about, is fully aware of the abiding worth of our moral principles and their permanent value for social advancement when he says that "We must revive the old laws of the Rishis. We must initiate the whole people into the codes of our old Manu and Yājñavalkya with a few modifications here and there to adjust them to the changed circumstances of the time." The fact is that a great moral system like that of ours has the means of reforming itself from within. No nation can grow into greatness by accepting and following the ideals and methods which are not essentially indigenous. The Hindu ideal of life is constructed on unimpeachable psychological and metaphysical foundations, and is through and through social in import and value. Dharma, Vairagya, and Jñāna are the most cherished watchwords of the Hindu ethical system. They furnish the key to the understanding of the moral conduct, and constitute the basic foundation for the growth of social virtues and personal goodness, and contribute effectively to the solidarity and the enduring welfare of the community.

Identity as a Postulate of Knowledge.

BY

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Some take identity as synonymous with exact resemblance, and for them numerical difference is not so important. Taking for instance, two peas occupying two distinct positions in space, if we find that they resemble each other in all other respects except in their positions, they are to be taken as identical. One and the same point of space cannot be occupied by two things at the same time.* And as the two peas exist at distinct positions, they are different. If they be different, how can they be identical? It may be urged that difference in respect of position is indifferent to identity, which consists in otherwise exact resemblance. But this implies that we can drive a wedge between 'that' and 'what' of a thing. When we perceive anything we perceive a definite fact, as attached to a definite point of space. If the sensible facts are distinguished, it is not in virtue of their contents—complexes of qualities and relations merely—but by both the content and existence, that and what, which, in combination, constitute the thinghood of a thing. Further, we can see through the theory, if we take into consideration the distinction between two sets of situations, namely, the two positions, one self-same thing occupies in succession, and the two positions, occupied by two things, at the same, between whom there may be the highest degree of resemblance. The latter set cannot be reduced to the former. In the latter, the two-ness of the two cannot be

*Spatial positions are not by themselves exclusive. Opposition is generated through the collaboration of time-element with space indicating a very intimate connection between space and time.

eliminated by abstracting from the spatial determination, and without this reduction, we cannot approach identity, by the way of mere exact resemblance.

Some logicians state the principle in the form, 'once true, always true, once false, always false.' 'True' and 'False' are relevant only to judgments. On the face of it the dictum may appear to be untenable. I judge in a particular situation, for instance, '*There is a snake.*' Now this judgment may be true in this one situation, but it may be false in another. But this objection is superficial and does not touch the main point. It can be pointed out that there is nothing like a judgment in isolation from its relevant content, floating on our mind's surface, so that we may fix on the self-same judgment on different occasions. A judgment, as a psychical fact possesses individuality, and the individuality of a judgment is determined by the individuality of the fact or facts referred to. So the so-called identity of a judgment, on two occasions or more, is merely sameness in semblance. For the difference of the contents will distinguish the judgments which may appear to be identical in form. Even in the case of similar facts, it is not that the self-same judgment is repeated. I perceive 'Fire,' for instance, in two contexts, and pass the judgments,—'*There is a fire,*' on the two occasions. But fire in one context is not the same fire as in the other? And though here I am using the same form of assertion, yet beneath this surface-sameness, there is difference, as determined by the differing individuality of the cases of 'Fire' in the two contexts. But it does not mean that a judgment is lost into nothingness as soon as it is passed. It, in fact, persists in the form of memory-judgment. Thus the falsification of a judgment is effected through the mediation of memory. But here all these are of no importance. Now in the light of the analysis we can read the dictum under discussion and find that what the theorists mean by it is simply this that

if a judgment is true, it is true, if it is false, it is false and it is a truism, but it is not to be on that score discarded as trash. The dictum simply brings out the timelessness of the determination in a judgment, which follows from the very relation of incompatibility between truth and falsity. The dictum as in itself is an expression of something quite reasonable, in regard to judgment. But it is too narrow to be taken as the formulation of the principle of identity, which does not pertain to judgment alone. To take it to be so is to confuse between a particular case of application of the principle, and the principle itself.

There is, however, a different approach to the situation. The Principles are taken as the principles of propositional determinations and in the conception of proposition, we discern a divergence from the traditional path. As it is maintained, proposition is not the linguistic expression of judgment. It is merely what is proposed in thought and it is upon a proposition that a judgment is passed. Thus taking P as any proposition, the principles are taken to mean, if P is true, P is true, if P is false, P is false, P cannot be both true and false, P must be either true or false. Now before pointing out that this view shares the same defect as that just above discussed, we should refer to a fundamental presupposition involved in the position. 'True and 'False' are taken as relevant predicates to proposition. But proposition as insisted on by the theorist in question is what is merely proposed. As proposition can be entertained in many ways and judgment is one among them. A proposition as such is indifferent to truth and falsity. As proposition in itself is not claimed for. And as there is no truth claim, truth or falsity is out of the question. Thus we find that the position that the laws of identity, contradiction etc. are the principles of propositional determinations is doubly defective.

The form of expression, 'A is A,' is significant. Some,

however, have taken exception to it on the ground that it is a mere tautology. But it is also interpreted to illustrate identity in difference. Identity in difference, as some logicians have pointed out, does not explain identity but presupposes it and further renders identity itself unintelligible. We cannot understand, how an element of difference can enter into the very constitution of identity. There is a confusion between identity of a thing in itself, and knowledge of identity. But it may be contended that identity of a thing is, after all, identity in difference. A thing is a complex of qualities and relations. So if there is identity, it is realised through the differences within the complex. But one cannot say, on that account, that identity is in the differences. It is undoubtedly true that a thing in itself is nothing in the abstract, in the sense that there is no room for difference. There are of course differences which fall within it. But here there is a peculiarity. When we are attending to the colour, shape or size, or any other aspect of a thing we may not be thinking of it at all. We can distinguish the differences there only by an abstraction. So also when we get a thing, given as a whole, we do not necessarily attend to the differences in detail. Further, the principle of identity is presupposed by these differences. Each of these possesses a definite content, in virtue of which they are distinguished. The fact is that identity does not pertain only to a thing, but is also relevant to its aspects, when held in abstraction. A thing is a complex and as such possesses a definite nature, in virtue of which it is, and is distinguished from its other. But the content of a thing is not equivalent to a mere conglomeration of some differences. Whether or not the analysis of the differences that enter into the constitution of a thing can be exhaustive, is perhaps a difficult problem. But it cannot hinder us in any way. Even from an incomplete analysis, we can safely assert that at the basis of the content of a thing, some differences combine.

But we must, at the same time, note that the content itself which possesses the characteristic of self-sameness, is something more than the difference. Further it is not that in knowing anything, we are knowing its identity as such. There is, however, no gain-saying the fact that the identity of the content concerned functions in the process of knowing the content. But the identity as such does not appear as the direct content of knowledge at the time. The knowledge of identity in itself of a content, is in the form '*same as*', and this calls for an occasion which involves an implication of difference. The act of knowing identity, coincides, with that of recognition. We do not recognise a thing which we are meeting for the first time nor when it is quite familiar. Recognition marks the midway between our first experience of a thing and its becoming familiar. Knowing a thing to be the same, has a necessary reference to our past experience concerning it. The past occasion and the present context, or even the past occasion and the present one, furnish the differences over against which identity of the content in question maintains itself and which become the psychological conditions of our knowing the identity of the thing concerned as a definite content. But here the differences do not enter into the identity itself. It may be argued that we may get identity between two things, in a certain respect, while they may differ in many others. But we ought not to forget that identity is identity. A and B, for instance, may be similar in certain respects. But we cannot get identity, even by the maximum amount of resemblance. Identity demands total elimination of the two-ness of the two, so that one is assimilated into the other, we cannot speak of two, and at the same time of identity. Identity-in-difference is therefore a misnomer. It may be asked, what about the differences, over against which identity maintains itself, in our knowing it, in a particular case. As we have already indicated the differences

do not enter as elements into identity itself. The differences of occasions do not offer any difficulty. They are merely epistemic, and do not affect the content in its constitution. When a thing is known in two contexts, there is apparently a difficulty. A, for instance, appears in our experience in two contexts, namely, K and P, in succession, and the question is whether the differences in the contexts effect any alteration in the content. Here we appeal to experience, and we find that in cases when the identity of a content is known, the contextual differences are indifferent to the content in question, but are relevant only as epistemic conditions of the knowledge of the identity. It may seem that we are making a division between the spatial position of a thing and its content. Truly speaking, a thing is its 'that' plus 'what'. We can think of either of these simply by an abstraction. Whatever is existent is spatial. It must occupy a particular point of space. But it does not mean that it has to be rigidly confined to the particularity of any particular point. A thing may change its position, it nevertheless need not necessarily change its identity, and this follows from the peculiar nature of space itself. We may then take the principle of identity thus: Anything, determinate in our experience, possesses a definite content, which means what it is, and in virtue of which, distinguished from its other, and further, the identity of a thing is known as a definite content only with a reference to some differences, which do not enter into its constitution.

Kant's Thing-in-itself.

By

TARASANKAR BHATTACHARYA.

The most intricate thing in the Critique of Pure Reason of Kant is his conception of the thing-in-itself. To eliminate the thing-in-itself is to eliminate Kant. For Kant is a transcendental realist and however repeatedly he may declare the unknowability of the thing-in-itself, yet it holds a distinct metaphysical position in Kant. It is an unobjective, ungiven, logico-practical necessity which for the theoretical reason is an unnavigated endless ocean limiting and bounding its jurisdiction. It is the *ens realissimum* and all intuitions baffle to have a glimpse of it. For intuitions are sensuous to Kant and it is distinctly a non-sensuous entity. The different versions of the thing-in-itself run as follows :—

(i) Things-in-themselves are the epistemologico-metaphysical entities. They lie at the foundation of phenomena, but nothing may be known of them. They are the unknown cause of sensations.

(ii) "It is the land of truth, surrounded by a wide and stormy Ocean, the region of illusion, where many a fog bank, and many an iceberg, seems to the mariner, on his voyage of discovery, a new country, and while constantly deluding him with vain hopes, engages him in dangerous adventures, from which he can never desist, and which yet he can never bring to a termination." It restrains sensuous intuitions within the boundary of phenomena and thus limits the objective validity of sensuous cognition.

(III) They are the Ideas of Reason.

(iv) It is analogous to the unity of self.

(v) It is the unconditioned background of sensible phenomena.

(vi) It is the *ens-realissimum*.

Let us consider the thing-in-itself in the light of these six statements and see the ultimate issue of the concept.

In the first place things-in-themselves are the non-sensuous cause of sensible representation and are entirely unknown to us. They are the unknown cause of sensibility. In what way does it differ then from the "something I know not what" of Locke? Locke's unknown object possesses the primary qualities. But Kant's unknown possesses no quality. To be known the given must be brought under the categories and forms. But these latter are inapplicable to them. Hence the thing-in-itself is in its utter naked purity unknown to us.

What then are the things in themselves? They are the uncausing unobjective realities which are not known even in ecstatic non-sensuous intuition. They are the logical unknown presuppositions of the known and the logical may not be objectively real. Take away the categories and forms from a particular object and what remains is the thing-in-itself. The phenomena are thus a non-metaphysical superimposition on the meta-epistemological real substrate, the noumenon. Epistemologically speaking there may be things in-themselves, but metaphysically there is only the thing in-itself.

In Sankara also the phenomena are an unreal superimposition on the unobjective, ungiven consciousness. But while the Vedantin admits a non-sensuous intuition of the noumenon, Kant recoils from such an intuition and declares it to be altogether unknown. In the knowledge of the noumenon, the assertory proposition is more real than the necessary proposition. To say that the noumenon is, is more real than to say, that the noumenon must be. It

means that actual realisation is necessary and actual realisation is possible only in non-sensuous ecstatic intuition in which the distinction between subject and object lapses.

What then is the cause of phenomena? The noumenon is not their cause as the category of causality does not apply to it. In Sankara the cause of the phenomena is an objective negativity, a cosmic nescience which is cancelled on the rise of true knowledge. But Kant has no Maya or cosmic illusion. The phenomena are made so by the synthetic activity of the understanding operating on the sense-materials. The categories and forms impede our knowledge of the noumenon. The thing-in-itself is never given and, to crown all, it appears with the impenetrable mist of forms. Is there then no means of piercing through the veil of phenomena and intuit the noumenon? Kant answers in the negative. Hegel reconciles the two and for him the necessity for an ecstatic intuition does not arise at all. The noumenon is both subjective and objective and it is knowable. But Kant admits no mode of knowing in which we can pierce through the veil of phenomena and intuit the noumenon. In Kant, again, the relation between the two is asymmetrical. The phenomena presuppose the noumenon, but the noumenon does not presuppose the phenomena.

Locke and Critical Realism

By

P. S. NAIIDU.

It is impossible to understand Locke's metaphysics aright without a knowledge of his "Natural Philosophy." Locke subscribed to the atomism of Democritus. Each atom is in itself imperceptible, and the 'object' is generated by a combination of atoms. The size and shape of the object need not correspond to the size and shape of the atoms composing it. The properties of the atoms are not perceptible to the senses; the qualities of objects are. So what is perceived is neither the 'brute fact' which is the atom; nor an idea, but something that is midway between the physical and the psychical. This, in brief, is Locke's position and herein lies the secret which later revealed itself in Critical Realism.

(1) 'The sensible bodies are made of inconceivable small bodies or atoms, out of whose various combinations bigger molecules are made; and so, by a greater and greater composition bigger bodies; and out of these, the whole material world is constituted.'

(2) 'There are duplicates of every object about me—two tables, two chairs etc...One of them is a commonplace object of that environment which I call the world...It is a thing...Table No. 2 is my scientific table which is mostly emptiness. Sparsely scattered in that emptiness are numerous electric charges rushing about with great speed but their combined bulk amounts to no less than a billionth of the bulk of the table itself. The process by which the external world of Physics is transformed into a world of familiar acquaintance in human consciousness is outside the scope of Physics.'

(3) 'Knowing is an interpretation of the object. What

we know about things is a kind of abstraction, a sort of ontological form, a logical outline of things.'

The views outlined above constitute a perfectly consistent system, the second representing a more advanced view of the physical doctrine outlined in the first, and the third setting forth an epistemology based on the second; and the whole might be attributed to any critical realist of the present day.

The critical realist distinguishes between three factors which contribute to perceptual knowledge: the object as understood by the physicist, the subjective physical idea and the 'essence' which enters between them. This *datum* or "*universal*" *essence* is the cornerstone of critical realistic epistemology. Without it knowledge is impossible and error inexplicable. Our contention is that the inspiration for the discovery of the essence was derived from the Lockian conception of 'Quality.'

The critical realist's substance is very close to that of Locke. But he objects to the agnostic separation of Locke between the substance and its characteristics. Our contention is that Locke is not correctly understood in this connection. Locke saw in an indistinct manner the absurdity of making an absolute ontological separation between substance and its quality. Our contention is strengthened when we turn to Locke's discussion of 'powers.' He speaks of 'powers' existing in substances and capable of producing different ideas in us. So if we stress and amplify the obscure aspects of Locke's doctrine of substance we come very close to Prof. Sellar's view.

Locke's qualities, according to our contention, are somewhat similar to the 'universals' of the critical realist. Because the idea of the 'Universals' is present in Locke's mind, but did not take any definite shape that he introduces a fundamental confusion between Idea and Quality.

According to Prof. Jackson, Locke means by Primary qualities, not a kind of qualities but all qualities, and he calls them primary to distinguish them, not from other qualities, but from powers, which are not qualities at all but wrongly supposed to be qualities. We are in entire agreement with the view set forth here, and when we compare it with Prof. Seller's definition of the 'Universal,' we find that 'it does not' take a very long step to go from the 'Qualities' to Universals.'

The critical realist draws a very interesting distinction between 'characteristics' and 'universals.' The characteristics are 'specific and intrinsic' and the universals are the 'terms in which we formulate and estimate these characteristics.' This distinction also, we claim, is based on Locke's distinction between Primary qualities and powers.

As to error, the critical realist thinks that the introduction of the datum or the logical 'universal' removes the difficulty and makes error easily explicable. In the explanation of error the idea of the Universal looms large also in Locke's mind.

Satadusani on Bheda.

By

S. S. RAGHAVACHAR.

Satadūṣaṇī is a work which attacks the fundamentals of Advaita and here I wish to discuss the problem of Bheda as treated in it.

According to Advaita the central fact of the universe is a homogeneous unity of infinite consciousness and distinctions of any kind are illusory. This is established in two ways :

1. Epistemological : that difference can never be apprehended and
2. Ontological : that its nature is ultimately indefinable.

Criticism

1. *The epistemological argument :*

(a) It is impossible on the Advaitic hypothesis to deny that there is the experience of difference. It is inconsistent with Sankara's declaration that "the sphere of the subject, that is the object of the consciousness of I and the sphere of the object, that is referred to by the consciousness of thou, are absolutely contradictory to each other as darkness is to light and possess mutually intransferable nature."

(b) Nor can it be maintained that the experience of difference is baseless and has no root in the ultimate structure of the universe. Being neither Brahman nor Sūnya, it must have some real relevancy to the nature of reality.

(c) And even in Advaita, Advaita is supposed to be responsible for the appearance of difference.

(d) And the denial of difference intended to be the purport of Vedānta necessitates the existence of experience of differences.

(e) The identity again which is the category that is admitted by Advaita must positively differ from the difference which it rejects.

Apart from the general considerations we have to watch how the actual difficulties that confront the concept of difference are met.

The question whether distinction and the distinct come to be perceived simultaneously or consecutively is founded on an erroneous submission to difference itself.

Among the alternatives about the occurrence of the apprehension of differences that which accepts the simultaneous

grasp of both difference and the object that differs is maintained. The impossibility of a simultaneous grasp is a fictitious fear. Difference does not require that the object that differs must be previously apprehended because being positive it can pass into consciousness through the same mechanism of perception.

Secondly, it does not also presuppose the knowledge of the fact from which the object is different because though that would be the case for the intellectual act of differentiation the factual ground does not require it.

Admitting for argument's sake that there is only identity and no difference, can perception reveal identity? Identity must always be of something with something. Therefore the thing that is identical and that with which it is identical must be grasped before it can be grasped.

Again, inference is possible if the difference between the universal principle and the particular context is given in experience. Analogy also makes use of a necessary quality for the sake of comparison. Testimony implies the difference between the linguistic symbols and the substances symbolised. Arthāpatti is built upon the recognition of the difference between the accepted explanation and the rejected suggestion.

2. *The ontological argument :*

Is difference a substantive essence or an adjectival content? Now the assumption underlying this question is that there is a difference between substance and quality. If that distinction is admitted, an absolutely uncompromising polemic against distinction of any kind is a superstitious gymnastic. If that is not admitted, the dilemma pressed with such a note of finality ceases to be of any logical interest.

Doubt and misunderstanding would be impossible. Error is the consciousness of difference in existence. Now when identity constitutes, as it does, the nature of the object itself

according to Advaita, how can a superimposition of plurality take place ?

The *Śatadūṣaṇi* holds that difference can be either a substance or a quality. By difference we should not mean differentiation but the factual ground of differentiation.

Doubt and misunderstanding are not impossible on this theory. A quality, for instance smell, might have a doubtful nature and after we find out its substantive substrate the doubt might disappear.

Again it is unnecessary to think that the quality of difference requires another difference to distinguish it from its term. What confers difference on a particular term has also self-stamped difference.



Reality and Perception :

A New Interpretation.

By

P. G. DUTT

The trend of philosophy from Locke down to the present age has always been towards a knowledge of reality as it is, apart from the sensation produced by it on our minds. This fundamental problem of metaphysics has completely foundered on the rock of perception. If for light we turn to psychology we find us not an inch outside the realm of confusion. Yet to this psychology we must turn to get an accurate idea of perception in which we awake into consciousness and meet spirit and matter face to face.

In spite of the various theories we have hardly risen above the Humean interpretation of perception. It is said that by interpreting sensation we form an idea of the thing which stimulates us and produces the sensation in our mind. It naturally follows that it is impossible for us to know the *sensa*, the reality, or the thing-in-itself and we are led to solipsism. Moreover the way in which the nature of reality has been defined makes the quest after reality a hopeless task. Reality, they maintain, is something other than its attributes and different from the sensation produced by it on our minds.

This interpretation of perception and reality is entirely erroneous. Reality implies activity or the power of doing something. If we can know this power we shall know reality. It is idle to draw a line between the power and the reality itself. But now the question arises how we should know these powers of a reality apart from our sensation. A power or activity cannot be isolated from the effect or the deed produced by it. To abstract a power from its deeds is absurd. Thus we have reality+power+effects indissolubly united into one organic whole. The confusion in psychology and philosophy is due to the splitting up of these three.

Our sensations are the various effects produced in us by realities and by knowing those sensations we know the powers of these realities, and knowing those powers we know the realities as they are. Quality in the correct sense is the power of doing something. In sensations therefore we find the manifestation of a power. We are face to face with reality in our sensation.

The above view is not identical with the old representationist theory because the qualities are not identified with the things producing them nor are they treated as images of things. It is also different from Hamilton's Natural Realism for though Hamilton pretends to get at reality directly by

intuition, he really infers it from the contrast of the ego and the non-ego in consciousness. But according to our view we come to know reality directly through the effects produced by the various forms of activity exerted by reality. Our view is also different from popular realism because according to it extension, solidity etc, are not in matter but in our minds and they are produced in us by the powers possessed by matter.

In sensation we are in direct communion with the world outside us. Similarly in thinking and volition we are in direct communion with the mental entity.

Can God be Seen ?

BY

PRALHAD. C. DIVANJI.

On a *prima facie* consideration of the problem it appears that God cannot be seen or touched in any form or shape, because the concept of God is itself such as to exclude the possibility of His having a physical form, since whatever has a form is necessarily limited by space and whatever is so limited cannot be omnipresent. All the great religions of the world unite in holding that the Highest Divinity is One, Eternal, Omnipresent, Omnipotent and Omniscient and is the Creator, Preserver and Destroyer of the universe and its Internal Ruler.

From the scriptural accounts too we cannot find an encouraging answer to the question whether God can be seen,

because even in the Upaniṣads there are several texts apparently supporting the above *prima facie* view. We should not give up the pursuit and run with this idea upon a superficial consideration of the scriptures. When we look into the records of the spiritual experiences of the ancient sages as well as of the traditions inherited by them from their ancestors and study these, we find them coming face to face with God and having had communion with Him. In the Hindu scriptures at least such accounts are accompanied by detailed statements as to the particular courses of study and discipline gone through by the saints and by exhortations to the audience to follow those courses in order that they too may, like the sages themselves, attain to the same perfect and happy state. This discipline has been raised to the dignity of a science called Yoga with three branches viz. Jñāna-Yoga, Bhakti-Yoga, and Karma-Yoga.

There may be said to exist a regular graded series of stages through which a devotee or an aspirant for knowledge passes before attaining consummation. The first stage is the imperfect Monotheistic view of the conception of God which states that God is absolutely impersonal i.e. without form and without limbs, and therefore He cannot be found anywhere in this world. If we wish to have a vision thereof, we should after living a life of purity and truthfulness die and wait till the day on which He would choose to reveal Himself to us i.e. to our souls. It is however one-sided and imperfect in as much as if He is Omnipresent He must also be everywhere in this world which comprises not only the mundane objects but our own souls as well and if even while in this embodied state, we can purify our hearts to such an extent as to make them capable of reflecting God, there seems no reason why we cannot see Him. The objection that unless God is an object He cannot be reflected, does not stand at all, because for obvious reasons it is not necessary for God to be in

existence as an object having a form before being reflected ; being All-powerful, He can also assume a form temporarily in order that the devotee may not get disheartened.

The devotee next passes to the stage of the spiritually adolescent who seek to know God as He is and find Him wherever in the universe there is life, splendour, beauty, prowess, etc. The 10th chapter of the Bhagavad Gīta (the Lord's Song) enumerates several objects of the animate and inanimate creation wherein God had become specially manifest, not for the sake of any particular human being but in the natural course of evolution. In this kind of vision of God all the senses are drawn inwards, even the particular which is brought into operation recedes into the back-ground no sooner a particular sound is heard, a form perceived, etc., the mind is no longer occupied with the particular phenomenal form conveyed to it by the sense but with its essence. Now, so far as this view viz. the monotheistic view is concerned, one who has reached this stage may be deemed to have reached perfection. But from the point of view of God Himself, there is still imperfection because in that view there being still a distinction between the objects as permeated and pervaded and God as the permeator and pervader, there is a duality which means that God is so much less perfect as to admit of the existence of another dissimilar entity side by side with Himself.

The devotee should therefore further contemplate over His nature. While doing so he will light upon the maturer view that is put forward in several texts of the Upaniṣads such as "All this is indeed Brahman, it being born of, absorbed in, and resting in it," and in such Smṛti texts as "It is very rare to find a great soul who realizes that all is Vāsudeva." This view is also graphically illustrated in the description of the Virāṭ Puruṣa hymn of Ṛgveda and in the manifestation of the

universe-form of the Lord in the 11th chapter of the Bhagvad-gita. In the preceding view God is only the Creator, Preserver and Destroyer of the world existing as a separate entity. In this the world has no existence apart from Him ; it is produced from Him. It is, so to say, a part and parcel of Him or is He Himself appearing in a multiplicity of forms. It takes years and even several births to develop this pantheistic sense, as Srikr̥ṣṇa himself says "One who has knowledge reaches me at the end of several births "

If the above state of merger in the object of experience continues for some time, as it necessarily would, when this kind of experience is repeated several times, then there arises the consciousness that there is only "One without a second," that "the consciousness is itself Brahman" and that "there is in it no diversity whatever." In fact there occurs a complete merger of the individual in the universal, the experiencer in the experienced, the subject in the object, and consequently the object ceases to be an object and there survives only the One from whom both had emerged. This is the climax of spiritual development known in the Vedānta works as Jivanmukti.

Evolutional implications of the Bhagavad Gita

By

M. V. V. K. RANGACHARI.

The Gita holds that matter and spirit are the two entities in the world, the destructible and the permanent ; (XV, 16) While the ideal is conceived to be permanent ; the world of matter is seen to be changing. The idealist stand of the Gita is transparent.

We start therefore with the fundamental basis of idealism which explains material universe negatively. But such idealism is a partial view of reality. The Gita seems to be more impartial when it says "I pervade the universe with a fragment of mine, and yet remain whole" (X, 42).

How the universe of life began is indicated in the Gita thus : "A fragment of myself, transformed in the finite world into universal soul, draws close unto itself the six senses including mind, rooted in matter." (XV. 7). This cannot be explained in terms of illusion ; for then it would involve Brahman in self-deception. Rather we see in it the attempts to explain the beginnings of evolution. What is at least an *Amśa* or fragment of the Brahman cannot in reality be argued out as non-existence. There is no reason to suppose that the Gita favoured the mentalist description of the universe as an experience. The use of the word *Brahma-Bhuta* in VI, 27, and XVIII, 54 is consistent with the physical view of the fundamental structure behind all experience.

"The space-time continuum, that mysterious four-dimensional alley of *Akāśa* and *Kāla*, is the *Adhibhuta* (rupa-element.) We have it in Gita "*Mama yonir mahat Brahma*"

(XIV, 3): this great Brahman is my womb, and out of it evolves the universe. The release of the categories, time, space, causality is the Vyakta (development) and Vikāra (modification) of the Brahma Bhuta. The Gita however does not ignore the fact that the universal vision, the power to see it whole is not given in life. But the nearest approach to such a vision may be attained by yogic balance.

The way of evolution lies in the elimination of those movements that injure the interests of the organism, and the perpetuation of those habits that further its growth. In the spiritual evolution of the individual self the same method is indicated viz. constant practice and detachment.

It is really the product of high evolutionary experiment that would detach itself from all aspects of individual identity, and the self-effacement is perhaps no better achieved elsewhere than in the cosmopolitan outlook of the song. To the difficulties raised in the first chapter as to the conflicting forces ranged on the opposite sides both of which are drawn from among close relations, the answer of detachment comes with greater force--"Aśaktir anabhisvaṅgaḥ putradāragṛhadiṣu" (XIII, 10), 'unattached to sons, wife and house.' It is a pointer to social evolution based on the effacement of the prevailing conceptions of family life.

The Conception of God in Leibnitz.

By

BEPIN VEHARI ROY.

The basic question for Leibnitz, as for Descartes and Spinoza, is the question of Substance. The essence of Substance is force, and not extension ; for "extension presupposes in the body a property, attribute or nature that extends itself, spreads itself out and continues itself." This force however is not physical but spiritual in nature, for the only direct evidence of force we have is in the sphere of voluntary actions where we find willing to be followed by changes in the outer world, whence, analogically, all other changes in the universe are manifestations of spiritual activity. This proves not one substance but a number of Substances, and these are Leibnitz's monads. These monads are simple and indivisible units ; they are so many reals, all eternal, independent and uncreated. They represent all grades of consciousness from the highest to the lowest, forming a graduated and continuous system.

One naturally asks : is there any room for God in such a system ? Much has been made of the qualifying expressions 'eternal', 'uncreated', 'independent' as applied to the monads. But these terms, it has been pointed out, are reserved for God, as we understand him. How can there be God existing side by side with so many ever-present, independent realities ? Again, the monads contain the germ of their own growth and develop in their own way—none subject to an accretion from without. This seems to give us the picture of a multiverse, and not of a universe. This gives us, in place of one God, a multiplicity of spirits, each having the attributes of God. Indeed in speaking about monads as uncreated, he sometimes calls them gods and says that God cannot create gods. A plurality of gods cannot be God in the real sense of the term.

But a careful examination of the epithets 'uncreated' and 'independent' will show that he is using them in support of a definite view of God and the universe. The temporal view of creation as adopted by Flint, viz., that creation takes place at a point of time, dissociates, as Pringle Pattison rightly remarks, God from the universe, and is fatal to a proper understanding of the relation of man and God. In any sane view of the matter, God and universe must be regarded as co-eternal; and it is in this sense that Leibnitz takes the monads to be uncreated. Again, independence, for Leibnitz, does not mean absoluteness; it does not mean isolated, unrelated units. It means freedom from outside influence, it is self-determination. All progress takes place within and through an interconnected whole. The theory of monads thus shows an innerconnection being ever present among the monads.

His theory of pre-established harmony also leads to the same conclusion. The harmony which operates in the universe is not a harmony forced from without. It would be so, if Leibnitz's God were *Deus ex machina* which He is not. Nor is it a mechanical relation subsisting among beings that exist outside one another. This will involve externality which is out of place in Leibnitz's system. The harmony is due to the very nature of reality. The universe is not a vast machine of which we are so many cog-wheels; it is an organism constituted by so many self-active monads, all fulfilling the purpose of God of whom they are the integral parts. By saying that God is the cause of such a universe, he does not mean a physical or transient cause but reason and sufficient reason. God is thus immanent in the universe, and His purpose operates in and through mechanism. Yet Leibnitz's God is not wholly immanent. The transcendental aspect is emphasised in the attributes he ascribes to God. God is the highest monad, the monad of monads. He does not appear only at the tail-end

of a series ; He is in them and beyond them also. The highest consciousness is not exclusive of, but by virtue of its perfection, encompasses within it all possible degrees of consciousness.

This is supported by his views on morality. Naturally he takes up the problem of evil. Evil is associated with imperfections ; and we are imperfect because we are finite, because we are many. Thus there are two courses open : either we choose to part with our individualities in which case there will be one and only one being, and all distinctions including that between good and evil will automatically vanish ; or we prefer to remain as individuals and must therefore submit to the inevitable law of existence. For God is governed by fundamental rules which are as much binding on him as they are on us ; he cannot make the impossible possible. This, however, does not conflict with the independence of God, for independence means self-determination ; and the necessary laws are God's laws. It follows then that if we grant a plurality of monads, we must have the necessary element of evil. This evil is not out of harmony with divine government, for God cannot overcome the limitations involved in the creation of a multiplicity of reals. The entire universe, past, present and future, is present in the mind of God. Essentially, God and the universe are one ; yet one does not merge in another ; it is not a case of diffused unity. Leibnitz's therefore is not the philosophy of isolation but one of harmonious integration ; not one of contentless God, but one of universe in God ; not one of coreless universe, but one of God in the universe.

In him we have an orderly arrangement of a number of spirits, and also a dominant spirit. His universe is not a republic as it is in McTaggart. His God is not a substance—who reveals himself in nature and man in different degrees. He is a spirit, a subject, a person ; the dominant spirit is also

an all-inclusive spirit. The highest monad again is not Howison's *primus inter pares* ; he is much more than that. Nor is he the absolute of Bradley in whom reality loses itself in a labyrinth of relations. Further, Leibnitz may be said to have cut fresh ground in the place he assigns to man. He rejects the asceticism of Spinoza and the exaggerated individualism of Pringle Pattison.

Yamunacarya's Refutation of Dehatmavada.

By

R. RAMANUJACHARI.

The theory of materialism in the East as in the West holds the eternal principles of earth, water, fire and air to be responsible for the development of everything in the world. Given them, even the self-conscious life mysteriously springs forth. No need to look upon the soul as distinct from the body, for the soul or atman is no independent principle but the body qualified by intelligence. The argument in support of this Identity Doctrine and the possible objections and their replies by the Cārvākas are considered below.

Perception is the only grand pivot on which stands the Cārvāka and his reputed theory. Statements like 'I am stout', 'I am lean' equate the atman with the attributes of stoutness or leanness and necessarily point to the impossibility of the separate existence of body and soul. Seeing that the primary meaning of the term 'I' or atman has nowhere undergone

change, it would not do to say, urges the materialist, that 'I' refers to the body only figuratively. Even to conclude the distinctness of body and soul from the necessary and invariable concomitance of the knowledge of an object and an apprehension of its parts, shape, size, etc., would not convince the Dehātmavādin who will retort that the said concomitance is nil in the case of internal cognition and far from being necessary and invariable in cases of outer perception. The Dehātmavādin may then have to face the horns of a dilemma which stands thus : if the body were identical with the soul, either the atoms that go to make up the body possess consciousness or do not. If the former, thousand thinking beings will be lodged in one and the same body ; and if the latter, the body will be divested of consciousness altogether. The reply to this dilemma is given by declaring it unwarrantable to assume that there is anything in the effect which depends on the antecedent, the cause, i. e. by casting doubt on the acknowledged notion of causality.

The Dehātmavādin may still have to meet another objection to his identification of soul and body. Consciousness cannot be a special quality of body, because at abnormal times like swoon or dreamless state the body exists despite the absence of consciousness. The ingenuity of the materialistic thinker lies in showing to the objector that his exception really lends support to the position excepted. To deny that consciousness is a special quality of the body is to affirm or at least to imply that it is a common quality of the body. Lastly, it is objected that one and the same thing can not be at once the subject and the object. Body, being an object of perception cannot at the same time be the perceiver or knower. The point of this argument is easily escaped by the materialist when he retorts that the body cannot be treated as an object at all, for is not object usually described as sharing the fruits of actions which are found in intimate associations with

something other than itself ? He would also challenge the objector to explain how it is possible that in self-consciousness one and the same thing becomes the jñātā and the jñeya.

Yāmunācārya dilates on the above points in a very learned manner by means of relevant examples and probing interrogations. In course of his discussion he raises the question whether the self exists for the sake of nothing but itself or it is to be enjoyed by others, and comes to the conclusion that we directly cognise the entire world of internal and external objects of experience to exist for the self and the latter is the only thing for whose glorification and enjoyment all else exists. Being a collection, the body cannot but exist for others. It is only by virtue of his nature as enjoyer that the self becomes that 'other' for whose sake all collections do exist.

Another point of definite importance which emerges in this connection is that consciousness, as noted already in course of the objections, cannot be upheld as a quality of body ; for had it been so, it must have been open to the perception of all perceivers and present in general in the parts that compose the whole viz. body. But that is not the case. Consciousness or intelligence is not any property material so as to be perceived by those other than the conscious person himself. It is his private property and cannot be known by other people in the same manner as he himself does. Consciousness is thus incapable of foreign jurisdiction and control and must be held, as a corollary necessarily following, as standing on a different foot-hold from any physical thing.

Advaitism in the Light of Modern Thought.

By

S. N. L. SRIVASTAVA.

The mighty impulsion behind the philosophical quest is the grand desire in the human heart for an ultimate and unitive understanding of the nature of existence.....existence taken in its entirety and completeness, the totality of all that is. Each science gives a systematic account of its own limited sphere. Philosophy is an attempt to correlate the ultimate findings of all Sciences. Philosophy is a search after the central and all-explaining principle of the universe. The philosophic genius of India culminated in the Advaita Philosophy, which has come to be regarded as *the terminus ad quem* of all philosophical thinking.

Our plan in this paper is to vindicate the essential unity or oneness of these three ultimately distinguishable aspects of experience—Self, Nature and Absolute, by taking our start from the cardinal tenets of modern idealism.

The absolute as modern idealism asserts it to be is the ultimate and all-inclusive concrete spiritual unity which comprehends within it the duality of subject and object and transcends this duality—the bifurcation of subject and object is within the inclusive unity of the Absolute.

The starting-point of modern idealism is the most fundamental fact of experience, the duality of subject and object, held together in epistemological coordination. The most general statement we can make about reality is that reality is subject-object. We have on the one hand the experiencing subject and on the other, the world of experienced objects. "The supremacy of the spirit," writes Perry "is argued from the theory of the priority of the knowing consciousness itself,

over all with which it has to do. The assertion of the priority of the Cognitive consciousness, the assertion that being is dependent on the knowing of it, may then, be termed as cardinal principle of idealism."

The self is epistemologically speaking the ultimate knower of the world of objects, the world which as Bosanquet says "exists in the medium of knowledge". The self, in short, is the foundational intelligence the ultimate epistemological ground of the entire knowable universe.

So far with regard to the self. What is the Absolute ? The Absolute in modern idealistic thought is more fundamental than the self. While the self is the epistemological ground of the objective world, the Absolute is the ground both of the objective world and the self that comprehends it. The self is the individual knower, the Absolute the All-knower. The two are distinct entities. The All-knower doctrine figures very prominently and is expressed in its most typical form in the writings of T. H. Green. The knowledge of the finite individual knower, it is argued, is subject to a process of growth and development, growing from less to more. It, therefore, presupposes as its ground and source an all-knowing mind or Eternal Consciousness or God, to whom knowledge in its infinity is ever manifest and whose reproduction the finite human minds are.

Here we come upon a radical divergence between modern idealistic thought and Indian Vedantism. From the Vedantic stand-point the self is ultimately identical with the Absolute ; though from an empirical or Vyavāharika stand-point it appears differentiated from the Absolute. The unity or oneness of the self and the Absolute is the corner-stone of the Advaitic system.

It discards the distinction between the individual knower and the All-knower and suggests that there is but one knower, one comprehending intelligence as the foundation of all

knowable or intelligible existence. The nature of knowledge itself suggests only one entity at the back of it.

Green and other idealists would like us to believe that the knowledge of the finite self or the individual knower, is a reproduction of the Absolute.

Does the phenomenon of knowledge point to another source behind what we call the self? Our reply is that we shall be constrained to answer these questions in the negative if we carefully consider the nature of knowledge and the necessary implications in the idea of a knower.

In every act of knowledge that we have, we are immediately conscious of its origination from the self, so that every act of knowledge, as Hamilton says, can be expressed in the formula "I know that I know". Knowledge, as the Mīmāṃsaka Prabhākara said, is a *triputisamvit*, where the knower, the known, and the act of knowledge are all simultaneously given in any act of cognition. It is impossible to have an act of knowledge, without the knower being revealed in the very same act. It is nothing short of sheer dogmatism to point to anything of the nature of an Absolute or an All-knower behind this knowing "I". The self as the ultimate knower cannot be equated with anything less than the first principle, the foundational reality. It exceeds and is subsumptive of all that is known. Individuality is a false attribute of the self, unreal metaphysically. The self is the Absolute.

It is because consciousness is of the very essence of self that it comprehends the entire objective universe. Consciousness, we repeat is the very essence of self, and not merely its attribute. Modern idealism takes the self to be a finite centre of consciousness rooted in Infinite Consciousness or God or the Absolute. Now, there is an apparent contradiction in the very idea of a finite centre of consciousness. Can a principle whose very essence is consciousness be finite? Can we put any limitation to consciousness? No, for the consciousness of

that limitation would necessarily exceed it. All limitation is *within* consciousness. All limitation being perceived by consciousness, the perceiving consciousness ever exceeds it. Consciousness in its very nature is infinite. The Vedantic Philosophers never failed to realise this ; hence they characterised consciousness as Vibhu.

It is the highest triumph of modern idealistic thought to have dealt a fatal blow to Naturalism by vindicating the logical priority of mind to Nature, and the supremacy of the former over the latter. Reality, beyond the range of knowledge, is simply inconceivable. All that is, is *in* knowledge. If anything could be called a first principle in Philosophy, then surely, no other principle could have greater claim for it than this. The relation of thought to reality is the central pivot round which the entire idealistic thought of to-day moves. The real world of our common experience is said to be outside the passing course of ideas and images in the individual minds and is construed as the permanent system of things to which the transitory ideas and images in the individual minds refer. Our fundamental contention is that the real that is *in* knowledge, could not exist otherwise than as knowledge. Berkeley's profound remark that ideas can be copies of ideas only, has unfortunately, been lightly passed over by modern idealistic thinkers. Reality is throughout such stuff as knowledge is made of. Josiah Royce has rightly observed "The world beyond all ideas is a bare mental that I know it." Only an existence which partakes of the nature of knowledge is capable of being apprehended in a knowledge process. We are inevitably led to the conclusion that all reality is spiritual. The knower, knowing and the known (object) are distinguishable aspects in knowledge and of knowledge.

To mark off "ideas in the mind" from the rest of reality is to create an artificial division in the seamless and undivided

unity of knowledge which reality is. What we are wont to call, or rather miscall "ideas in the mind" are the intermittently successive acts of knowledge, which construct for us the objective. Reality on our view is an undivided and indivisible continuum of knowledge, and the 'object' so called is in the last analysis found to be made of the very stuff of knowledge.

To sum up, our foregoing discussion has brought us to the recognition of one fundamental knower, the Root Reality, whether we call it the Self, or the Absolute or the Ego or by any other name, and that epistemologically viewed the supposed duality of self and the Absolute or the All knower is a sheer fiction. There is but one fundamental and foundational knowing principle, which epistemologically is the substratum of the entire knowable universe, and therefore of the entire range of the objective. Further the entire objective is sustained by a continuous ideal affirmation of the knowing principle which realises its inherent necessity of knowing by positing an objective which is known. This is *Advaitism*, the view that ultimately the One alone is the Real.

Intuition and Intellect.

By

J. C. BANERJEE.

Intuition as the basis of metaphysics is more an ancient belief than intellect. The primitive man professes what he *sees* rather than what he wants to prove. All religious metaphysical thoughts of the ancient and the mediaeval ages are deeply rooted in *Intuition* and *Faith*. To many the futility of the intellect is not altogether unknown but its utility is recognised in so far as it promotes and enhances the human faculty for the ultimate realisation of the Truth. We may refer here to Plato and the Vadānta.

Further, it may also be remarked that intuition has been evoked not only by a distrust of reason but also by an excessive reliance on it as a mark of protest. History depicts that the 'France of the Enlightenment' gave birth to Rousseau. It was the Age of Reason which produced such an 'apostle of feeling.' As a revolt against pure rationalism Jacobi maintained that metaphysical truth must be reached by immediate perception and not by the mediate knowledge of ideas. Hence God must be known by direct knowledge and this direct knowledge of Jacobi is '*Glaube*,' 'faith' which means intuition. Kant also meant almost this kind of intuition. In his Critique of Judgment (1790), he emphasised the ground of belief 'on the necessities of feeling';—of course the feeling Kant means is the 'æsthetic' feeling.

The sum and substance of Schopenhauer's philosophy is :—what the scientific intellect can give us is nothing but appearances and phenomena but the reality in our own minds is intuitively known and we "know this reality to be of the nature of *will*." Schelling suggests that our 'æsthetic sense'

contains "the perception of the ultimate truth of things, that the genius of the artist is a gateway to metaphysical knowledge, and art the organon of philosophy." Through the works of Bergson the method of intuition once more received a respectful bearing.

Intuition metaphysically means 'an intimate fusion of mind with reality'. Sense-knowledge is no doubt an immediate apprehension of the object known, but for the Indian thinkers, the type of immediacy we get in intuition (*aparokṣa*) is a non-sensuous immediate apprehension. The knower and the known are merged in one identity which is knowledge. Self-knowledge is the best instance of such an intuition (*aparokṣa*). According to Sāṅkara self-knowledge is the indubitable certitude on the basis of which all other kinds of knowledge are more or less based—every other kind of knowledge presupposes the knowledge of the self. The traces of this doctrine of *svānūbhava* of Sāṅkara may be found more or less in those of Descartes' 'Cogito ergo sum,' Spinoza's 'Scientia Intuitiva,' and Leibnitz's self-observation of the 'pure reason.'

Epistemologically considered Intuitionism may in one sense be said to be a form of Empiricism without the assumption 'that the self is isolated from the not self,' that the subject is distinct from the object. The Intuitional theory, unlike the Empirical one, does not consider knowledge as the *effect* of the object upon the subject. Thus Lossky observes, "Mystical, in contradistinction to individualistic, empiricism maintains that the external world is apprehended in experience as it is in itself and not merely in its effects on the self."

Bergson concludes that the real time is known only by direct perception and not by measurement or intellect; and this direct perception is intuition. His intuition may be defined as "a sympathetic attitude to the reality without us

which makes us seem to enter into it to be one with it, to live it. Many such objects as 'motion' and all forms of changes,' living beings beyond self, animals, other persons etc. fall within the range of this 'intellectual sympathy.' For Bergson, Intellect helps us to act in the universe but intuition to know. Intellectual knowledge is *external* i. e. intellect approaches an object which it considers to be different from itself. Intellectual knowledge is *relative* inasmuch as it is conditioned by likeness, interest and other environments. It is *abstract* and *partial* and hence it represents its objects as *static* and therefore *dead*. Intellect is merely analytical, it cannot give us a synthetic view of objects, it "*analyses* and cannot recompose." On the basis of such an analysis of intellect Bergson sets aside intellect as a true representative of reality. It is Intuition which gives us a clear apprehension of the *Absolute*.

Most of the firm convictions on the basis of which our life and philosophy is built up are not derived from perceptual knowledge or logical analysis. The synthetic view of the universe is a mere faith or a question of intuition. Art, morality life and all other absolute achievements of human souls are deeply rooted in the fundamental intuitive principles. Intuitionism may be said in one sense, to have bridged over the gulf between knowledge and existence. "According to the Intuitionist theory knowledge is neither a copy, nor a symbol nor a phenomenal appearance of the real world in the knowing subject, but is reality itself, life itself, which has simply become differentiated by means of comparison." Is it not too much on the part of those Intuitionists who draw a line of demarcation between intellect and Intuition? Is intuition a *distinct mode* of knowledge as compared to intellect? If we understand by intuition a non-relational apprehension, how can it be a distinct mode of knowledge?

We think that intuition cannot set up alone as a sufficient way of knowing and the reasons are obvious: Firstly in cannot

define *what* it perceives inasmuch as the definition presupposes a concept. Secondly it cannot *express* what it perceives or knows since language is made up of judgments and judgments of concepts. Lastly "*it cannot defend its truth nor distinguish true from false interpretation*" without the help of the intellect. Intuition may be said to be the precise counterpart of intellect but not as absolutely free from the clutches of it. But, here the question arises : Can the idea of intuition as non-relational mode of knowledge not be justified at all ? And our contention is : yes ; it can be so done in one sense and that is the sense in which intuition is to be understood and not in any other sense. That is so when we understand intuition as *itself the reality* i. e. when intuition knows nothing apart from itself.

The above account of ontology of Intuition gives us an explanation to another query in the concern : *Is there an intuition of ultimate reality ?* If reality is known by intuition then that reality is not distinct from the intuition of it ; and if it is so then there cannot be any state of reality which is not known i. e. the reality is ever known.

Sex and Morality.

BY

C. V. SRINIVASA MURTY.

Civilization, to-day, seems to be passing through one of its periodic crises. But the present crisis goes deeper than any before. In every department of life, there is to be seen a movement away from the old orders of life. The situation is most intriguing in the social life of men. The institutions of social life have been shaken to their roots. In this essay I shall take up one aspect of the perennial problem of social beings—the problem of the relation between sex and morals. In this connexion I shall fix my attention more readily upon the problems of marriage, family, parenthood, contraception and divorce in their ethical bearing. We can conveniently begin our subject by stating the nature of the ethical criterion. But as it opens up the whole question of right and wrong in conduct, no off-hand answer is possible. Still it is permissible for our purpose to assume one particular ideal—the ideal of self-realization. As the ideal of ‘self-realization’ and that of ‘social-wellbeing’ are of analogous import we may put the criterion in some such form like this : whatever enhances social well-being is moral, whatever hinders it is immoral. Self-realization is possible only through self sacrifice. It means that self-realization consists in the control of those impulses and tendencies which make for social disharmony and chaos. Of the various innate tendencies the instincts with which we are now concerned and which have far-reaching consequences upon the social life are the sex and parental instincts. These two endlessly play upon each other and are responsible for the various social institutions and problems. I shall now take up the problems one by one.

Marriage and the family.

Marriage which implies family is the fundamental integrating factor in social life. There are *prima facie* reasons to believe that the primary impetus for the marital relation is the physical satisfaction of the sex-impulse. But the organisation of sex-impulse is not the sole end of marriage. Properly understood, marriage is the foundation of ethical life. Of the different types of marriage such as polyandry, polygamy, and monogamy, the last one has justified itself by the facts of history, by the verdict of religion, and by the ideal of rational ethics. It is the increasing appreciation of the spiritual values which the steady influence of the monogamous family makes possible that does not make life a burden in old age. It allows the satisfaction of the physical sex-urge and develops the sense of spiritual values. By the concentration of interests and the recognition of each other's capacity and human worth the organic side of the sex assumes less and less importance. I fully agree with Bertrand Russell in his insistence on the monogamous family, and in his view that there must be complete identity of interests in the married pair. But when he recommends Lindsay's prescription of "companionate marriage" and goes on to say that man and woman must have complete liberty to have sex relation with any even after the birth of children I do not agree with him. The strong individualistic trend of his thinking has carried him to this extreme and he has buttressed his position by a polemic against the absolutistic conception of the State. But it is easy to see that Russell's suggestions for the betterment of marital relations of the sexes lead to sex promiscuity and hence do not make for self-realization.

Marriage implies family. The definition of marriage includes the idea of the family. The contribution of family to self-realization is very great. The indispensibility of the

family for self-realization lies in the fact that certain 'character values' can never be acquired outside the home. Family-life begets happiness. Where the sense of family solidarity is wanting the sense of social solidarity is out of the question.

Parenthood.

I have pointed out the intimate relation between the sex and the parental impulses. Marriage without children threatens us with the same sort of sexual promiscuity which would result from supposing that one enters into marital relations for the gratification of the sexual impulses. A sterile marriage cannot fail to be injurious to the ethical life of the husband and the wife. The birth of the child establishes the permanence of the monogamous family and the child becomes the central figure disciplining the behaviour of both man and wife. The many-sidedness of human personality does not find its full fruition in a mere companionship of the two sexes not merely for sex-life but for appreciation of spiritual values. To argue for parenthood is not to justify what is called 'irresponsible parenthood.' In the latter case it is thoroughly unethical to procreate children. The only practicable means of controlling such cases is the use of contraceptions.

Contraceptions.

The employment of contraceptions has provoked a good deal of criticism. On the one hand it is urged that this process is unnatural. On the other hand it is urged on religious grounds that it is unethical and is positively a sin. I fail to understand why it should be so. Contraceptions by themselves are neither natural nor unnatural, neither good nor bad. Their goodness or badness depends upon the concrete situations in which they are used or not used. I would consider its use as thoroughly immoral by persons who are wealthy and healthy and who possesses a high quality of body

and mind, in a word, who are fit for 'responsible parenthood'. On the other hand, it is perfectly social to use contraceptions in those families where children ought to be unwelcome. The questions of right and wrong in conduct are to be judged by the facts of human experience. The argument that contraceptions leads to sexual promiscuity is also thoroughly unfounded. Contraceptions abolish the 'double standard of morality', gives liberty of actions to individuals; removes the necessity of having unwanted children and relieves the mother of the intolerable strain of frequent child-birth. These factors go a long way towards 'the realizations of the true self of man.

Divorce.

Our attitude towards the problem of divorce depends upon the line of thought in which we have glided. Divorce is not justifiable if marriage is invested with religious sacredness. Marriage is to be regarded however, as an ethical institution where men and women come together for the purpose of living a common life and for the realization of common ideals. But it is too much to expect of human nature that there will always be the marriage of true minds. Hence divorce is a necessary remedy in cases of unhappy marriages. If the married couple do not agree even on fundamentals, if the home is the arena of constant quarrels, such a home is the last place where the care of children, social duties and hence self-realization are possible. Hence the need for legalising divorce. Divorce is thus not an end in itself but a remedy for disease.

The notion of difference in Dvaita.

By

M. A. VENKATA RAO.

The opponents of advaita within the fold of vedanta have given battle in defence of the world of difference with weapons of acute analysis. The attack and defence of this basic notion may conveniently be divided into three main divisions. (1) Psychological (2) Epistemological (3) Ontological.

1. *Psychological*. If difference is a reality, it must be capable of being perceived by the well-known sources of knowledge. According to Advaita all the instruments of right cognition excepting scripture depend upon perception. The problem of perception of difference on the psychological side is analysed into the following alternatives viz. (i) Do we apprehend difference alone in a single act? (ii) Or do we apprehend difference along with its ground? (iii) If we apprehend it along with the term, do we grasp them successively in either order? (iv) Or do we become aware of them in a single act? The assumption underlying this scheme of questions is that perception functions in distinct moments and therefore can grasp only distinct terms in isolation. If perception can grasp only momentary entities, we cannot apprehend difference in isolation, for difference implies at least two terms held together in a single relation. Continuity is therefore not given but ascribed to the object.

The Dvaita replies by making a distinction between act of mind and content of apprehension. Madhva points out in *Tattvanirṇaya* that the mind can grasp both the terms and the difference between them in a single flash. As a matter of fact, there is no undifferentiated presentation at all. The utterly identical with no shade of discriminated content is a myth.

2. *Epistemological.* Here difference may be regarded as a quality, a peculiar relation of mutual exclusion (*anyonyā-bhāva*) or as identical with the ground of difference itself. The last is the view of *dvaita*. Considering difference as *dharma* or quality, the *Chitsukhi* makes the following objection. The relation between substance and attribute may be held to be that of subject and predicate as the *Bhāttas* do or that of a peculiar constitutive relation as the *Nyāya* does. But both types of relation involve a diversity of aspects not open to simultaneous apprehension ; so the above views lead on to infinite regress.

Let us now consider difference as the thing itself. If difference is identical with the term, it should not require reference to anything else for its intelligibility. If A's difference from B is identical with A itself, it should not presuppose a knowledge of B. The moment we hear of A we should *ipso facto* grasp its difference from B. But such is not our experience. To this objection Madhva answers that it is a relational identity. He urges that the fallacy of mutual presupposition does not arise because the grasp is simultaneous. The difficulty is spurious and arises from a faulty psychology. Further, in *Tattvanirṇaya* he points out that the apprehension of anything whatever involves necessarily an apprehension of its distinction from everything else.

An objection may be raised here that if the apprehension is at the same time an apprehension of its difference from everything as is claimed by *dvaita*, we ought to attain omniscience with the bit of knowledge we acquire in life. Madhva as usual replies by a distinction between general and specific knowledge. When we know anything it is true that we know its difference from everything else. But this knowledge is pitifully meagre and vague. If this is enough to constitute omniscience every living thing possesses it. Omniscience ought to mean much more.

Now we come to the nerve of the attack against difference in particular and the external world in general. Advaita offers a dilemma to the defenders of difference particularly to those who hold that it is the essence of the term itself. Either A's difference from B is an absolute entity synonymous with A, in which case the origin of the notion in experience becomes inscrutable. Or, A's difference from B involves an essential relation to the correlative B, in which case, the nature of B enters into the nature of A. On the former alternative the very idea of difference becomes inexplicable. On the latter alternative it becomes an internal relation and far from limiting off objects from each other involves everything in universal relativity.

Dvaita is aware of the full force of the analysis and offers a constructive dialectic in its place. From the standpoint of epistemology, it holds that a distinction should be made between internal and external relations. All relations need not be *svarupa sambandha*. Very often the difference of an entity from all other things can be brought to us not by anything that enters vitally into its nature but by an extrinsic accompaniment. Madhva points out that A's difference from B is in A, and is uniquely identical with A. B's nature does not enter into it, for B's difference from A is not at all the same as A's difference from B. Hence even in the term relation of difference, there are two distinct differences involved for there are two natures and from a comparative standpoint they are mutually non-transferable. Moreover difference is not a relation but the terms themselves. A is A and B is B and out of this situation arises the experience of difference. Metaphysically the dvaita puts terms and relations on the same level; difference has the same ontological status as the ground thereof. Brahman's difference from the world is as true as Brahman. It is also necessary to point out here that for dvaita, there are two levels of relatedness, the foundational

one in which every thing is pervaded by one supreme spirit and the secondary level in which there is an infinite variety of specific situations and specific individualities.

Metaphysical background. Advaita is a philosophy of pure identity. It supposes no difference. Dvaita on the other hand is a philosophy of difference. To it difference is the sign-manual of reality and the bearer of value. The vital nerve of the advaitic critique consists of a presentation of the central contradiction of identity in difference. Dvaita adopts the plan of accepting both identity and difference as real and postulates a creative power in all existent things from Brahman to the blade of grass, a power that leaps across the contradiction. It is called the principle of *viśeṣa*. It is a metaphysical category which stands for the principle of organic unity in reality. Finally however both admit an ultimate mystery but they put it in different places. In advaita the mystery is why a world that never was, is or will be should appear at all. In dvaita the mystery lies in the fact of individuation without diremption of nature. Thus advaita is pure idealism denying all otherness ; whereas dvaita is a concrete idealism, accepting otherness as essential to the nature of reality.

A Study of the Bergsonian Conception of Matter.

By

MISS A. L. HALDAR.

A number of strands have entered into Bergson's theory of Matter. The realistic tendency is represented by the view that life meets with resistance from something which breaks it up into an infinite number of species and which life con-

quers by inserting itself into it and turning it into its own profit. The vitalistic element is evident in the theory that life and matter are really differences of tendency and that while the upward push towards novelty and indetermination is the vital form the downward impulse immanent in life itself resists the upward push and represents the material aspect of life. Matter becomes a form of life itself when its origin is traced to the loss of tension by life. How the mobility of life becomes reduced to immobility is a problem that is left unsolved but without the opposition of matter life would be deprived of its incentive to effort and evolution. The idealistic tendency is represented by two lines of thought. We are told that intellect and matter are created together—that the evolution of the brain and the origin of matter are simultaneous facts and that the science of space and the science of thought are ultimately identical. As a variant of this thought we have the view that matter originates because we are practically interested in the world—that if the question of realising plans had not been present reality would not have degenerated into the material form. The divisibility of matter arises because of the practical need of cutting reality at any point and repiecing it according to need. Intelligence is the faculty of action just as intuition is the faculty of real knowledge. One other form of this type of thought is that matter has the quality of extensiveness derived from thought itself—only that it represents the repetition of the past in the present without that qualitative difference which is inseparable from the operations of mind. But the difference is not of kind but of degree as between mind and matter.

The Ideal and the Real.

By

PHANINDRA KRISHNA BOSE.

We come into the world which exists before our birth. The so-called extra-mental reality and our corporeal selves are the two distinct phenomena in our lives, and the chief concern from the dawn of our existence is to reconcile the two in a manner that one may grow under the influence of the other. They appear to be interdependent though quite opposed to one another.

But deeper philosophical thinking leads us to support the doctrine of *Panpsychism* in nature. The primordial life which first appears as latent thrill in rocks and stones, reproduces itself in plants and trees, reappears in the shape of a conscious mind in the life of animals and ultimately expresses itself as an evergrowing intelligence in man. In a word, we are faced with a duality and not a dualism of experience. Nature with its multiplicity implies a radical unity which links the manifold into a cosmic harmony. Now the teleological character of the universe is conceived by the intelligence of man from its own nature. The character of intelligence is to coordinate the different elements of nature into a systematic and symmetrical unity so as to fulfil its own good or purpose. The world process is only the cosmic representation of a universal spirit to realise its own highest good and in realising its own highest good, the universal spirit reproduces himself in finite spirits in the fulfilment of their subordinate goods which are held together by a divine unity of purpose and these goods taken together form a hierarchy of goods all contributing to the fulfilment of the highest good of the Supreme. The plans which we frame in our lives for our good are conceived by the transcendentalists as sham cravings

for falsehood and are to be brushed aside if we are to realise ourselves. The world is a mirage in so far as we forget its changeable character, be engrossed in it and think it as permanent. But to annul the world as totally a falsehood and unmeaning in relation to our metaphysical existence and to teach worldly life as a total perversion of the true life and to hold that the only value of life is to be sought in a total abandonment of the world and absolute self-surrender to an absolute spirit where all differences, both physical and spiritual have been transcended is to disconnect the real from the ideal without any passage from the one to the other.

The real in order to be real must ever yearn after the ideal and the ideal in order to be ideal must ever be materialised by an unending process of honest striving for it by the real. The teleological evolution of the world has therefore no meaning for the abstract monist whose ideal is all in all and consists in a total negation of the real world altogether. If this world in which we live and our desires and cravings are all born of ignorance and if *Prañā* consists in the annulment of all these cravings ultimately how can the cravings be generated from the *One* who is without any craving or is the *Śānta Brahma* as he is called? This view takes the ideal as real when the real mundane existence has vanished from us altogether and a total transfiguration of existence is brought about. The real has merged in the ideal and the ideal becomes a realised ideal excluding the so-called real. All this is no doubt matters for realisation. But from a philosophical point of view, this view appears to be untenable for it presupposes a point of time when the manifold ceases to exist. The underlying idea is that to think of God as *Bhūtastha* (immanent in living beings) is to degrade his spiritual character as the character of *Bhūtas* is *Parināmi* or subject to change while God is *Aparināmi* or unchangeable. *But unless Prakṛiti emanates from God and God*

is also immanent in it as Purusha, Prakriti cannot lead us to Purusha. All charges against special creation theory are apparently met by the argument that the 'world exists for *Baddhajīvas* or individuals who are in bondage. But this is only an evasion of the relevant points at issue for these *Baddhajīvas* would also one day or other be free and the world would be meaningless for them also. *We are logically therefore led to uphold the doctrine of perpetual creation and to conceive perpetual creation as co-extensive with the eternal God as the author of the Universe and to hold that whatever is real is rational.* The real is therefore only the inadequate manifestation of the ideal and the more we shall grasp the ideal, the more we shall master the real and prove to be as complex as our thoughts which are far-reaching and which are characterised by self-transcendence. A man dies with his love for his good unrealised. His idea of good may widen with his evolution in next life but the eddies in his mind once begun will never subside or be stifled by better knowledge but will enlarge to coalesce with the cosmic plan of which his plan or idea of good is only a part. Indeed, as Emerson puts it, "The soul never loses by its progress."

The real is nothing but an approximation to the ideal and the ideal is nothing but a plan premeditated that moves the real to grasp it. God and creation are co-extensive and the reciprocal relation to them is that of a producer to its product in which the individual spirits play their respective roles of action linked with Him as his factors. The real and the ideal are therefore not fundamentally opposed to each other but are ever interdependent, the real being the inadequate embodiment of the ideal and its striving for the ideal is made possible by its spirit or the self-realising idea or soul immanent in it or in other words by the ideal.

The Nature of the Wish.

By

Dr. G. BOSE.

In psycho-analysis the term *wish* is used so very frequently that it is of the utmost importance that its true connotation should be clearly understood. But unfortunately the task is very heavy. Great introspective ability is required when we try to describe a *conscious wish*. The difficulty of description becomes all the more apparent when we take into account the *unconscious wish*. The classical psychologists did not clearly indicate the distinction between a 'will' and a 'wish.' The problem of the unconscious wish did not arise with them. The term 'will' was used to denote a variety of different concepts. Although Külpe is willing enough to acknowledge that a will may exist outside consciousness, he is disposed to lean towards the view that the characteristic of will is consciousness of the end. If we adopt this definition, it becomes at once apparent that the term unconscious wish becomes self-contradictory. But there are cases which force us to extend the concept of the wish to include situations where the consciousness of the end is not present. It is justifiable to extend the scope of the term wish to include experiences of the unconscious type also ; particularly so when by introspection after an analysis a subject is sometimes able to appreciate as a conscious process the aim which had remained unconscious before ; that is, in such cases the previously unconscious wish has become conscious. Bearing in mind this consideration we might describe 'wish' as a peculiar psychic process—conscious or unconscious—which precedes or accompanies the tendency of the organism in its effort to change the environment so as to have an adjustment

different from the existing one. This description is biological. We might give a psychological description of a conscious wish as a peculiar feeling of activity and power which appears to change a group of existing perceptions for another.

A wish like a sensation has certain attributes. There is the attribute of intensity. The idea of intensity of a specific wish carries with it a connotation of energy. A wish possesses further the attributes of quality and duration. The most important attribute of wish from the psychoanalytic standpoint is clearness. When the aim is fully realised by the subject the wish may be called a clear wish. There are cases where the aim may be supposed to lie at the margin of consciousness or in the background of consciousness. Again there are cases where the clearness of the wish is entirely absent and the aim is supposed to lie in the unconscious sphere. Thus we see that the attributes of a wish are its intensity, duration, quality and clearness. In view of these attributes it is possible to represent a wish graphically by a straight line.

In a wish-situation there are several elements. A wants to strike B. In such a wish there is the subject A who feels the striving to strike. There is the object B with reference to whom the wish develops. The particular action concerned in the wish is the act of striking. A wish therefore may be taken to represent a subject-object relationship. Again in the case mentioned above the subject A has a sort of appreciation of the object B. What is the appreciation? Appreciation consists in the subject's feeling the existence of certain characteristics in the object B. B must have influenced A in a certain manner which calls forth the desire of A to strike B. The impression produced by B on A's mind leads to the appreciation of some of B's attributes, that is, A places himself unconsciously in B's situation. There is splitting up, as it were, of A's personality into two halves; one of these

gets identified with B who is the object and the remaining half of the personality makes A act as the subject.

There is wish element in perception. The action attitude constitutes the meaning part of the perception. The meaning is not always in the conscious sphere. It may exist as an unconscious mental attitude. Moreover in all perceptions there is a splitting up of the personality into two halves as I have already mentioned in discussing the question of the analysis of wish. A perception therefore cannot exist apart from a wish. As all perceptions contain a latent wish element, it is possible to represent a perception also graphically, in accordance with the scheme mentioned previously in the case of wish.

Philosophical Approach to the Subject-matter of Psychology.

By

BAHADUR MAL.

To call Psychology a natural science or scientific is to express an aspiration rather than an achievement. Its aim, like that of all natural sciences, is to study a specialized department of experience. Being young its field of investigation is at first rough and gradually it becomes clear and well-defined and its scope well ascertained

The time-honoured definition of psychology is that it studies consciousness. Metaphysics, too, tries to understand the nature of consciousness. Then what is the point of departure of psychology from metaphysics? Moreover metaphysics has proved that consciousness is something unique and *sui generis* and therefore cannot be the object of any scientific enquiry.

The second known definition of psychology is that it studies mental states. Brentano and others analyse mental states into mental acts (sensing, imagining, thinking, etc) and their contents (sensations, images, ideas, etc). But mental acts as such do not qualitatively differ. Mental acts mean the fact of being conscious and as consciousness they do not differ. Only in their contents they appear different.

Next comes the question of mental contents (sensations, images, ideas, etc). Mental contents are regarded as subjective. Galileo first declared sense qualities to be the effects of the physiological functioning of the body and as having no place in the physical world. Descartes regarded them as the modifications of the mental substance. Much of the misconception about the subject-matter of psychology is due to the two pioneers—the one of modern science and the other of modern philosophy—from whom the psychologists inherited their views as a sort of legacy.

But thanks to the new realists, sensations like 'red', 'green' etc can no longer be regarded as states of consciousness. Our consciousness does not become '*red*' or otherwise when we have sensations of 'red' or otherwise. Hence they cannot be regarded as subjective. The qualities belong to the object and not to us. They are objects of experience and not acts of experiencing.

Perception is a two-term relation. There is no *tertium quid* or third term in this operation. Hence to call sensation mental and to explain perception by bringing in a third term entails unnecessary complication. Considering all these it is better to define Psychology as the study of behaviour.

Physics, Chemistry and Biology study behaviour of different objects and in their study they avail themselves of mechanical causation. But in psychology, mechanical causation is not sufficient, teleological causation must also be taken into account. For the question why do conscious beings behave in the way

they do, psychology cannot ignore though it does not wish to discuss and indeed it is out of its scope to bother whether mechanical and teleological causation can be reconciled or not.

Our behaviours are of different types and they admit of classification and in such classifications the question of teleology comes in and no longer structural standpoint can be adhered to. I should like that Psychology should study the behaviour of individuals, but unlike Watson and his school, should not ignore teleological causation. In such explanation of behaviours psychologists should use sensations, images, ideas, etc. But these must not be taken to be mental. But they are not for that reason (arguing or believing in Descartes' dichotomy) physical. They, like ethical principles, number, values, etc, have an existence transcending both the mental and physical realms or, better, they have subsistence. They remain in a natural realm. Consciousness has nothing to do with them. It only reveals. Similarly, active imaginations etc. are not mental entities but simply expressions which stand for certain definite kinds of behaviour. All these are the basic foundations on which the edifice of psychology is to be built.

Many of the problems which Psychology studies may as well be relegated to Philosophy. One such problem is the problem of self or consciousness. Consciousness as such is an abstraction and psychology cannot indulge in abstraction, it must rest on something concrete. Consciousness is an abstraction because to be conscious one must be conscious of something and without that something consciousness pure and simple evades our grasp. Another problem which Psychology may well banish from its realm is the problem of the relation of mind and body. How these two are related psychology need not study. It is the business of metaphysics to study how they are related or whether they are related at all.

Æsthetic Appreciation.

By

R. GHOSE

Fechner, a German psychologist, attempted to analyse and determine the factors that make up beauty. But experience goes to prove that such an objective standardisation of beauty is untenable. Though the field of beauty is divided into two sections, one dealing with the aesthetic object and the other with aesthetic appreciation, in actuality the two go together. The concrete fulness of the situation of the appreciation of beauty cannot be divided in this way by a hatchet, for thereby the thing of beauty fails to retain its character as such. In an aesthetic appreciation there is always much more in the mental states of the subject than in the object. It is a matter of common experience that an object does not appeal equally to two observers. Common is also the experience that an object excites one person aesthetically but not another. For example, no two persons will agree in their answer to the question who is the most beautiful woman ? And it is socially desirable that they should not agree. Again, the same thing with no apparent variation of objectivity appeals to the same subject in two different ways at different times. The thing which once enthralled you is now dull and insipid. All these facts show that we cannot rely on the objective measurement of beauty. Subjective attitude seems to be responsible for such divergences. This is also corroborated by modern schools of psychology. The two great schools, the psychoanalytical and the Gestalt, deny the assumption that our perceptions are analysable. They both assert that subjective factors are dominant in perceptions.

Dr. G. Bose in his new theory has proclaimed that the

knowledge that we have about this world is gained by projection, introjection and identification. In our aesthetic appreciation we by the mechanism of identification bring ourselves close to the object of beauty. We bear hatred towards ugly objects. But nevertheless we can by way of identification turn such an object into a beautiful thing. The reason is that repression which is the cause of such hatred can be relieved by identification. A thing excites hatred so long as there is the cause of such hatred namely, repression. When identification relieves this repression the ugly appearance begins to vanish and gradually acquires new charms and beauty. I made an experiment in which two subjects were given 'A gallery of beautiful women' and they were asked to find out the most beautiful picture. They differed in the selection of the picture. I then asked my subjects to narrate the pictures. The analysis of the language in two cases brought the phenomenon of identification to the surface. This identification will explain the fact why the onlooker feels heavy at heart when some injury is caused to his 'beauty.' In love we have this identification and the love-object acquires beauty. According to Prof. Wood 'being in action' is beautiful. The reason is not that activity excites aesthetically but that in activity we have the facility for identification roused. The expression of the self through the action makes the path for identification easier and the being in action is easily aesthetically appreciated.

The inadmissibility of the objective standard of beauty is again proved by the fact that society, for good or evil, fashions our tastes. The social standards have established themselves rigidly in the field of aesthetic appreciation and selections of beauty.

Into the Matrix of Memory.

Akāśa or Ether is viewed as the so-called basic substance of universe within which we have our being. But memory is greater than Akasa. It is the basic principle not only of the universe of name and form but it underlies also the three states of the self—waking, dream and sleep—though appearing differently in different states. It may be asked what is it that persists as memory throughout? The question is illegitimate for persistence implies time and time is an illusory creation of memory. To call it *māyā* or 'avidyā' is to go back a step further and not to explain it. Now is there any question of memory without or apart from a previous experience? But it begs the question, for it is the very thing that is to be proved or explained. Indeed memory is unanalysable or indefinable. There is no 'it' in memory for it implies existence and existence implies memory. Hence the fallacy of arguing in a circle.

Bertrand Russell in his 'Analysis of mind' attempts at a solution of this puzzle. Memory, he argues, is no doubt of the past but the act of remembering is always an act in the present and there being no logical connection between events it is not at all theoretically absurd to think that along with the act of remembering the past is created. Hence memory has only pragmatic value. Theoretically it is not tenable. But he warns us not to indulge in the serious hypothesis for, as he says, it is uninteresting (whatever that term may mean). Russell feels the difficulty but by calling the hypothesis uninteresting he simply avoids the question instead of facing it

Again Russell distinguishes between memory and true memory. What actually occurs in memory is described as true memory. According to Bergson recollection alone is true memory. True memory has only pragmatic value. Memory as such cannot be described. It is immediate and can be referred to itself alone and that is why it is indescribable. It can only be experienced. Memory is always the present memory and the whole of the past that is remembered may be the illusion of the present moment.

Here Russell tries to hoodwink. Theoretically it may be impeachable but we cannot but feel that there is a past which we may rely on. Feeling of 'reality' is a characteristic of all illusion and on this feeling he builds up his system. Feeling cannot give us true knowledge and much of the intellect is often coloured by our feeling which hinders us from seeing clearly the truth.

Knowledge can only save us and with knowledge our illusion goes (the example of rope and snake) and we are face to face with the real. Hence the necessity of knowledge.

Now in knowledge as well as in ignorance one thing that is certain, and without reference to which there cannot be any question of knowledge or ignorance, is self. In memory as mere illusion there is reference to self and it is self which bridges the gulf between memory and the past to which it is referred. But self must not be identified with false individuality. Self is something spiritual. It is not the life external but life internal.

Memory is pure experience. It is pure light and we are concerned with that experience for there is no 'it' there that is said to persist.

Metaphysics can go so far but metaphysics is not the ideal of reality.

Memory is the very life of experience. Intellect and will are based on it. Consciousness of anything is the memory of

something as an object in thought or a percept in perception. Memory again is always present memory though it has reference to the past for when you remember, you remember here and now. Therefore memory and consciousness are identical.

When we ask what persists in memory we try to understand consciousness itself. Consciousness gives reality to every situation by being what it is and memory brings in past, present and future in one trend and keeps reality going for without reference to time and space the world has no meaning and memory is the basis of time and space. True memory gives us perfect knowledge and false memory gives false knowledge for we remember something for something and it is called *Adhyāsa*. But it then, too, is memory. Hence memory is the basic principle of the universe, as well as the very life of the Being. Thus the real is ever conscious of itself i.e. its memory of itself is ever perfect.

The Problem of Sensory Quality.

By

SUDHIR KUMAR BOSE.

The concept of sensation current in psychological literature was a logical construction made in the last century in order to build the new science of Psychology. The "mental chemistry" view-point lurked behind the minds of pioneer laboratory psychologists with whom rested the task of placing psychology on a scientific footing. Influenced by the concept of atom in Physics and the method of analysis in Chemistry, the 19th century psychologists defined sensation as an elementary

mental process constituted of certain attributes. This definition has been generally accepted, though it has been restated by writers belonging to different Schools of Psychology, to suit their respective terminology. Thus we find that one psychologist regards sensation as the "first response of the brain to the external stimulus", while another says that sensations are the immediate objective experience or "presentations".

Such a concept of sensation has been very useful in advancing the cause of the science of psychology up to a certain extent, as the concept of atom has been so in the case of Physics. But both these concepts seem to have outlived their utility and they should now give place to other concepts in order to cope with all the observable data of mental and physical process. Indeed, physics has already started the dissolution of atoms and is falling back on "pockets of energy" (i.e. sources emanating energy) as the starting point of the explanation of physical events". It is now probably time for the psychologist to revise his concept.

To say that a sensation is inseparably connected with a feeling, and that the former is not to be regarded in complete abstraction from emotion, ideas, memories, etc, is not of much practical value unless it is indicated "how this supposedly more integral view really affects our understanding of sensory experiences". The physicist who simply says that space has a relation to time, but does not explain how, in practice, time-measurements are to be taken into calculation with space-measurements, has but a narrow intellectual outlook. So long as we cling to the view that sensation and feeling are two simple elementary psychical processes, different in their identity but connected inseparably, we can not make much headway in understanding our experiences in the totality, of our present intellectual attainment.

Protests have been recently raised against the present concept of sensation. Peirce, Whitehead, Hartshorne and others have put forward views on the nature of sensory quality, which though differing in minor points are substantially the same. Their thesis is that the stuff of which the entire content of consciousness is composed is feeling—"affective tonality", "feeling value". The dualistic conception of sensation and feeling is to be abandoned. The feeling-tone is not merely associated with a given sensory quality, but is "one with its essence or nature." "The 'gaiety' of yellow is the yellowness of the yellow. The two are identical in that the 'yellowness' is the unanalysed and but denotatively identified X of which the gaiety is the essential description or analysis". Analysis of an experience leads, when carried to its last stage, to a state of "affability" of consciousness—a mere affective tonality. The proposed change in the concept of sensation is, therefore, to regard sensory quality as an affective continuum. Such a concept embraces all the principles and facts known to our intellect. The principle of *mathematical continuity*, the fundamental *social character* of experience, the biological and evolutionary principles—all have been taken into consideration in the formulation of this new concept. The continuity principle is respected by making the changes of sensory qualities a question of degree only; the present-time emphasis on the social aspect of experience accounts for this very "objectivity" or "over-against us" character of sensations. "The 'coldness' of green, the 'distance' of blue, the 'aggressiveness' of red, embody modes of variation fully explicable only in terms of experience conceived as a social continuum". The evolution of different specialised sensory qualities may be explained on the supposition of a primitive quality of sensation, the affective quality, from which development or differentiation has occurred *pari passu* with the development of new, structural organs.

The current concept of sensation seems to furnish no basis for the explanation of the illusory character of perception, strong emotional tone of the 'complexes' (in Freudian unconscious) or, the closure principle of the Gestalt psychology. In fact, the propounders of those principles or theories have put aside sensation as something with which they are not concerned. The proposed concept of sensation may be acceptable and useful to them.

Psycho-Analysis and Academic Psychology

Abstracts of the Paper read at Waltair, Dec. 1934.

By

PARS RAM.

Academic psychology and science have maintained an attitude of reserve if not of suspicion towards the findings of psycho-analysis. Men trained in the traditional scientific technique find themselves transported to an unfamiliar universe of discourse on reading psycho-analytic literature and they refuse to recognize the status of psycho-analysis as a scientific discipline. This is due to the fact that modern scientific structure remains to a great extent unexplained. Moreover it excludes an important aspect of experience from its construction. Builders of academic psychology in approaching their subject-matter applied logic relentlessly in order to make a coherent system of psychology. Freud and his followers on the other hand coined their concepts freely as clinical data forced these concepts on them. Hence the psycho-analytic theory as it stands to day is more difficult and

confusing than ever not only for the laymen but also for the specialists in psycho-analysis. It must be said however, that psycho-analytic concepts are more near to life and help in understanding these aspects of human nature on which academic psychology is mute. Hence arises the desirability of a closer examination of psycho-analytic method and theories with a view to determine the contribution this new science can make to the technique and methodology of academic psychology. This paper is a preliminary attempt in that direction. Psycho-analytic method is strictly a scientific and empirical method. The analyst observes the spontaneous behaviour of his patient very minutely including the insignificant movements and gestures. This mode of observation is much superior to any in laboratory situation. It has the following advantages :

1. Reactions of the individual can be studied with reference to the totality of their relation to life.

2. Individual experiences can be studied from the ontogenetic point of view.

3. Ontogenetic study will throw light on the phylogensis. Psychologists who may accept the scientific characters of the psycho-analytic method usually object to the interpretation which the psycho-analysts put on their data. Interpretation in psycho-analysis is never made categorically. Very often the analyst has to change his interpretations. Again interpretation is not the result of suggestibility aroused in the patient as a true interpretation always arouses opposition.

In appraising psycho-analytic theory of impulses it may be observed that there is no strict boundary *a priori* between the mental and the physical between the energy that is manifested in bodily reactions. Energy of the instinct is discharged in all phenomena which constitute life. The old distinctions between body and mind made purely on heuristic basis may be revised in the light of the above remarks.

In conclusion it may be remarked that there is the danger of psycho analysis inflating the scientific concepts, as they stand today. Categories of Science need revision and extension so that the facts of psycho-analysis may be incorporated.

The Epistemology of Illusion (as Non-cognitive Construction)

By

BHASKAR. S. NAIK.

The givenness of the illusory and its consequent cancellation is responsible for fantastical idealistic interpretations of empiricity. On the ground of the cancelling experience the illusory is shown to be a non-cognitive construction.

It is contended that the content of the negative judgment, "this is not snake" cannot be formulated in objective terms for the simple reason that it is negated. Now, if the negated content cannot be characterised in objective terms and still the judgment is to be valid or significant we have to say that the content is specifiable only as what was believed, that is, by the past belief in the snake. The past belief, however, cannot claim to be a substantive subjective fact in so far as it is definitely rejected now. So the past belief as well as the present disbelief are both non-cognitive. Just as the belief in the negative judgment is the rejection of the past belief so also the belief in affirmation is the rejection of the past disbelief. Thus cancellation and affirmation are explained away as non cognitive affair.

When it is said that to affirm a belief is to reject the previous disbelief in its content we have to ask : what is the nature of this rejected disbelief ? Can disbelief like belief be an original attitude of mind to be subsequently rejected or reaffirmed ? On the above hypothesis the phenomena of error and illusion are in fact impossible.

Moreover, the snake rope on the view under consideration, becomes a content at once both believed and disbelieved. This is obviously unintelligible—apart from the difficulty how a belief or disbelief gets specified externally. Apart from the difficulty to understand this external specification which seems quite inconsistent with the nature of belief or disbelief, the account cannot explain the phenomenon of cancellation—the ousting of one percept by another. Both the belief and disbelief, on this view, being non cognitive, either cannot be said to have advantage over the other and hence there seems to be no criterion by which one can be said to have the capacity to oust the other.

The non-cognitive explanation rules out the possibility of memory in general and particularly the memory of illusion. In what sense can we urge that “consciousness of the *past* belief is not memory” ? Can we really take the past belief to be “a transitive fringe” of the content now remembered ? We can realise how far this view is drastic when it states that in the case of illusion “the pastness of the percept is but a quality of the percept—a name for the presented unreality.” This is simply to deny that there was any perception of the snake at all.

If it be objected here that just as memory of feeling is to live through the feeling again so also “to be conscious of a subjective fact like belief is to have a present dealing with the content of the belief in the way of rejection or reaffirmation.” We may say that the analogy does not help us much. For, from the nature of the case the past can be significant

only in the *now* of the *present*. The past to reveal itself does not require the impossible fact that knowledge itself should lapse into the past. Our epistemological realisation as false does not necessitate the fact that the illusory should not be presented as a content to consciousness, on the contrary, it is just possible that the illusory presentation necessarily presupposes the sense of objectivity. It would not be quite meaningless to say that the cancellation of the given illusory snake is significant only in reference to the cognitive belief in the rope.

In every piece of knowledge whether it be perception, judgment, inference or even illusory apprehension, the self-evident is involved as the necessary presupposition, and this does not require that the illusory should not be presented as a definite content to consciousness. Neither the presentation of the illusory nor its subsequent cancellation warrants the hypothesis of the content being a non-cognitive construction.

But there may be illusions which are not cancelled at all in life. Can we say that such experiences are incapable of being remembered? Shall we say that wrong knowledge is no knowledge? Only cognitive experiences are capable of being remembered. But this seems to be violating the dictum that illusory experiences are not remembered because they are incapable of being retained, owing to their being there without the aid of empirical psychosis.

The fate of the Soul in Behaviorism.

By

U. C. BHATTACHARYYA.

In this short paper I propose to discuss how the Soul has fared in Behaviorism. The position of the behaviorist is this. There is no mind or mental existence. Man is but a bundle of instincts. Thinking is largely a verbal process. The result of all this is that there is no soul. Man is after all an organism of a particular type, Personality is only a convenient way of expressing the fact that we are looking at the individual not from the standpoint of how well or how poorly any particular emotion instinct or group of habits he possesses may function, but from that of how the organism as a whole works or may work under changed conditions.

We object to Behaviorism not because it offends against accepted religious codes but because even as a scientific doctrine, it is open to serious objections. Judged as a psychology it is inaccurate and untrue. The Behaviorist urges that in order that Behaviorism may have the same power of predicting events as other sciences have, it must free itself from notions connected with mind and mental existence. But is this a reasonable ambition on the part of psychology? Even without accepting the behaviouristic interpretation of man, some prediction of his activities is possible. But there is a limit to this predictability. Can we point out to any particular gland secretion in a man when he deserts his wife or lives in a gutter? Behaviorism cannot explain all human behaviors. It is further claimed that Behaviorism can train men up as better citizens. But a machine has no initiative. One machine cannot improve another as Watson improves a dog. If we are all machines, how about all this talk of training men for better life and making the world a fitter place

for human habitation? The central thing in Behaviorism is the machine idea. Man is a physiological machine. A machine does not behave differently if placed in a group of similar other machines. But man does behave differently in two different situations. Behaviorism has also a materialistic bias. Even assuming that mind is a quality of matter, it is not the quality of all matter. This is an important fact. All matter does not behave in exactly the same way as an organism. How do we account for it? Behaviorism cannot.

We frankly admit that Behaviorism has certain merits. It is right in extending the bounds of psycho-physics and physiological psychology. We also regard it a merit of Behaviorism that it makes human behavior an object of special study. If Behaviorism regarded itself as an extension of physiology, we could appreciate it. But to call itself a psychology is a misuse of names. For it is psychology without a Psyche.

Personality and Impersonality of God.

By

C. N. ANANTA RAMAIIYA SASTRI.

It can be proved that the Dravidian conception of God is Personal. The word *Anbu* distinctly shows God's love to creations and the created beings' exalted love to each other or one another. In the case of human beings their love may be towards God as well. The demonstrative *A* is at the bottom of the term *Anbu*. This *demonstrative* in this word demonstrates that love of a blissful nature cannot but have reference to God. It has to be borne in mind that the Tamil term for

God viz., *kadasul* shows that God is both immanent and transcendent. The Tamil synonym for God *Irai* the final and eternal Lord is made secondarily applicable to human lords.

"On the lap of the Gods" is an English idiom and Tamil idiom also has *Andar* and *umbar* in the plural. *A* in *Andar*, is also the one Tamil demonstrative of distance. The mouth is widest open when we utter *A* and the function of this *demonstrative* which has changed in the *Indo European* and Semitic groups which shared the demonstratives in common, is philologically seen in anatomical purity. *U* is the demonstrative of hiddenness and it is interesting to find it in *Umbar*.

Inbam, the low love or pleasure is related to *this* world, *I* being the *demonstrative* of nearness. *Perinbam* is a compound word coined to denote heavenly bliss even in this-world. It literally means the big pleasure even 'there' as opposed to the counterpart compound sometimes used for *Inbam*. This counterpart literally means the small pleasure of this world.

The one term for God in sanskrit which retains the idea of the *personality* is *Purusha*. It has other meanings, the *jeevatman*, the *person* in grammar, and *male*.

May the theory of personality prevail !

Modern Psychology and Philosophy.*

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS

(Psychology Section)

By

H. P. MAITI, M.A.

I gratefully appreciate the honour done to me by asking me to preside over the Psychology Section of the Tenth Indian Philosophical Congress and I thank the authorities of the Congress for it.

Psychology claims nowadays complete independence of Philosophy and it is usual for Psychologists in the West to meet on a platform separate from the philosophical. The Psychological section of the Indian Philosophical Congress may raise, therefore, the problem of the relation of modern Psychology to Philosophy. I propose to deal within the narrow compass of this address with certain broad aspects of this relation.

Psychology, as we all know, was content to form a subsidiary part of Philosophy for more than two thousand years and it is only very recently that it has been able to dissociate itself from philosophy and to pursue its course as an independent science. It is interesting to note the psychological reactions of the two systems of knowledge to the new situation before dealing with the relation between them.

* Being the Presidential address, Indian Philosophical Congress, 1935.

In order to conform to the limits set by the Editor of the Proceedings, I have to omit parts of the original address —H. M.

The present attitude

The attitude of Psychology can be stated in a few words. It is proud of its present position as an independent natural science, working for human welfare in various directions after the manner of the sister sciences, and looks regretfully back to the long period of its tutelage under philosophy. As a consequence, it fights shy of any problem or concept that seems to have a philosophical flavour. It tries to move further and and further away from philosophy, consciously at least.

Not being in active touch with philosophy, it is rather difficult for me to correctly assess the feelings of the philosophers with reference to modern psychology. Many seem to regard psychology as just one of the sciences and to believe that philosophy has no special interest in it, as if the long association of psychology with philosophy in the past was a purely disinterested 'trust'. Others, however, seem to recognise a special relation, as is evident from their desire to retain 'Analytical' psychology as a part of philosophy. It appears that many entertain doubt as to the really scientific character of psychology and look upon the present hostilities within it as an indication in support of their doubt.

I believe that the present relation of complete aloofness between psychology and philosophy is a bit forced and strained, and has arisen mainly out of historical reasons; and that there is possibility of more sympathetic understanding between them without the sacrifice of their fundamental characters as science and philosophy respectively.

Philosophical tendencies within Psychology.

It appears to me that if we critically examine the characteristics and aspirations of modern independent psychology, we can point our finger to different quarters where it seems to come close to and even touch philosophy. The first point

of contact between the two systems is represented by certain philosophical tendencies within present day psychology. These consist in the aspiration of the schools and individual systematisers to explain life, and even reality, in terms of psychological concept. It is interesting to see that those who have begun by damning and avoiding philosophy in all forms should end by developing philosophical views of life! I will illustrate this tendency with the help of a few examples.

Medougall¹ recommends his purposive psychology as the only possible basis of Teleological Philosophy, as it is the key concept of life. Indeed he conceives of a hormic physics and chemistry.

— The Behaviourists are rigorously consistent in their thinking and maintain physiologism in the face of epistemological difficulties that have been pointed out so often by their critics. It is the nerves, and as the nervous tissue is reducible to physical and chemical units, matter, that determines behaviour and constitutes the ultimate reality. The same type of philosophy is also illustrated by the Environmentalism² that traces even the complex and higher forms of behaviour to the specific effect of environmental stimuli and that forms a second main note of Behaviourism. Watson³ is outspoken in his desire to supplant existing philosophy by what is claimed as the new philosophy of life based on the experimental method. Wiess,⁴ one of the Behaviourists, is more thorough and advances an electro-proton philosophy of life.

1. Psychologies of 1930. chap 1.

2. Wordworth— Contemporary schools of psychology, p 73

3. Watson— Behaviourism

4. Wiess— Psychologies of 1930, chap 15.

The Gestalt school, though beginning on an experimental basis, has been more ambitious than the rest and seems to have discovered the supreme category of being in the *Gestalt*. It constitutes the principal characteristic and reality not only of mind, but also of life and matter. It is the concept which knits up Psychology, Biology and Physical Sciences in one lump.

I may also refer here to the 'critical personalism' of William Stern in whom Psychology and Philosophy appear to be closely combined. The concept of 'personality' is a valid concept within empirical Psychology but reaches out here into the heights of Philosophical speculations.

Instances given above come from within the experimental field. To take instances from the clinical I may refer to the philosophical tendencies of Freud's and Jung's thoughts. Jung is outspokenly philosophical and even mystical from the very beginning, specially in his concepts of the Archetypes and Anima. Freud, beginning with a scientific open mindedness as regards theories could not resist in the end the temptation to round up his views into a consciously elaborated system. In his *Problem of Lay Analysis*, he candidly admits "In the works of my later years.....I have given free rein to the inclination to speculation which I kept down for so long."⁵

I have cited only a few instances of explicitly philosophical ambition within Psychology. One can easily point his finger to a few others.

What is the *significance* of the obviously philosophical tendencies we have illustrated above ?

The Eclectics, who form perhaps the majority group in contemporary psychology⁶ and who want to keep close to

5. The problem of Lay-Analysis, p 290

6. e.g. as according to Boring and Woodworth.

experimental data above all, seem to regret the philosophical tendencies. Their feelings on the subject would be obvious from the following two quotations.

'We should keep our speculation (i. e. philosophical) apart from our regular business as psychologist, and certainly not make any claim on our fellow psychologists to join our outside ventures" (i.e. application of psychology to philosophical problems)—Woodworth.⁷ Referring to the philosophical trend in psychology, Boring⁸ says, 'inevitably it must hinder work in the individual and thus the most rapid progress in the Science.'

Though we may regret, like Boring, the philosophic developments in the interest of progress of 'pure' experiments in psychology, we can very well understand and sympathise with these tendencies. Woodworth⁹ suggests that these are largely due to eagerness of the Schoolmen to capture the votes of the Eclectics who sitting 'on the middle of the road' 'do not admit allegiance to any school.' I believe that, even if this motive exists, it is not very strong and significant. We know of similar tendencies on the part of Physical Scientists e. g. Haeckel, Ostwald, Mach etc, to present comprehensive views of the world in terms of scientific concepts. This tendency appears, however, to be more frequent and powerful in psychology than in the other sciences. Is it a remnant of the prolonged intimacy between philosophy and psychology in the past? Or is it due to the easy applicability of psychological analysis and concepts to philosophical problems? That Psychological facts and concepts are so applicable is call illustrated from Indian Philosophy, as pointed out by Sir. S. Radhakrishnan¹⁰ and Prof. Bose.¹¹

7. Contemporary schools of psychology, p 217

8. History of Experimental psychology, p 661.

9. Contemporary schools of psychology, p 218

10. Indian philosophy vol I

11. The psychological outlook in Hindu philosophy.

One of the causes of the philosophical developments of Psychology seems to be connected with the extension of the scope and meaning of the Mental under the influence of Biology. Mind now appears almost all along the biological line and a general theory of psychology is likely, therefore, to develop into a statement of the most general principle of life.

Apriori Postulates

We have seen that the Psychological Schools have tended to approximate philosophy by developing in their final form along philosophical lines. A second tendency at approximation is indicated if we analyse the schools into their fundamentals. They would turn out to be based on certain apriori general principles or postulates. These constitute the essence of the standpoints and, as Boring¹² puts it, "pre-determine the nature of Psychology for them (the Scholastics) and evaluate data which claim to be part of psychology." These are, in other words, far-reaching in their effects in as much as the scope, method, arrangements, selection of contents and theoretical interpretations are almost wholly determined by them. There seems to be a close relation between the tendency of the Schools to develop philosophically and their tendency to work down from general postulates, and it is possible to regard the former as a consequence of the latter.

It is not possible here to delineate in details the effects of apriori postulates on the theories and researches of the Schools. I will content myself with simply pointing out the fundamental assumptions behind some of the prevailing standpoints.

We may take *structuralism* for our illustration. It is well known that that the structuralists¹³ are keenly alert about

12. Psychologies of 1930, p 115.

13. Titchener—Functional psychology and the psychology of act.
Am. J. psycho. 1921 1922.

the dividing line between the philosophical and the psychological and are particularly zealous to preserve the 'pure' character of their science. It claims to have provided the formula on which the foundation of scientific experimental psychology was possible in the late nineteenth century.

The theoretical assumptions of the structurativists have been criticised as being uncritically speculative by other Scholastics as also by the Eclectics. The basic assumption relates to the nature of mind as being a structure of discrete elements. This concept of element determines the whole character of the science. Mental states being complexes of discrete units, introspective analysis, patterned on physical analysis as closely as the nature of the material allows, forms the method of study. Complex mental events are to be understood by being reduced to the elements involved in their *constitution*. Psychology can have but a descriptive ideal and if explanation implies reference to dependable conditions, the ultimate principle of explanation in Psychology cannot but be physiological¹⁴.

The elements are hypothetical and their speculative character has been exposed by the Gestalt Psychologists¹⁵ who claim to have proved the organised nature of all actual experiences. The conception of sensation, the most fundamental of the structuralists' elements, may be traced to that of unitary nerve impulse caused by an unitary stimulus—a conception useful for Experimental physiology, which had undoubtedly a preponderant influence on the origin of both experimental psychology and structuralism.

One of the consequences of the exact correlation between stimulus and nervous impulse on the one hand and sensation on the other, is the doctrine of constancy of sensation as a

14. Titchener—Text-Book of psychology

15. Kohler—Gestalt psychology.

mental unit,¹⁶ implied in structuralism. Another apriori belief implied in the elemtarism of the structuralists consists in the supposition that the elements, being stable and constant in nature, are substantial. Tichener, the greatest of the structuralists, opposes¹⁷ substantialism of the mind as a whole to make room for that of mental bits. It is because of this substantialistic implication that the question of attributes has a prominent place in Tichenerian Psychology.

The apriori character of the basic assumptions of the *Behaviouristic position* has been repeatedly brought out by its critics. The progress of Behaviourism has been marked by rigorous pursuit and application of these assumptions, without any heed to insurmountable methodological difficulties and epistemological fallacies. These assumptions are mainly twofold—e. g., (1) that, behaviour which is ultimately a group of somatic reactions constitutes the only subject matter; and (2) that, the study of functional dependence of behaviour on stimulus the only valid and possible method of Psychology. No reference to qualitative experience is felt necessary, even though description of different kinds of stimulus as also of behaviour is being constantly carried on by the Behaviourists themselves in terms of such experiences. This state of things arises out of a passion for consistency and indicates the tendency to develop the psychological system from certain postulates.

Gestalt psychology begins with a critical consideration of the basic assumptions of structural psychology. But when it comes to systematic generalisation from its own standpoint, it reveals the influence of certain postulates comparable in general nature to those involved in other standpoints. The concept of Gestalt, though originally based on experiments,

16. Kafka—Growth of mind 1924. p 271

17. Text-Book of psychology sec 3.

is raised into an all-pervading principle which explains everything and in which all experiences and realities lose their distinctive characteristics. I may also illustrate by reference to the treatment that the problem of psychophysical relation receives in Gestalt psychology. The Gestalt theory makes rather an easy solution of the problem by postulating exact correspondence between the psychological Gestalt and the physiological, which, in turn, are postulated to correspond with the physical Gestalt. It implies, in other words, the *copy* theory in its gross form on the epistemological side.¹⁸ One may suspect, therefore, that the concept of Gestalt, though well supported in certain fields of experiments, has had an *a priori* orientation in the mind of the Gestalt theorists.

It seems to me that the wide divergences between the schools within present day psychology is mainly due to *a priori* character of their standpoints. Some concept is uncritically accepted as primary and supreme, and in the zeal for system making, attempt is made to mould facts, theories and methods into it. The general procedure followed by the schools thus appears in many cases similar to the mode of thinking of the speculative philosophers. It seems to me that postulates behind the standpoints of the schools raise an important question, e. g. the epistemology of psychological enquiry. Psychology does not appear to feel at present any need for this; for, the sister sciences have very well managed without it. But the case of psychology seems to me to stand apart. Without preliminary examination of methodological assumptions, we are likely to develop variety of mutually quarrelling standpoints and systems, as we have done within the last three decades. A need for such an examination is very strongly suggested by the recent movement in Germany that wants to oppose *psychology as a natural science* by *psychology as a cultural*

18. Petermann—The Gestalt Theory, p 312

science. Following Dilthey's famous dictum "we explain (the life of) nature, we understand the life of mind," the cultural psychologists¹⁹ have called in question the purpose and method of 'explanatory' psychology and recommended intuitive understanding as the valid psychological method.

Psychological aspect of Philosophy,

If psychological concepts have tended to develop independently along philosophical directions, philosophical speculation has also tended to be based on the application of psychological analysis. In other words, the philosophical aspect of psychology has its counterpart in psychological aspect of philosophy. This relationship may be regarded to constitute the third point of contact between the two branches of knowledge.

Philosophical speculation may be generally said to involve psychological knowledge but the applicability of it is specially obvious in connection with problems of epistemology and ethics. The theoretical basis of the special relationship of philosophy with psychology rests on the fact that philosophising is an effort that the human mind makes only at a certain height of its development, and that it consists in the use of the developed mind for a specific purpose. As psychology deals with ways of functioning of the mind from the point of view of detached observation, it should have important bearing on the philosophical pursuit. Sciences deal with objects of experience; psychology with the experiencing as such; philosophy consists in critical consideration of experience as a whole and in all its forms with a view to a comprehensive interpretation. In doing its work philosophy requires to examine critically the conditions and nature of experiencing in all forms (including modes of value experience).

Contemporary scientific psychology has been indifferent

19 e.g. Dilthey, Spranger, Jaspers etc.

(mainly on account of historical reasons in my opinion) to psychological analysis that may be applied for philosophy. This analysis and the knowledge it yields are now in the hands of philosophers and represented by 'Analytic psychology.' This type of psychology works under difficulties"²⁰ due to combination of philosophical and psychological interest in the same person and is specially susceptible to metaphysical bias.

I think it is possible to organise from the point of view of philosophical problems psychological knowledge that would not consist merely of uncontrolled personal introspections of individual philosophers, but would be based on controlled and verified evidences acceptable to scientific psychology. The proposed system of psychological knowledge would constitute a form of applied psychology, comparable in its aims to Educational Psychology. Philosophy, like education, is more than psychology but, also like education, rests partly on it.

Organisation of psychological knowledge and research for philosophical application need not be regarded as a retrograde step. I believe that psychology emancipated and independent, is different from psychology in tutelage, and may look upon philosophical problems without fear of being adversely influenced thereby, and without giving up its empirical standpoint. Scientific psychology is empirical without being able to be fully experimental as yet ²¹ in many parts of its wide field; and the organisation of psychological knowledge from the special point of view of its application to philosophical enquiry may rest on an empirical basis. I suggest that it may also rest partly on the experimental basis. I may refer to some experiments of the psychological laboratory that are capable of

20, Cf. Boring. *Psychologies* of 1930 chap. 6.

21. Boring. *Psychologies* of 1930 chap. 6.

being applied, with some re-orientation or change, for throwing light on philosophical problems, e.g. (1) Experiments on Perception and Illusion. These may show 'relativity of the sense of reality and illustrate conditions thereof. (2) Experiments on thought processes. In the hands of the Würzburg psychologists these have yielded analytic results mainly. They seem capable of development from the side of functional analysis so as to show how meanings and relations are apprehended. (3) Studies on neo-genesis by Spearman²² may illustrate development of concepts. (4) Studies on will processes by Aveling, Michotte etc. reveal important distinctions within the province of Will (5) Testing and psycho-analytic results reveal conditions and correlations of value experiences etc.

I can suggest certain obvious *advantages* in favour of the proposed Philosophical Psychology as a distinct branch of psychological knowledge. Problems, e.g. relation of body and mind, place of mind in life etc., that lie on the border line between philosophy and psychology will have their proper place in it. Built on empirical and partly experimental basis, it may render certain aspects of philosophical speculation more factual and definite. It may constitute a separate unit for teaching, within philosophy, if not within psychology, as also for research. But the most important advantage from the side of psychology may lie in the possibility of psychology being consciously alert about the relative distinctions in the standpoint and scope of the two disciplines, and thereby rendering the unconscious philosophical bias on it innocuous. Lastly, it would offer a distinct field of work for the philosophically minded psychologists as well as for the psychologically minded philosophers.

In dealing with philosophical psychology I have referred to

22. Spearman claims to explain concepts like Infinity, God etc. by his neo-genetic principles.

the possibility of attempting from the scientific point of view what is now being done by Analytical psychology, without impairing of course, the scientific character of psychology in this attempt. Whether this be feasible or not, it appears as a fact to me that philosophising depends on special use of the mental functions and this fact constitutes the basis for a special relationship between philosophy and psychology.

Psychology of philosophy

If there be any objection at present to the recognition of philosophical psychology as a branch of empirical psychology, there would be no such objection, I think, to the recognition of psychology of philosophy as a distinct line of psychological research. I may regard this line as the fourth point of contact between philosophy and psychology. It would aim at viewing the philosophic activity as a whole in relation to characteristics of the mind which constitutes the context or background conditions of such activity. It is grounded on the fact that the active pursuit of philosophy depends on a mental characteristic that is popularly described as philosophic interests and also on the fact that the special type of philosophy to which a philosopher fixes his allegiance is related to his personal psychological (temperamental !) factors. Some of the roots of philosophy lie deep in human nature and psychology of philosophy would try to delve down these roots. Without denying the truth-seeking value of philosophy, it would try to interpret philosophical activity in general as also the special systems of philosophy from the psychological side. Philosophy need not object to such an interpretation. If it proves that philosophic truth is relative, there would be increase of tolerance between one philosophy and another. It may also be possible that when the personal determinants of philosophies are laid bare, their truth seeking function would become more objective than at present and would lead to

better results. Psychology would gain by the widening of its field and add new chapters to Type Psychology.

If Psychology of Philosophies be taken as a sign of self-consciousness on the part of human thinking, Indian philosophy should be said to have been more self-conscious than thought systems of the West. In its doctrine of the grounds of philosophical enquiry, it explicitly deals with the conditions and motives thereof. In the doctrine of Adhikarabheda (difference of aptitude and qualifications), it refers to the fact of correlation of different philosophical beliefs with different temperamental and attitudinal tendencies. The strong emphasis it lays on the acquisition of the proper emotional and intellectual attitude by specific course of discipline (Sādhana) points also to the relation of philosophical apprehension to intra-personal factors. The different systems of Indian Philosophy may be correlated to different types of human nature. I may suggest here that it is possible to define the main psychological attitudes behind the philosophical systems of the West also.

In the West, analysis of the philosophic mind and philosophic interests has been attempted by several thinkers, e. g. Schopenhauer, James, Muller-Friemfels, Nietzsche, Herzberg. But their thoughts in this direction have not been organised into a definite form. Psychoanalytical investigations into the mechanism of personality from the genetic point of view, may also throw light on some important factors behind philosophical thoughts. I can not say how far the 'understanding' psychology which concerns itself with the relation of the total individual with his historical *milieu* and also with types of culture manifestations, would be of help in connection with psychological study of philosophy. The possibility of help from 'understanding' Psychology in this direction is indicated from the fact that Jaspers has already written on the "Psychologies of Philosophy" (1925).

Within the short compass of this address, I have tried to indicate *several points of contact* between contemporary psychology and philosophy, e. g. in connection with philosophical tendencies within Psychology, apriori character of basic assumptions of the Schools, possibility of Philosophical Psychology as branch of Psychological enquiry, and possibility of Psychology of Philosophies. I hope that the proposals contained in the paper will not startle either Philosophers or Psychologists further away from each other than they are at present.

The Mind and the Body

By

SHYAM SWAROOP JALOTA.

(Summary)

The problem of the Mind and the Body is almost as old as Philosophy itself. The various concepts of the mind and the body and the hypotheses regarding the relation between them are either confusing or absurd. The confusion and the absurdity is the heritage of our original intellectual analysis of the one living and full blooded indivisible reality into the mind and the body. The body without the mind is an empty concept; and the mind in isolation is but another empty concept. But when they are viewed in joint action they become an appreciable percept. Analysis in this case has misled us not merely from Reality but also from Truth.

In the total knowledge-situation we never have any 'mere mind,' or 'mere body', but we always have a subject knowing an object. The subject by itself is always a mind-body whole, or a psycho-somatic organism. While the characteristic of the mind is only an inference from its 'knowing an object', and the 'knowing' of the subject can be safely reduced to the interpreting of an *impression*, this impression itself is the result of a physiological interpretation of the expression or the physical stimulation by the object within the knowledge-situation. Thus the complete situation may be described either as a psycho-physiologico physical Gestalt, or as an 'impression-expression' situation.

The mind is not merely an interpretation at any particular time nor is it just a sum-total or a mosaic of psychical impressions, but is a flux of impressions or *cittasamtāna* which is always found concomitant and in conjunction with the body of

the subject. There is every reason to believe that when the psychological subject falls in swoon or goes to sleep, the flux of impressions continues albeit on a lower level, below the level of the waking consciousness. In a sense, therefore, it may be said that the mental is only an *impression*, or an interpretation of the expression of an object, from a particular point of view (Bewusstseinslagen) through a particular medium (the psychic). In the knowledge situation the body is merely a convenient symbol signifying the point whence the expression of the object radiate. Here, the body or object can never be anything but the converging point of these objective expressions.

The affective view of sensory qualities

By

S. K. BOSE.

The current concept of sensation is both theoretically unsound and practically inadequate. Furthermore, our understanding of the relation between sensation and feeling is imperfect and unsatisfactory.

A probable solution of the difficulty lies in the direction of shifting the centre of gravity, so to say, from sensation to feeling. Feeling is to be regarded as the primary and primal stuff of our experience, conscious or unconscious. The elements of experience are to be conceived by considering them both in themselves and in relation to social, biological and evolutionary principles. Such a demand is satisfied, at least to a great extent, by accepting the view of 'affective continuum' of experience and regarding feeling as the ultimate residue of analysis. The works of Pikler, Troland, Lavelle, Reich, Whitehead, Mitra and others point to the affective basis of sensory qualities. The writer's own introspective analysis is in accord with that. According to this view, it would not be correct to say that feeling-tone is associated with a given sensory quality : The more correct version would be that the affective tonality is identical with sensory quality being one with its essence or nature.

Sensation and feeling, then, are not two independent psychical elements. Feeling is the original constituent of consciousness. Sensation and feeling, and sensations from different sense organs are linked up in a continuous system. Sense data are externalised subjective states. Qualitative analysis of elementary experiences shows that the qualitative differences are due to experiences of continuous variables of affective-social life in its relation to environment.

Ethical Consideration of Mechanical Determinism.

By

D. L. De,

§ 1. Here we propose to examine some of the stock arguments by which mechanical determinism has been defended, and to show how far they are tenable.

By mechanical determinism is meant the theory which denies moral self or personality, the *conditio sine qua non* of moral science, and reduces the self to a mere series or congeries of temporal antecedents, states or conditions.

A thorough-going determinist includes the doings of men as well as the motions of matter under the uniformity of nature. There is no ambiguity in the meaning he assigns to determination. It is the hypothetical necessity of science. The law of causality, he contends, applies in the same strict sense to human actions as to other phenomena, involving in both cases, not constraint but invariable, certain, and unconditional sequence. The antecedents which determine human conduct must consist of (a) character and (b) external circumstance. The moral causes or antecedents, determining volition, are desires, aversions, habits, and dispositions, combined with outward circumstances suited to call those internal incentives into action. All these again are effects of causes, those of them which are mental being consequences of education, and of other moral and physical influences. For it is pointed out by the upholder of mechanical determinism, that to deny the causal determination of our acts by antecedents is to deny the presence of rational connection in the psychical sphere, and thus to pronounce not only Psychology, but all the sciences which take psychical events as their material and attempt to discover rational connection between them

in principle impossible. Thus the very existence of Psychology, Ethics and History proves the applicability of the principle of causal determinism to mental states.

This is still more evident if we reflect that all science consists in the formulation of laws or uniformities and that the formulation of laws rests upon the principle that the same result follows under same conditions i.e. upon the principle of causal determination.

Further, if psychical events are not so determined, then Psychology and the mental sciences generally are inconsistent with the general principles of the mechanical physical sciences.

And, as a matter of fact, we do all assume that psychical events are causally determined by their antecedents. In Psychology we assume that our choices are determined by the strength of motives. Hence, if you know what are the motives present to a man's choice, and the relative strength of each, the determinist thinks the prediction of his conduct is reduced to the purely mathematical problem of the solution of an equation or set of equations. Thus the doctrine of determinism is: "That, given the motives which are present to an individual's mind and given likewise the character and disposition of the individual, the manner in which he will act may be unerringly inferred: that if we know the person thoroughly, and know all the inducements which are acting upon him, we could foretell his conduct with as much certainty as we can predict any physical event." (Mill's Logic, Book II, chap. II, § 2.) That our present mathematical resources will not avail for the unequivocal solution of such equations is, on this view, a mere temporary defect incidental to the present condition of mathematical science. In principle the equations must be soluble, or there is no science of human action.

And in practical life we do all assume that it is possible to predict with considerable confidence the effect of typical

conditions upon the aggregate of mankind, and also, when you have the requisite data, the effect of a definite set of conditions upon an individual man. Thus we count upon the deterrent effects of punishment, the persuasive influence of advertisement, etc ; and again, in proportion as we really know our friends, we believe ourselves able to answer for their conduct in situations which have not as yet arisen. Why, then, should we suppose it theoretically impossible, if adequate data were furnished, to calculate the whole career of a man or society in advance, as the astronomer calculates the path of a planet from its elements ?

§ 2. These are the chief of the stock arguments which have been adduced by the thorough-going determinists in support of their position.

The logical value of all these arguments is nothing at all. They fall of themselves into two groups, one based upon the general view that all rational connection, or at least all such rational connection as is significant for our knowledge, is mechanical causal sequence, the other upon an appeal to the supposed actual practice of the mental sciences.

We may begin with the first group. It is certainly not true that causal determination by antecedents is the only form of rational connection. For there is manifestly another type of connection which may be appropriately characterised as teleological coherence. In order to bring out the real force and significance of the latter type of connection we shall have to enter into an analysis of the process of voluntary activity, because the contention of the thorough-going determinists turns upon this very analysis. Their procedure in the main is to regard motives as forces, between which in deliberation there is supposed to be a conflict, till at length one proves itself the strongest, whereupon the action, that is said to be determined, ensues. The man meanwhile seems to play the part of a passive spectator simply. How little he determines

the result according to this view is shown, for example, by the reiterated statements of that classic determinist, Hobbes. "In deliberation there may be many wills, whereof not any is the cause of a voluntary action but the last," "Will therefore is the last appetite in deliberating." Now there is no doubt that motives in relation to each other have a certain analogy to forces or to weights, whence indeed the word deliberation is derived. But the relation of motives to the subject deliberating is not at all that of independent forces applied to an inert object, albeit Hobbes treats of them under the head of Physics (See English Works, Molesworth's edn., Vol. 1, p. 408.) Appetite and aversion imply something that seeks and shuns, a subject that actively strives according as it feels and as long as it lives. Psychologists do not ordinarily talk of motives save in connection with deliberation, which in strictness is an intellectual rather than a conative process; but for the purpose of our present discussion it will be convenient, and need not mislead, if we regard motives not as pleas or reasons for acting but as impulses or tendencies to action. So regarded their characteristic is not, that like external forces they move or tend to move the subject, but that they are themselves part of the subject moving or tending to move, or more accurately, acting or tending to act.

The analogy then between the relation of forces applied to an inert object and the relation of conations to an active subject seems to fail in all essential points. So long as the subject does not act but merely deliberates or ponders how he shall act, there is some resemblance in his procedure to that of using a balance to determine weights. The suggested metaphor is as old as Plato; but it is only a metaphor after all. When, however, we consider the facts in their active rather than their cognitive aspect the disparity between the psychological and the physical seems complete. Forces, though distinct, conflict only because they converge, so to say, on one subject.

The forces, that is, are applied to the body ; the motives spring from the subject.

The body moves in the path which the forces collectively determine, the subject moves in the path which it selectively determines. The magnitude of a force is referred to an objective standard, the strength of a motive depends on its subjective worth ; the sufficient reason is in the one case mechanical, in the other it is teleological.

Nevertheless, the thorough-going determinist will doubtless rejoin that these differences are comparatively superficial, and that when we think the matter out what we come down to at last is in both cases alike the same necessitation, the same complete determination of the consequent by its antecedents. We speak of man's path through life as well as of a body's path through space, and this, however intricate it may have been, we know was throughout perfectly definite and at every point inevitably determined. Now what is true of the motion of a body is true of the doings of a man. Well, it is certainly true always that whatever is once determined is inevitably determined and that in this sense the complete antecedents uniquely determine the consequent. But is this a reason for ignoring the difference between the circumstances that determine the rolling of a stone and the volitions that determine the movements of a hero ? Or can any one seriously maintain that we get to the bottom of things by thus ignoring it ? If the said difference is merely an accidental accessory, what is the essential characteristic that pertains alike to the physical event and to the voluntary act ? It is, the determinists will repeat, that the antecedents in both cases, in the rolling of the stone and in the willing of the man, are beyond control : as Hobbes has said, "The will is also caused by other things whereof it disposeth not." If we ask for further explication, we get two answers, more or less connected, which it will be best to consider in turn.

First, it is said, a man's volitions depend on his nature, and that is not a matter of choice. If it be urged that often they depend rather on the character which he has acquired, a character which may control his nature, it is replied that acquired character is due to modification of nature induced by circumstances, so that after all we come back to nature or original character in the end. It is thus evident that character can never be interpreted by the determinists as an original frame of the mind, nor as a habitual disposition caused by a series of voluntary acts. Character is thus conceived by them as a temporal antecedent upon which motives from without operate. But what real distinction, we may ask, can any one find between a subject and its nature or character? As to what an individual subject is, there may be room for much metaphysical dispute. But at least we are certain that it is not an indefinite 'this' or an abstract entity, having only an extrinsic connection with its so-called nature. The same habit of thought which has led the indeterminists to talk of the freedom of will apart from motives, has led the determinist, as Priestly has done, to talk of motives as the proper causes of human action, though it is the man that is called the agent. The efficiency and initiative that the indeterminist seems to find in the man apart from his character, the determinist professes to find in the character apart from the man. But whereas it is certain that there cannot be less in the concrete self than we know, there may very well be a great deal more; and therefore, while it may be possible to clear indeterminism of its seeming paradox, it is not possible to reconcile thorough-going determinism with our actual experience. We might then fairly content ourselves by saying that thorough-going determinism finds at once in the doctrine variously known as Sensationalism, Associationalism, Presentationalism its logical outcome and its refutation. But the reasons of its failure can be put very briefly. In the first place, determinism and

sensationalism alike, in common with all naturalistic thinking, set out from the objective standpoint, as if it were absolute. The subjective factor in all experience, which the natural sciences can safely ignore, can, they assume, be ignored by the moral and historical sciences too. The category of attribute or property which implies possession is metaphorically used of things, though these, albeit qualified, in reality possess nothing. "Without property no person," Hegel has said ; but we may convert this and say, without a person no property. Experience in this sense is property: it is always owned. Percepts and appetites that nobody has are not percepts and appetites at all. To talk of motives conflicting of themselves is as absurd as to talk of commodities competing in the absence of traders. Again, if there is only a bundle of percepts and motives, but no self to determine and control, it is obvious that there can be no self to be determined or controlled. But since presentationalism cannot consistently regard presentations themselves as purposive, there can be no purpose in the many at all. Finally, since the only causality naturalism recognises is the hypothetical regularity of sequence, there is no place left for efficiency : the world is resolved into mechanism, and so experience is explained away. The thorough-going determinism which denies self-determination and self-direction *in toto* refutes itself by overshooting the mark and proving too much ; by resolving the subject of experience into an abstraction it denies the reality of experience altogether.

§ 3. Turning now to the determinist's allegations as to the factual procedure of the mental sciences, we may make the following observations !—(1) As to the argument from the psychological treatment of motives as the determining antecedents of choice, we may say that it is either a tautology or a fallacy. Choice is causally determined by the strongest motive ; what does this mean ? If the strongest motive simply means the line of action we do in fact choose, the argument amounts

to the observation that we choose what we do choose, and not something else. But if motives are to be regarded as antecedents causally determining choice in proportion to their strength, we must suppose the strength of the various motives to be previously fixed, independent of the choice they determine. Thus the determinist argument requires us to hold that alternative possibilities of action are already motives apart from their relation to the purpose of the agent who has to choose between them, and moreover have, independent of the purpose or character of the chooser, an inherent strength of their own. This seems to be absurd. An alternative is not a motive at all, except in relation to the already existing, but not fully defined purpose of some agent and whether it is a strong or a weak motive depends likewise on the character of the agent's purpose. The attempt to conceive of motives as somehow acting on a mind with an inherent strength of their own, is a palpable absurdity.

§ 4. There is an equal absurdity inherent in the determinist view as to the kind of prediction of conduct which is possible in concrete cases. We aver that no infallible prediction of the cause of events in an individual case is ever possible. Mechanical calculation and prediction may be possible in physical sciences simply because they deal with average character of a vast aggregate of processes which they never attempt to follow in their concrete individual detail. The uniformities advocated by the determinists might hold good, so long as they professed to be nothing more than statistical averages got by neglecting the individual peculiarities of the special cases composing them. It is not possible to know the character as a datum given in advance, from which to calculate, with mathematical precision, the as yet unknown future acts of the man in question, because the character is, in fact, not there as a given fact before the acts through which it is formed. The character is not a fixed and unvarying

quantity, given once and for all at some period in the individual's development, and thenceforward constant ; it is itself, theoretically at least, in the making throughout life. No man's character is fully expressed by his conduct in the past. The character must include undeveloped possibilities. The whole nature of the self is unrevealed either to self-observation or to any human observation. The assumed data of prediction (in the case of character) are such that we cannot possibly have them until after the event. If the appeal then is to be to facts, can anybody seriously maintain that it is even ideally possible what he, still less what another, will think and do a week hence ? Besides, even if the forecast could be made it would take the week to make it ; for none of the intervening thoughts and deeds could be safely omitted ; nor could their rate be accelerated unless a like acceleration held throughout the world—and then we should be relatively just where we were before. The so-called forecast in a word would be after the event. Surely if there is an empirical common-place beyond dispute it is this, that no man knows beforehand even his own possibilities completely, to say nothing of those of another. Therefore the determinist data could at best be no more than a number of dispositions or tendencies, and from such data there can be no infallible prediction, because, in the first place, dispositions are not always developed into actual fixed habits ; and, in the second, their data, such as they are, are incomplete, seeing that dispositions may, and often do, remain latent and escape detection until the emergence of the situation adapted to call them out. So that, even if it were true that complete knowledge of a man's original stock of dispositions would enable them to calculate his career from its elements, it would still be impossible to be sure that their knowledge of his dispositions was complete.

§ 5. Our answer to the determinist contention that all

the sciences, both physical and mental, admit of or proceed upon the application of the principle of causal determinism, is that mechanical postulates are valid only in physical sciences, because we have an interest—that of devising general rules for dealing with typical physical situations—which is met by neglecting all those aspects of concrete fact which the mechanical scheme excludes; whereas in mental sciences our interest being fundamentally different from that in physical sciences, the mechanical postulates cannot have any claim to admission into mental sciences as their ruling principle. Our interest in these investigations is to obtain such a teleological representation of psychical processes as might be made available for the appreciative judgments of Ethics and History and their kindred studies. Thus even admitting the possibility of treating psychical life for some purposes, by abstraction from its teleological character, as if it were a mechanical sequence, the abstraction would be fatal for the purposes of the concrete mental sciences, and is therefore inadmissible in them. A teleological unity in which we are interested as a teleological unity cannot, without the stultification of our whole scientific procedure, be treated in abstraction from its teleological character. Mechanical postulates being methodological rules for the elimination from our data of everything which is teleological, they are only legitimate in Psychology so far as Psychology desires mechanical results. But the initiation of purposive action is not a process which Psychology can fruitfully treat as mechanical. Psychology, then, in its most characteristic parts, is not based upon the causal postulate of mechanical science, but on the conception of teleological continuity.

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* The name was changed into Ethics, Social and Political Philosophy.

